The limits of platformization: A field perspective on the challenges of B2B platforms

Abstract

Despite significant interest in the influence of digital platforms, we still lack a theoretically grounded understanding of why platformization processes and outcomes differ across contexts. In this article, we address this gap by developing a field-theoretical framework that conceptualizes platformization as a field-level transformation process shaped by the structural conditions of strategic action fields (SAFs), including actor constellations, patterns of interaction and mutual awareness, and shared understandings about purposes, power relations, and rules. Empirically, we present a comparative analysis of platformization processes in three business fields – logistics, mechanical component manufacturing, and orthopaedic technology – drawing on 89 interviews, survey data, and ethnographic materials. Our findings show that platformization is limited by the specific structural conditions of business fields. These include the organizational complexity and heterogeneity of user firms that curtail standardized solutions, the long-standing relational networks that reduce intermediation opportunities, the importance of domain-specific experiential knowledge that platforms struggle to replicate, the strong bargaining position of users and complementors, and the complexity of formal and informal regulation. These conditions result in distinct platformization processes that diverge from the ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamics observed in consumer-facing fields. Instead of platform dominance, based on strong network and lock-in effects, we identify outcomes such as marginal and partial platformization and even platform shutout. Platforms remain confined to niche segments, coexist with incumbents, or are absorbed into existing structures. Overall, the article contributes to platform studies by shifting the analytical focus from platform-centric explanations to the broader socioeconomic contexts in which platforms are embedded. It highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of platformization that accounts for variation across fields and challenges generic claims about the dominance of platform organizations across society.

Introduction

The growing dominance of digital platforms in various economic sectors has inspired claims about the rise of a ‘platform capitalism’ (Srnicek, 2017), ‘platform economy’ (Kenney and Zysman, 2016), or even ‘platform society’ (van Dijck et al., 2018). These accounts, however, mainly draw on studies of consumer-facing platforms in areas like social media, e-commerce, and mobility services. Studies on platforms like Facebook, Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb have generated valuable insights into platform business models and organizational forms. Yet, their focus on consumer settings neglects the diverse social and economic conditions that shape platform development and transformative effects. This has led researchers to underestimate the variety of platformization dynamics across contexts and overstate the dominance of platforms in the economy.

The importance of contextual factors (e.g. regulation) has been demonstrated through multiple avenues, including studies of consumer platforms across national and institutional settings (Jia et al., 2022; Thelen, 2018). It has become particularly evident as researchers turned their attention to business-to-business (B2B) platforms (see Feike and Rösch, 2024; Madanaguli et al., 2023; Shree et al., 2021; Springer et al., 2025). Findings show that B2B platforms often confront particular challenges including the strong bargaining position of user organizations, complex regulatory landscapes, and limited technological standardization. These factors hinder the scalability and network effects associated with consumer platforms. However, despite growing empirical evidence of the peculiarity of B2B platforms, we still lack a theoretically grounded explanation for why their trajectories diverge from their consumer-facing counterparts.

Our paper addresses this gap by systematically examining the wider contextual factors shaping B2B platform development. Specifically, we ask: How do the characteristics of socioeconomic contexts populated primarily by business organizations shape the development of platforms and the dynamics of platformization? This question cannot be answered by focusing narrowly on platform organizations and their strategic management, but requires attention to the wider arenas in which platforms are embedded. To model these, we develop a framework that draws on strategic action field (SAF) theory (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Seibt, 2024). This enables us to understand platformization processes as shaped by the interaction of diverse economic and non-economic actors, as well as shared understandings of field-specific purposes, power relations, and rules. The SAF concept thus provides a comprehensive theoretical foundation for comparing platformization processes across contexts.

Empirically, we apply this framework to a comparative study of platformization in three business fields: logistics, mechanical component manufacturing, and orthopaedic technology. Based on 89 interviews, an online survey, and ethnographic material, we examine the influence of actor constellations, interaction patterns, and shared understandings about field-specific stakes, resource distributions, rules, and norms. Our findings reveal several factors that limit the establishment and growth of B2B platforms while also highlighting important differences across fields. Together, they contribute to a more nuanced account of how digital platforms reshape the economy, countering exuberant claims about platform capitalism or platform society.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces our conceptual framework by linking the scholarship on platforms and platformization, particularly in B2B contexts, to SAF theory. The third section outlines our empirical data and methods. The fourth section presents our empirical findings on platforms in three different business fields. The fifth section compares and discusses our findings and identifies key barriers to platformization in the fields we study. We conclude by highlighting the broader implications of our findings for the emerging debate on B2B platforms.

The emergence of B2B platforms in strategic action fields

Platform architectures and platformization

Our analytical framework is designed to examine the emergence and effects of platforms within wider social arenas, thereby enabling systematic comparison between platformization processes across (e.g. business and consumer) contexts. This requires an understanding of platforms that is both general and allows for variation. We therefore adopt the view that all platforms share the same basic architecture that can, however, be configured in varying ways (Ametowobla and Kirchner, 2023; Baldwin and Woodard, 2009; Dolata and Schrape, 2025; Gawer, 2014). Specifically, we define a platform as a sociotechnical system in which a core platform organization provides a technical infrastructure that enables at least two groups of peripheral actors (e.g. users and complementors) to interact in ways governed by the infrastructure’s technical interfaces and related terms of use (Seibt, 2024: 4).

This perspective is deliberately broad to capture the variety of platforms operating in different social settings. Platform organizations may include start-ups, Big Tech firms, non-profits, or even state organizations. The infrastructures they provide may support context-specific activities ranging from ordering a taxi to finding a spouse or programming software. Peripheral actors may be individuals or organizations whose interactions may involve communication, economic exchange, and cooperative problem solving. Platform interfaces and rules may be more or less specific, permissive, and sophisticated. In short, platform architectures occur in various configurations and can be adapted to diverse settings.

Despite this diversity, the observation that all platforms share a common underlying architecture permits some conjectures about typical, although not necessary, dynamics of platform establishment and platformization. For instance, the above definition suggests that early on, platform organizations may struggle to gain traction, as the small number of users and complementors reduces the value of their mediating infrastructures. Conversely, once platform organizations attract a critical mass of peripheral actors, self-reinforcing network effects may accrue, leading to user lock-in and oligopolistic market structures. Successful platform organizations thus often occupy central positions in multisided markets or innovation ecosystems, enabling them to orchestrate user and complementor activities through the design of platform rules and interfaces, while thriving on business models that monetize platform use directly (e.g. fees) or indirectly (e.g. data sales). An architectural view thus explains findings of both the high failure rates of aspiring platform organizations (Yoffie et al., 2019) and the powerful position of so-called platform leaders (Cusumano et al., 2019).

Despite these advantages, the question remains: What determines the successful establishment or failure of platform architectures? So far, the literature has focused on the strategic choices of platform managers and the practical design work of system architects (Rilinger, 2024) that occur within platform organizations. This platform-centric perspective emphasizes design decisions regarding factors like platform boundaries (Gawer, 2014), the subsidization of market sides (Evans, 2009), business models, ecosystem rules (Cusumano et al., 2019), and orchestration styles (Tiwana, 2014). This focus on intra-platform processes helps account for variation between individual platforms. However, it falls short of explaining why platforms systematically thrive in some contexts while failing to gain traction in others. To account for these differences, we must go beyond a platform-centric view and consider the position of platform organizations within wider social contexts.

