Abstract
During “Allied Force,” NATO's bombing operation in Yugoslavia, the B-2 bomber, built to penetrate Soviet defenses and deliver many megatons of nuclear explosives, drew first blood in conventional combat. The B-2 is the last U.S. weapon that will ever be built with a nuclear-only mission; it was the end of an era
The B-2 joins other atomic veterans, B-1s and B-52s, that now have conventional missions. As they had previously done against Iraqi targets, B-52s once again fired air-launched cruise missiles with conventional high-explosive warheads. These are the same missiles that had been built for nuclear war. Meanwhile, Britain joined the United States in firing conventionally armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles–another former nuclear mainstay. Even the French flew their ancient Super Etendard nuclear bombers in support of an alliance that France is not a military member of.
One might be cynical about the U.S. Air Force using this latest laboratory to prove the value of its mega-expensive stealth bomber, the B-2. But the use of B-2s also reminds us of the most compelling reason to get rid of nuclear weapons: Nukes get in the way. And they are a drain on the military. The United States still stores nuclear weapons at Aviano and Ghedi airbases in Italy, home to NATO planes for operations against Serbia. These weapons require extra manpower for security, a costly “certification” process, and they exact continuing political costs for no conceivable deterrent benefit. Although they fly conventional missions, F-15Es and F-16s are also nuclear-certified, an onerous, continuing, and expensive diversion for tactical units.
And then there is the political fallout: The Kosovo war wasn't a day old before rumors were floated from mischievous quarters that the Russians might again deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. By day two, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov said that any chance the Duma would soon ratify start II had been buried in the rubble. On day three, Moscow called off cooperation on Y2K-related issues, including the sharing of early-warning data.
Russia voiced its displeasure over the bombing campaign, just as it did during rounds of bomb diplomacy in Iraq. But as Russia banged its shoe over the NATO operation, there was almost unanimous agreement in Washington that a prostrate and nearly bankrupt Russia could not really do anything. If Russia didn't have thousands of nukes, these voices say, no one would care what Russians said.
Does the existence of those Russian nukes mean that the United States should not pursue military action against Serbia? Not at all. I've never argued that we shouldn't pursue our national interests just because Moscow doesn't like what we do. But if the United States is going to take extreme actions that run the risk of returning to a bipolar conflict over principle, why can't the principle be nuclear disarmament?
In March, two extraordinary articles–one by Fritz Ermarth in the National Interest, the other by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker–described Russian corruption at the highest levels. Ermarth, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, says U.S. policy-makers have chosen to look the other way. Meanwhile, Hersh reveals that on the narrow question of Iraq, intelligence suggests that Saddam Hussein funneled money to Primakov.
The old Soviet experts who dominate the administration don't want to hear about it or act on it. The peril of sending American dollars to Moscow to prop up a corrupt system is immaterial: We have to because Russia has nuclear weapons.
Given that Russia and its nukes are normally the trump card for faint-hearted policy pursuits, why is it that the administration seems willing to risk all by bombing Kosovo? There are two reasons. One, because short-term goals and policies matter above all else. Bomb today, this White House believes, and the fallout can be sorted out tomorrow.
Second, the Clinton team finds it easier to bomb than to break Washington's Cold War addiction and pursue a clear national interest: To live in a world unencumbered by nuclear weapons. Taking on the nuclear bureaucracy and really changing the rules is harder for them than thumbing the American nose at Russia.
If Allied Force illustrates anything, it is that the air force, navy, even NATO, have adjusted to a post-nuclear world. Meanwhile, Russian weaknesses are newly emphasized. Even Russian threats to move warships into the Adriatic–not long ago a sure crisis in the making–have no oomph.
Still for the Russians, nukes are increasingly all they have. Iraq and now Yugoslavia have likely solidified the attitude of the Moscow elite that nuclear weapons must be retained in defense of the homeland. That the United States may have contributed to the reemergence of this antique view is the most serious collateral damage of the Kosovo campaign.