Formalising asymmetry: Cultural diplomacy and the UK–China film co-production agreement

Abstract

This article analyses the 2014 UK–China Film Co-production Agreement as a case of cultural diplomacy embedded in cultural and industrial policy, tracing its evolution across the Golden era of UK–China relations and their subsequent deterioration (2014–2022). The study is based on qualitative analysis of the agreement, policy documents, official statements and sectoral guidance that frame film co-operation as both cultural dialogue and strategic asset. The article examines how co-production was positioned as a ‘win–win’ mechanism capable of deepening mutual understanding, expanding market access and symbolising a modern, partnership-based relationship. It then shows how the agreement's implementation exposed divergent understandings of culture's role in theory and practice: a UK approach grounded in creative industries and cultural relations, and a Chinese approach closely tied to discourse power, national identity and cultural security. Cultural diplomacy and cultural security are treated as unevenly aligned agendas whose relationship depends on specific policy priorities, at times mutually reinforcing and at others operating with distinct aims, while nonetheless influencing one another. Conceptualising these differences in their cultural diplomacy codifications, as well as along a spectrum from defensive to generative cultural security, the article argues that the institutionalisation of film co-production reflects and formalises the limits of collaboration across diverging values and policy translations over the role of culture. The UK–China case illustrates both the appeal and the structural limits of using cultural co-operation as a transactional diplomatic resource, particularly across structural industry imbalances, in contexts of growing geopolitical tension, and heightened sensitivity around cultural narratives.

Keywords

UK–China relations film co-production film policy cultural security cultural diplomacy cultural relations Chinese film industry creative industries

Introduction

The UK–China Film Co-Production Agreement (FCDO, 2014) was signed at a moment of warming bilateral relations and expanding expectations around cooperation in the cultural and creative industries. Framed publicly as a win–win mechanism, the treaty promised mutual market access, strengthened cultural exchange, and a flagship form of cultural diplomacy through film. Yet in the years following its ratification, the agreement produced limited outputs and did not deliver the level of sustained collaboration anticipated in the early 2010s. This article argues that this gap between ambition and outcome is caused by the incompatibility of two fundamentally different cultural systems and approaches to cultural diplomacy. The agreement sits at the intersection between cultural diplomacy and cultural security agendas, two areas whose relationship is uneven and dependent on policy priorities: at times, they are mutually reinforcing, but often they operate with distinct aims while nonetheless influencing one another. While the UK model facilitates collaboration through arm's-length governance and support for independent producers, in the Chinese model film collaboration is structurally shaped by state-mediated industry participation, approval regimes, and cultural security concerns. In this context, the agreement did not so much simplify collaboration as formalise an asymmetric framework, embedding structural inequalities between the two sides in the very conditions of co-production.

Recent scholarship has begun to address the UK–China treaty directly. Shangguan, drawing on co-production theory (Morawetz et al., 2007; Hjort, 2010), characterises UK–China co-productions as ‘arranged marriages’ (Shangguan, 2013: 4), capturing the institutionally brokered nature of treaty-based collaboration and the mismatch of expectations. Building on this insight, this paper argues that the persistence of the imbalance is to be found in deeply divergent policy architectures and cultural security logics in the two countries. To clarify this, the article proposes a distinction between defensive and generative cultural security, highlighting how cultural cooperation can be simultaneously promoted for economic and diplomatic gain and constrained by sensitivities regarding narrative, identity and perceived ideological risk. Empirically, the article draws on qualitative analysis of the treaty and associated policy documents, official statements, and sectoral guidance, situating them within shifts in UK–China relations between 2014 and 2022. The analysis proceeds in three steps: first, it contextualises the treaty within the broader evolution of UK–China cultural exchange and the Golden Era; second, it examines how cultural diplomacy and cultural security are differently codified in the UK and China and how these differences translate into film policy; third, it demonstrates how these structural asymmetries shape the treaty's operation and limit its capacity to function as a stable platform for co-production.

Figure 1.

Defensive and general cultural security.

Context of the 2014 UK–China film co-production agreement

Film co-production refers to a joint film product that results from economic, artistic and/or technical collaboration between two or more countries and is considered a domestic film in the countries involved in the collaboration (Andersen, 1996). For the purposes of this study, I consider state-facilitated film co-productions, and the UK–China co-production agreement, as examples of cultural diplomacy between the UK and China. Cummings defines cultural diplomacy as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding’ (Cummings, 2009: 1). The two countries have a long-standing tradition of using culture and education as political and symbolic platforms for mutual understanding and advantage. The first engagement through the British Council started in 1941 (Fisher, 2009), and the first agreement on education and cultural cooperation was formalised in 1979 (Xu, 2018). In the years leading up to the agreement, film was playing a strategic role in cultural diplomacy for both countries. Between 1995 and 2010, the Chinese film industry saw the growth of private productions and co-productions; between 2006 and 2010, all the top 10 box-office hits in China were co-productions produced by private studios (Su, 2016). In the same years, the UK was also promoting co-productions through the British Film Institute (BFI) as avenues for broader market access for UK films, for further inward investment, and to build mutual trust.

A common objective for the UK–China agreement was to reinforce an existing, positively evolving relationship with stronger avenues for cooperation in the cultural and creative industries (Shangguan, 2013; Xu, 2018). The treaty was first conceived in 2013, signed in 2014, and ratified in 2015, at a time when the UK and China had registered a positive trend in the evolution of the bilateral relationship, which was branded as the Golden Era of Sino–British relations (HM Treasury, 2015). However, further to this common intention, there were also profoundly different ambitions that mirrored the structural needs and roles of the cultural industries in the two countries, which are reflected in both cultural diplomacy and cultural security frameworks. The British film industry regularly depends on bigger markets, like Hollywood, either to export its films or to invest in the UK's facilities, and China offered a promising new market to unlock (British Film Institute, 2012; Macnab, 2014). The initiative was largely developed by the BFI, and it was intended to lead to increased trust between the two countries, beginning with cultural relations (British Film Institute, 2012; FCDO, 2014). This idea resonates with the British Council's mission, as stated on their website, to ‘support peace and prosperity by building connections, understanding and trust between people in the UK and countries worldwide’ (British Council, 2024).