The need for a contextual perspective has been highlighted through several strands of research. Institutional theorists studying the expansion of US-based platforms such as Uber and Airbnb found that the effects of platform entry differ radically across national and regional settings (Boon et al., 2019; Davis and Sinha, 2021; Thelen, 2018). Other studies point to the unique trajectories of non-Western platforms (Langley and Leyshon, 2022; Renzi and Frenzel, 2025), especially China (Jia et al., 2022; Kloet et al., 2019; Plantin and Seta, 2019) and emphasize the importance of sociotechnical, cultural, and political conditions. Another line of inquiry has shifted attention beyond mass consumer markets to examine platforms in domains such as care work (Lentz et al., 2025) and medicine (Williams et al., 2024). More recently, the need for a contextual lens has been underlined by findings on the divergent trajectories of platforms in business-to-business contexts. Since our paper contributes to that line of inquiry, we briefly review this work below.

Platformization in B2B contexts

The success of B2C and C2C platforms has fuelled expectations that platforms would also dominate in B2B environments. However, a growing body of research demonstrates that the development and transformative effects of B2B platforms differ from their B2C counterparts due to factors including market size and structure, user characteristics and relationships, and regulation (Anderson et al., 2022; Butollo and Schneidemesser, 2022; Grabher, 2025; Madanaguli et al., 2023; Shree et al., 2021). Some commentators even warn that ‘building on insights from B2C could lead to wrong decisions and platform failure or unintended outcomes for participants’ (Feike and Rösch, 2024: 1).

B2B sectors often feature high entry barriers due to the need for compatibility with pervasive regulations and legacy IT infrastructures (Feike and Rösch, 2024), as well as formalized procurement processes at user organizations. Moreover, value chains are often more complex than in consumer markets. User organizations tend to be embedded in long-standing business partnerships and competitive dynamics, requiring platform organizations to engage with a greater variety of actors to deliver valued services (Hein et al., 2019). These challenges make it harder for platform organizations to enter B2B sectors and attract users and complementors.

Even after overcoming initial hurdles, B2B platform organizations operate in environments that limit their scalability and network effects. Unlike B2C platforms aimed at consumer mass markets, B2B platforms often serve a smaller number of user organizations that are highly heterogeneous in size, internal processes, and digital competencies (Riemensperger and Falk, 2020; Rohn et al., 2021) but command significant economic and technical resources (Anderson et al., 2022). This creates more symmetrical power relations between platform organizations, complementors, and users, allowing the latter to negotiate customized solutions (Dolata, 2024), which raise development, implementation, and customer support costs, compared to the ‘plug-and-play’ applications common in consumer markets (Arnold et al., 2025). Moreover, business organizations also have more complex and demanding requirements than individual consumers, as they deploy platforms for large-scale, ‘business-critical processes’ (Hein et al., 2019), such as predictive maintenance for factory equipment, enterprise resource planning, or the integration of AI tools in medical workflows (Williams et al., 2024). Accordingly, business organizations are highly concerned about data security and use, unlike consumers who may readily share data in exchange for free services (Anderson et al., 2022; Butollo and Schneidemesser, 2022). Reservations on data sharing are particularly strong, when user organizations perceive that platforms may transition from service providers to competitors (Arnold et al., 2025; Ozalp et al., 2022).

All of these factors make B2B platform development, implementation, and maintenance technologically and organizationally challenging and economically expensive. Crucially, fragmented market structures and idiosyncratic customer demands limit the potential for scalability and network effects within and across sectors (Feike and Rösch, 2024; Ritala and Jovanovic, 2024). Taken together, empirical research thus suggests that platformization of B2B markets is less likely to result in the same ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamics often observed in B2C contexts.

Towards a contextual perspective

Most empirical research indicates that the differences between B2C and B2B platforms stem from the socioeconomic environments in which they operate. However, these findings have not been satisfyingly theorized. Most work still takes a platform-centric perspective, focusing on the managerial strategies that platform organizations use to obtain or defend leadership positions (Arnold et al., 2025; Cusumano et al., 2019; Ozalp et al., 2022). Less attention is paid to how these strategies are themselves shaped by the social, cultural, and economic contexts in which platform organizations emerge and operate. Such an approach, however, risks overemphasizing the strategic latitude of individual organizations, while missing systematic differences between platformization in business and consumer contexts.

We contribute to recent scholarship aiming to decentre platform organizations and conceptualize ‘actually existing platformization’ (Popiel and Vasudevan, 2024) within concrete social, cultural, and economic contexts. To better delineate our own approach, we briefly discuss the most notable frameworks in a broader turn to context in platform studies.

The most common terminology to discuss platforms in their contexts has been that of ‘ecosystems’. However, while drawing attention to a broader set of actors, most ecosystem approaches remain platform-centric. Indeed, the most common approach defines ecosystems as a set of actors coordinated around the (modular) products of a focal firm (Autio et al., 2014; Jacobides et al., 2018) – often a platform organization (Hein et al., 2020; Parker et al., 2017). Even approaches that define ecosystems around an interdependent set of activities rather than on the basis of affiliation with a core actor only consider the activities necessary to realize a focal value proposition (Adner, 2017). By focusing on affiliation and activity alignment, these approaches downplay actors and activities that represent competing developments or oppositional forces. Recent work in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and media studies improves on that by defining platform ecosystems (e.g. the Western platform ecosystem) as ‘an assemblage of networked platforms’ (van Dijck et al., 2018, 4) that governs the everyday practices of their users. This approach is more attentive to the wider social and cultural effects of platformization (Nieborg and Poell, 2018; Poell et al., 2019) and the agency of non-platform actors including ‘[g]overnments, incumbent (small and large) businesses, individual entrepreneurs, nongovernmental organizations, cooperatives, consumers, and citizens’ (van Dijck et al., 2018: 4). Nonetheless, it mainly examines the expansion and infrastructural power of platform organizations, particularly Big Tech firms (Helmond et al., 2019; Plantin et al., 2018).

Approaches in sociology and political economy more clearly focus on contextual factors. Several studies have examined regulatory responses to platformization on the national and EU-level in terms of a Polanyian double-movement between platform-based marketization and a re-embedding of platform markets in society (Cioffi et al., 2022; Cohen, 2020; Grabher and König, 2020). Another line of work compares platformization processes in different institutional settings (Boon et al., 2019; Davis and Sinha, 2021; Thelen, 2018). Findings highlight the enabling and constraining influence of both cultural factors and regulatory battles involving shifting alliances between platform organizations, users, incumbents, regulators, and others (Culpepper and Thelen, 2020; Garud et al., 2022; Li, 2024). Although it has much to recommend it, this is best suited to comparing the expansion of platform firms across national or regional institutional settings rather than across sectors or industries with substantially different purposes, actor types, and orientations. It is this gap that our field perspective on platformization seeks to close by building on recent work with similar intentions (Esposito, 2024; Hendrikse et al., 2018; Kirchner and Schüßler, 2020; Pernicka and Schüßler, 2022; Seibt, 2024).

Platforms and fields

The success or failure of platforms cannot be adequately explained by technical properties or managerial decisions alone but must be understood in relation to the specific social, economic, and cultural contexts in which platform organizations are embedded. We conceptualize these contexts as strategic action fields (SAFs) (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). ¹ This perspective foregrounds that what platform organizations do and are able to accomplish is shaped by their position within contested social arenas characterized by specific actor constellations, relational networks, stakes, power relations, and rules. It further posits that actors actively interpret these field structures and engage in strategic action to challenge or defend the status quo.

Fligstein and McAdam define SAFs as follows:

A strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field. (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 9)

Building on this definition, we conceive of social action in fields as structured by five closely interrelated dimensions: (1) actors, (2) their patterns of interaction and mutual awareness, and their shared understandings about the field's (3) purposes, (4) power relations, and (5) rules.

