Violence capital: On the framing and construction of a policy problem

Abstract

Criminal law is directed at distinct individual actions and is therefore less suited for combating patterned, repeated, and collective actions. In an attempt to overcome such problems, the concept of violence capital was introduced in an amendment to the Swedish Criminal Code in 2016. The current study aims at initiating an academic debate and theory development regarding violence capital, through critical engagement with the empirical case of how the concept of violence capital was constructed when it was introduced in Swedish criminal policy and criminal law. The legal reform seems to mainly rest on the work of a specific group within the Swedish Council of Crime Prevention. Furthermore, violence capital comes across as a somewhat “slippery” concept without links to wider academic debates. The study highlights the fact that such a fundamental form of social action as violence has been absent in the academic line of thought regarding different forms of capital. Also, there is a gap between common sense ways of understanding patterns of violence and their cumulative effects and researcher models. As the concept seems to be largely unknown outside of the Swedish language media and policy debates, to be relevant to wider academic debates, the concept needs to be more clearly defined and theorized. Further developed, the concept of violence capital has the potential to shed light upon the process whereby individual acts may accumulate collective, transferable resources.

Introduction

The research field of violence is encompassing phenomena such as war, terrorism, securitization, ethnic “cleansing,” gender-based violence including intimate partner violence, violent crime, and hate crime (Walby, 2013). Although the field is broad and diverse, there are some recurring features to debates regarding violence as a social practice. Many instances of violence are repeated to some extent and there are patterns in the ways in which violence is used. This is the case both when it comes to violence in the public domain, for example, within organized crime, and violence in intimate relationships. Furthermore, a pattern of violence has cumulative effects, for the perpetrators, the victims, and, also, for social relations at large. Within academic debates, violence and its effects have been conceptualized and theorized in a number of different ways, ranging from the early works of, for example, Elias on the civilizing process (2000), Galtung on structural and latent violence (1969), and Bourdieu on symbolic violence (2010) to later efforts to understand patterns of violence and their cumulative effects on, for example, gender relations (see, for example, Walby et al, 2014; Kelly, 1988). Some recurring themes in these debates is how acts of violence may simultaneously impact upon both individual relationships and the social order (e.g., Kelly, 1988), and how there are symbolic aspects to violence that shape meaning beyond specific acts. Thus, violence does not have to be manifest, to impact upon social relations (e.g., Galtung, 1969, on latent violence). In fact, according to Bourdieu (2010), symbolic violence “works” best to reproduce patterns of social inequality the further away it is removed from blatant domination and physical acts within interpersonal relationships.

Through policy debates in Sweden, yet another concept can be added to these debates: violence capital. In 2016, an amendment to the Swedish Criminal Code [CC, Sw. Brottsbalken] introduced the concept of violence capital into Swedish criminal law (SFS, 2016: 508). Since then, alluding to a violence capital constitutes a reason for assessing a crime as gross. The amendment concerns four different crimes: unlawful coercion (4 Ch. 4 § CC), unlawful threat (4 Ch. 5 § CC), extortion (9 Ch. 4 § CC), and violence or threat to a public servant (17 Ch. 1 § CC). The formulation of these four sections of the criminal code means that when assessing if a crime is to be considered gross or not, it should be considered if the act has been evidently reinforced through a reference to a violence capital.

It should be noted that “violence capital” [Sw. våldskapital] is only found in the original Swedish version of the law. In the formal translation of the Swedish Criminal Code into English from 2020, the concept is translated as “by allusion to a capacity for violence.” ¹ One reason for this translation could be that—as will be discussed below—there is no well-established policy or academic discourse on violence capital in the English language literature. An English language example of the use of “violence capital” can be found (Gambetta, 2009) but the concept seems to be largely unknown outside of the Swedish language media and policy debates, and at closer look the denotation of violence capital seems unclear and in need of further anchoring in the empirical world and in theoretical thinking. The merging of “violence” with “capital” could potentially be an innovative way of making sense of cumulative and symbolic aspects of violence, as the concept seems to have an intuitive appeal and direct understanding within Swedish policy debates. However, to make the concept relevant to wider academic debates, it needs to be more clearly defined and theorized.

The current study aims at initiating an academic debate and theory development regarding the concept of violence capital, through critical engagement with an empirical case of the use of the concept. More specifically, we explore how the concept of violence capital was constructed at the introduction in Swedish criminal policy and criminal law. Given the restrictions on space, we will not be able to analyze what possible effects on sentencing the amendment has had, and we will only briefly discuss theoretical implications; however, we are convinced that both policy and theory would benefit from the discussion. To combat unwanted activities, we need a sound understanding of social practice, including violence and this may be accomplished by the means of clear and informative theoretical concepts.

