Mobility in EU cultural diplomacy and cultural relations: Ambiguities and the value of partnerships in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean

Abstract

Cultural diplomacy and relations have become central components of European Union's (EU) external cultural action, intended to foster transnational exchange while projecting values such as diversity, freedom of expression, and human rights. Within this framework, cultural mobility plays a pivotal yet underexamined role. While long central to EU internal cultural policy, mobility remains marginal in external cultural action, with limited dedicated support despite mounting pressures from migration, conflict, and climate change. This article argues that cultural mobility offers a critical lens through which to analyse the ambitions, contradictions, and governance dynamics of EU cultural diplomacy and relations. Focusing on the Mediterranean, the study combines policy analysis with a micro-level examination of actors and lived experiences, drawing on interviews, programme evaluations, and the authors’ long-term professional engagement in the region. The Mediterranean offers a particularly revealing lens due to mobility inequalities, postcolonial legacies, and complex governance involving EU institutions, intermediaries, and local actors. The analysis highlights fragmented frameworks, scarce resources, and structural power imbalances that constrain mobility, while also revealing the agency of cultural professionals. Overall, the article shows how mobility exposes the fragility of EU cultural action while pointing to its potential to support more equitable, value-driven international cultural cooperation.

Introduction

Since the publication of the Joint Communication Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations (cultural relations strategy) (European Commission, 2016), culture has gained momentum within the European Union (EU)'s external action, aiming to foster transnational exchanges while reflecting and projecting the Union's values, such as diversity, freedom of expression, and human rights. However, while cultural mobility has been central to EU internal cultural policy – supporting both artistic careers and broader EU integration objectives (Duxbury and Vidovic, 2022; Kaufman et al., 2022; Magkou, 2012) – it has been relatively absent from EU external cultural action's institutional discourse and policy instruments, despite increasing constraints on the circulation of cultural professionals.

In this article, we argue that examining support for cultural mobility provides a meaningful entry point into the complexities of EU cultural diplomacy and relations activity, as mobility crystallises EU values in practice, exposes tensions and ambiguities of governance, and reveals gaps between policy intentions and implementation. Similarly, although research on EU cultural policies has started to get traction, EU cultural relations and cultural diplomacy have only recently attracted sustained scholarly attention (Dâmaso, 2025; Lamonica and Murray, 2025; Magkou et al., 2023; Sattler, 2025). This article complements these perspectives by combining a concise overview of policies and instruments with an analysis centred on actors and practices, following a sociological prism (Pasquier and Weisbein, 2004). It addresses three interrelated questions. First, how is cultural mobility framed and operationalised within EU external cultural action? Second, what tensions emerge between policy discourse and implementation, particularly in relation to governance and power asymmetries? Third, how do local actors navigate these constraints, and what does this reveal about the limits and possibilities of culture in EU external relations?

To address these questions, we focus on EU external cultural action in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (Southern Mediterranean) region, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Jordan. Rather than exploring cultural policies at the national level (Mathieu and Visanich, 2023), the paper analyses fragments and frictions (Tsing, 2005) of EU action across this region that illuminate key features and challenges of mobility and cultural cooperation. This choice stems from several reasons. First, though it is a heterogeneous region, the Southern Mediterranean is marked by pronounced challenges related to mobility, shaped by complex geopolitical and contextual factors, as well as a colonial past. Second, it occupies a distinctive place in EU external action since the Barcelona Process, benefiting from regional and bilateral cultural programmes. Third, EU cultural action in the region involves a diverse constellation of actors with differing mandates and agendas, resulting in complex governance arrangements that warrant closer examination. Finally, the authors’ long-standing professional engagement in the region provides first-hand insight into both the opportunities and structural constraints of EU-funded cultural cooperation.

Our paper is based on a review of EU and other stakeholders’ documents, exchanges with EU institutional officers, professionals working in public entities, and independent artists and culture professionals in the Southern Mediterranean over the last 20 years. Attempting to grasp the mechanisms of mobility and EU cultural external action in the Southern Mediterranean region is a challenging task, particularly given the scarcity of data and a fragmented cultural action landscape with diverse policies, agendas, actors and discontinuous funding programmes. Nevertheless, approaching it through the lens of mobility offers a revealing perspective, highlighting the priorities underlying EU action, as well as the ambiguities between discourse and practice.

Cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, and mobility in EU external cultural action

Between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations: The EU approach

Despite extensive scholarly debate distinguishing cultural diplomacy from cultural relations, the terms continue to be used interchangeably in policy and academic discourse. Cultural diplomacy is commonly associated with interest-driven state action (Ang et al., 2015), whereas cultural relations are framed as value-oriented processes, often enacted by non-state actors and grounded in longer-term societal exchanges. Cultural diplomacy has been frequently associated with nation branding and propagandistic logics, reflecting an instrumental and often unidirectional understanding of culture in international relations. By contrast, cultural relations are often characterised by relative autonomy from government intervention (Rivera, 2015) and understood as reciprocal, and frequently emergent processes, shaped by shared values and sustained interaction. Such approach aligns with a shift toward fair cooperation rather than asymmetrical exchange, despite authors (Hampel, 2017; Joffe and Magkou, 2025; Magkou et al., 2023) recognising the difficulty of implementing such principles in contexts marked by persistent power imbalances and unidirectional funding flows.

Terminological ambiguity also characterises EU discourse, where cultural relations are increasingly emphasised over traditional diplomatic instruments. This reorientation is accompanied by a new policy vocabulary, emphasising ‘people-to-people contacts’, ‘partnerships’, ‘exchanges’, ‘mutual listening and learning’, ‘new spirit of dialogue’, ‘co-creation’, and the search for ‘common ground’, as reflected in the cultural relation strategy. While it aimed at mainstreaming culture in EU external action (Figueira, 2017), the shifting vocabulary mobilised reflects strategic flexibility and conceptual uncertainty in the EU's approach. This echoes previous analyses showing that mainstreaming culture across EU policies creates both opportunities and tensions in terms of objectives, consistency and governance (Bouquerel, 2023; Calligaro and Vlassis, 2017). The New European Agenda for Culture (European Commission, 2018) reaffirmed the importance of culture in EU cultural relations. This trajectory is further reinforced in the Culture Compass for Europe (European Commission, 2025a) the European Commission's latest strategic document for culture, which states that the EU values international cultural relations and partnerships, seen as a source of soft power and a reputational asset supporting global engagement.

Cultural mobility within EU cultural policies

Mobility is increasingly seen as a key lens for understanding global flows and their impact on society. The mobility paradigm (Sheller and Urry, 2006; Urry, 2007) frames mobility not just as movement, but as a process shaped by meanings, systems, and power relations. Mobility, including participation in exhibitions, festivals, residencies, training programmes, and professional networks, has also long constituted a structuring dimension of artistic and cultural practices. Mobility reflects an orientation towards openness, curiosity, and engagement with alterity, positioning movement as an intrinsic component of creative work rather than a peripheral activity (Magkou, 2012). Access to mobility is thus essential for artists and culture professionals to work and lead what is described as ‘mobile’ (Elliott and Urry, 2010) or ‘transient’ lives (Debonneville, 2022), using travel and transnational engagement as a core element of their creative and professional development (Ericarts, 2008). As such, mobility is both enabling and stratified: it creates opportunities while simultaneously reinforcing existing inequalities.

