The authors focus on repeated distributive negotiations to investigate how expectations of role reversal in future transactions (i.e., a buyer [seller] in one transaction is the seller [buyer] in the next transaction) affect behaviors in the current negotiation. They demonstrate that when negotiators expect a role reversal, they are likely to make more concessions and reach agreement more quickly in the current negotiation. The authors find that this effect is driven by negotiators’ beliefs that they will be able to recover these concessions, because negotiators expect their counterparts to reciprocate in the later transaction when the parties reverse roles. However, when the two negotiations occur in different “accounting” periods (i.e., fiscal periods) or when the negotiating parties do not explicitly communicate their willingness to reverse roles in the future, role-reversal expectations do not affect concession making. Implications arise in both managerial and consumer contexts where the possibility of engaging in future negotiations—as well as reversing roles—exists.
AdamsJ. Stacy (1965), “Inequity in Social Exchange,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2, BerkowitzLeonard, ed. New York: Academic Press, 267–99.
2.
Aristotle, (2004), Rhetoric (Book II), W. Rhys Roberts, trans. New York: Dover Publications.
3.
AxelrodRobert (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
4.
AxelrodRobert and HamiltonWilliam D. (1981), “The Evolution of Cooperation,”Science, 211 (4489), 1390–96.
5.
BagozziRichard P. (1995), “Reflections on Relationship Marketing in Consumer Markets,”Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23 (4), 272–77.
6.
BaumeisterRoy F., BratslavskyEllen, FinkenauerCatrin, and VohsKathleen D. (2001), “Bad Is Stronger Than Good,”Review of General Psychology, 5, 323–70.
7.
Ben-YoavOrly and PruittDean G. (1984a), “Accountability to Constituents: A Two-Edged Sword,”Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 34 (3), 283–95.
8.
Ben-YoavOrly and PruittDean G. (1984b), “Resistance to Yielding and Expectation of Cooperative Future Interaction in Negotiation,”Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20 (4), 323–35.
9.
BerscheidEllen, GrazianoWilliam, MonsonThomas, and DermerMarshall (1976), “Outcome Dependency: Attention, Attribution, and Attraction,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34 (5), 978–89.
10.
BinmoreKenneth, ShakedA., and SuttonJohn (1985), “Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study,”American Economic Review, 75 (5), 1178–80.
11.
ChertkoffJerome M. and ConleyMelinda (1967), “Opening Offer and Frequency of Concession as Bargaining Strategies,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7 (2), 181–85.
12.
CialdiniRobert B. and GoldsteinNoah J. (2004), “Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity,”Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591–621.
13.
CialdiniRobert B. and RhodesKelton V.L. (2001), “Human Behavior and the Marketplace,”Marketing Research, 13 (Fall), 8–13.
14.
CurhanJared R., ElfenbeinHillary Anger, and EisenkraftNoah (2010), “The Objective Value of Subjective Value: A Multi-Round Negotiation Study,”Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40 (3), 690–709.
15.
DahlDarren W., HoneaHeather, and ManchandaRajesh V. (2005), “Three Rs of Interpersonal Consumer Guilt: Relationship, Reciprocity, Reparation,”Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15 (4), 307–15.
16.
De DreuCarsten K.W. (2010), “Social Conflict: the Emergence and Consequences of Struggle and Negotiation,” in Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 5th ed., FiskeS.T., GilbertD.T., and LindzeyG., eds. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 983–1023.
17.
DeutschMorton (1973), The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
18.
EdwardsJeffery R. (2001), “Ten Difference Score Myths,”Organizational Research Methods, 4 (3), 265–87.
19.
EpleyNicholas, KeysarBoaz, Van BovenLeaf, and GilovichThomas (2004), “Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87 (3), 327–33.
20.
EsserJames K. and KomoritaSamuel S. (1975), “Reciprocity and Concession-Making in Bargaining,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31 (5), 864–72.
21.
GouldnerA.W. (1960), “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,”American Sociological Review, 25, 161–78.
22.
GiacomantioMauro, de DreuCarsten K.W., and MannettiLucia (2010), “Now You See It, Now You Don't: Interests, Issues, and Psychological Distance in Integrative Negotiation,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98 (5), 761–74.
23.
GuthWerner, SchmittbergerRolf, and SchwarzBernd (1982), “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,”Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3 (4), 367–88.
24.
HaisleyEmily, MostafaRomel, and LoewensteinGeorge (2008), “Myopic Risk-Seeking: The Impact of Narrow Decision Bracketing on Lottery Play,”Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 37 (1), 57–75.
25.