SAFs are further characterized as dynamic social arenas in which stability and change result from the interlinking activities of actors pursuing their respective interests. Although actors share a general understanding of the field's structures, they are able to reflect on the situation and maintain or improve their position through skilful social action and the use of available resources (Fligstein, 2001). The interpretive frames and strategies actors adopt in this ongoing struggle are influenced by their relative positions. Three types of positions can be distinguished. Incumbents have strong resource endowments that allow them to shape the rules of the game and capture most of the field's rewards, which in turn motivates them to defend the status quo. Challengers have fewer resources and less influence, prompting them to seek opportunities to contest the existing field order. Internal governance units (IGUs), such as professional bodies or standard-setting organizations, oversee and often enforce rule compliance. Moreover, SAFs are embedded in a web of other fields, which influence their dynamics. Among these, state fields are especially important, as state actors are uniquely entitled to set general rules to which actors in other fields must abide.

Our view of fields as contested social arenas underpins our understanding of platformization, which we define as the gradual reorganization of fields along the technical and organizational architecture of digital platforms, resulting in the rise of platform organizations to incumbent positions (Seibt, 2024). This is consistent with other definitions (Helmond, 2015; Poell et al., 2019) but emphasizes the structuring influence of social contexts rather than the agency of singular actors. This perspective enables us to establish a framework for comparing platformization dynamics across contexts. For instance, linking the five field dimensions to the literature reviewed above begins to explain the systematic differences between platformization in business and consumer fields.

Actors: In business fields, a platform’s potential users and complementors are business organizations rather than individuals, meaning that platform procurement and implementation are subject to formal rules and procedures rather than personal preference. Moreover, users and complementors are fewer and more heterogeneous than in mass consumer markets.

Interaction and Mutual Awareness: Business fields are often characterized by long-standing rivalries and partnerships between organizations, involving intense mutual awareness between them. Accordingly, intermediation by platforms may be valued less, alternative sources of services may be available, and political coalitions against platforms may form more easily.

Purposes: Business fields revolve around an economic logic, meaning that potential users and complementors will primarily evaluate platforms based on their economic usefulness. Moreover, business organizations are typically concerned with large-scale, high-reliability operations, adding further requirements, especially when cooperation across multiple organizations is involved.

Power Relations: In business fields, the bargaining power of platform users tends to be considerably higher than in B2C contexts, owing to the larger resource endowments of business firms (e.g. financial resources, installed technological base, and specialized competencies) and the smaller number of potential users in comparison to consumer markets.

Rules: Business fields often feature complex regulatory landscapes and informal norms orienting professional practices. As these rules co-evolve with the field, they may be tailored to the interests of incumbents and materialized in existing product architectures and material infrastructures, putting newcomers at a disadvantage.

We note that these five dimensions, while analytically distinguishable, work together in structuring social action in fields. Their relationship is not one of linear causality but of recursivity and mutual constitution. For instance, powerful incumbents may shape the formal and informal rules of legitimate action which, in turn, help reproduce their dominance. From this perspective, transformation processes in SAFs arise from complex configurations of factors and their interpretation by strategic actors rather than simple cause-effect relations.

Depending on their configuration, some fields may be more or less conducive to platformization, resulting in the variation of observable processes and outcomes, including between business and consumer markets. To capture the range of potential outcomes, we conceptualize platformization as a gradual process in which the reorganization of fields along platform architectures is realized to different degrees, resulting in different positions for platform organizations. Platform organizations may enter the field but fail to establish viable platform architectures, leading them to either exit or fully adapt to the existing field order, making them indistinguishable from established organizations. These challenges may still trigger gradual field transformation but are best described as platform shutout. Platform organizations may also remain in challenger positions for long periods, sustained by cross-subsidization or venture capital. We refer to this as marginal platformization. Even where platform organizations assume incumbent positions, they may share these with non-platform organizations in hybrid arrangements or dominate only within specific subfields. We call this partial platformization. Finally, one or a few platform organizations may establish monopolistic or oligopolistic positions, becoming the field's undisputed incumbents in a development we term full platformization. Even then, some field actors and activities typically remain unaligned with platform architectures, preventing full incorporation of the field into platform operations. ²

Research design, materials, and methods

Our empirical study explores platformization in three business fields – logistics, mechanical component manufacturing, and orthopaedic technology – using a multiple case study design (Yin, 2018). The three case studies were initially conducted and analysed independently, each focusing on a field considered a front-runner in B2B platform development (Butollo and Schneidemesser, 2022; Butollo et al., 2024; Helwing et al., 2023; Seibt, 2023a, 2023b; Verfürth and Helwing-Hentschel, 2025). These studies revealed substantial, although varying, challenges to B2B platform establishment, resulting in platformization dynamics that differed from those reported for B2C contexts.

We subsequently conducted a cross-case comparison using the shared analytical framework described above. This allowed us to identify similarities and differences between platformization processes and to link them to the structural features of the respective fields, thereby moving toward a middle-range theory of platformization. We note that reusing qualitative data (Bishop and Kuula-Luumi, 2017) and synthesizing single-case studies is increasingly common in the social sciences (Hoon, 2013). In our case, this approach was justified by the clear empirical and methodological commonalities between the initial studies.

Empirically, all cases represent early examples of platform entry into business fields. All fields were relatively stable prior to platform establishment, and all platforms were initially designed as transaction platforms mediating buyer-supplier relations. However, field configurations varied across the five dimensions outlined above, featuring different actors (e.g. number and size of organizations), interaction patterns (e.g. strength and structure of social networks), purposes (e.g. production vs. delivery), power relations (e.g. bargaining power of buyers and sellers), and rules (e.g. form and strength of regulation).

Methodologically, all studies share an exploratory and qualitative design reflecting the novelty of the phenomenon. Data collection primarily relied on semi-structured interviews, with other methods providing background knowledge. Interviews covered the key actor groups in each field ³ : platform organizations, their complementors and users, non-platform incumbents and challengers, and field-internal governance units including regulatory and professional bodies and other experts (see Appendix 1). Most interviews were conducted in Germany.

The logistics case comprises 37 interviews conducted between 2020 and 2024 with 11 platform organizations, five platform users, four complementors, three organizations that act as both platform users and complementors, and 11 other experts not affiliated with platform organizations (e.g. trade unionists and works council representatives). The mechanical component manufacturing study is based on 33 interviews conducted between 2020 and 2023 with five platform organizations, seven platform complementors, three non-platform challengers, two non-platform incumbents, and eight other experts. It also draws on an online survey (2022) among 59 component manufacturers asking about their cooperation with digital manufacturing platforms. The orthopaedic technology case study comprises 19 interviews conducted between 2020 and 2023 with five platform organizations, two complementors, four users, and three non-platform challengers. Background knowledge was gained through another 85 expert interviews conducted as part of an extensive research project on the digitalization of orthopaedic technology (2015–2020) and a subsequent ethnography of a platform development project with participation in 115 meetings (2020–2023). In all cases, research was supplemented by an analysis of newspaper articles, press statements, company websites, annual reports, and policy documents to contextualize interviews and triangulate findings. Despite slight variations in the focus of data collection, the relevant information for a field analysis was thus covered in each case.

The 89 interviews used in the present paper were recorded, transcribed, and analysed using qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2014). While our initial analysis was guided by a coding scheme deduced from our analytical framework, we subsequently complemented this approach with inductively derived categories to capture the empirically salient characteristics of platformization dynamics in each field.

In a first step, we analysed each case using a shared coding scheme including the five field dimensions (actors, interaction and mutual awareness, purposes, power relations, rules) as well as the main elements of platform architectures (platform organization, platform infrastructure, platform users and complementors, platform interfaces, platform rules). This enabled us to identify empirical patterns linking platform development to field characteristics. From these patterns, we derived a second set of codes describing field characteristics that limited platformization in each of the cases (e.g. complexity of legacy systems, trust-based coordination, and uneven data availability). In a second round of analysis, we applied these inductive codes across cases, enabling systematic comparison of platformization dynamics in all three fields. This proved crucial for re-evaluating our findings from single-case analyses. For example, it revealed that some factors (e.g. degree of product standardization) had diverging effects across fields, while some that had originally escaped attention (e.g. complexity of user organizations) could be identified in multiple cases. This comparative analysis led us to revise and condense the arguments developed in our initial case studies to arrive at more general statements about the limits of platformization related to each of the five field dimensions. These statements thus represent the outcome of a stepwise abstraction process moving from within-case to cross-case analyses and from empirical patterns to more general conceptual explanations.