Understanding and criminalizing patterns of violence

In terms of previous research of relevance for this study, it is both extensive as in debates regarding notions of violence and the criminalization of it, and very limited when it comes to violence capital specifically.

Within criminology and sociology, it is easy to find lengthy discussions about how to conceptualize violence (see, for example, Walby, 2013; Walby et al., 2014). One aspect that is repeatedly brought to the fore in such debates is how to understand and tackle the connection between violence as discrete acts—targeted by criminal law—and the contexts for such acts, that is, the processes, systems of meaning, and social relations repeated acts of violence are enabled and sustained by. There is no space here to do justice to these debates, so we limit ourselves to pointing out some of the most relevant for our exploration of the introduction of the concept of violence capital into Swedish criminal policy and criminal law.

Violence can be thought of as the last resort at hand when trying to settle a conflict. Violence might be the last desperate act people resort to when nothing else seems to work. Violence can also be described as senseless, cruel acts committed by seemingly non-rational persons directed at random victims (Rokach, 2017). The desire for vengeance is sometimes described as the root of violent acts. Senseless violence and violent vengeance are good examples of illegitimate violence that much of a nation-states’ legitimate use of violence is directed at combatting. From one perspective criminal law is designed as a form of collective self-defense, and from another perspective to exact vengeance on behalf of the citizens (Whitman, 2003). No matter what perspective we choose, criminal law describes certain acts as unwanted and also ascribes proper sanctions if the law should be violated. Legitimate violence is used to combat illegitimate violence and the state holds the monopoly of legitimate violence as its main function, according to a widespread reductivist definition (Fletcher, 2006). But even though the state holds the monopoly of violence, the role of the state is also to minimize its own use of violence as far as possible. Whenever conceivable, other forms of governance should be preferred. The tricky task for the state is thus to minimize all forms of illegitimate use of violence, using as little legitimate violence as possible.

There are wider and more narrow definitions of violence. In peace research, Johan Galtung is famous for his very wide definition of violence including structural violence, meaning social injustices such as class differences in life expectancy, or other forms of manifest divisions, hindering people to meet their full potentials (Galtung, 1969). Galtung’s formulation of violence is an early example of conceptualizations bringing patterns of violence into the picture. An example of a narrower definition lies closer to an intuitive notion of violence in its focus on personal actors and restriction to physical aspects: Violence is “the more or less intended direct but unwanted physical interference, by groups and/or individuals, with the bodies of others.” (Keane, 2004: 35, quoted in Munck, 2008: 13). Criminal law is clearly better suited to cover this kind of more clearcut single acts committed by a single individual towards another. When violence is repeated, committed as part of organizational practice (e.g., as part of organized crime) or less physical (e.g., as emotional violence within intimate relationships), criminal law seems less suited to cover it. In attempts to combat organized crime there have been attempts within the EU to harmonize the legislation since the early 1990s. However, the results of such efforts have been criticized both for being maleficent and for being obscured attempts at restricting civil liberties and promoting harsh legislation in general (Calderoni, 2008). Similar efforts in the United States, have met the same kind of critique as the EU legislation. It is argued that it is not efficient enough and that it runs the risk of handing over too much discriminating power to the prosecutors and police (Curry and Mongrain, 2009).

Violence as capital

Debates on the concept of capital are, of course, another strand of previous research relevant to our study. As will be discussed below, the idea of violence capital drawn upon in Sweden seems to be that it presupposes more or less explicit references to previous acts of violence. Some theoretical work is thus clearly needed, to reconcile the use of the concept of violence capital with other—at first glance similar—concepts recurring within violence research. One such concept is “symbolic capital.” The point of symbolic capital in Bourdieu’s sense is that it is more effective when hidden; what is perceived as the normal state of things have greater impact on social relations than overt oppression and domination (Topper, 2001). The explicit reference to acts of violence presupposed in the policy debates in Sweden is thus quite far from the concept of symbolic capital in Bourdieu’s sense. The aspect of the concept of violence capital coming closest to Bourdieu’s understanding of capital is the idea that capital can be accumulated over time and that different forms of capital can be transformed into each other, as when threats and intimidation—that is, violence capital—is used in cases of extortion and thereby transformed into economic capital. In classical economic thinking, capital is a second order concept that consists of all entities produced by labor and land and reused for production, which means tools, machinery buildings etc. In later years, less tangible factors of production such as human and social capital have been added to the more traditional forms (Dean and Kretschmer, 2007). Especially social capital and its emphasis on networks and groups seem relevant for the discussion of violence. However, the debates on social capital tend to focus on its positive aspects and research on negative aspects, such as the link to crime, seems to be underdeveloped (Putnam, 2000). We can also learn from this that capital is the part of man-made resources that is put into further production and in more complex post-industrial societies, capital gains in explanative power relative to land and labor. Economists hold that capital can be accumulated for future production but also that it can age, meaning that it loses value with time (Westlund, 2006). From such a line of thinking follows that violence needs to be used repeatedly to function as threat in the longer run. It has to be learned at some point in time and the skill to use it must be put into production not to deteriorate.