Mobility constitutes a central component of the EU's broader cultural strategy to foster creative exchange, strengthen Europe's cultural ecosystem and contribute to a European cultural citizenship (Magkou, 2012). Enshrined as a right in the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU, 1992) that formally brought culture into the EU's legal framework, mobility is not limited to economic purposes. Since then, the EU Commission has progressively developed its cultural action through instruments and programmes supporting or supplementing Member States in the field of cultural exchanges and artistic and literary creation, facilitating cross-border circulation of artists and supporting cooperation projects across Europe, leading up to Creative Europe today. The Commission's European agenda for culture in a globalising world (European Commission, 2007) introduced mobility of artists and cultural workers as well as the circulation of all forms of artistic expression as a strategic objective, a commitment reaffirmed in the New European agenda for culture (2018). This orientation has been supported by the European Council, the Parliament and extensive policy reflection (Ericarts, 2008; KEA, 2018) alongside the Member States’ expert groups (European Council, 2010) and civil society advocacy calling for fairer access to mobility (Voices of Culture, 2021). A key actor in these conversations has been On the Move, an independent cultural network founded in 2002, defining mobility as a conscious process whose cultural, social, political, environmental, ethical, and economic implications must be taken into account by those who engage in or support it. It is worth noting that, in response to long-standing advocacy from the cultural sector, since 2022 the EU expanded its support for artistic mobility through Culture Moves Europe, a Creative Europe initiative with a budget of € 46 million (2022–2028) that funds mobility and residencies while prioritising accessibility and inclusivity through measures reflecting recent EU policy's positioning, such as top-ups for green travel, disabilities, visas, and family needs. Finally, the Culture Compass (European Commission, 2025a), reaffirms EU support for cross-border collaboration and mobility to empower artists, strengthen the European cultural space and expand access to new markets and audiences.

This brief overview of EU policies related to mobility raises two main questions. First, cultural mobility remains situated at the intersection of multiple – and sometimes competing – policy objectives, with no fully coherent framework yet adopted (Balta Portales, 2022). This fragmentation becomes particularly visible when considering the diverse ambitions assigned to mobility: reinforcing the cultural sector's competitiveness, facilitating access to the single market, greening the sector, promoting a shared European identity, encouraging diversity, fostering social cohesion and contributing to local development. These objectives often require contradictory measures, generating structural tensions within EU frameworks. Second, there is a growing involvement of diverse stakeholders in the design and implementation of EU funding instruments. The European Commission has relied on consortia bringing together a plurality of players with distinct mandates and modes of action, reflecting the multi-actor nature of EU cultural policy-making, offering the opportunity to design instruments informed by a number of perspectives but with a less coherent action. We argue that activity in the Southern Mediterranean exacerbates these tensions that we examine further below.

Contrasting paradigms, uncertain values and multiple agendas to support mobility in the Mediterranean

Attempting to grasp the EU's cultural external action and mechanisms for mobility in the Southern Mediterranean is a challenging task, particularly given the scarcity of data, a fragmented cultural action landscape, and region-specific features that make mobility particularly challenging in the region. How do EU institutions argue their action to encourage cultural mobility amidst external priority objectives, and what mobility agendas do they promote?

Regional structural barriers to mobility in the Southern Mediterranean

Beyond the geopolitical conditions that pose numerous obstacles to mobility, economic resources and opportunities for the arts in the Southern Mediterranean are very limited, cultural infrastructure is outdated, and cultural exchanges are severely restricted (Dabdoub Nasser and Bouquerel, 2019). Current mobility debates (post-pandemic, mobility's carbon footprint, and hybrid mobility) and increased cross-border and political restraints have challenged even further cultural mobility in the region. The hurdle of border crossing is the most obvious marker of inequality to access mobility (Le Sourd and Yazaji, 2026) as visa allowances have tightened. Costs of travel to Europe or to other countries within the region are prohibitive and poorly supported. Data shows the extent of the inequality: 88% of the funding schemes at a global scale to support mobility come from Europe and North America, while Arab states give a very minor contribution of 4% (El Bennaoui, 2018), tending to support a select few who are complacent with the regimes (Helmy, 2023). Finally, poor interactions among the Southern Mediterranean countries and ongoing armed conflicts in the region place security issues at the forefront of actors’ priorities. The long-term impacts of current wars in the region are dramatically increasing the number of artists in exile – a topic that remains out of this paper's scope but is gaining attention (Yazaji, 2025). In that context, initiatives facilitating mobility are mostly offered by international foundations, European cultural institutes, civil society organisations – and, to a minor extent, EU schemes. Though they may cater to culture professionals and artists’ needs, these European-rooted measures reflect the multiple entanglements of European cultural relations in the region (Magkou, 2022; Vos, 2024), where colonial history continues to weigh heavily.