HomansGeorge C. (1961), Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
26.
HoppnerJessica J. and GriffithDavid A. (2011), “The Role of Reciprocity in Clarifying the Performance Payoff of Relational Behavior,”Journal of Marketing, 48 (September), 920–28.
27.
KahnemanDaniel and LovalloDan (1993), “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking,”Management Science, 39 (1), 17–31.
28.
KeysarBoaz, ConverseBenjamin A., WangJiunwen, and EpleyNicholas (2008), “Reciprocity Is Not Give and Take,”Psychological Science, 19 (12), 1280–86.
29.
KruglanskiArie and WebsterDonna (1996), “Motivated Closing of the Mind: ‘Seizing’ and ‘Freezing,’”Psychological Review, 103 (2), 263–83.
30.
LeBoeufRobyn (2006), “Discount Rates for Time Versus Dates: The Sensitivity of Discounting to Time-Interval Description,”Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (February), 59–72.
31.
MannixElizabeth A., TinsleyCatherine H., and BazermanMax H. (1995), “Negotiating over Time: Impediments to Integrative Solutions,”Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62 (3), 241–51.
32.
MoralesAndrea C. (2005), “Giving Firms an ‘E’ for Effort: Consumer Responses to High‐Effort Firms,”Journal of Consumer Research, 31 (4), 806–12.
33.
MorganRobert M. and HuntShelby D. (1994), “The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing,”Journal of Marketing, 58 (July), 20–39.
34.
O'ConnorKathleen M. and ArnoldJosh A. (2001), “Distributive Spirals: Negotiation Impasses and the Moderating Role of Disputant Self-Efficacy,”Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84 (1), 148–76.
35.
O'ConnorKathleen M., ArnoldJosh A., and BurrisEthan R. (2005), “Negotiators’ Bargaining Histories and Their Effects on Future Negotiation Performance,”Journal of Applied Psychology, 90 (2), 350–62.
36.
PalmatierRobert W., JarvisCheryl B., BechkoffJennifer R., and KardesFrank R. (2009), “The Role of Customer Gratitude in Relationship Marketing,”Journal of Marketing, 73 (September), 1–18.
37.
PattonCharles, and BalakrishnanP.V. (Sundar) (2010), “The Impact of Expectation of Future Negotiation Interaction on Bargaining Processes and Outcomes,”Journal of Business Research, 63 (8), 809–16.
38.
PreacherKristopher J. and HayesAndrew F. (2004), “SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating Indirect Effects in Simple Mediation Models,”Behavior Research Methods, 36 (4), 717–31.
39.
PruittDean G. (1968), “Reciprocity and Credit Building in a Laboratory Dyad,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8 (2), 143–47.
40.
PruittDean G. and JohnsonDouglas F. (1970), “Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14 (3), 239–46.
41.
RabinMatthew (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,”American Economic Review, 83 (5), 1281–302.
42.
RoetsArne and Van HielAlain (2011), “Item Selection and Validation of a Brief, 15-Item Version of Need for Closure Scale,”Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 90–94.
43.
RudiNils, KapurSandeep, and PykeDavid F. (2001), “A Two-Location Inventory Model with Transshipment and Local Decision Making,”Management Science, 47 (12), 1668–80.
44.
SosterRobin L., MongaAshwani, and BeardenWilliam O. (2010), “Tracking Costs of Time and Money: How Accounting Periods Affect Mental Accounting,”Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (4), 712–71.
45.
SrivastavaJoydeep and ChakravartiDipankar (2009), “Channel Negotiations with Information Asymmetries: Contingent Influences of Communication and Trustworthiness Reputations,”Journal of Marketing Research, 46 (August), 557–72.
46.
SrivastavaJoydeep, ChakravartiDipankar, and RapoportAmnon (2000), “Price and Margin Negotiations in Marketing Channels: An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining Under One-Sided Uncertainty and Opportunity Cost of Delay,”Marketing Science, 19 (2), 163–84.
47.
ThalerRichard H., TverskyAmos, KahnemanDaniel, and SchwartzAlan (1997), “The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (2), 647–61.
48.
ThompsonLeigh and HastieReid (1990), “Social Perception in Negotiation,”Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47 (1), 98–123.
49.
TverskyAmos and KahnemanDaniel (1991), “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (4), 1039–61.
50.
VallacherRobin and WegnerDaniel (1989), “Levels of Personal Agency: Individual Variation in Action Identification,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 660–71.
51.
WedellDouglas H. and BockenholtUlf (1990), “Moderation of Preference Reversals in the Long Run,”Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 16 (2), 429–38.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
