Raúl Alfonsín’s Government: The Beginning of Political Polarization in Argentina

Abstract

Argentina has just elected one of its most divisive politicians ever as president. This follows several years of democratic erosion and growing polarization. This article argues that political polarization is rooted in the way that democratic transition took place in Argentina. This shows, more generally, that the nature of democratic transition can continue to shape a country’s politics over many decades. The article offers an analysis of the Raúl Alfonsín government, emphasizing that the lack of political and economic agreements during the first democratic period planted seeds for the economic and political crises that battered Argentina from 1983 to 2023. It argues that the absence of political agreements explains the increasing political polarization that has been weakening democracy in the country. To explain these ideas, the article offers a detailed analysis of the political economy, government–trade union relations, and human rights policies implemented by the Alfonsín government.

Introduction

In December 2023, while Argentina celebrated 40 years of democracy, Javier Milei, one of the most divisive politicians ever, was elected president with 55.69% of the total vote. This follows several years of democratic erosion and growing polarization. This article argues that political polarization is rooted in the way that democratic transition took place in Argentina. This shows, more generally, that the nature of democratic transition can continue to shape a country’s politics over many decades. The article explores the extent to which the lack of political agreements during the first democratic government consolidated a democracy plagued by polarization. It aims to gauge the current strength of Argentina’s democracy.

A Post-war Transition with Three Dilemmas

On June 14, 1982, the Argentine Armed Forces surrendered during the Falklands/Malvinas War. General elections took place 16 months later, on October 30, 1983. There were three reasons for this long transition. First, the military dictatorship (1976–1983) had to rebuild its government after its defeat in the war. Second, most political parties that were persecuted during the dictatorship needed time to reorganize their structures. Third, as the last general election was held in September 1973, time was also needed to organize the elections.

The 1983 elections witnessed the first electoral defeat of Peronism since its emergence in 1945. Raúl Alfonsín won over 52% of the national vote. From the beginning, Alfonsín made several decisions based on great optimism. The general feeling in his political party was, What could go wrong? (Gerchunoff, 2022, p. 149).

However, the government faced a difficult economic situation. The external debt amounted to US$ 44 billion, which was 67% of GDP. Additionally, the fiscal deficit was 11% of GDP. Further, international reserves were US$ 1 billion, while arrears with external creditors were US$ 3.2 billion (Machinea, 1990, p.12). This economic situation limited the government’s options in terms of political economy. Indeed, there was pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international creditors to implement economic strategies that would allow the payment of the debt. If this was not done, the government would not receive help from international financial institutions. Even if the payment of the debt would reduce the funds needed to respond to the demands of the labor movement, a debt moratorium was not on the government’s agenda.

Politically, the government’s failure to judge the military using its own justice system paved the way, paradoxically, for one of Alfonsín’s greatest achievements: The oral and public judgements of the Juntas Militares. However, after the trial, military officials refused to be judged by civilian courts. This caused three military rebellions that shook the country.

The debt, trade unions’ demands, and the public judgement of the Juntas acted synergistically, exacerbating their consequences. Though after their electoral victory, Alfonsín and the Radical Party wondered What could go wrong?, at the end of his time in office, Alfonsín wondered How could anything has gone right? (Gerchunoff, 2022, p. 149).

Alfonsín took office on December 10, 1983, and appointed Bernardo Grinspun as economic minister. By that time, external debt had reached US$ 45 billion (Tedesco, 1999, p. 186). The external debt was a major fiscal problem. The government had to repay the debt with escalating interest rates, prompting it to raise funds through taxes, trade, and loans. Fanelli and Frenkel (1989, p. 11) estimate that, from 1976 to 1982, public debt increased by 407.7% and private debt by 364.5%. In November 1982, the Central Bank took charge of private debt because of the private sector’s inability to repay it. This was done through swaps: The private debtor paid the Central Bank in pesos and the Bank paid international creditors in dollars (Graziano, 1986). This ensured the socialization of losses, while profits remained private. Thus, Alfonsín’s government would have to pay interest on foreign debt, but the surplus of the trade account, which provided funds to repay the debt, was in the hands of the private sector (Basualdo, 1987, p. 117).