Contrasting paradigms and inconsistent values in EU external policies related to cultural mobility

As exposed above, mobility stands at the intersection of different and sometimes competing policies within the EU. The external action adds another paradigm that clashes with the freedom of circulation, a key principle of the EU: security. Indeed, mobility can be considered both an opportunity and a threat to European borders, crystallising societal tensions across the EU. In this light, the case of the Southern Mediterranean is particularly interesting. In the Barcelona Declaration (European Union, 1995), a breakthrough moment in EU engagement with the region, culture was introduced only marginally as a development pillar. The European Policy in the East and South Neighbourhoods (European Commission, 2004) provided a new framework for development aid in these regions, however it failed to mention culture, including in its reviews following the Arab Spring. In 2021, The New Agenda for the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2021) emphasises once again economic development, positioning the security dimension as well as migration and mobility as priority areas for cooperation. These policies align with the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (European External Action Service, 2016) and the Global Gateway (EEAS, 2021). While culture is hardly mentioned in the Global Strategy, mobility is addressed in two ways. First, it is seen as a positive and necessary pathway to development and second as a way to reinforce societal links and cultural exchanges with EU neighbours. Mobility is also mentioned in relation to the efforts for a ‘more effective migration policy’, that is, regulating cross-border movements. As for the Global Gateway, it focuses on investments and infrastructures, leaving no space for culture or mobility, except in the field of education. The newly published Pact for the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2025b) gives emphasis to culture and mobility, albeit with restrictions. It claims to support mobility to strengthen cultural ties and reinforce cooperation; however, in parallel, it addresses migration in a way that focuses on the EU's own interests. This finds echo in the first-ever EU visa strategy, which sets clearly as its main aim the security of its citizens (European Commission, 2026), while reaffirming a desire to welcome artists and cultural professionals. This brief review shows that these policies have failed to promote culture or mobility as drivers for exchange and development, and that the cultural relations strategy had little, if any, impact on embedding culture within EU external action. Indeed, cultural mobility has largely been overshadowed by dominant migration and security discourses.

Such emphasis on security in external relations action challenges the value-driven cultural relations discourse. The cultural relations strategy proposed an approach that promotes partnerships with local actors aiming to co-create actions based on the values of respect and equality. However, in practice, policies continue to be largely formulated in Brussels, and insist on strengthening the prosperity, stability and security around Europe, which cringes with the partnership paradigm of equality, co-creation and shared ownership. This Eurocentric approach determines power relations where inequalities persist, and Southern Mediterranean countries feel patronised. Indeed, an EU officer's reference to Europe as a ‘cultural superpower’ at the Med Culture Regional Forum in Amman in 2017, echoing similar positionings by Federica Mogherini, then High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, were received with embarrassment by the assembly. This approach also stands in sharp contrast to the EU's inconsistent stance in response to recent geopolitical developments in the region, including migration, climate change, and war. The reality on the ground and the political discourse of politicians of EU member states betray serious divergences that do not escape the notice of the people of the region. One long-standing example is the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, recently exacerbated by the genocide in Gaza. A persistent gap exists between the values the EU formally promotes – often as a condition of its support for the region – and its record in upholding human rights. Moreover, the incremental restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility, which continue unabated, resonate deeply across cultural scenes in the Arab world, rendering the EU's position increasingly untenable.

Mobility's multiplicity of views and agendas of EU institutions and their agents

The making of EU policies and schemes supporting mobility is also challenged by the multiplicity of EU institutional players involved, each with their own vision and agenda. International cultural relations are still not recognised as a policy field of its own, serving culture, foreign affairs (including peace and security), development cooperation and enlargement contrasting agendas (European Council, 2025). While the staff responsible for cultural affairs at DG EAC (Education, Youth, Sport, and Culture) envisages culture as a field on its own and supports mobility to empower artists, a top officer in charge of culture at the Strategic Communication directorate at the European External Action Service (EEAS) views mobility mainly through the lens of visibility. Even though EEAS mobility formats now include master classes or B2B sessions, their matrix refers to cultural diplomacy and focuses on participation in major global events. Likewise, it is challenging for European Delegations, who are dependant of the EEAS and are an integral part of local cultural landscapes, to give up decades of activities showcasing European artists, such as the Chellah Jazz Festival or the European cinema week in Morocco, and shift to the cultural relations approaches – especially when their work is assessed through their visibility in the media. However, next to developing traditional diplomatic actions, Delegations have also lately signed cultural bilateral programmes with governments of partner countries in Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco, engaging in structural actions in close connection with local partners and promoting local mobilities.