The Chinese government, on the other hand, did not have a particular need for further market expansion, especially in a relatively small market like the UK. Moreover, state-facilitated cultural diplomacy through film, such as official co-productions, tends to be a rather formal exercise, with strong oversight from the government, and often aimed at promoting China's soft power by strengthening positive narratives (Peng and Keane, 2015; Su, 2016; Kokas, 2017; Fang, 2024).

The co-production agreement as cultural diplomacy

Scholarship on Chinese film co-production has been dominated by analyses of China's relationship with Hollywood. Key studies examine how censorship, market access, and policy negotiation shape Sino–US film collaboration, often framing co-production as a site of both competition and interdependence (Kokas, 2017; Zhu, 2019). This literature also highlights the conceptual ambiguity of ‘co-production’ itself (Yang and Higbee, 2024: 121), which can refer to a wide range of practices, from low-budget independent collaborations to large-scale international blockbusters. Su conceptualises co-productions as market-driven partnerships, sites of policy negotiation, and experimental ventures, noting that political ideology, linguistic barriers, and divergent expectations often undermine their success (Su, 2016). Building on this line of critique, Shangguan draws on Morawetz and Hjort to characterise UK–China co-productions as ‘arranged marriages’ (Shangguan, 2013: 4), emphasising the extent to which such collaborations are institutionally brokered and shaped by asymmetric expectations rather than organic creative alignment. More recent scholarship has begun to examine China's co-production agreements with partners beyond the United States, including Hong Kong, Denmark, India, Italy and countries in the Global South and Northern Europe (Peng, 2015; Keane et al., 2018; Yang, 2020; Fu and Indelicato, 2017; Yang and Higbee, 2024; Zhai, 2024). What has not been adequately studied, however, is how China's co-production strategy intersects with co-production strategies in other countries, and how this intersection links to cultural diplomacy and cultural security approaches.

Cultural diplomacy in China and the UK

In the UK, the main official body responsible for cultural diplomacy is the British Council. This organisation, founded in 1934, operates at arm's length from the UK Government and is defined by Pamment and Åkerlund as a ‘semi-state organisation’ (Pamment and Åkerlund, 2025: 296). The British Council adopts a ‘cultural relations’ approach to cultural diplomacy (Devane, 2019: 4). The goal of the organisation is to establish long-lasting cultural relations between countries, at both the state and the people-to-people levels. Cultural relations, even among countries holding different values, are believed to lead to increased trust in the long term. They can be established through exchanges in education, the arts, science, and language learning. In addition to pursuing this value-driven mission of mutual understanding, the British Council's strategy also broadly aligns with priorities and trends in the UK's foreign policy (Devane, 2019; Singh, 2019). Therefore, at least in its intention, the cultural diplomacy strategy adopted by the UK, that of cultural relations, aspires to reciprocity in the relations it establishes (Singh, 2019).

In China, a similar function to that of the British Council is given to the Confucius Institutes. These institutes, presided over by Hanban until 2020, are accredited for teaching Mandarin across the globe, where they are usually associated with universities. Hanban, the former CI Headquarters, was a not-for-profit organisation with corporate status. However, the Chinese government covered the costs of its overseas expansion, as its strategy was in line with the government's agenda to increase Chinese soft power (Liu, 2018: 139). According to Liu, China's cultural diplomacy relies on ‘“culture”, [which] serves the purpose of reshaping China's image away from being the “cultural other”, and […] “political values” […] to change the perception of China as the “ideological other”’ (Liu, 2018: 131). However, given the clear governmental ambition behind cultural diplomacy, this is not always successful. According to some scholars, such as Shambaugh and Rosen, it is precisely the clear presence of government behind cultural diplomacy actions that causes a certain ineffectiveness of China's efforts in cultural diplomacy (Shambaugh, 2013; Rosen, 2019).

Besides the Confucius Institutes, China's cultural diplomacy tools include the media and, more relevantly for this study, cinema. Until recently, the Chinese government's strategy for film has focused on the role of international co-productions. These became particularly prominent in the 2010s, following a strengthening of the Chinese film market, which made it particularly attractive for international stakeholders, especially Hollywood (Su, 2016; Kokas, 2017). Beyond Hollywood, however, the Chinese government has encouraged international collaboration on film production by entering a series of international co-production agreements, in particular between 2004 and 2017, with various countries in Europe and beyond, including the UK in 2014. Film cooperation, among other avenues, has become one of the most attractive and successful tools for China's cultural diplomacy, particularly due to the attractiveness of its growing film market (Becard and Menechelli Filho, 2019).

The two countries, therefore, hold very different codifications of cultural diplomacy: one open, aimed at building networks for independent collaborations and the long-term construction of international trust, and the other much more rigid and explicitly linked to governmental presence. In the UK, the government's role in the cultural industries is one which limits itself to an enabler of a positive environment for cultural collaboration (Cabinet Office, 2021); in China, on the other hand, the government takes an active part in the cultural and creative process (Fang, 2024), and culture plays a politically strategic role in promoting governmental narratives. The tension between these two models has further manifested in recent years with the emergence of the concept of cultural security, its meaning and its translation into cultural diplomacy.