Here it is argued that the economic and political conditions left by the military dictatorship created three dilemmas. Domestically, the dilemma posed by human rights violations was whether to forgive and forget or prosecute and punish (Huntington, 1993, p. 224). Argentina is different from other Latin American countries in which the military has committed human rights violations, such as Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile. The difference is that the military defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War, initiated by the dictatorship on April 2, 1982, with the invasion of the islands, made the Armed Forces deeply unpopular. In total, 649 Argentines died in the war, 170 of whom were participating in obligatory military service without any training. After the war, the military was discredited. Nevertheless, Alfonsín’s decision to prosecute and punish created political instability, which provoked three military rebellions. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the decision to prosecute and punish was correct: The oral and public judgement of the Juntas Militares was Alfonsín’s most significant legacy, contributing to the consolidation of democracy.

The second dilemma concerns debt: Repaying the debt would affect the reactivation of the economy. However, declaring a default would mean the economic isolation of the country, which would jeopardize any domestic plan. The government attempted parallel negotiations on external debt with the IMF, World Bank, and US government, while simultaneously calling for a debtor coalition among Latin American countries. After many failed attempts to avoid an agreement with the IMF, the government was forced to implement economic strategies which would allow debt repayments.

Restrictions on economic policy posed a final dilemma: To confront or negotiate with trade unions. The trade union movement, historically linked to the Peronist Party, became an obstacle to implementing the IMF’s requirements. There were 13 general strikes and approximately 4,000 strikes in different sectors in both public and private companies (Tedesco, 1999, p. 175). According to Alfonsin’s government former members, the economic team was unable to address all the problems facing the government (Gerchunoff, 2022; Torre, 2021). Alfonsín was aware of the impact of the IMF’s requirements on the relationship with Peronist trade unions and the demands of the Armed Forces but was unable to convey it. There was a significant level of uncertainty regarding how to handle the economic crisis (Torre, 2021, p.159). The government found itself caught between the economic constraints imposed by external debt, a complicated relationship with the IMF, and fierce opposition from trade unions.

A lack of political dialogue contributed to the radical government’s failure to solve any of these dilemmas. After its 1983 electoral defeat, Peronism underwent a renovation process that made it more difficult for the radical government to establish a dialogue. Likewise, Alfonsín and the Radical Party were unwilling to pursue a political dialogue to secure governability. They wrongly believed that they could “divide and rule” the labor movement. For instance, the government tried to divide trade unions by inviting the so-called grupo de los 15 (group of the 15) to join the cabinet, appointing Carlos Alderete as labor minister in April 1987.

Finally, because of Alfonsín’s creation of the Comisión Nacional sobre Desaparición de Personas (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, CONADEP) and the beginning of the Juicio a las Juntas (Trial of the Military Juntas), three military rebellions showed the democratic government’s weak equilibrium. These rebellions led to the Punto Final (Full Stop) and Obediencia Debida (Due Obedience) laws, which sought to end military unrest.

Prosecute and Punish or Forgive and Forget?

In December 1983, Alfonsín abolished the self-amnesty law enacted during the military dictatorship. He established the CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons) to accept denunciations and evidence of human rights violations and send them to the judiciary. When the CONADEP was created, Alfonsín´s popularity increased to 85% (Gerchunoff, 2022, p. 163).

In September 1984, CONADEP presented its report entitled Nunca Más (Never Again). The report provides a detailed account of the crimes committed during the dictatorship. It revealed more than 40 clandestine prison centers in different parts of the country, controlled by the Navy, Army, and Air Force. ¹ It described how prisoners were tortured, kidnapped in front of their children, or illegally buried in different cemeteries. During the dictatorship, there were rumors about illegal detentions; however, the CONADEP report confirmed the existence of concentration camps, the practice of torture, and the fate of some desaparecidos (missing persons) and the whereabouts of their bodies.

The publication of the CONADEP findings was a milestone. It was impossible for the government to ignore it and continue to avoid a civilian trial against the Juntas Militares. The Nunca Más report opened the eyes of many Argentinians who knew that the Armed Forces had committed human rights violations but were unaware of the existence of concentration camps, the cruel torture, or the kidnapping of minors. The Buenos Aires University publisher, EUDEBA, first published the report in November 1984. It printed 40,000 books, with many subsequent reprints. By September 2022, 500,000 books had been sold.