Results

In this section, we analyse the ongoing platformization processes in logistics, mechanical component manufacturing, and orthopaedic technology. For each field, we outline its status quo at the time of platform entry and examine how the subsequent platformization dynamics relate to each field dimension. We highlight both relevant transformations and limits of reorganization, ending each case study with a summary and evaluation of the current degree of platformization.

Logistics (LG)

Logistics – understood as the planning and control of the movement and storage of goods (Coe, 2014) – plays a dual role in the global economy. It is both a key component of supply chains across various industries and a distinct field in its own right (Coe, 2021). Since the early 2010s, several transaction and service platforms have emerged in the field, particularly operating in the road freight segment. This subfield has long been characterized by widespread outsourcing and the crucial role of third-party logistics providers (3PL), which broker freight orders between industrial and retail companies and a diverse set of logistics firms, ranging from global corporations to SMEs. Digital logistics platforms now challenge the incumbency of 3PLs by assuming their intermediary role between industrial and retail companies (users ⁴ ) that place freight orders and logistics firms (complementors) that transport these goods. Logistics platforms primarily aim to improve transactions between these actors through data processing and algorithmic coordination, especially in relatively standardized services, such as the full truck load (FTL) segment. Moreover, some platforms, particularly so-called digital freight forwarders, go beyond matchmaking. By offering data-based services such as automated route management and digital invoicing, they aim to develop into comprehensive freight management service providers, described by one platform manager as a ‘digital end-to-end solution for the entire transport process’ (LG_6).

Actors

The key actors in European road freight logistics include industrial and retail companies that outsource logistics operations, large 3PL companies that offer a full range of logistics services but also subcontract parts of their operations, and a multitude of SMEs that provide specialized logistics services. Overall, this is a relatively large field, with more than 500,000 transport companies, comprising a few large incumbents and a large number of SMEs with fewer than 50 employees (Toelke and McKinnon, 2021: 7).

A recurring observation from the interviews is that, while the sheer number of actors creates opportunities for improved matchmaking, the lack of standardization across firms poses a challenge for logistics platforms. Effective collaboration between platform organizations, users, and complementors depends on the use of digital technologies. However, the digitalization of logistics remains incomplete and highly fragmented, partly due to the complexity of decision-making within firms. Within each user and complementor organization, the adoption of technologies, such as digital data communication software or vehicle telematics software, must be legitimized with regard to diverse formal rules, procedures, and economic goals. Moreover, decisions often hinge on negotiations involving multiple firms with different interests. For instance, one platform user described the platform's requirement of fully digital processes as incompatible with customer preferences: ‘I still have customers who want paper, who want their own waybill with their logo and signature on it […] and the platform simply can’t process that’ (LG_30).

Interaction and mutual awareness

The high level of mutual awareness in the logistics sector limits platforms’ ability to establish stable and exclusive relationships with user organizations. Several of our interviewees emphasized that platform start-ups must build relations with potential users and complementors through cold outreach (Seeßle, 2021). User acquisition is challenging, however, as industrial and retail companies maintain long-standing relationships with incumbent 3PL companies, based on shared routines and trust. By contrast, platforms are often viewed merely as additional service providers. As one platform user explained: ‘In the first step, we always use our own network of companies that we have known for years and work with extensively; everything beyond that runs through the platform’ (LG_19). Likewise, complementors use multiple channels to acquire freight orders, further complicating the platforms’ efforts to establish exclusive relationships.

Purposes

The overarching purpose of the logistics field is a cost- and time-efficient flow of goods. This economic orientation is particularly evident in the road freight segment, where market entry barriers are low, and competition among 3PL companies and carriers is intense. Platform organizations seek to establish themselves by promising enhanced transparency, automation, and efficiency across the entire supply chain. However, the insufficient standardization of datasets, infrastructures, and practices across user and complementor organizations complicates these attempts.

Platform efforts to optimize transport processes and centralize information flows are hampered by their lack of user data and the physical infrastructure for handling complex transports. Decision makers at platform organizations thus felt the need to invest in further optimizing databases and algorithms and diverge from asset-light business models by building their own logistical expertise and infrastructure. Moreover, some platform organizations move beyond matchmaking by offering digital infrastructure services, software, and telematic systems to complementors (LG_14, 31, 33).

Power relations

Power relations in logistics are characterized by the entrenched position of incumbent 3PL companies, which broker between industrial and retail companies on the one hand and subordinated logistics companies on the other. These companies are able to leverage their field-specific resources such as an installed technological base, physical assets, and existing business relationships to fend off potential challengers, including platform organizations.

To successfully challenge incumbents, platform organizations rely on the large-scale adoption of their platform by users and complementors to generate network effects and aggregate user data. However, our interviews reveal that so far platform power has remained limited. First, platform organizations are restricted in their ability to reach ‘the critical point of generating sufficient data’ (LG_1), which constrains their ability to develop novel services to distinguish themselves from incumbent 3PL companies. Second, the field's relational structure enhances the bargaining power of platform users. As carriers often maintain business relations with several 3PL firms in addition to platform organizations, they have multiple options for selling their services. That makes it difficult for platform organizations to generate lock-in effects or unilaterally impose business terms such as the mandatory real-time tracking of carriers. On the contrary, platforms must respond to the technical and organizational requirements of their users to compete against incumbent 3PL companies.

The outcome of the power struggle between 3PL companies and digital platforms thus depends on the relative value of the resources they hold. While the former primarily rely on physical infrastructures, logistical expertise, and established business relationships, the latter seek to leverage digital technologies. In this context, incumbents have recently begun to develop their own digital solutions to counter challengers, while some platform organizations have invested in physical infrastructure to cancel out the incumbents’ advantage (LG_31).

Rules

The regulation of European road freight logistics focuses on operations and labour (e.g. driver rights, driving times, cabotage, environmental regulations, and tolls). However, platform uptake is hindered less by formal rules than by informal professional practices surrounding data exchange and technology use. Two notable examples highlighted by our interviewees include the limited use of GPS tracking by complementors and the widespread subcontracting of freight orders. Both practices complicate data collection and sharing along the value chain, limiting the ability of logistics platforms to generate value through data-driven approaches.

Platform organizations therefore design their terms and conditions in ways that require users and complementors to introduce and use digital technologies, such as the platforms’ software and GPS tracking devices for trucks, which one interviewee (LG_31; Verfürth and Helwing-Hentschel, 2025) described as the key mechanism to unlock data access. Similarly, to ensure direct data exchange between the platform and its complementors, some platform organizations prohibit complementors from subcontracting orders. However, the power of logistics platforms to enforce these rules is limited, in particular due to weak lock-in effects (see Logistics (LG), Power relations).

Summary: platformization of logistics

In summary, digital platforms in the road freight segment have emerged as relevant challengers to incumbents, particularly in relatively standardized logistics services. However, platform organizations face significant field-specific hurdles in establishing themselves in the market, primarily due to limited data access and high competition from incumbents. This reflects a partial platformization, in which incumbent firms and challenging platform organizations coexist. Moreover, positions gradually converge, as incumbents increasingly mimic certain features of digital platforms, while platform organizations slowly shift from asset-light business models toward more conventional approaches.

