Abstract
Over the past several years, the presidents of China and the United States have spoken of how both nations must build a constructive strategic partnership between them for the next century.
But the “next” century is upon us, and the Chinese-American relationship has grown tense. The two countries are again attempting to find ways to define their common strategic interests while avoiding policies that might further increase tension.
China and the United States have worked well together in recent years in many security areas—including making the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permanent, eventually agreeing on the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, trying to cool the persistent fever on the Korean Peninsula, issuing a joint statement deploring the nuclear tests in South Asia, and—even more recently—attempting to control the export of nuclear and missile technology.
But in the long run, the future security relationship of China and the United States depends largely upon how they perceive and respond to each other's role in the Asia-Pacific region.
Perceptions
China regards the United States as the major force in East Asia and the key obstacle to its eventual national unification—that is, reintegrating Taiwan with the Mainland. Nevertheless, it is in China's interest to avoid a confrontation over Taiwan while continuing to work with the United States in regional security matters.
In that context, Japan is also a major concern. Japan is already a great economic power; China will become one. Inevitably, China and Japan will become economic competitors. But Japan is no longer satisfied solely with its economic status. Instead it is ever more eager to project political influence.
Given the delicate balance in East Asia between China and Japan, how the United States plays its role in the region is critical. The military alliance between Japan and the United States, forged during the Cold War, is a key factor. The alliance once served two purposes: containing communist “expansion” while checking the potential rise of Japanese militarism.
However, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan security tie has not loosened. Rather, with the revision of the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” in 1998 (approved by the Japanese Diet in 1999), Japan can now take a more active role in regional security. It can employ force in the “surrounding area” if it deems it necessary.
How broadly will Japan define the “surrounding area”? Would the Taiwan Straits be included? Thus far, Japan has refused to explicitly exclude Taiwan. This inevitably causes China's leaders to question what Japan really intends to do—and what America's intentions in East Asia are.
This concern has been exacerbated by continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Further, both Washington and Taipei have spoken of co-researching a land-based theater missile defense system or introducing a highly capable U.S. land-based system to Taiwan.
The “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,” introduced in the U.S. Congress in March of last year, would damage Sino-U.S. relations, if approved and signed into law. The act could allow the United States to sell Taiwan advanced weapons, possibly including theater missile defense equipment, submarines, an early warning system, an airborne anti-submarine system, and advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles.
Looking through a Chinese prism, the China-U.S. security relationship does not seem promising, at least in the near term. Currently Beijing is watching the military buildup in Tokyo and Taipei, hoping to see its concerns allayed over time while readying itself for worst-case scenarios.
China and the United States face many common security problems. On the negative side of the ledger is the U.S. buildup of missile defenses. This summer the United States may decide to deploy a national missile defense system. That would alter the global strategic balance and potentially stimulate a strategic arms race.
In Northeast Asia, the U.S. effort to develop and possibly deploy theater missile defense systems is also viewed with great concern because it could destabilize the regional balance.
Nullifying China's deterrent
As the world enters the twenty-first century, it seems as if the United States is reemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons and de-emphasizing nuclear arms control and disarmament. Most prominently, U.S. attempts to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to leave room for national missile defense are worrisome.
Some in the United States even indicate that if the ABM Tr eaty becomes a barrier to building such a defense system, the treaty should be abandoned. (In a January 1999 press conference, for instance, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen said that if the treaty could not be amended, the United States would have the option to “simply pull out of the treaty.”) Meanwhile, the United States is speeding up its theater missile defense programs.
The United States has the largest and most formidable nuclear and conventional arsenals of any nation on earth. It should be the last nation to feel insecure. Nevertheless, the United States hopes to protect itself with a missile-proof umbrella. It claims that it wants to prevent “rogue states,” such as North Korea, from attacking it, and it wants to be able to intercept unauthorized or accidentally fired missiles originating from Russia and China.
From a Chinese perspective, that argument makes little sense. It will take a long time for North Korea to acquire a realistic long-range ballistic missile capability. The actual effect of a U.S. national missile defense system would be to deny China a strategic deterrent. (The planned system would not have enough interceptors to knock down Russia's strategic weapons. But it could possibly nullify China's modest strategic retaliatory arsenal.)
What really matters is the technical ability of the national missile defense system. If it has a chance of working as advertised, it would sabotage a host of nuclear arms control frameworks, reverse the balance of strategic offense and defense, and poison international relations. It ought to be terminated.
Having said this, the effectiveness of the system could be overstated. It is dangerous if Washington pins its security on an illusory system that may not work well.
Nevertheless, China may be forced to make a worst-case assumption—that the system could achieve an unbelievably high interception rate of 90 percent. In that event, it would be easy to respond by simply increasing the Chinese arsenal by nine times. That would retain the same level of deterrence and cost the equivalent of about a few billion dollars over a span of 10-20 years. It would not be difficult for China's economy to absorb that cost, if it has to do so.
While it is not certain that a U.S. national missile defense system would work, it is certain that China would not remain idle while the effectiveness of its deterrent force is undermined.
Theater defense
The United States is developing the army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the navy's Theater Wide system. Compared to a national missile defense system, which has no clear rationale, the United States has a more plausible reason to develop genuine theater defense.
U.S. overseas troops and the troops of its allies are always at risk even in a localized conflict. But the United States needs to be careful not to help Taiwan with such a system. That could so disturb the military balance as to promote an arms race across the Straits.
Even if Taiwan were to develop (with U.S. help) or acquire a theater missile defense system—and even if it worked perfectly—it could still be overcome.
A barrage of reentry vehicles could be employed to use up Taiwan's supply of interceptors. Or Mainland Chinese warheads could break the defense by using much higher-than-expected reentry velocities. Or the Mainland's missiles could employ depressed trajectories to minimize radar detection and tracking. Or the reentry vehicles could employ terminal guidance to change course, greatly complicating the defense.
Theater missile defense would not enhance Taiwan's security. Instead, it would only increase tensions. For decades, strategic planners throughout the world have recognized that a missile defense system could be easily overwhelmed by the offense. Why the United States has forgotten that truism is a mystery.
Thus far the United States has not decided to co-develop theater missile defense with Taiwan or to provide highly capable theater missile defenses. That is good policy. Why risk offending Mainland China by introducing a land-based theater missile defense system in Taiwan?
A positive Sino-U.S. relationship must be preserved, despite occasional tension. Beginning with President Richard M. Nixon's initiatives in the early 1970s, a high degree of “strategic cooperation” between the two countries has emerged. However, Taiwan is still a volatile issue. But it shall be resolved eventually—and, one hopes, peacefully.
Meanwhile, it is wise for the United States and China— including the people on Taiwan—to avoid anything that might lead to a physical confrontation between the United States and China. It is not in their interests to fight for the sake of Taiwan.