On the last day of the Juntas Militares trial, prosecutor Julio Strassera ended his accusation, stating: “I expressly wish to renounce any claim of originality to close this requisition. I want to use a phrase that does not belong to me, because it already belongs to all the Argentine people. Judges: Never again.” ² This trial was a historic event. Daily updates were aired on television and testimonies were printed in El Diario del Juicio (The Journal of the Trial), ³ describing the horrors perpetrated by the military. Adriana Calvo de Laborde and Pablo Díaz’s testimonies were terrible accounts of the Armed Forces’ actions. ⁴

The historical significance of this trial and its impact on Argentine society cannot be underestimated. After the trial, it was impossible, in Samuel Huntington’s words, “to forgive and forget.” The CONADEP report and trial opened a Pandora’s box that remains open. Since the end of the dictatorship, mothers and grandmothers have been searching for their children and grandchildren. Three human rights associations were formed after the dictatorship ended: Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo ⁵ (Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo), and Hijos por la Identidad la Justicia, contra el Olvido y el Silencio (Sons and Daughters for Identity, Justice, Against Oblivion and Silence, H.I.J.O.S). Their members were the mothers, grandmothers, sons, and daughters of those who disappeared during the dictatorship. Thanks to the work of the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 133 children were reunited with their families. ⁶

Alfonsín aimed to find an equilibrium between Huntington’s words—to prosecute and punish, or to forgive and forget. He wanted the Armed Forces to be judged by their peers and to differentiate levels of responsibility. Before winning the election, Alfonsín had discussed with Carlos Nino and Jaime Malamud Goti, two young philosophers, the idea that due obedience be implemented in human rights violation trials. The concept of due obedience is based on three levels of responsibility. The degree of punishment was to vary between those who had been responsible for planning the repression, those who had committed “excesses” during the repression, and those who had simply obeyed orders from their superiors (Alfonsín, 1992, p. 108).

Alfonsín’s main objectives were to prosecute and punish the highest members of the Armed Forces, especially the members of the Juntas Militares, and to forgive military personnel who merely followed orders from their superiors. His intention was to deter future human rights violations by demonstrating that everyone, including those in the highest offices, was accountable to the law (Alfonsín, 1992, p. 69).

The due obedience proposal was sent to Congress but was modified by the vote of Senator Elías Sapag (leader of a political party from Neuquén province), who argued that those individuals who committed aberrant and atrocious acts could not be excused from punishment.

To Pay or Not to Pay?

In 1984, inflation was the highest in the world at 400% per year. GDP per capita and investment were lower than in 1970, and industrial production was lower than it was in 1971 (Torre, 2021, pp. 70–71). The external debt was equivalent to five years’ income from exports. The fiscal deficit reached 15% of GDP by 1983. Torre (2021, p. 73) summarizes the situation: “There were immediate problems that required urgent responses and took all the time away from the big challenges and the preparation of long-term measures.”

In a letter from April 1984, Torre emphasized that it was crucial for political parties, trade unions, and the business sector to reach agreements. However, no agreement ever materialized. Rather than establishing political dialogue, many Alfonsín’s followers within the Radical Party wanted to create a new hegemonic movement (as Peronism has been characterized since 1945). They wanted to develop Alfonsinism as a political force. Paradoxically, they were trying to build a political actor not unlike the one they wanted to destroy. They wanted Alfonsinism to undermine Peronism. This idea was antidemocratic. The transition to democracy was the time to use political dialogue to reach short- and long-term agreements, yet neither the government nor the opposition seemed able to see this.

Politicians appeared unaware of the severity of the economic crisis. The President was one of them. Indeed, on May 1, 1984, Alfonsín opened the parliamentary session and summarized the following economic measures: A wage increase, economic reactivation, and the fight against inflation. He predicted a GDP growth rate of 5%. In the short term, wages would increase between 6% and 8% and inflation would decrease by 50%. However, there were contradictions between Alfonsín’s promises and the real economic situation. The government and IMF experts had different priorities. While the government wanted to talk about debt repayments, the IMF experts emphasized the high inflation problem. For instance, Adolfo Canitrot, the vice-minister of economy, explained to the IMF team that there was no social demand to contain inflation, so one of the IMF experts wondered what would happen if that demand did not materialize. Canitrot was clear that inflation would rise (Torre, 2021, p. 104). The government lacked the power, and the will, to implement an anti-inflationary policy. Indeed, this type of policy was seen by many in the Radical Party as the first step towards recession. The scenario shows that ignoring the IMF’s plan could unleash an international crisis, whereas implementing the plan would create a domestic crisis (Torre, 2021, p. 115).