Mechanical component manufacturing (MCM)

Mechanical components made from metal or plastics are crucial for many manufacturing industries such as automotive, electronics, and mechanical engineering. Their production can occur in-house or be outsourced to specialized manufacturers. Outsourcing grew rapidly with the introduction of lean production in the 1990s and the increasing heterogeneity of products across industries, resulting in a large number of component manufacturers. Recently, several dozen platform organizations have entered the field. They aim to reduce frictions in supply chain transactions by improving the matchmaking between industrial buyers (users) and component manufacturers (complementors). However, platforms still mediate only a small share of transactions in this field. Many are not yet profitable and rely on investor funding to sustain operations.

Actors

The MCM field is populated by diverse organizations. Industrial buyers of different sizes and from various industries outsource production to component manufacturers. Some component manufacturers are large system suppliers producing high volumes of metal or plastic parts (e.g. for the automotive industry), but the vast majority are SMEs offering small batches of customized parts or prototypes. As the field spans several industries, its boundaries are blurred, and its size is difficult to determine. In Germany, there are approximately 21.000 companies active in intermediate goods manufacturing, many of which produce metal and plastic components (Destatis, 2025: n.p.).

This actor constellation offers opportunities for platform organizations to improve matchmaking and reduce transaction costs. Indeed, several start-ups position themselves as intermediaries between component manufacturers and industrial customers, aiming to become a ‘one stop shop for manufacturing on demand’ (MCM_9), as one prominent platform promises. Platforms do, however, face competition from so-called online contract manufacturers, who use digital technologies to offer flexible in-house production capabilities while automating component sourcing workflows for direct customers.

Interaction and mutual awareness

In MCM, the patterns of interaction and mutual awareness are shaped by the diverse requirements of industrial production. For industrial companies engaging in mass production, a stable supply of components is crucial. Therefore, they typically rely on direct, long-term relationships with component suppliers based on shared routines and trust. However, in product development and small series production, responsiveness and speed outweigh long-term relationships.

This pattern shapes the scope of platformization. Platform organizations have entered the high mix, low volume segment and gained some foothold there, but have remained excluded from the high-volume market, where trust-based, direct supplier relationships dominate. More generally, intimate knowledge of the field and its relational networks is a precondition for successful platform establishment, as several platform founders emphasized, who had previously worked in procurement or engineering roles at component manufacturers or industrial buyers (MCM_4, 9, 18). Similarly, even those component manufacturers who sell through platforms maintain direct customer relationships in parallel and mainly use platform-mediated sales to improve capacity utilisation (MCM_10-14). Particularly for component manufacturers from Eastern Europe and Asia, this use of platforms is an opportunity to expand their international reach, which had previously been constrained by customer preference for stable, trust-based, and mostly intra-regional supplier relationships (MCM_13, 33).

Purposes

The purpose of the field of MCM is to offer outsourcing options to industrial firms. Mechanical component manufacturers therefore aim to cost-effectively provide components that match customer specifications in terms of product features, quality, and lead time. If costs or quality would not justify outsourcing, this would threaten the business model of component manufacturers and the existence of the field as a whole.

Throughout the analysed materials, platform organizations frame their value proposition in these terms, promising to increase efficiency through the improved mediation of production contracts. The CEO of one platform organization described high mix, low volume orders as the ‘sweet spot’ where they can deliver on this promise and remarked: ‘we focus on customers who have a recurring need to get different designs produced in small quantities’ (MCM_8). This market segment is known for limited market transparency, time-consuming searches for contractors, laborious communication, and manual preparation of quotations and manufacturability tests. Platforms promise a process where users simply upload technical drawings with product specifications, and complementors receive these orders via an online portal. As the CEO of one of the largest platforms explained: ‘you access the website, upload diverse 3D or CAD [computer-aided design] models, then you receive an offer with lead times and prices within seconds. Additionally you receive feedback on the feasibility of your project’ (MCM_9). The realities of intermediation lag behind such technological visions, however. Complementor onboarding, production preparation, and quality control still involve significant amounts of human interactions and manual handling of orders. As platform organizations currently impose few requirements on data sharing and data formats to attract new users, their employees frequently need to interact with the contracting parties to ensure manufacturability (MCM_4, 18). The CEO of a company that combines in-house component manufacturing with the development of pricing software applications points out the current weaknesses of the platform's business models (MCM_21). According to him, automated quotations based on machine learning only deliver rough approximations that employees need to check manually. Consequently, the transaction cost gains that determine the margins for platform-based mediation services remain flat. Conventional sourcing remains competitive under these circumstances, and the expansion of platforms remains dependent on venture capital and the expectations of future market dominance.

Power relations

The competitive pressures for component manufacturers are high, given the large number of producers globally with comparable and relatively limited technological capabilities. This leads to asymmetrical power relations between industrial buyers and mechanical component manufacturers, which limit the latter's room for manoeuvre and squeeze their profit margins.

These conditions also affect platform organizations. Since they serve as formal contracting partners for both sides, users exert the same price pressure on platforms, as they do on component manufacturers. As platform companies have not (yet) established themselves as exclusive mediators, they cannot easily hand down this pressure to their complementors. Indeed, while platforms depend on component manufacturers as complementors, the latter maintain direct customer relations in parallel to platform-mediated sales (MCM_10-14). In the future, cross-side network effects may shift these power relations in favour of platform organizations. However, for the time being, the presence of strong direct ties between potential users and complementors limits their ability to exert pressure on either side (Butollo et al., 2024).

Rules

MCM is a relatively weakly regulated field. Internal governance units play a marginal role, although ISO certification is required for certain order types. Instead, component manufacturers mainly need to navigate the rules relevant to customer organizations, which belong to diverse industries such as furniture, medical equipment, or automotive.

Formal or informal rules thus pose no significant entry barriers. On the contrary, platform organizations themselves seek to establish a more stringent set of rules for users and complementors to fulfil customer requirements and secure profitability and control. First, platforms require complementors to hold quality certifications and submit general information about their services. Second, platforms demand that all contracts need to be mediated through the platform, and components need to be physically sent to the platform organization's offices before being forwarded to customers. This prevents direct interactions between users and complementors, enables quality checks, and allows the platform organization to maintain control over the transaction process (MCM_6). Third, platform organizations are allowed to acquire the data generated in those transactions including information like prices, specifications, and lead times as well as technical drawings of the sourced components. These can be used to train algorithms for automated quotations and manufacturability testing and therefore constitute an important asset for platform organizations (Butollo and Schneidemesser, 2021). Although platform organizations have limited leverage to enforce these conditions (see Mechanical component manufacturing (MCM), Power relations), they are still able to negotiate some rules, particularly where they do not diverge greatly from established practices. For example, companies are used to sharing data on transactions, including technical drawings and specifications of components. Such data can be aggregated by platforms in order to refine their services. The CEO of one of the largest companies explained: ‘Over one million CAD files were processed with our self-learning algorithm, which means it collected a great amount of data. This helps us to improve our algorithms’ (MCM_9).

Summary: platformization of mechanical component manufacturing

Digital platforms have emerged as relevant challengers in the MCM field, if only in the high mix, low volume segment. However, their foothold in this field is limited, and building sustainable business models remains difficult. Although the field's fragmented actor constellation affords opportunities for intermediation and regulation that pose few barriers, the preference for long-standing, trust-based supplier relations among industrial customers undercuts the platforms’ power position and ability to enforce novel rules. Platforms also struggle to demonstrate new ways of achieving field-specific purposes, as matchmaking remains labour-intensive. With regard to the wider field, we thus observe a marginal platformization with many (but not all) platforms still dependent on venture capital. In the future, a partial platformization is possible, with some platforms establishing themselves as one sourcing option among many.

