Abstract
We think that in the Kosovo conflict, as a result of [the use of depleted uranium by NATO forces], that there will be some 10,000 deaths from cancer,” Roger Coghill, a biologist in Britain, said early in the air war.
I don't know which is more asinine: That such a declaration could be made without the slightest idea whether nato had fired one or one-hundred thousand depleted uranium (du) rounds, or that the news media would report the claim without checking on such little details.
But that's the du debate. The anti-crowd radiates, the press propagates, and the military goes into defilade. The attempt by Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel (page 42) to put the controversy into perspective notwithstanding, there is no end in sight.
In the du world, for every crackpot haunted by radiation, there is a craven and unsympathetic commander or bureaucrat. In the middle are many physicians and suffering veterans who think du is the cause of the post-Gulf War nightmares many veterans suffer. They are not soothed by reassuring studies and presidential commissions.
The war in Yugoslavia proved again that whenever and wherever du appears, it is a political headache. Operation Allied Force wasn't a week old before the press started speculating that du was being used, and that it would have adverse health and environmental effects. Anti-DU activists added fuel to the fire by starting a rumor (untrue) that air- and sea-launched cruise missiles fired in the opening salvos contained du “counterweights.” Soon, Russian sources were speaking of elevated radiation levels in Belgrade.
At the end of April, the Defense Department told reporters that it had started using 30-millimeter gatling guns with du ammunition on the A-10 “Warthog.” That was an instant irritant to the nato alliance. On May 14, Gen. Walter Jertz, a nato spokesman, said that du had in fact not been used “in the last few weeks” and that only in “rare cases” would it be “used at all.”
The Pentagon, which was initially reluctant to release figures on du usage in Yugoslavia, did so in mid-October. A total of 37,000 rounds–or 11 tons–were used. This contrasts with 320 tons in the Gulf War.
Here's the conundrum: There is no scientific consensus that “huge areas of southern Iraq and Kuwait were contaminated with depleted uranium dust and debris,” as an August report from the National Gulf War Resource Center blithely says. Further, there's no proof that a single American soldier is sick purely as a result of du exposure.
The Defense Department's kneejerk reaction to the lack of scientific evidence regarding DU's presumed ill effects has been to notch a victory in its Gulf War Syndrome counter-insurgency campaign. That is shortsighted. If you believe that du is indispensable in anti-armor munitions, then giving up du munitions for any reason would mean that the United States and its allies would lack an important capability in some future war.
Although du opponents have an annoying tendency to label du a wonder weapon, it is no more wonderful than a dozen other non-DU weapons in the U.S. tank-killing arsenal. And if we have learned anything in almost 10 years of du debate, it is that smart weapons work.
In the Gulf War, laser-guided bombs and Maverick and Hellfire missiles were as good at destroying armor as du rounds. But in Operation Allied Force, despite the fact that du munitions were seldom used, you didn't hear anyone utter a peep to suggest that some tank-killing capability was missed.
For air attack, du is a weapon of the 1970s. For ground attack, du rounds may be the best that the army currently has for armored warfare. Nevertheless, no serious consideration has been given to finding an alternative, and the army probably has not given the armor threat a serious look in more than a decade.
No doubt finding a du alternative, which would involve spending extra money and admitting that du exacts a political toll when used, has a low priority at the Pentagon. Thus U.S. forces are destined to be stuck with du munitions–weapons they cannot use in a future alliance-led conflict.