When it comes to violence capital specifically, we have been able to identify a number of news media references to this concept in recent years, mainly from Sweden, but also some examples from Denmark, Norway, and Germany—all possible to trace back to Swedish media pieces (Vainik et al., forthcoming). However, more research-oriented work is harder to find. The only academic discussion found where the actual term “violence capital” is used, is the work by sociology professor Diego Gambetta (Gambetta, 2009). In Gambetta’s use of the term, violence is seen as the most efficient form of communication among inmates. In prison, most forms of communication are restricted, resulting in uncertainties regarding the hierarchical order, which can be solved by referring to “violence capital,” according to Gambetta. Gambetta seems to presume that there is a need for a “balance of terror” in the prisons and that violence is the best resource available to establish hierarchies. Newcomers use violence to send messages to others, but also to find out how much of a resource violence is for them in the new context. New acts of violence are needed to communicate your capacity and readiness to use violence, but also rumors, symbols, and criminal careers can be efficient signals of your place in the hierarchy. In Gambetta’s analysis, violence is certainly not senseless: violence is possible to accumulate in networks, and it is important that this capital is publicly displayed among the inmates since it is viewed as a form of communication. To be effective, violence needs to be manifest and publicly displayed in Gambetta’s use of the term. To use violence as a way to communicate, all parties involved in the interaction must recognize its significance. Direct physical violence can thus, in certain circumstances, have advantages over other methods to display power and settling conflicts, due to its brutality which leaves little room for interpretations, discussions, or ignorance.

Summing up, Gambetta’s work on violence capital is the text coming closest to the topic of our study. However, as will be discussed below, there is no reference to his work in the empirical data on the backdrop of the Swedish reform. Furthermore, Gambetta himself makes no references to relevant theoretical debates concerning, for example, symbolic capital or social capital. It is possible to identify academic debates about some concepts coming close to violence capital, such as “street capital” (e.g., Sandberg, 2008) or “criminal capital” (e.g., Bayer et al., 2009) and also commentators drawing on Gambetta to discuss violence as a resource in the context of crime and criminal gangs (Marsh, 2020). However, none of these texts discuss violence capital explicitly. There hardly seems to be a “state of knowledge” about violence capital at all, and thus, the recent development in Swedish law creates an urgent need of further empirical research and theoretical development.

Method

Our theoretical approach when exploring the introduction of the concept of violence capital into Swedish crime policy and criminal law is social constructionist, and an important point of departure is that social problems and the handling of them—for example, through criminalization—can never be studied separately from the problem definitions, interpretative frames, and actors that create them as “a social problem” and an issue for policy interventions, instead of something “natural” or non-existing (Bacchi, 1999; Spector and Kitsuse, 1987). Our study of the construction of violence capital has been carried out with two points of entry into the empirical material. The first was identifying the interpretative frames used when defining and introducing the concept into crime policy and criminal law. Interpretative frames are schemes for interpretation making it possible for actors to place, perceive, identify, and name phenomena in their life world and the world at large (Goffman, 1959; Mumby and Mumby DK Clair, 1997: 196 ff.). The next step was to make explicit the underlying problem construction, by drawing on the “What’s the problem represented to be?” approach as outlined by Bacchi (1999). This approach consists of a set of questions to use when critically reviewing a public policy or piece of legislation. In the present study the following questions have been put to the texts regarding violence capital: What presuppositions or assumptions underpin the representation of violence capital as a “problem”? How has this representation of the “problem” come about? What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the “problem” be thought about differently? What effects are produced by this representation of the “problem”?

Data

The exploration of the construction of the concept of violence capital when it was introduced into Swedish criminal policy and criminal law draws on qualitative content analyses of three different sources of data. The focus is on the ways in which the concept of violence capital is defined and used in the different data sources.

The first kind of data is preparatory works to the change in the law, such as a public inquiry report, consultancy comments, the governmental suggestion to change the law, that is, the “proposition” (white paper), and similar.

