Abstract
Trust but Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War
By David T. Lindgren
Naval Institute Press, 2000
222 pages; $32.95
The development and operation of overhead imagery systems–satellites and aircraft–to provide strategic intelligence during the Cold War began in secrecy. The U-2, SR-71, and Keyhole reconnaissance satellites all began as “black” projects. But leaks and declassification have provided a wealth of information about the systems and their uses during the Cold War. Declassification, in particular, has made it possible for those bound by cía secrecy agreements to write about reconnaissance matters in some detail.
David T. Lindgren is a former cia imagery analyst whose academic career has included the chairmanship of the geography department at Dartmouth College. He has also served as a consultant to the cia, nasa, and the Interior Department.
In Trust but Verify, Lindgren seeks to provide an overview of the importance of imagery activities during the Cold War. The book takes the reader from the earliest days of the period up to an examination of the future of U.S. imagery interpretation. Along the way, he focuses on the advent and uses of the U-2, the Cuban missile crisis, the development of the Corona reconnaissance satellite and its impact on estimates of Soviet missile capabilities, and the use of imagery in support of arms control and Reagan administration strategy.
Strangely, despite the subtitle of the book and the author's experience, Lindgren devotes very little attention to the analytic process. Readers will not come away with an understanding of how imagery interpreters go about turning imagery into intelligence, how objects are measured or identified, or how “collateral” information is used to assess the significance of a photograph. Nor will they read about interpreters bent over light tables or manipulating imagery on a computer work station. At several points, including in the captions to satellite photographs, Lindgren notes that imagery interpreters were able to extract certain types of information from particular photographs–but he fails to tell the reader exactly how this was accomplished.
Rather, Lindgren concentrates on three other aspects of U.S. imagery activities–the introduction of aerial and space collection systems, the targets against which the systems were employed, and the value of the images obtained.
He recounts, for example, the introduction of the U-2, its use against an array of Soviet targets (including bomber bases and possible missile sites), and the impact of the missions. According to Lindgren, U-2 photos “revealed no crash program to produce long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (icbms), submarines, or tanks.” The imagery from the flights “enabled Eisenhower to make informed decisions on what weapons were most needed,” played a role in reducing the fear of surprise attack, improved the targeting data available to Strategic Air Command mission planners, and helped “unveil the shroud of secrecy that had enveloped the Soviet Union.”
Similarly, Lindgren explores the introduction of the Corona satellite system and the use of imagery it obtained in puncturing the myth of the missile gap, in assessing the nature of the Tallinn air-defense system, and in evaluating claims concerning the capabilities of the SS-9 icbm.
The book's final chapter is a personal assessment of the state of U.S. imagery interpretation. In particular, Lindgren focuses on the radical change brought about by John Deutch when he served as director of the cia (1995-97). During his April 1995 confirmation hearing, Deutch pledged to reorganize the U.S. imagery-interpretation effort. That pledge was implemented on October 1, 1996, with the creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (nima), which was placed within the Defense Department
Nima absorbed the Defense Mapping Agency (dma), the cia Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Imagery Analysis, and most importantly, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (npic)–a joint cia-military center managed by the CIA. Besides providing a brief history of nima, Lindgren examines the immediate consequences of the merger–which included a significant loss of personnel, who for a number of reasons did not find nima an acceptable substitute for npic. One problem, Lindgren reports, is that the approximately 2,000 former cia analysts found themselves a minority in the new agency, which had absorbed the dma's 7,000 employees.
Nima is responsible for determining the priorities assigned to proposed reconnaissance targets. Lindgren persuasively argues that a military-run effort may shortchange policy-makers and others outside the military who have a clear need for high-quality imagery–from the State Department to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. He adds that some of those who stayed on at nima have–undoubtedly much to their distaste–been diverted from strategic intelligence work to provide “target packages” in support of military operations.
Despite Lindgren's background, he includes some questionable or incorrect statements. His treatment of the creation of the National Reconnaissance Office (nro) and early cia-nro battles can be misleading. For example, Lindgren writes that the nro's creation in 1961 was an attempt to curtail air force-CIA squabbling. But the NRO primarily resulted from a desire of key administration advisers and officials–including Edwin Land and Robert McNamara–to establish a unified organizational structure to manage the national reconnaissance program.
The author incorrectly equates the A-12 and SR-71 aircraft–the former being the cia's one-seat predecessor to the air force's two-seat SR-71. (The cía plane also flew somewhat higher and faster.) In addition, one could challenge his implied assessment that given developments in satellite reconnaissance, the SR-71 was superfluous by the time it became operational in 1968. Although the SR-71 was never used to overfly Soviet territory, it did collect both imagery and signals intelligence data on the periphery of the Soviet Union as well as in other areas of the world.
Another shortcoming of the book is the author's limited use of original documents. Lindgren largely relies on secondary sources for his account. The only primary documents employed appear to be those contained in one of the several edited cía volumes on Corona or national intelligence estimates. And, as would be expected, a single chapter cannot compete in terms of attention to detail or authority with a lengthy book on the subjects of the U-2, the Cuban missile crisis, or the Corona project.
The book does have its virtues. For example, Lindgren breaks some new ground in his treatment of the U-2. Using unreferenced sources, the author states that U.S. agents in Moscow were monitoring Soviet progress in developing U-2 counter-measures, which adds an intriguing element to the events leading up to the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers.
Lindgren also notes that the images from KH-8 low-altitude surveillance satellites are long photos of narrow width–a previously secret detail about a still classified program.
For those who have closely followed imagery developments, the discussion on NIMA will be valuable. More importantly, the book's concise overview of 50 years of imagery developments is useful as an introduction to the field as well as a refresher course.