This was the economic dilemma: To repay or not to repay the debt. Debt repayment meant that the government would have to allocate financial resources to honor the debt rather than invest them in reactivating the domestic economy. The IMF recipe, also known as the Washington Consensus, included the reduction of the fiscal deficit, tax reform, privatization of public companies, liberalization of exchange and interest rates, opening the economy to foreign investment, and deregulation. These measures were unfeasible in the 1980s. The government wanted to promote domestic markets and national companies.

An Intertwined Legacy

The military dictatorship left intertwined problems, which constrained the maneuvering room of any subsequent government. However, a Peronist government was more likely to achieve governability because of its relationship with the trade union movement. Moreover, the Peronist candidate, Italo Luder, was, in 1975, a provisional president who signed a decree which authorized the Armed Forces to participate in the fight against urban guerrillas. During the 1983 electoral campaign, Luder did not object to the self-amnesty law established by the military while Alfonsín anticipated that the self-amnesty law would be reversed.

These differences between the main political parties could have been overcome at the national and provincial levels with an agreement to deal with the consequences of the military dictatorship. However, this was not on the agenda. On the contrary, there was no political cooperation between the main political parties, trade unions, landowners, and the business sector. Neither the government nor the opposition was able to judge the importance of political agreements in the transition to democracy. Spain established the pillars of its transition with the Pactos de la Moncloa (Moncloa Pacts). Portugal’s transition was unstable, but this was overcome by constitutional reforms in 1976 and alliances between political parties. Uruguay’s transition was framed by the Pacto del Club Naval (Navy Club Pact), signed in 1984 by the Armed Forces and political parties. Finally, in Chile, the main political parties, Socialist Party and Christian Democrats created the Concertación de Partidos para la Democracia (Concertation of Parties for Democracy), which governed the country from the end of the dictatorship in 1990–2010. In Argentina, political and economic disagreements began as soon as the new government took office.

The Austral Plan

In June 1985, the launch of the Austral Plan showed that the government was abandoning its gradualist perspective and implementing profound economic reforms. The plan had three main pillars: A general wage and price freeze, a reduction in the fiscal deficit, and a new currency together with a de-indexation of the economy. The IMF approved the plan. The initial effects of the plan were satisfactory. The inflation rate of consumer prices fell from 30.5% in June to 6% in July. The fiscal deficit decreased from 8.3% of the GDP in the first half of 1985 to 2% in the second half (Machinea, 1990, p. 27). There was also an improvement in the balance of payments: The current account and balance of payments deficit fell from US$ 2.930 and US$ 1.744 billion to US$ 953 million and US$ 556 million, respectively (Tedesco, 1999, p. 204).

Despite these advances, Torre (2021, p. 238) recalled that Radical Party members complained about the plan’s rigidity. He explains an important contradiction: In the negotiations with the IMF, Argentina first accepted the demands but immediately demanded flexibility. It seemed to him that the Alfonsín government was only dealing with everyday crises without a long-term strategy.

Alfonsín was aware that the transition to democracy was not just about economic recovery. Political goals for protecting the transition were as important as those for the economy. In October 1985, there was pressure from the Armed Forces to increase wages. At the time, the public and oral judgements of the Juntas Militares were taking place. Thus, Alfonsín suggested a wage increase for the military to avoid a confrontation with the Armed Forces. Politically, a wage increase targeting only the Armed Forces was difficult, if not impossible, to justify. Thus, Alfonsín suggested a general increase of 5%, a 25% increase for teachers, a 15% increase in pensions, and a 25% increase for military personnel (Tedesco, 1999, p. 104). One of the main pillars of the Austral Plan was the general wage freeze. Therefore, these increases undermined the freeze only four months after its implementation. The economic team was unable to convince the president of the importance of preserving the wage freeze.