The second set of data consists of texts published in Sweden by the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) where the term violence capital is used. The texts were identified through references in the preparatory works to the law, and through a series of web searches. In terms of the web searches, the first step was to go through both general and academic search engines and look for any references to violence capital in Swedish (“våldskapital”) or English. These searches soon led us to look closer at the texts published by Brå. A first search on the Brå website for publications between 2000 and 2017 mentioning violence resulted in 85 hits. A more in-depth search on capital in relation to these hits resulted in 16 hits on “violence capital” (“våldskapital”), 18 on “intimidation capital” (“skrämselkapital”) and four on “criminal capital” (“kriminellt kapital”), in total 38 hits in 12 different reports. ²

The third dataset comes from a pilot study with police staff about the familiarity with, and use of, the concept of violence capital. As almost all references to the concept of violence capital came from texts published by Brå, which has staff within the legal system as one of its target groups, we wanted to explore to what extent this concept was known among actors within the legal system. The pilot study was carried out in the autumn of 2017, with 10 police officers and one local authority civil servant recruited through a training event for senior staff within the police. The respondents had different positions and tasks within the police organization, such as police sergeant working with crime prevention at an overarching level, police inspector and head of a group of both civilian and uniformed police officers, district police commissioner responsible for development of police work, civil servant within a local authority working with safety and security analysis and strategies, development officer from the National Operations Department, and similar. In accordance with national policy on research ethics, the interviewees participated anonymously and were informed about the purpose of the pilot study, that it was in no way part of the training, that it was voluntary to participate, and that they could choose not to answer particular questions. The respondents answered a five-item questionnaire with open ended questions: In what contexts have you come across the concept of violence capital? How should this concept be understood? Can violence capital be an individual capacity and if so, how? Can different degrees of violence capital be identified? How is the concept of violence capital applicable in your own area of work? The answers are described and discussed below.

Legal reform

The suggestion to include violence capital as a reason for assessing a crime as gross was first presented by a public inquiry on criminal law interventions against organized crime in 2014 (SOU, 2014: 63). The task of the inquiry was to consider to what extent it is possible to amend criminal law to more effectively combat organized crime (dir., 2013: 19). Following upon the inquiry report, the government presented its considerations and suggestions in early 2016, in the proposition (white paper) Improved criminal law tools against organized crime (Proposition, 2015/16: 113), and the amendments to the Criminal Code came into force the first of July the same year, without any transitional regulations.

The concept of violence capital

In the final report from the public inquiry (SOU, 2014: 63), the concept of violence capital is defined in relation to criminal networks: “Violence capital refers to a capacity of a criminal network or a criminal group to use violence, e.g., violent crimes or arson” (SOU, 2014:63, 281, authors’ translation). The investigators discuss the concept of organized crime and argue that a key problem with organized crime is that perpetrators of organized crime “merge power (to use violence) and capital (built up through multiple criminal acts and then at least to some extent is reinvested in new crime)” (SOU, 2014:63, 234, authors’ translation). The argument is also stated as follows:

Our assessment is that the most prominent problem of organized crime is that criminal networks and groups, when committing crime, are using a violence capital, which gives them a distinctive power over other people. The use of this violence capital is making the criminal acts committed more threatening and intimidating and enable the networks and groups to gain power over people in their surroundings (SOU, 2014:63, 18, authors’ translation).

According to the investigators, violence capital is a problem partly because it is used to intimidate people, and partly since it is used as protection for those involved in organized crime (SOU, 2014:63, 48).

In a couple of places in the investigation report, the concept of violence capital is formulated as “violence and intimidation capital”: “An important part of the explanation for criminal gangs being able to continue their criminal activities is that they have gathered a violence and intimidation capital which then can be used to put pressure […]” (SOU, 2014: 63, 59). In addition, on page 62 in the investigation report, the term “intimidation capital” is used in the description of how persons from so-called brotherhood groups draw upon their accumulated resources and thereby do not need to commit serious acts of threat or violence, to get what they want. A bit further on in the text, “violence and intimidation capital” reoccurs, this time together with a clarification that “from now on, the concept of violence capital is used to capture this phenomenon” (p. 236). It thus seems as if the investigation treats violence capital and intimidation capital as synonymous.

Following the argument outlined in the public inquiry, violence capital can be understood as an issue of renown or a reputation that the perpetrators can use as leverage. In such cases it can, according to the investigators, be sufficient for a person belonging to a criminal organization to mention this membership to intimidate a witness, so that the witness in question does not dare to report any observations to the authorities. The criminal gang as “built up muscles” that can be used for unlawful coercion and extortion. These “muscles” or this reputation is used both for financial gain and to protect the criminal enterprise. According to the investigators, it is these features that make organized crime a threat to the system (SOU, 2014: 63, 66). The concept of violence capital should thus be considered in a broader perspective, and it includes other crimes as well as violent crimes: “The concept of violence capital should be understood in a wider sense as it is not limited to a capacity to commit violent crimes specifically but also includes other crimes that is a danger to life and health, e.g., arson or devastation endangering the public” (SOU, 2014: 63, 237, authors’ translation). The concept also means that violence capital is not necessarily a matter of the reputation of an individual, as it can be linked to the “infamy” of the group the perpetrator is a member of or is referring to. This is also clarified in the comments on the suggested amendment: “It does not need to be a question of a violence capital at disposal of the perpetrator himself. Consequently, it also concerns cases in which an outsider is profiting from the reputation of a criminal group” (Propositions, 2015/16: 113, 84 authors’ translation). In the same commentary it is also clarified that the existence of “actual” violence capital should not be considered necessary for the assessment of violence capital as an aggravating circumstance: “The violence capital alluded to does not have to be an actually existing violence capital. What is crucial is to what extent it appears as if the perpetrator belongs to, or is supported by, a group that can and is prepared to use violence to achieve its goals” (Proposition, 2015/16: 113, 84, authors’ translation). It is thus the potential to use violence, rather than the actual use of violence that is brought to the fore in the reform process. Another way of putting it is to claim that the amendment on violence capital brings latent violence into the picture, that is, violence which “is not there, yet might easily come about” (Galtung, 1969: 172).