Cultural security

The concept of cultural security has recently gained popularity throughout the cultural diplomacy discourse and beyond, both in academia and policy. The relationship between cultural security and cultural diplomacy is established to varying drgrees depending on governmental priorities and approaches to culture and security. In some cases, cultural diplomacy strategies act as strategic instruments for cultural security objectives. Often, however, this relationship remains less explicit, or the two priorities act with separate aims, despite inevitably affecting one another. In the Canadian context, after culture was added as a pillar of foreign policy in the 1990s, Bélanger (1999) observed a tension between societal concerns about cultural security and the erosion of cultural identity stemming from globalisation, and governmental tendencies to prioritise an instrumental use of culture. This approach overlooked the security dimensions of culture, despite Canada's formal adoption of a human security framework. More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Cull observed a tendency among nation-states to merge cultural diplomacy and security objectives through practices such as ‘praising the self; criticizing the other; engaging others through gifts and a strategy of multilateral cooperation’ (Cull, 2022: 18), under a strategy he frames as ‘reputational security’ (Cull, 2022). Examining approaches to the protection of cultural heritage adopted by China and Russia, Pagani identifies cultural security priorities in the two countries’ cultural diplomacy strategies, for example in China's pursuit of cultural cooperation projects in countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative, and in its close engagement with organisations such as UNESCO for international recognition of its cultural heritage (Pagani, 2025). Finally, Pamment and Åkerlund observe a tension in European countries between the priorities of traditional cultural diplomacy actors, such as the British Council and the Goethe Institut and foreign policy priorities set by central governments, including with regard to security objectives (Pamment and Åkerlund, 2025).

Referring to the field of terrorism studies, Nemeth defines cultural security as ‘research, analyses, and strategies aimed at mitigating the exploitation of cultural property as a pawn in foreign relations and as a tool in acts of political violence and terrorism’ (Nemeth, 2007: 20). Others understand cultural security as part of human, or non-traditional, security (Watanabe, 2018; Wieviorka, 2018; Samier, 2015). Yan and Alsudairi identify some tensions between modernisation and securitisation drives. This is exemplified by tensions between the internalisation of culture (through overseas study and academic exchange) for prestige and recognition, and securitisation of culture aimed at preserving regime stability and ideological security (Yan and Alsudairi, 2018). This tension can also be applied to the film industry, where the government's push for international collaboration contrasts with protectionist policies aimed at preserving cultural security (Yang, 2016). Finally, Sakai and Chopin propose cultural security as an alternative classification of security, beyond national and human security paradigms, which protects communities and the culture that forms the basis of people's lives. They contend that, particularly in highly developed societies, community-level rights are at risk despite individual rights being guaranteed. Cultural security, therefore, is aimed at safeguarding the ties that hold communities together (Sakai and Chopin, 2021: 331).

With globalisation, culture became, or so it seemed, transnational. The constant exchange of images and information contributed to the depersonalisation and transnationalisation of cultural objects, and to a loss of the originality of local traditions. National efforts to construct cultural identities appeared superfluous and out-of-date in a constantly flowing, interconnected global reality (Berry, 2010; Su, 2016; Wieviorka, 2018). In contemporary society, however, counter-movements have emerged to protect culture, including visual culture, as a way of preserving social identity against the forces of globalisation. That is especially true in the case of minority cultures, which have been directly threatened with erasure and standardisation by globalisation processes. Languages and traditions have become increasingly perceived as threatened, and with them the societies, minorities and lifestyles attached to them. In the light of globalisation and neo-liberal forces, culture is therefore associated with strong emotional value and seen as a ‘“safety net” of one's identity’ (Watanabe, 2018: 5). Where culture is directly linked to identity, the threat of its erasure falls into the existential realm and can therefore be considered an aspect of human security.

The concept of cultural security, at its core, highlights how culture is deeply tied to identity, to the point that threats to culture are considered threatening a community's very existence. I build on Wieviorka's conceptualisation of culture along an axis at the two terms of which lie two opposite conceptions: at one end, there is an essentialist view of culture which associates it with tradition, essence and identity. In extreme cases, it can be naturalised, leading to racist and fundamentalist views. At the other end, culture is seen as a place of constant mutability, contact, and exchange; it is hybrid, and it is ‘produced and not reproduced’ (Wieviorka, 2018: 20). The two conceptualisations of culture as theorised by Wieviorka can be extended broadly as reflections, in the first case, to the globalisation idea of culture as denationalised, and identity as hybrid, and as the product of an increasingly interconnected world. Notions of cultural diplomacy as cultural relations are based on similar hybrid conceptualisations of culture as a dynamic force that is constantly created and fuelled by exchange, thereby contributing to trust and peacebuilding (Fazio Vargas and Pineda-Ramos, 2023).

Figure 2.

Cultural security between the UK and China.

Defensive and generative cultural security

This paper proposes a conceptual distinction between two fundamentally different meanings associated with the notion of cultural security. Adopting Wieviorka's conceptualisation of culture existing on a spectrum, I suggest adopting the notions of defensive cultural security and generative cultural security.

Defensive cultural security refers to the conceptualisation of culture as static, essentialist, linked to tradition. In this case, cultural security refers to the protection of cultural identity (associated with national identity, minority identity, sub-national or supra-national groups) from external influences. Depending on who sets cultural security as a priority, the boundaries and definition of cultural identity and the identification of its threats (market competition, cultural imperialism, a specific country or a political-religious group) may shift significantly (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2018; Yan and Alsudairi, 2018).

Generative cultural security, on the other hand, refers to culture as a mélange of ideas, a place of constant change and creation. In this instance, cultural security consists of the protection of the conditions for culture to continue to be created, and for exchanges to take place as a prerequisite for that creation; or, in other words, the protection of the right to create freely and to imagine ‘the metamorphoses of an identity’ (Wieviorka, 2018: 20).

The two concepts are fundamentally different, with one even risking limiting the other. For instance, a protectionist national approach to cultural security, which limits cultural exchange and the flow of ideas, might threaten generative cultural security by denying a space for exchange and culture generation. However, it is still useful to understand the two concepts as lying at the two ends of a spectrum, with nuanced and intermediate approaches to cultural security existing between the two (Figure 1). In fact, multiple purposes of cultural security might be applied by the same actor, depending on their priorities and relationships in different cultural sectors, or with different cultural actors, in the national or international space. From a normative point of view, cultural security applied at the policy level should protect both the right of culture to exist and not be erased or threatened by external forces, and the right for it to be produced freely.

