Abstract
In may, as brazil was preparing for its winter festival celebrations, the government reported that a severe drought threatened the country's power supply. Faced with one of Brazil's worst energy crises ever, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who had been enjoying an upswing in approval ratings because of Brazil's favorable economic forecast, announced that electricity would be rationed. Three-quarters of the country's 170 million inhabitants were told to cut consumption by 20 percent or face blackouts. Public lighting in the country's major cities was scaled back (forcing the country's all-important soccer games to be moved to the daytime), and businesses were forced to make drastic reductions in power usage or pay heavy fines. Officials even flirted with the idea of three-day weekends.
Brazil's Angra dos Reis nuclear complex, near Rio de Janeiro.
Although most Brazilians had been aware of the growing crisis, rationing came as a huge surprise. Long accustomed to cheap and abundant electricity, Brazilians were now forced to forgo long showers, turn off water heaters, and purchase portable, gaspowered generators. Most of the blame for the crisis was placed on President Cardoso, whom observers accused of failing to prepare for the energy shortfall. Almost overnight, Cardoso's approval ratings plummeted. “The government knew about the energy problems for years and did nothing,” says Naldo Navajas, an artist from Ouro Preto. “Now they want us to pay for their mistakes.”
Brazil is in fact a land of abundance when it comes to natural resources—especially water. With one of the largest networks of rivers in the world, Brazil—the most populous nation in Latin America—has filled more than 90 percent of its needs with hydroelectric power. This strength, however, is also a great vulnerability. Because it has so much hydroelectric capacity, the country has invested very little in other energy sources. When drought struck early this year and hydroelectric reservoirs started drying up, the government was left with little alternative but to cut back on consumption and threaten blackouts if planned reductions weren't met.
The government also announced plans to diversify its energy infrastructure by building several dozen gas-powered plants and completing a third nuclear power plant—Angra III—which has sat mothballed just outside Rio de Janeiro for the past 15 years. Although plans to construct the gas-powered plants have faltered because of regulatory problems and disputes with investors, the government seems determined to complete Angra III despite public concerns over the safety of the plant and critics' warnings that it is not economically viable. In the July 2 Financial Times, Pedro Párente, the minister in charge of the recently appointed Energy Crisis Coordinating Committee (nicknamed the “Turn-Off Ministry”), said, “The chances are increasing that it will be decided to conclude Angra III. The climate is much more favorable than in the past.”
Critics of the plan point out that even if the plant is completed—at a cost of $1.7 billion—it will produce only 1,350 megawatts of power, or 2 percent of the country's electricity output. It would also come too late to help with the current crisis. Says Luis Pinguelli Rosa, a vice-director of the engineering school at the Univer-sidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, “If Angra III is built, it won't be ready for at least four to five years, by which time the crisis will have already passed.” It would be foolish, he says, to base any decision about Angra Ill's future on the current energy crisis.
Supporters of the nuclear plant counter by saying that it is already half paid for and that maintenance of the mothballed facility costs the government $20 million a year. They also point out that Brazil is rich in another natural resource— uranium. According to Eletronucle-ar, the state-owned company that runs Angra I and II, Brazil has the sixth largest reserve of uranium in the world—approximately 300,000 metric tons. Nearly two-thirds of the country remains to be prospected, raising the probability that more deposits will be found.
But securing the private investment necessary to complete the plant has been difficult. Although Eletronucle-ar has already sunk more than $1.3 billion into Angra III, the government has had a hard time finding foreign investors. The problem seemed to become more acute last year when rumors circulated that the German government, which recently decided to close its own nuclear power plants, had decided to opt out of a 1975 agreement to build eight nuclear plants in Brazil. Eletronuclear officials told me that the agreement, which was signed with the military government in power at that time in Brazil, is still intact.
According to a July 12 Reuters article, a senior German embassy official said that his government may still help complete Angra III but was awaiting proposals from Brazil before making a final decision. Eletro-brás, Brazil's state-owned holding company, is trying to arrange financial support for the construction from the French-based Framatome, which recently acquired Siemens's nuclear power division.