In summary, when introduced into the Swedish criminal law, violence capital was primarily framed as a negative form of latent violence. It was also framed as a capacity of criminal networks and organized crime and as such a capacity of a collective, rather than of an individual per se.

The relevance of the concept

According to the public inquiry, the act of alluding to, or drawing upon, a violence capital should be considered in relation to crimes involving the perpetrator threatening someone or forcing someone to do—or not to do—something. The inquiry task was to consider organized crime and it is also this task the suggestions for legal reform are referring to. However, the investigators also argue that their suggestions should not be considered in relation to the context of organized crime only: “A point of departure for the suggestions we are making is that they should be possible to use in the combat of organized crime at large, but it does not seem desirable to limit the new regulations to only concern crimes committed by or within organized crime” (SOU, 2014: 63, 72 authors’ translation). The public inquiry thus opens for the notion that the phenomenon of violence capital could be relevant also in other contexts.

In a similar vein, the government argues that it is important to consider that the kind of offences committed within organized crime also occurs in contexts without reference to organized crime, and that it is therefore important when amending the law to bear in mind that the new measures should be introduced through criminal law regulations with general scope (Proposition, 2015/16: 113, 59). There is possibly a slight shift in emphasis, between the public inquiry and its more general wording about the applicability of the law, and the government with a more pronounced focus on the organized crime. For example, the following definition of violence capital can be found in the proposition: “Violence capital refers to an ability and preparedness within a criminal group to commit serious violent crimes or other crimes that can endanger life and health” (Proposition, 2015/16: 113, 83, authors’ translation). Here, the concept is more clearly associated with criminal groups than is the case in the previous public inquiry report.

Consultation remarks

As stated above, nine of the consultation bodies made explicit remarks about the introduction of the concept of violence capital. The Enforcement Authority is entirely positive and considers the reform as an effective measure that will make significant improvements. The other eight are to varying degrees expressing critique. Some are positive when it comes to the focus on the phenomenon as such but are critical to the concept of violence capital. It is argued that violence capital is not an established and accepted concept and it is regarded as “constructed” and difficult to interpret (e.g., the Courts of Appeal for lower Norrland). A couple of the consultation bodies question the notion of making “reference to” claiming that it is not clear enough to be useful in legal practice (e.g., the Swedish Economic Crime Authority). Some write that “of especially dangerous kind” should be enough to achieve what the reform is intended to achieve (e.g., the district court of Norrköping), or that the acts targeted by the amendments are already covered by the regulation about unlawful threat and that the introduction of violence capital will lead to a change in the assessment of the severity of crimes to an extent that is perhaps not intended (e.g., the district court of Malmö). There are also some bodies that express concern that the reform will have unintended negative consequences and increase the heavy sway of criminal organizations (e.g., the Swedish Prosecution Authority), or legitimize the very phenomenon of “intimidation capital,” as the Council of Crime Prevention chooses to call it in the comments.

Empirical and theoretical base

If violence capital is not an established and accepted concept in academia or in court practice, how did it enter the political domain in Sweden? When trying to trace the use of the concept it soon became clear that in the last decade it has regularly been occurring in texts published by the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (Brå). The earliest reference to the phenomenon is from 1999 and concerns outlaw MC gangs (Brå, 1999). This early reference is a literature review about the conflict between the Swedish Hells Angels and Bandidos during the mid-1990s. To a large extent the publication is based on information from the national police authority’s intelligence unit (KUT): “Through the ‘capital of fear’ [“kapital av fruktan”] that the gangs collected during the violent conflict in the Nordic countries, today they have such a standing that their threats render results to a worrying extent. This aspect of the gangs is what KUT calls system threatening” (Brå, 1999: 8–9 authors’ translation, italics in original).