What the securitisation of culture entails at a practical level, however, is a different matter. As mentioned above, when brought into the realm of security, issues are identified as constituting existential threats. This existential character justifies the use of extraordinary measures that go beyond the merely political. According to Wæver, securitisation is a situation where a referent object is depicted as an existential threat and justifies to the relevant audience the use of extraordinary measures: ‘whenever something took the form of the particular speech act of securitization, with a securitizing actor claiming an existential threat to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable, this was a case of securitization’ (Wæver, 2011: 469). As pointed out by Pamment and Åkerlund, cultural diplomacy is generally characterised by a tension between state control and cultural diplomacy organisations acting on the state's behalf, as well as by a fragmentation of actors involved in cultural diplomacy activities. However, it is possible to read a state's intentions between the lines of the bureaucratic structures that link governments and their cultural diplomacy organisations. As these vary significantly from one country to another, so do the conceptualisations and techniques around cultural security (Pamment and Åkerlund, 2025: 291).

While China's codification of cultural security in official policy is well-known and has been discussed in academic scholarship (Keane, 2010; Edney, 2015; Johnson, 2017), I suggest that the concept has emerged in the UK as well, though in a less explicit form and with a different framework. While in China cultural security has been codified as a set of measures to protect its culture and values from overseas influence, and is thus related to foreign policy objectives, in the UK cultural security is implemented as a set of measures to protect the healthy development and creation of culture, on the one hand, and as a series of practical policy responses to emerging security challenges in cultural cooperation on the other.

Cultural security in China

In China, cultural security became an explicit policy topic in the mid-1990s, when culture was raised to a matter of national security, in response to US-led cultural hegemony (Johnson, 2017: 63; Keane, 2010; Edney, 2015). The securitisation of culture has intensified under Xi Jinping's leadership, along with a trend towards extending security status to policy areas around media and ideology. Under Xi Jinping, cultural security became a crucial governmental priority along with a wider focus on the importance of culture, as a strategic source of national identity and cultural confidence. Traditional Chinese culture, in particular, is used as a source of confidence to compete with Western culture and counter the image of China as the ‘sick man’ of Asia (Lin, 2024: 84). This metaphor has been replaced by images of China as a ‘great power’ (Lin, 2024: 84), of ‘national rejuvenation’ (Lin, 2024: 84), and the ‘China Dream’ (Brown, 2022b: 439), whose evocative emotional power further contributes to the construction of a strong national identity. Behind this use of culture as the basis for the construction of identity, a key role has been played by the ideological work of Wang Huning, who contributed the main ideological basis for the evolution of contemporary Chinese politics, acting de facto as a behind-the-scene leader in contemporary China (Patapan and Wang, 2018; Brown, 2022a). This state-constructed culture is coherently linked with broader strategic priorities of the Chinese government.

In policy application, the emergent importance of cultural security in China is reflected in laws linking cultural production with military and ideological sectors. For example, the 2018 Law on Protection of Heroes and Martyrs explicitly mentions the promotion of ‘excellent literary and artistic works, and radio or television programs, […] publicizing or carrying forward, the spirit of heroes and martyrs’, as well as the production of media and publications disseminating the ‘spirit of heroes and martyrs’ (China Law Translate, 2018, Art. 18).

The conceptualisation of cultural security adopted in China by the Chinese government constitutes an interesting phenomenon. According to the classification of cultural security made by Wieviorka and outlined above, cultural security pertains to the realm of non-traditional security, and, more specifically, human security. In the context of China, however, the concept is read within a national security framework, and culture is therefore used in an essentialist way to reinforce national boundaries and identity. Moreover, the boundary between non-traditional security and traditional security is purposefully blurred by creating links within a coherent strategy between traditional security sources, including the army, and cultural protection and production.

Cultural security in the UK

In the UK, cultural security is not explicitly codified as a policy priority. Rather, it emerges implicitly through broader approaches to public diplomacy, cultural relations and foreign policy. The concept appears in varying forms depending on the strategic goals of different actors, particularly the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the British Council. While the FCDO tends to view cultural diplomacy as a tool supporting wider diplomatic aims, the British Council emphasises long-term cultural engagement as a means of building mutual understanding and trust across nations beyond the immediate priorities of the current government (Pamment and Åkerlund, 2025). Different conceptualisations of cultural security, therefore, emerge: on the one hand, the idea can be linked to a strengthening of intercultural exchanges and cultural relations which, by strengthening relations with other countries and mutual trust, increase overall security, reducing the likelihood of conflict. This is consistent with the British Council's own promotion of cultural relations as a solution to increase long-term trust. The second conceptualisation aligns cultural security with soft power, and thus asserts that a projection of national power, culture and identity, will contribute to a country's security profile. This sees the contribution of cultural promotion and trade to an overall soft power strategy, where cultural diplomacy is intertwined with government-led activities (Pamment and Åkerlund, 2025). The case of a government-facilitated agreement with regard to creative industry engagement, like the UK–China Film Co-Production Agreement and the UK–China Television Co-Production Agreement (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2017), falls within this framework. In this case, matters of culture, trade, soft power and security were intertwined to facilitate an intergovernmental agreement aimed at promoting private-sector collaboration between cultural industries in the UK and China.