Alfonsín looked at the big picture to avoid confrontations with the military when clashes with the Confederación General del Trabajo (General Federation of Labor, CGT) were ongoing. With the benefit of hindsight, the puzzle surrounding the Alfonsín administration becomes clear. Six actors had conflicting demands: The Armed Forces, the trade union movement, the Peronist Party, the Radical Party, international creditors, and the government. It was impossible to negotiate an agreement that satisfied them all simply because their demands were contradictory. Negotiations were not contemplated by any of them. The Armed Forces were reluctant to accept prosecution and punishment for human rights violations. The trade union movement presented an economic strategy which aimed to defend production and employment to defeat inflation. In this plan, the trade union movement suggested a unilateral moratorium on the interest payment of external debt, nationalization of bank deposits, tax reform, and an increase in the education budget and house building (Beliz, 1988, pp. 228–233). This economic plan would create a conflict between the government and its international creditors. A unilateral moratorium would isolate Argentina financially, creating a deeper economic crisis. The same applied to nationalizing bank deposits.

The absence of political agreements between the government, political parties, trade unions, business associations, and external creditors is the key to explaining the fate of Argentina’s first democratic government. The Radical and Peronist Parties, trade unions, and the business sector did not address the constraints of the military dictatorship’s legacy. Political, social, and economic actors could not grasp the fragility of the transition. No one seemed ready to take the necessary steps to negotiate or make concessions. Thus, the government was cornered by the combination of the impact of the external debt on its maneuverability regarding the political economy, pressure from the trade union movement to increase salaries, and the uncontrollable consequences of the Juicio a las Juntas. In this context, Alfonsín’s biggest fear was provoking the Armed Forces.

Tackle the Crisis or Ignore It?

On December 9, 1985, the Federal Chamber of Justice sentenced the Juntas Militares. Jorge Rafael Videla and Emilio Eduardo Massera, members of the first Junta Militar, were given life sentences; Roberto Viola was given 17 years; Armando Lambruschini was given eight years; and Orlando Agosti was given four years. Although this was a clear triumph for the government, it also created political instability. Negative reactions from the Armed Forces could not be ignored.

An important decision was to appoint Carlos Alderete from the Luz y Fuerza (Light and Power) union as Labor Minister in 1987. He belonged to the Grupo de los 15, an internal group of trade unions more inclined to negotiate with different governments, including the 1976 military dictatorship. Alderete lasted for six months in the cabinet. During this period, there were no general strikes, but the confrontation between trade unions and the economic team moved into the cabinet. Alderete’s main objective was to make the labor ministry autonomous from the economic team (Gerchunoff, 2022, p. 241). The new labor minister achieved an increase of 17.6% in the minimum wage from June 1987 and a general increase in wages of 6% (Tedesco, 1999, p. 120). Alderete unofficially approved wage increase agreements between trade unions and employers.

While Alderete was in the cabinet, Alfonsín had to cope with the consequences of the Federal Chamber of Justice’s sentencing of the Juntas Militares. Point 30 of the sentence opened the door to additional trials. It promoted “the trial of superior officials who commanded the zones and subzones of defence during the war against the guerrillas and of all those who had operational responsibilities” (Tedesco, 1999, p. 122). The Federal Chamber’s sentence opened the door for more trials. The worst was yet to come.

On April 14, 1987, a group of officials refused to present themselves to the Federal Chamber of Córdoba province. Three days later, another group barricaded themselves in the Campo de Mayo regiment. Their main demands were a political solution to the human rights trials, a change in the army’s commander-in-chief, and their own pardons. The rebellion ended when Alfonsín visited the Campo de Mayo regiment and spoke to the rebels.

After the military rebellion, Alfonsín asked his economic team to avoid any type of confrontation, especially with the labor movement. It seems that political economy became irrelevant. From now on, the main objective was to avoid the economic problems and claims of the Armed Forces feeding off each other and threatening democracy (Torre, 2021, p. 403).

When Alfonsín left office on July 8, 1989, seven members of the Juntas Militares had been condemned, 17 members of the military were being processed owing to human rights violations, three had been condemned for acts during the Malvinas War, and there were 92 processes and around 300 disciplinary sanctions owing to military rebellions during Easter Week 1987 and in Monte Caseros and Villa Martelli (Gerchunoff, 2022, p. 209).