Gangs and organized crime

After the report in 1999 there is a gap until about 2008 when the concept is starting to occur in several texts. In a report on unauthorized influence on crime victims and witnesses (Brå, 2008a) the concept of criminal capital and gang capital refers to outlaw MC gangs, neo-Nazi groups, ethnically based gangs, and football hooligans. “Regardless of who is the actual perpetrators the gang capital [gängets kapital] is used to intimidate” (Brå,2008a: 72), as it is put in one passage in the text. A similar use of the concept can be found in a report on strategies to combat football related disturbances of the public order (Brå, 2008b). The report draws a parallel between football hooligans and outlaw MC gangs, with reference to the previous report: “A comparison can be made with outlaw MC gangs who can achieve certain advantages by using their ‘capital of fear’ [kapital av fruktan] (Brå, 1999)” (Brå, 2008b: 20, authors’ translation).

Another aspect brought to the fore in the reports published by Brå in the last 10 years is the link between the use of violence capital and threats aimed at persons representing the state, such as politicians and staff within the legal system. In a report about police encounters with organized crime and unauthorized influencing of public officials (2009a) it is, for example, stated that:

Due to the limited proportion of police officers who have been subjected to violence an interpretation is that violence is not primarily aimed at the police. Instead, the violence capital which some actors rely on is created through violence against others, probably primarily other persons within the criminal milieu. (Brå, 2009a: 40, authors’ translation).

In the report, there are also some references to the link between criminal capital and drug addiction; however, it is also made clear that there is a particularly strong link to organized crime:

The concept of organized crime itself carries associations to gangs or groups with the capacity and readiness to use extreme violence, and one can thus claim that almost all organized crime is using “intimidation capital” [skrämselkapital]. Against this backdrop it becomes important to assess the actual threat. (Brå, 2009a: 64–65 authors’ translation)

Other reports on violence capital concern officials within the legal system and the unauthorized influencing of prosecutors and judges (Brå, 2009b), the vulnerability of politicians subjected to threats, violence, and harassment (Brå, 2012a), and unauthorized influencing of civil servants (Brå, 2016).

Another strand in the use of the concept of violence capital is the review of violent political extremism (Brå, 2009c), in which the authors argue that the violence capital of the far right—white supremacy milieu—is more developed than the one developed by the far left—the so-called autonomous milieu:

Consequently, the white supremacy milieu does not constitute a direct threat against the democratic society or any of its basic functions. However, should a clear intent appear, access to weapons and explosives, violence capital and experience of gross violence, the milieu would be able to cause serious harm to parts of these functions, a political party, a newspaper or an authority. […] Limitations in numbers, coordination and violence capital however means that the autonomous milieu is not able to destroy or seriously harm the basic functions of the democratic state such as for example political decision making (Brå, 2009c: 19 authors’ translation)

Yet another example of use is how violence capital is also explicitly associated with financial crime, as in the Brå report on the development of crime in Sweden until 2015: “Broad scale illegal work is to a large extent organized, and persons with violence capital are included in the picture alongside traditional financial criminals with a stronger focus on accounting” (Brå, 2017: 342 authors’ translation.)

Throughout the texts reviewed in this article, the terms violence capital, intimidation capital, capital of fear, and criminal capital are used almost synonymously. There are some indications that these terms might refer to slightly different phenomena; however, as no elaboration can be found in these texts about what the relationship might be between, say violence capital and intimidation capital, it is not possible to assess to what extent these concepts are the same or possibly differ from each other.

A “slippery” concept

Over time, it is possible to identify a slight shift in emphasis in the use of the concept. Initially, it was almost exclusively used in relation to gangs, while the use in the latter part of the period more often refers to organized crime. This is probably an expression of an increased level of attention paid to organized crime in Sweden over the last decade. Through the whole period violence capital is used interchangeably with intimidation capital or criminal capital.

It is striking that most of the references in the Brå reports are made to other reports by the same agency. A few references to research can be found, along with references to the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) and the national police authority’s intelligence unit (KUT) as well as to Lasse Weirup who is a journalist and author of several popular books about criminal gangs (Weirup, 2007; Weirup and Larsson, 2007). This pattern of referring to certain sources suggests that the concept of violence capital has mainly been developed within a specific group at Brå, which would explain the lack of references or debate about the concept within the wider academic community. Furthermore, it has not been possible to identify more elaborate explorations of the theoretical basis for the concept, engagement with academic debate or discussions about the relationship between violence capital as it is defined by Brå and different ways of conceptualizing “capital” (e.g., Bourdieu, 2010; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2002) or “violence,” as in debates on “latent violence” for example (e.g., Galtung, 1969).

In summary, violence capital comes across as a somewhat “slippery” concept in the texts from Brå, not precisely defined or theoretically elaborated. One interpretation of the lack of a clear definition or discussion of the theoretical foundation is that the use of the concept of violence capital to a large extent draws on every day or common sense understandings of “capital,” and possibly also of “violence.”