Orthopaedic technology (OT)

Orthopaedic technology encompasses the design, manufacture, and fitting of prostheses, orthoses, and other devices supporting individuals with musculoskeletal injuries or disabilities. While such devices have existed since antiquity, OT emerged as a craft-based professional field in the 19th century, when large-scale warfare and advances in medicine increased demand for assistive devices. In the 20th century, the vast number of injuries caused by two World Wars spurred partial industrialization, resulting in the field's current division of labour: Industrial manufacturers produce standardized components, while smaller OT firms manually assemble and fit them to individual users and produce custom products for specific needs. Over the past decade, numerous start-ups have emerged that promote the digitalization of orthopaedic manufacturing through technologies like 3D scanning, 3D modelling, and 3D printing (Seibt, 2023b). Among these challengers, some have developed B2B platforms that mediate between craft-based workshops, as user organizations, and digital service providers, as complementors.

Actors

The OT field in Germany encompasses a few industrial manufacturers and around 2000 SMEs. Large manufacturers rely on their engineering expertise and use industrial machinery for scaled production, while smaller firms are headed by certified prosthetists and orthotists (CPOs) and use manual methods for producing and fitting custom devices. The activities of both incumbent groups are overseen by various governance units including professional associations, testing laboratories, notified bodies, and insurance companies. Recently, a group of challengers has emerged that includes providers of 3D scanners, 3D printers, CNC carvers, and specialized software, as well as 3D modelling and printing services. Notably, some firms now offer platforms that integrate these tools into so-called ‘digital workshops’ that promise CPOs a unified digital environment covering the entire production process from 3D scanning of patients to digital modelling of bespoke orthopaedic devices, to the digital manufacturing of those devices using 3D printing.

Platform adoption, however, is limited by the characteristics of field actors. On the user side, many CPOs view manual production in their own workshops as integral to their professional identity. They perceive digital workshops as ‘something completely unfamiliar that seems to be meant to replace your own craft’ (OT_4). More tech-savvy CPOs typically use an idiosyncratic mix of digital tools with little standardization across firms, creating integration challenges. In the absence of plug-and-play solutions, platform adoption requires costly onboarding, training, and customer support, with some platform organizations even setting up dedicated e-learning programmes. On the complementor side, technology providers are deterred by a field that one interviewee described as follows: ‘It's highly fragmented, it's highly regulated, you need to know too much, and it's a very small market’ (OT_13). Consequently, would-be platform organizations fail to attract a critical mass of complementors able to develop additional tools for their digital workshops. Instead, they frequently develop new applications in-house or in cooperation with select partners.

Interaction and mutual awareness

The OT field is relatively small, with dense interpersonal relationships. OT firms maintain long-term ties with component manufacturers, referring physicians, and customers, while sharing a collective identity fostered by professional apprenticeship programmes and professional associations. Extending this pattern, CPOs prefer building long-term, trust-based relationships with new business partners, and many have begun to build such ties with select digital technology providers despite initial scepticism.

Our interviews clearly show that these expectations regarding business relations strongly affect platformization dynamics. Platforms seek to mediate between a fragmented group of OT firms and the diverse population of new digital technology providers – such as firms offering 3D printing, scanning, or modelling software. However, even those CPOs open to digital technologies prefer to develop direct relations with chosen providers. As one CPO remarked:

We are examining how the manufacturers operate: Do I have good service behind this? Are they interested in developing things together? […] Is this a collaborative project? Do they even understand […] what I want from them? (OT_11)

This preference for cautious market probing and trust-based partnerships reduces the scope for platforms to broker novel connections or act as exclusive mediators. Therefore, while platforms offer access to multiple digital services, they do not replace other forms of coordination and platform organizations struggle to occupy central positions in relational networks.

Purposes

Actors in OT aim to provide end-users with high-quality assistive devices. Their pride in delivering effective care tempers the field's economic logic. Nonetheless, views diverge on how this purpose should be fulfilled. Industrial manufacturers follow an engineering approach emphasizing science-based design and large-scale production. Smaller firms follow a craft logic prioritizing customization, manual production, and ongoing customer relations.

The interviews indicate that platform organizations attempt to align with the logic of CPOs, their main user group. They promise to integrate digital tools into unified workflows that increase efficiency while enabling customization beyond the offerings of industrial manufacturers. However, reconciling the requirements of customization and consistent quality proved challenging. For instance, platform scope was limited because some applications, such as mass customization and virtual testing, remained tied to specific product classes. As one interviewee explained: ‘If [designers] have only considered ankle-foot orthoses and now you want a scoliosis brace, that doesn’t work’ (OT_3). Similarly, the promised patient-care benefits of digital manufacturing, such as lightweight design, proved difficult to realize within the limits of entrenched design conventions and reimbursement schemes, often prompting CPOs to ‘revert to established practices’ (OT_4). Platform organizations, in short, struggle to align with the field's dual purpose of producing orthopaedic devices that are both clinically convincing and economically viable.

Power relations

Power is asymmetrically distributed between industrial manufacturers and smaller OT firms. The latter are hard-pressed as the growing standardization of orthopaedic devices and a shortage of skilled labour erode the status of craft-based production, while industrial manufacturers buy up smaller firms or compete with them by offering manufacturing services for custom devices. Nevertheless, smaller firms remain indispensable for assembling and fitting components and manufacturing parts that require full customization, such as prosthetic sockets.

The digital transformation constitutes an opportunity to renegotiate these power relations. Scenarios range from a further automation of manual work, benefiting large manufacturers, to a resurgence of custom production, enabling CPO-led firms to leverage their professional knowledge (Seibt, 2023b). Platform organizations frame themselves as allies of smaller firms, highlighting the potential for customization. Those firms, however, usually combine platform services, unmediated outsourcing, and in-house (digital) manufacturing. This variability allows them to maintain autonomy and insist that ‘despite the new technological possibilities, the technician should retain full control over the entire process of service provision’ (OT_9). Platform organizations therefore cannot impose exclusive business terms but must facilitate diverse workflows and partial platform use. This limits lock-in effects and makes it challenging for platforms to sustain user engagement. Many platform organizations therefore remain reliant on venture capital and non-platform-related sales. Several providers have already been acquired by industrial manufacturers that have integrated their technologies into conventional business models. Thus, rather than disrupting established power relations, platforms risk being absorbed into incumbent businesses.

Rules

Orthopaedic technology is subject to stringent formal and informal regulation. Mass-produced products must be certified as medical devices, requiring extensive testing and clinical trials. Custom devices may only be produced by certified prosthetists and orthotists (CPOs) who rely on professional expertise to ensure product quality and safety. The reimbursement schemes of insurance companies further structure the field by defining product categories and billable rates.

A recurring finding is that the introduction of digital technologies created new regulatory grey areas. For example, ‘the current regulatory framework has not been designed with 3D-printing in mind’ (OT_3), making it unclear whether the mass-customized products promoted by digital platforms should be classified as mass-produced medical devices, custom one-offs, or something else. Similar concerns arose from the complex value chains created by platform intermediation and increased outsourcing. According to one interviewee, ‘digitalization has produced a complete organizational separation between individual areas and the decisive question, which is entirely unclear, is: Who bears what responsibility?’ (OT_3). Such legal ambiguities prompted various interest groups to lobby governance units and state agencies to influence future regulations. Some platform organizations viewed this situation as an opportunity to establish themselves in the field. Others perceived them as a further risk to their legitimacy with CPOs, who already feared that digitalized workflows and the unfamiliar materials of 3D-printed components would undercut their ability to evaluate product quality and safety. Data security was another concern, as CPOs hesitated to share data with platform organizations for fear of revealing proprietary knowledge or undermining customer trust. Consequently, data-driven business models were difficult to realize, leading some platform organizations to avoid storing user data altogether. Overall, building trust with a discerning group of users seemed to require long-term, personal relationships, making intermediation through platforms unattractive.