This blurred picture is further exacerbated by the working conditions and practices of the staff working on international cultural relations. First, EU officers involved in this field deal with other topics. In DG MENA (Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf), the main person in charge of regional programmes in the Southern Mediterranean dedicates about 40% of his time to culture, his predecessor only around 25%. The same goes with their colleagues based across the globe – the focal points for cultural relations in each of the 139 Delegations usually also deal with civil society, communication or human rights. Then, there are few opportunities or little interest for exchanging and coordinating among the various stakeholders. At the European Council level, apart from an ephemeral ad hoc working group set up during the Hungarian presidency in 2024, there is still no permanent arena to discuss these affairs on a multilateral basis. The interservice cultural group of approximately thirty actors, involving the EEAS and seven DGs, gathers participants showing strong interest and commitment. Scheduled only twice a year, it is hardly enough to fine-tune a strategic action, leading officers involved in cultural relations to deliberately identify colleagues whose expertise or position can be of relevance and engage with them for information sharing. However, these occasional encounters in the ‘Brussels bubble’ do not allow for a coherent articulation of their work.

The multiplicity of actors and the discrepancy between the different agendas constitute a major challenge. How this translates through the various programmes, and how these programmes are viewed by local actors, shows tensions as well as alternative solutions to support mobility in the region.

Cultural mobility in the EU external action on the field: Programmes, implementation models, and local perspectives

Despite this political background, several EU initiatives support mobility. What type of mobility do these actions support, and what cultural relations models do they promote? Who are the players implementing these programmes, and how do they fit in the configuration of players supporting mobility? Ultimately, what do these initiatives tell us about EU cultural action?

Resources and fluctuating models of cultural programmes and mobility

There is no proper budget line for international cultural relations, and financial resources for culture are fragmented. It took one year for a seasoned cultural diplomacy professional involved in the Council of the EU's works to identify the instruments available to this end. Not surprisingly, resources are also very limited: an estimated € 250 million was allocated in this framework between 2016 and 2021 (Helly, 2020). And even though some programmes dedicated to artists based in Europe are meant to be accessible to artists based in non-EU countries, facts show opportunities are very limited. For instance, out of the Southern Mediterranean countries, only Tunisia has signed up to participate in the Culture Moves Europe scheme, and out of 7224 grants allocated between 2022 and 2025, only 43 grantees were resident in Tunisia, while 80 others had Tunisia as a destination, making this country one of the least represented in the programme. Regional programmes that align with the cultural relations paradigm in the Mediterranean over the last 20 years are quickly listed: Euromed Heritage (1998–2013) and Euromed Audiovisual (1997–2014), succeeded by Med Culture (2014–2019), All around Culture (2020–2024) and Ecologies of Culture (2025–2029). Even though mobility was not mentioned as a criterion, many activities involved transnational mobilities. Aimed at supporting culture as a vector of democratisation and development, Med Culture has funded micro transnational projects across the region, and practised south-south mobility to promote regional collaborations between cultural professionals, artists, and policy and decision-makers, many of whom came from marginalised areas (Med Culture, 2019). The programme spent around € 1.1 million – around 25% of its budget – on support for mobilities and networking, which participants identified as particularly meaningful. All Around Culture (2020–2024) aimed to foster a vital cultural ecosystem as an enabling environment for social and economic inclusion of young people. Besides challenges for physical meetings imposed by COVID-19, this project introduced both local and regional mobilities, amounting to a total of 200. More recently, Ecologies of Culture, with a budget of € 4 million, has designed a Creative Caravans pillar fostering the circulation of ideas through digital media platforms and the touring of works across borders via artistic events and residencies.

