Abstract
The Ultimate Terrorists By Jessica Stern, Harvard University, 1999, 176 pages; $22.95
World War II gave rise to a new meaning of “ABC” that was unrelated to the alphabet or the broadcast network. The initials, representing atomic, biological, and chemical, were military shorthand for weapon-types that were set apart from conventional munitions. The trinity later morphed into “NBC,” with “n” standing for nuclear, and into “CBR,” with “r” standing for radiological. By the mid-1990s, these triads of initials gave way to the more ominous designation of “WMD”–weapons of mass destruction.
The rhetorical ante keeps going up. In 1997, I participated in a conference on terrorism and WMD called “Superterrorism.” Now, Jessica Stern, the former director of the Nuclear Smuggling Interagency group of the National Security Council, has given us a book on this subject titled The Ultimate Terrorists.
If there is a more maximal term than “ultimate,” which in this context I take to mean “as bad as something can ever get,” I am not aware of it. The doomsday implication is consistent with some recent fevered, if unwarranted, pronouncements that terrorist attacks with WMD are inevitable, even imminent. Happily, the title aside, this slender volume is largely free of hype, and is characterized by fair reporting and sober analysis.
Stern's unexceptional thesis is that the threat that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction–particularly chemical and biological ones–has grown in recent years. While there is no reason to panic, she says, society should be taking measures to prevent and respond to attacks. Little in this book will be unfamiliar to the specialist. But it presents an immensely valuable snapshot of where the world stands vis-à-vis the threat, and how the worst possibilities might be minimized.
Early on, Stern addresses one of the most intriguing questions about the subject: Why now? Why have we become so much more concerned about WMD terrorism than we were 20 or 30 years ago? After all, gas was used extensively in World War I, and biological and chemical agents have been considered effective weapons for several decades. Her answers fall into two broad categories: the changing motivations and technical capabilities of terrorists, and recent conditions and behaviors of some countries. Her arguments for the importance of the former are less persuasive than for the latter. More precisely, the interest in these weapons by terrorists seems in large measure to be a consequence of state actions.
Stern believes that “a new breed of terrorists”–religious fanatics, right-wing extremists, apocalyptic cults–are more inclined to use weapons of mass destruction. But kooks and fanatics who commit indiscriminate violence in the name of politics or religion were around long before this decade. And the technical know-how for making many types of chemical and biological weapons has been publicly available for most of this century. A nuclear device is far more difficult to make, and therefore less likely to be used by a terrorist–unless, of course, the weapon is obtained through state auspices, which leads to the importance of state actors in explaining the new interest in WMD terrorism. Here Stern is on solid ground as she explores the basis for heightened concerns.
The book has two particularly informative chapters: one on Russia titled “The Threat of Loose Nukes,” the other on Iraq called “The State as Terrorist.” The chapters nicely outline what are, in my judgment, the main reasons that WMD terrorism is more worrisome now. In the case of Russia, the threat comes not from a government that might arm terrorists. Rather, the problem is the uncertain control over the chemical and nuclear arms left over from the Soviet era, plus the thousands of underemployed scientists who work in the nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. The collapsed Russian economy has meant less oversight of the country's stockpiles and more corruption in general. Underpaid scientists and other officials with access to weapons might be tempted to sell them and the knowledge to build them to organized crime, other countries, or terrorists. Stern writes, “The most significant threats to U.S. national security now arise not from Russia's military might but from its weakness.”
In contrast to Russia, Iraq seems a more plausible candidate to intentionally provide terrorists with horror weapons. In describing Iraq's weapons programs, Stern recalls that the country used chemicals against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens. Moreover, Iraq has failed to abide by its agreement after the 1991 Gulf War to allow U.N. inspectors to verify that its unconventional weapons programs have been completely dismantled. Stern cites an especially troubling 1997 statement by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. While denying that Iraq was “in the business of terrorism,” Aziz warned that hostilities against his country could prompt terrorist acts against Americans.
Iraq is not the only potential state sponsor of terrorism that intelligence officials worry about. Others include Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, all of which are believed to have chemical or biological weapons.
The indirect influence of state behavior on non-state groups is no less important. Much of today's interest in chemical and biological weapons may be traced to Iraq's use of chemical arms in the 1980s and the failure of the international community to seriously object. The Gulf War and its aftermath drew further attention to the Iraqi weapons programs. This attention had a bearing on two incidents that occurred in 1995. The first involved the release of sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway by the cult Aum Shinrikyo, which reportedly was inspired by Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The second was the attempted acquisition of plague bacteria by white supremacist Larry Wayne Harris. Harris said he was trying to develop a vaccine against germs that Iraq might introduce into the United States. Stern briefly alludes to the apparent Iraqi inspiration in both cases. She would have done well to explore further the spillover effects that can arise when such errant state behavior goes unchecked.
Meanwhile, in the past few years, media hoopla about the danger of germs and gas may have been giving other unsavory characters bad ideas. The drumbeat of publicity seems a likely explanation for the rash of anthrax hoaxes this past year. (See “Anthrax Hoaxes: Hot New Hobby?” in the July/August 1999 Bulletin.)
Stern's last chapter is prescriptive. Its many sensible proposals include giving more assistance to Russia to destroy its nuclear and chemical stockpiles, providing jobs for unemployed Russian weapons scientists, enhancing intelligence cooperation, and instructing local emergency teams on how to respond to chemical and biological incidents.
Stern deserves credit for emphasizing that weapons of mass destruction are “unusually cruel,” that their range may be “unpredictable and impossible to control,” and that they are therefore morally unacceptable. Ultimately, as she advocates, we should be strengthening international agreements that foster the norms against using these weapons. The long-standing taboo against poison weapons helps explain their infrequent use in the past. The sense of moral repugnance they generate should be respected and nurtured as a valuable aid in lessening the likelihood of their use in the future.