In the case of creative industries collaboration with China, the approach taken by the UK government, and by other arm's-length bodies involved in this set of interactions reveals the existence of cultural security concerns and attempts to mitigate them. In particular, the decision to undertake a government-level agreement to facilitate private-sector collaboration with China is in line with a policy approach adopted by the UK government that aims to create a government-led infrastructure and safety net to preserve the interests of private creative practitioners in the UK working with China. In addition to the agreement per se, this approach is further reiterated by the development of a UK–China Film and TV toolkit in 2016, 2018 and 2021 by the British Embassy in Beijing, the UK's Department for International Trade and two arm's-length bodies, the British Film Institute (BFI) and, initially, the Producers Alliance for Cinema & Television (PACT). The toolkit was meant to ‘help UK companies develop projects with Chinese partners. The toolkit helps create a legal framework for the sharing of confidential ideas and Intellectual Property (IP) as part of the creative process’, providing safeguards for intellectual property rights following concerns expressed by creative practitioners working with China (gov.uk, 2021). Finally, following rising tensions between the UK and China, growing visa difficulties faced by UK film professionals when visiting China, and Chinese film professionals in the UK, PACT decided to suspend its delegations and UK–China exchanges in 2019 (International Trade Committee, 2019). These examples point to a cautionary approach adopted by the UK government and relevant stakeholders, which reveals, albeit indirectly, the presence of cultural security concerns (Figure 2). Rather than being explicitly spelled out in policy documents, these concerns are reflected in practice and are adopted as responsive measures to emerging challenges in the political and security relationship with China, and in creative collaborations more specifically.

Both countries place national security high on their list of governmental priorities, and they both consider cultural industries to be central to their economic development and national identities. However, behind the two countries’ conceptualisations of culture, security and cultural diplomacy lie two substantially different systems of values, policy and national regulations. Moreover, between the early 2010s, and 2022, the two countries’ relations have shifted significantly, with China labelled as a security priority for the UK. While in China cultural security is an active measure and an explicit priority in policy frameworks (Johnson, 2017), in the UK cultural security is to be interpreted as a non-explicit policy reaction which has been driven by wider geopolitical concerns, and specific concerns about intellectual property theft, surveillance, and political influence.

One might argue that these two policy interpretations of cultural security present significant differences: one being, at least apparently, active and explicit, the other non-explicit and reactive. At first sight, both articulations might be understood as examples of defensive cultural security, since they aim to preserve, with policy or media messaging, culture in a given country from a perceived external threat or challenge. When observed more closely, important differences emerge. For one, it is worth noting a fundamental difference in the interpretation of culture by the two countries, as national or hybrid. The Chinese government insists on protecting culture in an effort to protect China's national identity, therefore presenting a national interpretation of culture and of security. The Chinese culture that the Chinese government insists on protecting from overseas influence is a state-mediated culture. On the other hand, in the UK, the interpretation of British culture is more flexible and often associated with the British cultural industries. These are acknowledged to represent, at least in theory, a wide variety of subcultures, minorities and groups.

Secondly, looking at the security component of the term, in China cultural security has been explicitly ascribed within the realm of national security, and indeed represents one of the components of ‘comprehensive national security’ (Johnson, 2017: 62). In the UK, on the other hand, the distinction is more subtle. While an aspect of human security - or even, more practically, of labour rights - is certainly present in the interpretation of cultural security, a more subtle shift towards national security is observable. While this is nowhere near the explicit and policy-active stance taken by the Chinese government, a national concern towards cultural collaboration with China is observable in the shifts that have occurred in this interaction. This is more of a reflected light effect, where emerging security concerns from other realms of the relationship have influenced the cultural realm.

These subtleties reflect the nuanced and complex nature of culture and its manifestations, even when applied to cultural policy, and demonstrate that interpretations of cultural security are by no means limited to the dual codification suggested above, which should instead be conceived as a spectrum. Within this spectrum, the Chinese government's codification of cultural security is closer to the absolute definition of the term, as a national effort to protect national (cultural) identity. The UK's interpretation, instead, adopts a more pragmatic approach to cultural security, adopting it as an ad hoc, reactive measure. The different approaches to cultural diplomacy and cultural security are directly reflected in film policy in the two countries, as well as the roles played by state and industry in film co-production.

Cultural diplomacy, cultural security and film policy in comparison

The different structures of the film industries in the UK and China play an important role in clarifying how co-production can potentially benefit their industries in the two countries, and why co-production caters to specific needs. In the UK, the advantages of co-production are mainly tailored towards independent producers, which make up a significant percentage of film and TV production (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2023; UK Government, 2025: 7). As a largely independent sector, the UK film industry is heavily reliant on government subsidies and funding, and thus co-production represents an extra avenue to access new sources of funding and creative networks. The role of government is merely that of providing access to such platforms, and of creating possible, often competitive, avenues for funding of independent projects. In addition to central government, collateral or arm's length bodies act as a channel between government institutions and private stakeholders. In the case of film, the BFI is the arm's length body, funded by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), which supports the British film industry and oversees schemes, grants and initiatives that producers can apply for to obtain funding and collaborate on international projects. The international co-production, as facilitated by the BFI, is tailored specifically towards ‘independent UK producers’ who might be willing to take part in ‘international co-productions, in any genre (including animation and documentary) and in any language, where the UK producer is a “minority” co-producing partner’ (British Film Institute, 2024). Therefore, this support is particularly thought of as useful for emerging producers, or at least to productions where the UK represents a minority partner, namely the partner who puts the lower percentage of investment in the overall production and usually has less decision-making power.

By contrast, in China, film co-production is an endeavour closely linked to the state. The 2016 Film Industry Promotion Law states that the state ‘encourages the initiation of fair and mutually advantageous international cooperation and exchange in film, and supports participation in foreign film festivals’ (China Law Translate, 2016, Art. 11). However, it only explicitly refers to ‘international film co-production’ (合作摄制电影, Hézuò shèzhì diànyǐng) with reference to its regulations (China Law Translate, 2016, Art. 14), without listing advantages for its domestic film industry. It specifies that, where films produced in international co-production adhere to standards and regulations and are officially approved by the State, these will be considered domestic productions. This allows domestic distribution while bypassing quota regulations, thus confirming the advantage seen by the BFI of ‘accessing new, emerging markets’ (British Film Institute, 2024).