Brazil's controversial nuclear past—particularly its 1975 treaty with Germany—has fueled arguments that cost overruns will likely be the norm if Angra III is ever brought on line. “One of the worst deals Brazil ever made was the nuclear program with Germany, in which we spent $10 billion dollars just to build Angra II—which has produced the most expensive megawatts in the world,” says Pinguelli. “If you divide $10 billion by 1,300 megawatts, you come up with the price of diamonds or cocaine, not the price of energy.”
The 1975 deal also left a legacy of public distrust of the country's nuclear bureaucracy. Union leaders, for example, argue that there is a lack of transparency in the decision-making process concerning nuclear policy, which dates back to the days of the dictatorship. Says Inilda de Souza Jorge, president of Brazil's chemical workers union, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias Químicas, “Brazil's nuclear program was born in the days of the military dictatorship, and despite the civil fagade, the military still maintains a large influence at the INB [Industrias Nucleares do Brasil, the country's state-run nuclear fuel provider]…. The problem is that society does not have any control over the process and potential problems are never publicly discussed.” Lack of public input, says de Souza, enabled inb's uranium enrichment plant to be located near Rio Parai-ba, which supplies 70 percent of the water for the state of Rio de Janeiro.
According to Joao Manoel, president of the National Commission of Nuclear Energy Workers, those in charge of overseeing the nuclear industry have a conflict of interest. “The problem is that those who do the monitoring also do the producing. This involves the whole production chain, including processing uranium fuel by inb.”
Despite public skepticism, government officials insist that they have learned from past mistakes and that nuclear power is the cleanest and most affordable solution to the country's energy woes. Firminio Sampaio, the former president of Eletrobrás, argues that “nuclear energy is competitive and therefore will provide us with a return in a period of five years after the plant is brought on line.” He claims that electricity produced by Angra III will be sold at $32 per megawatt hour, cheaper than the energy generated at gas power plants ($34 per megawatt hour). According to government estimates, Angra III will also allow the country to cut carbon dioxide emissions by six million tons per year.
Nuclear officials claim that investing in Angra III will also help the country become self-sufficient in producing nuclear fuel. Currently, enrichment technology developed by the Brazilian navy is being shared with the civilian sector and plans are in the works for expanding inb's industrial complex in Resende, Rio de Janeiro state.
Still, despite Angra Ill's potential benefits, the public has yet to be persuaded that nuclear power is the best option. And a series of problems at the country's two functioning reactors have fueled public concern over the health and environmental hazards posed by nuclear power. Angra I, which came on line in 1992, is nicknamed the “firefly” because it has been switched off so many times due to technical problems. And Angra II, which finally began operations last year—23 years after construction began—was temporarily shut down less than a month after going critical because of mechanical failures.
“Obviously, the probability of a devastating accident is small, but the impact of such an accident would be huge,” says Ruy de Guys, coordinator of Greenpeace Brazil's nuclear program. Further, says de Guys, Brazil has yet to develop regulations for storing spent nuclear fuel and has no concrete plans for a permanent waste site.
Many people—including both critics and proponents—agree that the only way for Brazil to develop a sustainable and healthy nuclear industry is for the country to rid itself of the vestiges of its military past. Greater public participation, they say, will ensure that money is not wasted on the “pharaonic projects” that were a hallmark of the dictatorship. Mystery still surrounds the navy's Aramar Project, which involves the construction of a nuclear submarine.
“Come on now, you can do it. Just put that fusion project down and start for home…”
There have been some small victories. For example, pressure from the residents of Angra dos Reis—a small port city located near the country's nuclear power complex—has forced Eletronuclear to expand the coastal highway and install a state-of-the-art alarm system.
Meanwhile, the rationing plan imposed on the country last May has had mixed results. Although several parts of the country have failed to meet the 20 percent reduction in consumption, as of early July there had been no blackouts. But continued lack of rainfall has spurred warnings of possible blackouts in the near future. There is also little chance that rationing will end any time soon. As Pedro Párente, head of the crisis committee, said in early July: “I can firmly say that there will not be rationing in 2003, but there are no guarantees for 2002.”