Abstract
This is my last issue as editor of the Bulletin. My wife and I are moving to an old family home in Missouri, where I hope to write books on Bulletin-related topics while retaining a long-distance connection to the Bulletin as “senior editor.” That connection is important to me. My background is in journalism, and I have had several newspaper and magazine jobs over the years. But editing the Bulletin, which I've done since 1991, has never been just a “job.” It has been an honor.
The new editor is Linda Rothstein, whose name you almost surely recognize. She has been an editor at the Bulletin since 1988 and managing editor since 1992. Linda is innovative, brilliant, and passionately committed to the Bulletin and to the principles that comprise its soul. The Bulletin is in very good hands. Linda's e-mail:
A few weeks ago in suburban Chicago, I became involved in a long discussion with 60 or 70 activists who were exploring a wide variety of peace-and-war issues. At one point, I referred to the essay by Bill Arkin, which begins on page 45. Arkin has written a thoughtful piece. In it he suggests that the precision-guided munitions used last year during the nato air campaign against Yugoslavia worked pretty much as advertised. Although the target selection was often poor, he says, the targets were almost always hit. Arkin, who conducted a post-bombing investigation for Human Rights Watch, determined that somewhere in the neighborhood of 500 civilians were killed in the 78 days of bombing.
One response is to say that 500 civilian deaths is 500 too many. But another response is to suggest that in the context of the past 60 years, that is a staggering statistic because the number is so small. During World War II, when the United States wanted to take out a factory in, say, Duisberg, a large part of the city would go up in flames, with thousands of civilians killed. In Korea, if the United States took aim at a bridge, an entire village might disappear. And all of us remember the horrors of Vietnam.
Put aside, if possible, questions as to whether nato had a “right” to bomb Yugoslavia, or whether the war was the result of Western intransigence or Slobodan Milosevic's calculated stubbornness, or whether nato should have gone in with ground troops from Day One. Ask this: If a war must be fought for whatever reason, isn't it better to do it in a way as to minimize civilian casualties?
Common morality dictates that outcome, as does international law. And yet, the notion of “precision warfare”—a persistent dream of American and British aviators since the 1920s—makes many of us intensely uncomfortable, including the peace activists at that meeting I spoke at. If the twentieth century taught us anything, many of us have argued, it is that “modern” war kills, maims, and brutalizes large numbers of innocent civilians. Given that, one should not engage in war except in the most extreme and clear-cut circumstances.
But the twenty-first century may tell a different story. In post-modern war, it may be possible to achieve victory while largely sparing civilians. That's both heartening and troubling. If it is possible to engage in relatively antiseptic war, would that eventually encourage the more frequent use of force? Would it lead to a cartel of technologically advanced nations who police the world with precision weaponry? If so, what would be the implications of that?
Those are not easy questions with reflexively simple answers. Under the editorship of Linda Rothstein, the Bulletin will continue to explore such thoughtful and provocative real-world issues.