Police perspectives

To get an indication of the extent to which the concept of violence capital is known by actors within the legal system we turn to the pilot study among police staff. In relation to the first question in the pilot study questionnaire (“In what contexts have you come across the concept of violence capital?”), some of the answers mirror the preparatory works to the law and the Brå reports quite closely. The police staff talk about reading about the concept in texts and reports about violent extremism and marginalized and socially deprived housing areas, and the access to violence among different groups in society. However, it can be noted that the term “organized crime” is not used explicitly in the answers to the question. The closest is the answer that: “The concept of violence capital is very negative and we use it when we within the police talk about criminal gangs and their ability to use violence.” The respondents also report coming across the concept through public media, political debates and speeches among police staff, as well as through public investigations and training in self-protection, tactical conduct and weapons training, and conversations with colleagues… The answers from the police staff indicate less of an emphasis on organized crime, compared to the preparatory works and more recent Brå reports, and they are thus more in line with the way in which the concept was used when it was first introduced in the late 1990s.

Furthermore, one of the respondents does not limit the applicability to criminals, as the concept is also linked to the legitimate use of violence: “In discussions about the abilities for the police and others with support from the law to use violence and others who do so without support from the law. As the Police force we have support from the law to use violence in accordance with the principle of proportionality.” This broader use of the concept, linking it to the capacity to use violence per se rather than criminalized forms of violence makes visible how legitimate forms of violence were left unproblematized—taken for granted—throughout the legal reform process as well as in the work within Brå on violence capital.

Illegitimate and legitimate violence

Some police-respondents focus on the use of violence when elaborating how the concept should be understood: “someone who for different reasons have the capacity to use violence,” “approximately what capacity or opportunity a person or persons can use violence. The violence itself can be everything from physical violence with an object or weapon or using people who use violence.” In some answers, it is made clear that violence capital is a negative phenomenon: “Violence capital is the product of a lack of morality,” and the concept is linked to crime: “The capacity of an individual or group to use threats or violence as leverage to achieve some kind of gain and that this capacity is known to others and is thus announced by the perpetrator/s. The capacity is supported by actual access to weapons or other capacities to use physical violence.” However, there is also a couple of answers that bring the state monopoly on violence to the fore, for example:

A description of an individual’s or group’s combined willingness, capacity and resource to use violent acts. In my opinion violence capital and monopoly of violence are interlinked. This is also one of the differences. The monopoly of violence entails another factor, i.e. the exclusive right to use violence and the monopoly on violence has a more positive, desired meaning while violence capital has more negative connotations, an unwanted capacity of an individual or group. The police have both a monopoly on violence and violence capital but more as an objective stating of facts.

The answers that focus on violence capital as linked to legitimate use of violence also make explicit that morality is inherent to the concept: “the arsenal and aggregated violence/expressions I have access to considering laws, moral and competences (physical),” as another of the respondents puts it.

While the preparatory works to the law and the Brå reports primarily frame violence capital as a phenomenon linked to a network or group, that is, frame it as a collective phenomenon, the police staff also indicate that it can be understood as an individual capacity: “an individual who has the capacity to use violence, regardless of support from the law.” It also seems as if this way of understanding the concept draws on well-established practices within the police force: “Previously the police used the concept of ‘dangerous’ […] about a person who we know by experience tend to use violence.”

In addition, some respondents outline different components that together constitute violence capital, and discuss how enabling and restraining factors “balance” each other: “The degree of strength of the different parts (willingness, capacity, resources). One part can be weak but the other two strong. That decides what level of the ‘violence capital scale’ you end up on?” When unpicking the concept of violence capital this way, the respondents make visible a possible way of conceptualizing “capital” as constituted by several different components (motivation/willingness, capacity, resources), which may or may not reinforce or counteract each other.

Everyday police work

As regards the applicability in the respondents’ own areas of work, some answers come close to the stated aims in the law, preparatory works and Brå reports: “Especially within intelligence services, about criminal groups,” is one example. Others emphasize preventive aspects, bringing the work to reduce the violence capital and work with individuals to the fore. Yet others are critical to the concept and argue that it is problematic to use in everyday police work, especially when the concept is linked to the police: “Violence capital is to me a [negatively] charged word… Therefore, it is better to use the concepts of the law, in §10 of the Police Law, ³ it is more nuanced about authority for the police to use violence to solve a work task.” We also note that one of the respondents talks about applicability of the concept in relation to a number of different types of crime: “To think about how we can set boundaries for the one who has no legal support to use violence. Risk analysis in relation to intimate partner violence, work against doping, collaboration around pubs and clubs, preventing robberies.” This respondent is thus broadening the scope of the concept beyond the types of problems discussed in the preparatory works to the law or the Brå reports. At the “street-level” of police work violence capital is relevant for a much broader range of phenomena than what is indicated in policy debates at a national level.