In China, co-productions are promoted by the Chinese government as a tool for international exposure and collaboration within its film industry. This advantage was seen as relevant and promoted by the Chinese government especially following China's entry into the WTO in 2001. The promotion of co-productions was part of China's strategy to comply with its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments, which included opening up its market to foreign investment and collaboration. In 2006, former Culture Minister Tong Gang recognised the influence of foreign investment, alongside state-owned and independent studios, in China's domestic film production (Su, 2016: 41). At the same time, as films certified as domestic productions, co-productions involve a cultural security risk in allowing international collaboration for a domestic production. The process around co-productions is therefore particularly complicated and controlled. According to the China Film Co-Production Handbook released by CFCC, the Chinese production partner must be either a state-owned production studio, or an approved private company (CFCC, 2013: 59). The procedure involves applying for script review, production approval by SARFTT – now the China Film Administration (Fang, 2024) – as well as applying for a review and permit of the final product. Each of the steps requires complex documentation and sub-steps, outlined in the CFCC China Co-Production Handbook (CFCC, 2013; CFCC, 2017). Films aspiring to be developed as international co-productions must apply to co-production status at the pre-production stage. This means that these films must comply with the strict China Film Administration policies on content, script development, review and censorship from the early development stages (Kokas, 2017).

This reveals an important and factual imbalance in the infrastructure established by the co-production agreement. While the British creative industry is largely composed of small, independent companies and entities, independent filmmaking is technically illegal in China. Independent or underground films in China are films that are not submitted to the China Film Administration for content censorship. Independent filmmaking has a history as a clandestine, low-budget, often politically critical cinema mostly screened abroad in film festivals. As a result, independent co-productions, though existent, are not technically allowed by the Chinese government and cannot benefit from the co-production agreement. In fact, the 2016 Film Industry Promotion Law explicitly states that ‘Foreign organizations must not independently engage in film production activities within mainland China; and foreign individuals must not engage in film production activities in mainland China’ (China Law Translate, 2016, Art. 14).

The state, therefore, occupies a very different roles in the industry contexts in the two countries. As Kokas pointed out with regard to US–China co-production, ‘In the PRC, government intervention drives the media industries, whereas in the United States, the media industries, in large part, drive the government’ (Kokas, 2017: 27).

From a governmental point of view, the UK's decision to enter the agreement aligned with its broader strategy of providing an enabling environment for cultural cooperation with China, by offering support in terms of logistics and economic tax relief, as well as facilitating contact and interactions with Chinese producers. In fact, the decision to undertake a governmental-level agreement to facilitate international co-production with China is coherent with a tendency to formalise exchanges with China and to offer top-down support, through governmental intervention, in otherwise private-level and independent exchange. This trend was confirmed by an interview with a former British diplomat with direct experience in UK–China cultural exchange projects:

[…] that seems to me the sort of mindset of the way that the British Government has approached this kind of collaboration with China over the years. So, you know, you got that, that top-down framework agreement, then you've got the space, you can go if you're in the British Council or if you're just a filmmaker, you can then go to a Chinese counterpart and say, well, our governments have agreed this collaborative, you know, deal, right where they're encouraging us to do this. Let's work on a project together. And so without that, it could be more difficult, more sensitive, more awkward to work with Chinese counterparts.

As shown by the imbalance between the status of companies in the UK and China, however, this approach ended up formalising institutional inequalities, rather than mitigating them, for film co-production. For China, on the other hand, co-production agreements create an opportunity to exert control over various aspects of the film production process (Moon and Yin, 2020). By only allowing full co-production rather than hybrid and less-structured forms of collaboration, the Chinese government has a say on different stages of the co-production, from pre-production to the end product and distribution, making the entire process difficult for foreigners to navigate without a Chinese intermediary (Fang, 2024). As in the case of US–China relations, it is the most intrusive government who has the final say on collaborative international entertainment projects (Kokas, 2017). Since the agreement was put into place, only one feature film was successfully co-produced: Special Couple (合法伴侣 Héfǎ bànlǚ, 2019), which reveals to some extent the effect of this imbalance. The film was never distributed in the UK and only obtained 10 million RMB from its limited distribution in China. In this film, the UK production company acted as the minority producer, as facilitated by the agreement. This adds a proportional disadvantage to the structural asymmetry created by the proximity of the Chinese production company to government circles. Adding to this point, the few successful co-productions that were made between the UK and China following the agreement were two documentaries, Earth: One Amazing Day (2017) and Asia (2024), in which the BBC acted as UK co-producer. This suggests that an arm's-length government body is better placed to collaborate on an official co-production with an approved Chinese company, rather than a smaller independent producer.

Conclusion

This reflects an asymmetry that goes beyond the common difficulties encountered in co-production. Rather, the motivations lie in the two countries’ diverging approaches to cultural diplomacy and cultural security, and how they interact. It is possible to find some degree of common motivation, as also found by Shangguan (2013), in the two governments’ willingness to signal a positive trend in the bilateral relationship and their openness to more cooperation. Part of this symbolic complex of meanings was also the ambition by both the UK and China to expand their influence and reputation in each other's countries through the export of cultural products. How this ambition for reputational power and influence is framed by both countries, however, is deeply different.

In the UK, the framing of culture as a source of international influence frames such exchanges as contributing to cultural relations. This framing, adopted by the British Council, sees culture as a dynamic force that moves and changes thanks to interactions between people, and values informal and non-official cultural networks as a source of multilateral trust, peace and mutual understanding, ultimately contributing to the UK's international reputation as a cultural power. In the cultural image the UK want to project, the government highlights UK cultural industries’ independence from government as one of the main strengths of the dynamic creative economy in the UK. In China, on the other hand, cultural diplomacy has often taken the shape of a much more structured exchange. The Chinese government plays a facilitator role whose presence is consistent across different stages of the exchange, and sometimes filters out the possibility for spontaneous and unpredictable interaction. This more formal approach to cultural diplomacy comes from a long-established connection between cultural production and politics, as well as from a historical, strategic governmental use of culture as a marker of positive exchange. Culture has historically been tied to efforts of national identity building, and in this context the government has sought to demonstrate to Chinese citizens China's recognition and popularity on the international stage to gain internal consensus (Edney, 2015). Cultural exchange must be effectively controlled, however, because it presents inherent risks to China's national cultural security.