There was a clear strategy for dealing with those guilty of human rights violations, but there was a lot of improvisation when it came to relations with trade unions and the external debt (Gerchunoff, 2022, p. 221).

Consolidating Democracy and Polarization

Alfonsín’s legacy was a combination of success and defeat. The main successes were the political demobilization of the Armed Forces and Juicio a las Juntas, and the consolidation of democracy. However, democracy was consolidated with many fault lines: A lack of agreements among political parties, trade unions, and business organizations; a high degree of polarization between the Radical Party and the Peronist Party; and an open confrontation with military officials, known as the Carapintadas, who organized three rebellions.

The economic crisis pushed Alfonsín to resign on June 30, 1989, five months prior to the end of his term. Carlos Menem from the Peronist Party took power on July 8, 1989. In August 1989, a state reform law was imposed, and the privatization of public companies began. Finally, in March 1991, Congress approved the Convertibility Law, which established fixed convertibility between the US dollar and the peso. This meant that the austral was no longer the national currency.

Carlos Menem was able to implement the IMF’s stabilization plan, including the privatization of public companies, such as telecommunications, the flag airline, and trains. The hyperinflation events of 1989 and 1990 made it easier for the new government to take unpopular measures. Additionally, the trade union movement, historically related to Peronism, partially accepted state reform, privatization, and monetary reform.

During the Menem administration, which lasted from 1991 to 1999, there were only nine general strikes. The labor movement underwent deep reorganization under the new administration. In 1989, President Menem confronted a strike organized by railway workers with a sentence that became famous and encapsulated the relationship between Menem and the trade union movement: “a railway branch that strikes, a railway branch that will be closed down” (ramal que para, ramal que cierra).

On October 8, 1989, Menem signed four decrees pardoning the military officials who had not benefited from the Full Stop Law or the Due Obedience Law, members of terrorist organizations such as the Montoneros, military officials who participated in rebellions during the Alfonsín government, and members of the Junta Militar who started the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.

On December 3, 1990, the fourth military rebellion began. Again, Carlos Menem adopted a different approach from Alfonsín. He asked the rebels to give up: “I am not Alfonsín, I will not negotiate. Either they give up, or we are going to bomb the regiments.” This was the first time this type of rebellion resulted in deaths. Fourteen people died, including five civilians on a bus that was crushed by a military tank (Cecchini, 2023).

At the end of December 1990, Menem issued six decrees pardoning the commander-in-chief, who had been condemned by the Juicio a las Juntas, and the highest members of the revolutionary movements, such as Mario Eduardo Firmenich from the Montoneros organization. Menem neutralized the conflict with the Armed Forces by pardoning those found guilty of human rights violations and those who had rebelled against the first democratic government. Many members of the military who benefited from Menem’s pardoning returned to jail at the end of the 1990s because some of the human rights abuses during the dictatorship were not included in the Juicio a las Juntas; in particular, the kidnapping of babies from women who were pregnant when abducted.

The Lack of Political Agreements

There were two issues which were Alfonsín´s government’s backbone: What to do with those guilty of human rights violations and how to democratize the trade unions movement. The absence of political agreements complicated the government approach to both issues.

As mentioned above, the due obedience proposal was sent to Congress but was modified by the vote of Senator Elías Sapag (leader of a political party from Neuquén province), who argued that those individuals who committed aberrant and atrocious acts could not be excused from punishment.

Senator Sapag also blocked the government’s plan to change the structure of the trade unions. In March 1984, the Senate rejected a proposal sent by the executive to democratize the trade unions. The government´s proposal included a call for elections for trade unions, which were still subject to government intervention or under a “normalising delegate.” Trade unionists rallied against this proposal. The democratic government attempted to intervene in the electoral procedures by appointing a delegate to monitor elections.

According to the 1980 census, Neuquén province accounted for 0.9% of the total population of Argentina. ⁷ One senator who represented a small part of the national population blocked two of the main objectives of the Alfonsín government. This could have been avoided through political agreements.

The impact of Sapag´s votes in the Senate was long-lasting. Two of the main pillars of Alfonsín’s project failed, namely, reforming the trade unions and having military courts judge military personnel. The government did not have an alternative to these initiatives, and thereafter, negotiations with trade unions, the Armed Forces, and external creditors did not exhibit a long-term strategy.