Two other initiatives display hybrid models that straddle cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, Halaqat 1 (2021–2024), were funded by the Foreign Policy Instrument under the action EU – League of Arab States Culture. The budget of € 900,000 was destined to organise an EU-Arab League summit, which finally did not take place. Instead, organisers supported the mobility of about 100 artists and partners from Arab countries and Europe to come to Brussels and engage in artistic creation and exchange through residencies and a regional event, where mobility strongly emerged as the most acclaimed and sensitive topic (Halaqat, 2022). While this action was not reconducted, € 2 million was made available to fund Halaqat 2 (2024–2027). Aiming at shifting away from a Eurocentric approach, it allocated grants to residency hosts and artistic initiatives primarily in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco, in addition to Brussels, thus steering away from the cultural diplomacy canon.

The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) merits some specific attention. Co-funded by the EU, the ALF is a unique organisation including an intergovernmental component with 43 states constituting its Board of Governors and 43 national networks gathering thousands of civil society members across the Euro-Mediterranean region, including cultural organisations. Although its intergovernmental nature places the ALF within the sphere of cultural diplomacy, its programmes addressing civil society networks feature priorities and practices of cultural relations. Its advocacy campaign, organised by the recently founded Public Policies Unit, placed mobility as a main pillar, putting an emphasis on mobility in the Pact for the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2025b). ALF has also developed the ALF in motion scheme, allocating mobility grants for partnership, creativity and knowledge, in response to beneficiaries’ strong requests for more mobility support.

Implementing the programmes: The political implication of consortia profiles and modus operandi

In a less visible yet significant way, the implementing parties involved in the programmes' management also carry some political weight. This management is entrusted to service providers or subsidised entities through open calls, and their level of autonomy varies depending on the contract typology and the relationship they build with their EU officer of reference. For Euromed Heritage, Euromed Audiovisual, and Med Culture, winning consortia set up a technical assistance unit (TAU) at their European premises. While benefitting from some margin of manoeuvre to carry out activities they had outlined in their proposal, they had to follow carefully EU directives. In the case of All around Culture and Ecology of Culture, selected consortia acted as intermediaries, funding small projects through cascading financing mechanisms, enjoying full autonomy in the implementation of the programme they had designed. The profile of leading partners at the forefront of project implementation is also all but neutral. Often, national cultural institutes are favoured by EU institutions as they offer financial, administrative and political guarantees, as well as a network of local antennas across the world. The Goethe Institute won several tenders in the region, such as Halaqat 1 and 2, but irrespective of the Goethe teams’ work to implement these programmes, geopolitics can come in the way. The fate of Halaqat 2 remained suspended for a moment because of Germany's refusal to condemn Israel for what was unfolding in Gaza, undermining the Goethe Institute offices’ credibility in the region.

On another note, the analysis of the consortia managing these programmes shows an increased connection with the local cultural scene. Med Culture was managed by the Italian company Hydea SpA and included the Jordan Royal Film Commission in its consortium; however, links with grassroots actors were primarily handled by locally recruited experts. All Around Culture was led by the German entity MitOst, a non-for-profit organisation with a long history of cultural cooperation in the Arab region, with two entities based respectively in Tunis (L’art Rue), and Beirut (Al-Mawred), which fully co-designed and co-implemented the programme. The event celebrating Al-Mawred's 20th anniversary showed the extent to which All Around Culture's ecosystem concept was embedded in Al-Mawred's holistic vision and large-scale work in the region. Ecologies of culture is led for the first time by an entity based outside the EU, the Arab Fund for Arts and Culture (AFAC), operating from Beirut, together with European partners. It gave AFAC the opportunity to design a programme addressing ecology – an issue they had planned to deal with following growing interest by their beneficiaries. These management approaches reveal a deeper consideration for local contexts and how EU funding can reinforce some players based at the margins of Europe, who are savvy to use these resources in accordance with their own mandate (Bouquerel, 2018; Dakowska and Visier, 2018).