Summary: platformization of orthopaedic technology

The structure of the OT field creates strong barriers to platformization. The limited number, heterogeneity, and professional identities of potential users make platform implementation and onboarding costly and deter complementors. Dense interpersonal networks and a preference for long-term reliability prevent platforms from acting as exclusive matchmakers. The dual purpose of delivering effective care and retaining economic viability creates tough technical challenges. Powerful incumbent manufacturers threaten to acquire potential challengers, while smaller firms can bypass platforms through existing supplier ties or in-house production. Regulatory complexity and professional norms further limit platform uptake, creating legal uncertainties and constraining data-driven models. Consequently, platformization has so far remained marginal. Platforms occupy challenger positions, often sustained by venture capital, and instead of displacing incumbents, risk being absorbed into established businesses (platform shutout).

Discussion

We have argued that the processes and outcomes of platformization are shaped by the conditions of the strategic action fields in which they occur. In particular, our analysis reveals several factors that limit the platformization of fields centred on business-to-business (B2B) relations (for a summary, see Appendix 2). We now link these findings to the dimensions of the field construct and contrast them with findings on B2C and C2C platforms in consumer fields. While we map each factor onto a specific field dimension, we note that the limits of platformization we identify always result from a configuration of factors across more than one field dimension. Our framework should therefore be used as part of a holistic field analysis rather than a way of identifying linear cause-effect relations.

Actors

In business fields, platforms mediate between business organizations (B2B) rather than individual consumers, gig workers, or independent developers (B2C or C2C). They thus face users and complementors with distinct requirements and capabilities that present specific barriers to platform adoption, implementation, and use.

Compared to individual consumers, business organizations operate at a larger scale, are explicitly profit-oriented, and require internal negotiation and compliance with formal processes. Across our cases, these characteristics were associated with slower platform adoption processes and increased scrutiny of platform performance, reliability, and security, as illustrated by the lengthy decision processes observed in logistics. Even after formal adoption, ‘platform-readiness’ (Helmond, 2015) varies widely across organizations, posing implementation challenges. Consumer-facing platforms in fields like social media and e-commerce benefit from a ubiquitous and standardized infrastructure of smartphones, operating systems, and web browsers that enable ‘plug-and-play’ solutions. In contrast, business organizations often rely on highly specialized systems with little standardization across firms. This requires additional efforts, such as developing interfaces between platform and legacy systems, implementing security measures, or acquiring additional software and hardware (e.g. telematic systems in logistics). Further, some organizations lack the skills to run the implemented technologies effectively (e.g. 3D scanning and modelling in OT). As a result, B2B platform organizations have to invest more heavily than their consumer-facing counterparts in individual customer support or e-learning programmes, as in the component manufacturing and OT cases.

Field size is another relevant factor. As noted by Anderson et al. (2022), B2B platforms often have fewer potential users than B2C or C2C platforms targeting mass consumer markets. This increases the bargaining power of each user organization (see Discussion, Power relations) while limiting platform scalability and potential network effects. This was evident in orthopaedic technology, where limited field size deterred developers of 3D-printable products, specialized software, and other services that could have acted as platform complementors. Similar effects applied in component manufacturing, where platforms also interact with hundreds of user organizations rather than millions of consumers. Logistics, however, represents an exception. With almost half a million transport companies and millions of potential users, the European road freight market offers considerable scaling opportunities. This variation in our cases suggests that the number of market participants does not limit platformization in all business fields, although being a limiting factor in some.

Limitation 1: The platformization of business fields is limited by the internal complexity of an often relatively small number of user organizations as well as the heterogeneity of their organizational and technical requirements and capabilities.

Interactions and mutual awareness

Business fields are characterized by dense networks of long-standing relationships and high levels of mutual awareness among actors. Across the three cases, these relational structures emerged as a central constraint for platform mediation. Unlike mass consumer markets, where platforms enabled new forms of interaction and mutual observation (Rochet and Tirole, 2006), these ingrained relational patterns leave little space for platforms to act as matchmakers or exclusive intermediaries.

While platforms reduced transaction costs to some degree in all observed fields, lock-in effects remained much weaker than in consumer-facing contexts (Cutolo and Kenney, 2021). User organizations maintained alternatives for accessing products and services, including the use of multiple platforms (all cases), in-house production (OT and component manufacturing), and direct sourcing (all cases). They also often prioritized long-term reliability and trust over short-term efficiency. Across cases, this preference for stability over efficiency limited the ability of B2B platforms to establish exclusive relationships. In logistics, transport companies and their customers upheld established partnerships and routinely used multiple transaction channels. In component manufacturing, reliability remained key, leading industrial manufacturers to favour direct, long-term supplier relationships, thus confining platforms to limited market segments. In the OT field, dense interpersonal networks limited platforms’ brokerage potential, while the professional identities of potential users fostered scepticism toward complementors. Taken together, these findings suggest that B2B platforms could not thrive by merely facilitating short-term market transactions. Instead, they had to navigate long-standing relational networks emphasizing stability and reliability. This challenge was more easily addressed, when platforms were initiated by field actors themselves, as in component manufacturing, where founders had prior field experience, or in logistics, where incumbents mimicked platform tactics. These observations indicate that dense relational networks play a decisive role in B2B platform dynamics, which has so far received limited attention in the literature, with few notable exceptions (Azzellini et al., 2022).

Limitation 2: In business fields, dense relational networks, high levels of mutual awareness, and a focus on long-term reliability limit the ability of platforms to act as exclusive intermediaries, thereby reducing the likelihood of lock-in effects.

Purposes

The economic logic of business fields, in principle, offers opportunities for platform organizations to improve operational efficiency and reduce transaction costs. However, while successful B2C platforms created new purposes for users and complementors (e.g. in the social media field) or radically new ways of fulfilling existing purposes (e.g. e-commerce, online booking), B2B platforms have not yet shown comparable disruptive effects.

Our empirical findings suggest that B2B platforms compete in domains where service provision requires specialized professional knowledge, such as that of logistics providers, certified prosthetists and orthotists, or mechanical component manufacturers. While platforms in these fields reduced transaction costs, the improvement of service quality, and the development of entirely new services, required practical, field-specific knowledge that platform organizations lacked. In our cases, platform organizations sought to acquire this expertise by working closely with individual customers (OT) and utilizing user data to enhance digital services (logistics, component manufacturing, cf. Madanaguli et al., 2023). However, unlike B2C platform users who often share data freely (Saura et al., 2021), business organizations were more reluctant due to concerns about data security (see Discussion, Rules) and preserving their competitive advantage (see Discussion, Power relations). This corresponds to the argument by Chabosseau and Dobeson (2025) that B2B fields may feature conceptions of data and data use that inhibit platform business models. However, component manufacturing represented a notable exception, as sharing technical drawings was already an established practice in the field.

Where platforms provided clear advantages to user organizations, these were limited to specific market segments: full truck load transports in logistics, high mix, low volume production in component manufacturing, and select product classes in OT. Similar limitations have been documented for B2C fields, such as live music booking (Azzellini et al., 2022), where service provision is complex and value difficult to quantify. By contrast, popular B2C platforms like Uber and Airbnb rose to prominence in fields where purposes were commensurable across large markets or market segments (Täuscher and Laudien, 2018). It remains unclear whether the confinement of B2B platforms to specific market segments will constitute a lasting limitation on their scalability and network effects, resulting in partial platformization, or whether they will function as niches where platforms gather momentum that enables future expansion.

Limitation 3: In business fields, where service provision is based on experiential knowledge, platforms struggle to develop radically improved solutions beyond specific market segments, particularly when they are unable to accumulate user data.

Power relations

In business fields, both incumbent service providers and users possess substantial resources that they can use in negotiations with platforms, internal governance units, and state actors. This contrasts with consumer fields, where powerful incumbents also exist (e.g. Pernicka and Schüßler, 2022) but individual users have virtually no influence over platform rules (Dolata, 2019), and user collectives may even represent a source of platform power (Culpepper and Thelen, 2020).