The second shared motivation viewed film co-production as an avenue for encouraging economic growth through the cultural and creative industries and creative cooperation, following previous positive engagement between creative industries in the two countries. However, in practice, the real ambitions that the two governments held for the practical advantages of co-production were quite different, both in light of market needs and the structure of the two film industries, which led to a particularly complex collaboration. Given the differences in regulations around content, film production and structure of the film industries, co-production between the UK and China presents itself as a particularly challenging project (Shangguan, 2013). A co-production treaty was meant to facilitate this process in order to make it more encouraging for producers based in China and the UK, by facilitating the creation of networks for collaboration, by providing financial benefits through UK tax relief and the BFI Global Screen Fund, as well as by making this opportunity known to the public and increasing interest among those who might not have considered it in the past. However, the creative industries in the two countries present profound structural differences, with the UK creative industries being largely composed of small and independent companies, and a relying heavily on governmental funding, and the Chinese creative industries, particularly the film industries allowed to engage in co-production, being largely composed of giant media conglomerates that do not typically rely on such economic facilitations. Moreover, the UK Government was keen to unlock new audiences and market access for British films. The size of the Chinese film market made access to the much smaller UK distribution market a less compelling priority for Chinese producers. By not adequately considering these fundamental differences, the agreement de facto formalised structural inequalities in the collaboration between the two industries, rather than mitigating them. These difficulties are linked to profound differences in the two countries’ values assigned to culture, cultural diplomacy, and cultural security. This paper shows the need for effective cultural policy and cultural management to take into account the ways in which approaches to cultural diplomacy shape and affect collaboration architecture. Cultural policymaking, particularly in cross-cultural contexts, should be adapted to mitigate potential imbalances that can pose obstacles to effective collaboration. Moreover, this paper contributes to the debate around cultural security and its codification across governance structures, and its interaction with cultural diplomacy.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Giulia D’Aquila

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

References

Andersen

(1996) The European Film Production Guide: Finance, Tax, Legislation. London: Routledge.

Asia (2024), TV series.

Becard

Menechelli Filho

(2019) Chinese cultural diplomacy: Instruments in China’s strategy for international insertion in the 21st century. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 62(1): 1–20.

Bélanger

(1999) Redefining cultural diplomacy: Cultural security and foreign policy in Canada. Political Psychology 20(4): 677–699.

Berry

(2010) What is transnational cinema? Thinking from the Chinese situation. Transnational Cinemas 1(2): 111–127.

British Film Institute (2012) The Wide Angle: The BFI's International Strategy. https://www2.bfi.org.uk/sites/bfi.org.uk/files/downloads/bfi-wide-angle-international-strategy-2013-v2.pdf [May 5, 2024].

British Film Institute (2024) UK Global Screen Fund: international co-production strand. https://www.bfi.org.uk/get-funding-support/funding-support-international-activity/uk-global-screen-fund/uk-global-screenfund-international-co-production-strand [accessed July 3, 2024].

British Council (2024) Our Strategy. https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/our-strategy#:∼:text=Our%20purpose,the%20UK%20and%20countries%20worldwide [July 31, 2024].

Brown

(2022a) Wang Huning and the Power of Chinese Culture. US-China Perception Monitor. Available at: https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/25/wang-huning-and-the-power-of-chinese-culture/ [August 8, 2025].

10.

Brown

(2022b) Knowing and feeling the ‘China dream’: Logic and rhetoric in the political language of Xi’s China. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 51(3): 1–19.

11.

Cabinet Office (2021) Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, Ref. CP 403. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy [July 15, 2025].

12.

CFCC (China Film Co-Production Corporation) (2013) China-International Film Co-Production Handbook. https://www.mpa-apac.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Co-Production_Handbook_English.pdf, [December 16, 2024].

13.

CFCC (2017) China-International Co-Production Handbook. Available at: https://www.mpaapac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2017-China-Co-Production-Handbook.pdf [May 28, 2024]

14.

China Law Translate (2016) Film Industry Promotion Law. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/film-industry-promotion-law-2016/ [May 28, 2024].

15.

China Law Translate (2018) People's Republic of China Law on Protection of Heroes and Martyrs. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/peoples-republic-of-china-law-on-protection-of-heroes-and-martyrs/ [June 12, 2024].

16.

Cull

(2022) From soft power to reputational security: Rethinking public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy for a dangerous age. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 18: 18–21.

17.

Cummings

(2009) Cultural diplomacy and the United States government: A survey. Cultural Diplomacy Research Series. https://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/MCCpaper.pdf [April 21, 2026]

18.

Devane

(2019) Foreword. In Singh J. P. (ed.), British Council and Cultural Relations: Betwixt Idealism and Instrumentality. 4-15. London: British Council britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/british-council-cultural-relations-idealism-instrumentality.pdf [October 21, 2024].

19.

Earth: One Amazing Day (2017).

20.

Edney

(2015) Building national cohesion and domestic legitimacy: A regime security approach to soft power in China. Politics 35(3-4): 259–272.

21.

Fang

(2024) The culture of censorship: State intervention and complicit creativity in global film production. American Sociological Review 89(3): 488–517.

22.

Fazio Vargas

Pineda-Ramos

(2023) The recognition of divergent voices: The role of artistic expressions in shaping the conditions for a long-term positive peace. British Council Cultural Relations Collection. https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/cultural-relations-collection-2023-the_recognition_of_divergent_voices_0.pdf [May 31, 2025].

23.

Fisher

(2009) A story of engagement: The British Council 1934–2009. https://universityofleeds.github.io/philtaylorpapers/pmt/exhibits/3082/BritishCouncil.pdf [September 13, 2025].

24.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (2014) Film Co-Production Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Cm 8877, pp. 1–21. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cs-ukchina-film-co-production-agreement [September 13, 2025].

25.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2017) Television Co-Production Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Cm 9508, pp. 1–24. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cs-china-no12017-ukchina-television-co-production-agreement [September 13, 2025].

26.