Since 1983, the main political and economic actors in Argentina have not been able to achieve long-term agreements on how to establish economic stability, growth, and political governability. In fact, political polarization has increased.

Backsliding or Erosion?

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) report of 2024 describes Argentina as an electoral democracy. The V-Dem project characterizes an electoral democracy as a political system in which leaders are elected under comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections and freedom of association and expression are guaranteed. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component is fundamental; without it, democracy does not exist. At the same time, the project recognizes that holding elections alone is insufficient (Coppedge & Lindberg, 2015).

The project defines the different components of democracy: Liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. The liberal component of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the majority.” This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties, a strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances limiting the use of executive power.

The participatory component embodies the values of direct rule and active participation by citizens in all political processes; it emphasizes non-electoral forms of political participation, such as through civil society organizations and the mechanisms of direct democracy. The deliberative component enshrines the core value that political decisions in the pursuit of the public good should be informed. The egalitarian component holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties; hence, a more equitable distribution of resources, education, and health across various groups should enhance political equality.

The latter is key. Poverty has been rising in Argentina since the establishment of democracy. In October 1982, poverty in Greater Buenos Aires affected 22% of households. In October 1985, following the implementation of the Austral Plan, poverty declined by 14%. After the December 1989 hyperinflation, it reached 38%. Immediately after the 2001 crisis, it reached 46%, whereas in October 2002, it reached 66%. The National Institute for Statistics and Census revealed that poverty in Argentina reached 39% in the final six months of 2022 (Molina, 2023). By February 2024, poverty hit 57%.

Income inequality is reflected in political polarization, which in Argentina is known as la grieta (the crack). The term was coined by political journalist Jorge Lanata, who, in 2013, mentioned that the worst that was happening in Argentina was the incapacity to talk about politics among members of the same family, friends, colleagues, politicians, and journalists. Polarization has been increasing since the return to democracy, but it is a historical feature of Argentina’s contemporary politics. The first wave of polarization emerged with Peronism in 1945 and dominated politics until the 1970s. The current wave began after the 2001 financial crisis when Néstor Kirchner won the presidential election in 2003 (Lisinska, 2022).

One of the main changes implemented by Kirchner’s government was the repeal of the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws, which were sanctioned during the Alfonsín government owing to the military rebellions. He also revoked the pardons (indultos) granted by Carlos Menem to the members of the Juntas Militares. While Kirchner’s followers celebrated the revision of human rights violations, many Argentines believed that the new president was trying to rewrite Alfonsin’s policies in his favor without considering the reasons for sanctioning those laws.

On the one hand, during the 1983 electoral campaign, Alfonsín had spoken about the different levels of responsibility, which were the basis of his Due Obedience proposal. On the other hand, the laws were a tool for reducing tensions with the Armed Forces. In the context of the first democratic government, these concessions were considered essential for consolidating democracy. Kirchner’s initiatives were the starting point of what was known as el relato (the narrative), which meant that the new government was rewriting the recent political narrative, presenting itself as the only voice against human rights violations committed during the 1976–1983 dictatorship.

Some Lessons from Argentina

What lessons can be learned from Argentina’s road to democracy? Lack of political agreement makes transitions turbulent. In Argentina´s case, it laid the foundations for political polarization and the reversal of policies. For example, Jorge Rafael Videla⁸ was sentenced to life imprisonment during the Juicio a las Juntas. He was released five years later thanks to the pardoning decree issued by President Carlos Menem in 1990. He returned to prison in 1998 when he was found guilty of kidnapping babies. He spent only 38 days in prison because of health issues and was transferred to house arrest. When Néstor Kirchner was elected president in 2003, Videla returned to prison. In 2005, the Supreme Court declared the Punto Final law to be unconstitutional. In 2006, a judge declared the pardon granted by Menem as unconstitutional; thus, a federal court restored Jorge Rafael Videla’s convictions for human rights violations. In July 2012, he was sentenced to 50 years in jail for stealing babies. He died in prison in May 2013.