Across our cases, we observed that platforms encountered strong competition not only from one another but from powerful incumbent service providers. Incumbents benefited from installed infrastructures, social relations, financial resources, and regulatory alignment, typically enabling them to outcompete platform challengers. Where platforms gained ground, incumbents used their existing resources to develop their own platform solutions, as in logistics, or buy up platform start-ups, as in OT. SAF theory further predicts that when such market-based measures are insufficient, incumbents will lobby state actors or field-internal governance units to change or enforce rules to exclude platform organizations. The fact that we observed a few such activities, with some exceptions in OT, may indicate that incumbents did not yet view platforms as an existential threat.

A distinguishing feature of business fields is the powerful position of platform users, a pattern reflected in all three cases. In mass consumer fields, power asymmetries between platform organizations and individual users are overwhelming, giving the latter few opportunities to challenge platform rules. In business fields, this imbalance is much weaker. Platform organizations cannot rely on strong lock-in effects, while user organizations command considerable resources, including physical infrastructure, professional skills, and social ties with service providers. This weaker position prevents platform organizations from imposing strict rules on their users. This was evident in logistics, where users effectively resisted the platform requirement of sharing GPS data with carriers. Similarly, platforms in OT were forced to retain open architectures to facilitate idiosyncratic user practices and infrastructures. Taken together, these patterns indicate that in business fields, user organizations enjoy significant bargaining power, which constrains the ability of platforms to disrupt existing field structures.

Limitation 4: In business fields, potential users as well as incumbent service providers command significant resources to shape or resist platformization processes.

Rules

In business fields, the rules of the game tend to be more complex than in consumer fields. Whereas consumer products and services are standardized and governed by generic rules focused on customer protection, business offerings are highly heterogeneous, with terms of service negotiated between contracting parties. Under these conditions, platforms must align not only with formal regulations but also with informal norms governing professional activities and business interactions.

Although it is difficult to generalize about the relative strength of formal rules in consumer and business contexts, our case studies confirm that the strength of regulations (Ozalp et al., 2022; Thelen, 2018) and the ability of platform organizations to sidestep them (Garud et al., 2022; Li, 2024) impact platformization dynamics. In OT, regulation is relatively strong and centred on medical device quality and safety. Here, digital technologies and platform intermediation created regulatory ambiguities that offered platforms a foothold but simultaneously threatened their legitimacy. By contrast, in logistics and component manufacturing, regulation was weaker and posed no major obstacle to platform entry. Indeed, platforms themselves aimed to implement more stringent rules to facilitate scalability and control.

Our study particularly highlights the importance of informal rules and professional practices for platformization dynamics in business fields. To build legitimacy in business fields, platforms must navigate informal rules not only in interactions with incumbent service providers and potential complementors, such as Uber drivers (Nieuwland and Van Melik, 2020; Thelen, 2018), but also in negotiations with user organizations. For instance, in OT, user preference for manual production limited platform uptake. In logistics, ingrained subcontracting practices undermined the enforcement of platform requirements for data collection. By contrast, in component manufacturing, the sharing of technical drawings was common practice, allowing platforms to implement corresponding rules. Taken together, our results suggest that the need to align with informal rules, combined with the more symmetrical power relations described above, constrains the ability of platforms to establish and enforce ecosystem rules (Cusumano et al., 2019) that deviate substantially from established practices.

Limitation 5: In business fields, platformization is constrained by field-specific regulations and the informal rules governing the actions of potential platform complementors and users.

Overall, none of the cases we studied involved the disruptive effects associated with platformization in consumer contexts, and platform organizations have not yet assumed dominant positions akin to those in social media, e-commerce, transportation, or hospitality. Instead, we found varying degrees of platformization across the three examined fields. In logistics, platform organizations have established strong positions alongside non-platform incumbents, resulting in a partial platformization of the field. Incumbents increasingly adopt features of digital platforms, while platform organizations gradually move away from asset-light business models. In mechanical component manufacturing, digital platforms are confined to the high mix, low volume segment, with most remaining dependent on venture capital even in that niche. This indicates a marginal platformization with some potential for a partial platformization limited to a specific subfield. In the orthopaedic technology field, platformization remains marginal, with a tendency toward platform shutout. While platform organizations have significantly advanced the digitalization of the field through multiple innovations, they face persistent challenges to economic viability, with some reverting to traditional business models, being absorbed into incumbent organizations, or going out of business.

Conclusion

Our analysis of B2B platforms in three business fields reveals that platformization processes are shaped by field-specific structures including actor constellations, patterns of mutual awareness and interaction, and shared understandings about purposes, power relations, and the rules of the game. The platformization of business fields tends to be limited by the interplay of several factors. The internal complexity of user organizations and the heterogeneity of their organizational and technical requirements tend to impede standardized solutions. High degrees of mutual awareness and dense interaction patterns rooted in long-standing relational networks further restrict platformization, as they make it difficult for platform organizations to establish exclusive intermediary positions. The importance of experiential knowledge for service quality is another limiting factor, as platform organizations struggle to generate radically new or improved solutions, particularly when user data cannot be accumulated. Moreover, in B2B fields, platformization is limited by the fact that both potential users and incumbent service providers command significant resources to outcompete platforms and resist reorganization. Finally, platformization is constrained by the complexity of field-specific rules, where informal norms and practices may be more relevant than formal regulation.

In the observed cases, these factors have so far limited the influence of B2B platforms, confining them to specific market segments of varying sizes. Future platformization dynamics in the respective fields will partly depend on whether these segments will expand and whether platform organizations will be able to extend their operations to other areas. This, in turn, hinges on various factors, including the standardization of products and services and the digitalization of field-specific interactions and practices. It seems likely, however, that incumbent organizations, benefiting from traditional economies of scale and trust-based relational networks, will retain key positions in large segments of the investigated fields.

What are the implications of our findings for a theory of platforms and platformization? First, as emphasized above, we argue that research on platforms needs to move beyond platform-centric perspectives towards the investigation of platforms within larger socioeconomic contexts. If context-specific factors matter, it is insufficient to explain the dynamics and effects of platformization by focusing on the business models, technologies, or organizational characteristics of platforms themselves. As argued throughout this paper, a field perspective (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) is particularly suited to analyse the context in which platforms operate, as it enables a holistic view including the characteristics of heterogeneous actors as well as their social networks and shared understandings of relevant purposes, power relations, and rules.

Second, our analysis of the limits of platformization shows that mediation through platforms is not necessarily a more efficient mode of coordination, but one among several alternatives. In our cases, it proved superior for specific purposes and field segments, but was less suited for others. Instead of assuming an unhampered path towards platform dominance, researchers should focus on the interplay among multiple modes of coordination in strategic action fields.

Third, interpretations of platform capitalism or platform society remain shallow as long as they focus exclusively on successful examples of scalability and disruption, without examining the specific conditions and limits of platformization across differently structured fields. As we have shown, a disruptive platformization cannot be taken for granted in B2B contexts. Research needs to tackle the hybridizations and blendings of new organizational forms and the regular economy with its legacies and path dependencies in order to arrive at an apt characterization of capitalism in the 21st century.

Supplemental Material

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Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-pns-10.1177_29768624261458540 for The limits of platformization: A field perspective on the challenges of B2B platforms by David Seibt, Florian Butollo, Veronique Helwing-Hentschel, Lea Schneidemesser and Philip Verfürth in Platforms & Society

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Supplemental material, sj-pdf-2-pns-10.1177_29768624261458540 for The limits of platformization: A field perspective on the challenges of B2B platforms by David Seibt, Florian Butollo, Veronique Helwing-Hentschel, Lea Schneidemesser and Philip Verfürth in Platforms & Society