Indelicato

(2017) China loves Italy: Transnational co-productions between China and Italy behind the mask of market. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 18(1): 47–60.

27.

Hjort

(2010) On the plurality of cinematic transnationalism. In: Newman

Durovicova

(eds) World Cinemas, Transnational Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 32–57.

28.

HM Treasury (2015) Chancellor: ‘Let’s create a golden decade for the UK–China relationship'. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-lets-create-a-golden-decade-for-the-uk-china-relationship [March 21, 2026].

29.

International Trade Committee (2019) UK trade with China, 17 October 2019, TWC 0016. https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/105655/pdf/ [September 24, 2025].

30.

Izadi

Saghaye-Biria

(2018) Americanizing soft power discourses and its discontents. In: Watanabe

(eds) Handbook of Cultural Security. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 269–289.

31.

Johnson

(2017) Securitizing culture in post-deng China: An evolving national strategic paradigm, 1994–2014. Propaganda in the World and Local Conflicts 4(1): 62–80.

32.

Keane

(2010) Keeping up with the neighbors: China’s soft power ambitions. Cinema Journal 49(3): 130–135.

33.

Keane

Yecies

Flew

(2018) Willing Collaborators: Foreign Partners in Chinese Media. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 1–270.

34.

Kokas

(2017) Hollywood Made in China. Oakland: University of California Press.

35.

Lin

(2024) The rising China is not a ‘sick man’ anymore: Cultural nationalism in the Xi jinping era. Journal of Contemporary China 33(145): 83–100.

36.

Liu

(2018) The vehicle and driver of China’s cultural Diplomacy: Global vision vs. localised practice. Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia 17(1): 130–151.

37.

Macnab

(2014) Feng Xiaogang launches BFI China Season. Screen Daily. https://www.screendaily.com/news/feng-xiaogang-launches-bfi-china-season/5068046.article [July 28, 2024].

38.

Moon

Yin

(2020) How Chinese filmmakers effectively respond to Chinese government policy for enhancing their competitiveness. Global Policy 11(2): 47–55.

39.

Morawetz

Hardy

Haslam

, et al. (2007) Finance, policy and industrial dynamics – the rise of co-productions in the film industry. Industry & Innovation 14(4): 421–443.

40.

Nemeth

(2007) Cultural security: The evolving role of art in international security. Terrorism and Political Violence 19(1): 19–42.

41.

Pagani

(2025) Embedding the protection of cultural heritage into a security agenda: China’s and Russia’s heritage diplomacy. International Journal of Cultural Policy: 1–22. 10.1080/10286632.2025.2599799.

42.

Pamment

Åkerlund

(2018) The role of the state in cultural diplomacy. In: Watanabe

(eds) Handbook of Cultural Security. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 290–307.

43.

Patapan

Wang

(2018) The hidden ruler: Wang huning and the making of contemporary China. Journal of Contemporary China 27(109): 47–60.

44.

Peng

(2015) China, Film Coproduction and Soft Power Competition . Doctor of Philosophy thesis. Queensland: Queensland University of Technology.

45.

Peng

Keane

(2019) China’s soft power conundrum, film coproduction, and visions of shared prosperity. International Journal of Cultural Policy 25(7): 904–916.

46.

Rosen

(2019) Ironies of soft power projection: The United States and China in the age of donald trump and Xi jinping. In: Rosen

Edney

Zhu

(eds) Soft Power With Chinese Characteristics: China’s Campaign for Hearts and Minds. London: Routledge, 63–80.

47.

Samier

(2015) The globalization of higher education as a societal and cultural security problem. Policy Futures in Education 13(5): 683–702.

48.

Shambaugh

(2013) China Goes Global: The Partial Power. New York: Oxford University Press.

49.

Shangguan

(2025) The China–UK film co-production treaty: Goals and gaps in a geopolitical context. Journal of Chinese Cinemas. DOI:10.1080/17508061.2025.2577009.

50.

Singh

(2019) British Council and Cultural Relations: Betwixt Idealism and Instrumentality. British Council. https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/british-council-cultural-relations-idealism-instrumentality.pdf [October 21, 2024].

51.

Special Couple (合法伴侣 Héfǎ bànlǚ, 2019).

52.

(2016) China's Encounter with Global Hollywood: Cultural Policy and the Film Industry, 1994–2013. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

53.

UK Government (2025) Creative Industries Sector Plan. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/685943ddb328f1ba50f3cf15/industrial_strategy_creative_industries_sector_plan.pdf [September 26, 2025].

54.

Watanabe

(2018) Introduction. In: Watanabe

(eds) Handbook of Cultural Security. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1–13.

55.

Wieviorka

(2018) Cultural insecurity in a world of violence, fear and risk. In: Watanabe

(eds) Handbook of Cultural Security. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 17–32.

56.

Wæver

(2011) Politics, security, theory. Security Dialogue 42(4-5): 465–480.

57.

(2018) The Effectiveness of Cultural Diplomacy in State Trust Building between China and the UK . Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations thesis. Lancaster: University of Lancaster.

58.

Yan

Alsudairi

(2021) Guarding against the threat of a westernising education: A comparative study of Chinese and Saudi cultural security discourses and practices towards overseas study. Journal of Contemporary China 30(131): 803–819.

59.

Yang

(2016) Film policy, the Chinese government and soft power. New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film 14(1): 71–91.

60.

Yang

(2020) The emergence of China–India film co-production: Policy and practice. Transnational Screens 11(3): 202–217.

61.

Yang

Higbee

(2024) Sino-international film collaboration and co-production: Policy and practice. Transnational Screens 15(2): 121–136.

62.

Zhai

(2024) The recent Sino–Danish film co-productions: Soft power and transnational talent development. Transnational Screens 15(2): 179–197.

63.

Zhu

(2019) The battle of images: Cultural diplomacy and Sino–Hollywood negotiation. In: Zhu

Edney

Rosen

(eds) Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics : China's Campaign for Hearts and Minds. London: Routledge, 100–116.