Based on an empirical comparison of peace processes in carbon-dependent economies over time, this article investigates the impact of decarbonization and the related declining availability of political finance on peacemaking. While the period of high oil prices in the mid-2000s saw a small number of peace deals that attempted comprehensive settlements, the decline of oil prices in the years from 2014 resulted in a new era of turbulence. The turbulence is characterized by a high number of peacemaking attempts that strongly lean toward conflict management rather than resolution. The reasons for this new turbulence are twofold: the available means for substantial “buy-in,” into a political marketplace by ruling elites in carbon-dependent conflictive political marketplaces have vanished while, at the same time, the strategic interest of international powers in geopolitical stability and their willingness and capability to invest in such stability has declined.
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