Decolonising and advocating for mobility: Reinventing partnerships with the civil society

Even though artists and culture professionals operating in the region participate in EU-funded initiatives, they also tend to view EU's activity in the region as whitewashing or as an effort to alleviate post-colonial guilt (European Cultural Foundation, 2008). The EU's focus on the green transition reflects this tension. Overlooking the specificities of the Southern Mediterranean, ‘green mobility’ often imposes an agenda that is contrary to beneficiaries’ needs. For them, green mobility, understood as low-carbon mobility, translates into no mobility at all. This perception has steered vivid discussions during the 2023 On the Move Forum in Tunis between Southern Mediterranean and African artists and European stakeholders, echoing diverging understanding of sustainability of the Western European diplomacy and their partners in the Global South (Faucher and Zhu, 2025). However, EU collaborations with robust organisations, such as Al-Mawred and AFAC, challenge asymmetric power dynamics, opening avenues for more balanced relationships. Indeed, Al-Mawred, who has been allocating mobility funds since 2004, building a network of more than 3000 members across the world, and AFAC, who has granted $43 million since 2007 to contribute to cross border cooperation exchanges in the Southern Mediterranean region, distinguish themselves by their long history, their broad outreach, and their large financial resources for culture – often larger than the EU ones.

Conscious of these persisting inequalities, cultural professionals from the Southern Mediterranean are voicing their own agendas while asserting themselves as equal partners; they call for strengthening local cultural sovereignty, while valuing local knowledge and skills; they advocate for mobility justice, while exploring alternative forms of mobility; they design mobility programmes with locally defined priorities and outcomes. In reality, these actors have been developing their own initiatives for more than twenty years. A pioneer in this field, the Roberto Cimetta Fund has supported mobility within the Euromediterranean area since 1999, while Safar and Istikshaf projects reflected on alternative approaches to mobility (Bashiron Mendolicchio and Huleileh, 2015). Beyond Al-Mawred and AFAC, other players offer innovative schemes: Mophradat has developed the Orbital programme, inviting artists to travel together and explore a local artist's practice as a vehicle for learning about a context, while Ettijahad has just launched Zad, supporting mobility for the Arab diaspora within Europe, addressing Arab artists who chose or were forced to leave their country of origin. These initiatives are but a trickle, but their design and implementation are grounded in deep knowledge of the communities they serve, and merit attention when considering future directions. Recent EU mobility schemes – shaped by sustained advocacy and feedback – suggest that strengthening links between EU institutions and grassroots actors could better align policy with practice and more effectively integrate artists’ and cultural professionals’ voices.

Conclusion

Exploring cultural mobility in the Southern Mediterranean informs the tensions and entanglements that characterise the EU's external cultural action in the region, where a particularly unequal access to mobility challenges artists and culture professionals’ pathways. Some of these contradictions are inherent in the way the EU designs its policies and instruments, and the fact that mobility is hinged to administrative and political policies of EU member states, on the one hand, and Arab states, on the other, which grants limited power to the EU when it comes to visa issues. Others have to do with the unstable political situation in the Southern Mediterranean, where few opportunities are offered to independent artists and freedom of expression is often challenged; still others have to do with the multiplicity of institutional players at the European end: different Directorates General, with their own agenda, prioritising different aspects of cultural work and promoting different approaches; the Delegations with their own concerns and insufficient staff to implement cultural programmes; and cultural institutes of member states whose agendas and country priorities often conflict with those of the EU. This diversity of players and their often conflicting agendas create confusion and incite frictions amongst them and with local players. The different financing instruments and ad hoc financing of cultural projects with mostly overblown objectives and inadequate budgets also contribute to the tensions.

There is much ground to cover for EU external cultural action to move beyond colonial power lines and the bloated narratives of intercultural dialogue, on the one hand, and migration and security on the other. However, beyond institutional perspectives, other dynamics can be identified through closer attention to actors’ work. Dialogue between some EU officers, Southern Mediterranean cultural entities, and individual artists and culture professionals has produced valuable knowledge about the reality on the ground, strengthened partnerships and nurtured the debate on how to support mobility in the region. Continuing to explore these phenomena that operate at the micro level can stimulate new dynamics: it is there that the value of future research lies, and the stalemate in current EU practices can be unlocked in favour of actions grounded in reciprocal agreements.