To Innovate or Imitate? Entry Strategy and the Role of Market Research

Abstract

A firm planning market entry can attempt to develop a product that is either similar to the incumbent's existing offering (imitation) or entirely novel (innovation). The authors establish that when the incumbent is more aggressive in research and development (R&D), this negatively affects the entrant's marginal return on R&D. Thus, if greater profits produce a strong (weak) desire for the incumbent to increase its R&D level, the entrant will respond by sharply decreasing (increasing) its R&D level. As a result, the incumbent's likelihood of retaining the lead position will exhibit an inverse U-shaped pattern as a function of monopoly and duopoly profits. The authors then examine the impact of uncertainty about the rewards from new products and allow firms to conduct market research to resolve the uncertainty. They characterize the conditions for the entrant's innovation versus imitation decision to reveal information about future rewards to the incumbent. When duopoly profits are uncertain and can be either high (upside potential) or low (downside potential), the entry strategy will be revealing if the upside potential is attractive enough relative to monopoly profits. In contrast, when innovation has uncertain commercial potential (i.e., either valued or not valued by consumers), the entry strategy will be revealing if duopoly profits are unattractive relative to monopoly profits. In these cases, the entrant's innovation–imitation decision is driven by market research; this allows the incumbent to forgo market research and infer the true state of demand from the type of entry strategy it observes.