The second lesson is that political polarization undermines democracy. Polarization between political and economic actors began on December 10, 1983, and has been increasing ever since. Argentina has been swinging back and forth on a political and economic pendulum since then. Politicians, trade unions, political parties, economic actors, and landowners have been unable to reach an agreement on long-term reform strategies. With more than 50% of the population living in poverty, those with political and economic power cannot make concessions or establish long-term agreements. They can only agree to disagree.

In this context, another question arises: Is Argentina’s democracy backsliding? According to International IDEA’s report (2021), democratic backsliding involves “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain existing democracy.” Following Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2023), I argue that, in the case of Argentina, there is democratic erosion rather than backsliding. Democratic erosion is a combination of stagnation and a democratic deficit. If we follow Carothers and Press (2022), Argentina exhibits all the internal factors that corrode democracy: Populism, polarization, and increased inequality. First, polarization (the so-called grieta) has increased under populist leaders such as Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who attempted to rewrite the human rights policies of Raúl Alfonsín. Second, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner criticized the justice system during her presidencies (2007–2011 and 2011–2015) and vice presidency (2019–2023), creating uncertainty about its independence.

Most importantly, democracy has not delivered results. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Census, 52% of the population was living under the poverty line 2023 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, 2024). The poverty rate was 14% in 1985 (Tedesco, 1999, p. 94).

Nevertheless, democracy seems to be the only game in town. National and provincial elections are free. The 2001 crisis provoked the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa, which was resolved by the National Congress. Political parties have been renovated at the national and provincial levels. For instance, while the Radical Party (Alfonsín’s political party) almost disappeared, a new party, Propuesta Republicana, won the national elections in 2015. The main ideas of the Peronist party were transformed during Carlos Menem’s presidencies (1989–1995 and 1995–1999), promoting the privatization of public companies and the implementation of a neoliberal approach with the dollarization of the economy. While many governments have confronted various newspapers, TV channels, and radio stations, freedom of expression has never been in danger.

One of the main achievements of the justice system, the Juicio a las Juntas, has been overshadowed by its incapacity to resolve the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine Israelite Mutual Association, AMIA) in 1994. In 2006, Jorge Julio López, a witness in a case related to the dictatorship, disappeared days before he must declare before the court. Finally, the prosecutor in the AMIA bombing case, Natalio Alberto Nisman, was found dead in his flat in 2015. Nisman accused the Iranian government, together with former presidents Carlos Menem and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, of being part of a group which provided cover for those who committed the AMIA attack. It remains unclear whether Nisman committed suicide or was murdered.

The absence of political and economic agreements during the Alfonsín government contributed to establishing a confrontational democracy that continues to haunt Argentina and explains the election of Javier Milei in November 2023. Milei is indeed a highly polarizing figure. Since his rise in Argentine politics, Milei has been known for his strong populist rhetoric, radical economic proposals, and confrontational style, all of which have contributed to increasing political polarization. One of Milei’s most controversial proposals has been to dollarize the economy, a move that has sparked fierce debate. Supporters argue that this could stabilize the economy, which has been plagued by high inflation and currency devaluation since the government of Raúl Alfonsín. Critics, however, see it as a drastic measure that could undermine Argentina’s sovereignty and worsen inequality. Milei advocates for severe austerity policies, including significant cuts to public spending, the reduction of social programs, and downsizing the public sector. These policies are deeply unpopular among sectors of the population who depend on government services and welfare. His economic vision alienates a large portion of the working class and those on the left of the political spectrum, while his supporters on the right argue that these policies are necessary to tackle Argentina’s fiscal crisis. His portrayal of the political establishment as corrupt and self-serving has resonated with many Argentinians frustrated with the political class.

Milei’s outsider status, coupled with his fierce criticism of the “political caste,” has resonated with many who feel disconnected from the traditional political parties in Argentina. Milei’s libertarian economic vision promotes market-driven solutions, reduced state intervention, and deregulation. These views appeal to a section of the Argentine electorate that believes the government should take a step back from the economy and allow free-market forces to drive growth. However, they also alarm many others who fear that such policies would worsen inequality and leave vulnerable populations without support.

Javier Milei’s presidency is likely to continue increasing political polarization in the country. Indeed, as of the completion of this article in February 2025, there were no signs of democracy growing stronger in Argentina.