Discussion

Freedom of association is a vital part of the Swedish constitution with important functions for democracy, and consequently it is considered very difficult to interfere with it in any way (Council on Legislation, 2019). Despite international requests and public debates, Sweden therefore have no lists of prohibited organizations, even when it comes to terrorism and organized crime (Swedish Public Inquiry Directives, 1998: 66). By introducing the concept of violence capital, certain forms of associations could be targeted, without actors within the legal system having to engage with the contested and problematic issue of freedom of association. Considering this context of previous debates, it is perhaps not surprising that when violence capital was introduced into Swedish criminal law it was framed as an illegitimate form of latent violence. It was also constructed as a capacity of criminal networks and organized crime and as such a collective resource (a social capital), rather than an individual resource per se (human capital). What is perhaps more surprising is that the theoretical and empirical basis for the concept was not discussed to any greater extent in the preparatory works. Instead, it seems as if the legal reform rested on an implicit, common sense understanding of the concept. The lack of clear definition and difficulties in interpreting the concept was also commented upon by some of the consultation bodies.

We found that the empirical base for the legal reform comes from texts published by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) during the last 10 years or so. Furthermore, in the Brå texts violence capital comes across as a somewhat “slippery” concept, not precisely defined or discussed in any depth. In addition, the Brå pattern of referring to different sources indicates that the concept of violence capital has been introduced by the work of the different parts of the police (e.g., the national police authority’s intelligence unit) and then developed and elaborated by a specific group within Brå, which would explain the lack of references or debate about the concept within the wider academic community.

Returning to questions asked when carrying out the analysis—What presuppositions or assumptions underpin the representation of violence capital as a “problem”? How has this representation of the “problem” come about? What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? (Bacchi, 1999)—we want to emphasize how the police and Brå come across as having played a central part. Looking at the pilot study among senior police staff, their responses make visible some of the unproblematized aspects in the legal reform as well as the Brå reports. The police staff comments problematize the taken for granted association between violence capital and crime, amorality or the immoral, seen in the preparatory works to the law. Instead, the police staff link the concept to their own professional role and the state monopoly of violence, that is, to legitimate forms of power enabled by the capacity to use physical force. This way of framing violence capital as a matter of a capacity for violence, rather than it being about illegitimate violence makes the use of violence in itself visible, which enables problematization and theorizing to a greater extent than is the case in the preparatory works or the Brå reports.

One reading of the law reform is that what is referred to is the phenomenon which in academic discourse is discussed as social capital. However, in academic debates the concept of social capital tends to be associated with positive aspects of social relations (Putnam, 2002), making it hard to use as a basis for assessing crime. Furthermore, the concept of violence capital does add a link between direct—manifest—interpersonal violence and capital in a way that lacks theoretical elaboration in current academic debates. What is formulated in a new way is the idea that violence is a resource that can be accumulated and exchanged into other forms of capital (economic, social, etc.). Since violence is a social practice that many institutions are set to diminish the roots of, how to invest in it and how it can be used for production must be learned and upheld in a subcultural context. The only legitimate use of violence capital is by the police: they are the core “violence workers” legitimized to use violence in emergency situations, taking care of all the dirty work in need of violence to be carried out (Seigel, 2018). As a form of capital, violence is monopolized by the state, kept latent as much as possible, but always ready to use if necessary. In other words, the rule of law rests on latent state violence, and citizens who try to use violence as capital, for their own production, therefore breech the most basic social contract. If violence is used as capital, by individual persons, gangs or within the context of organized crime, it threatens the legitimacy of the state. The analytical coupling of violence and capital therefore implies a view on criminals as more active and rational in their social practice.

The exploration of the introduction of violence capital into Swedish criminal law points to important questions for further debates within the field of violence research. Looking at the historical development of the concept of capital, the discussion started with real capital and then moved on to economic capital, human capital, social capital, and symbolic capital (Westlund, 2006). It is striking that such a fundamental form of social practice as violence has been absent from this line of thought, mirroring an interest in legitimate factors of production. Another question is raised by the fact that there seems to be a gap between common sense ways of understanding patterns of violence and their cumulative effects, and researcher models of violence, as well as a gap between academy and the broader society (politics, daily press, the police, etc.). It may not be a coincidence that it was the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention that picked up the concept from police practice and disseminated it further, as this institution works closer to the field and in a more applied manner than universities and other academic institutions tend to do. The development of the concept of violence capital in the Swedish context thus point to the broader issue of theorizing violence in relation to everyday experiences and the lack of engagement with the issue of violence in many “grand theories” on the social world (Walby, 2013).

The introduction of the concept of violence capital does of course raise questions to be clarified, such as, what the relationship is between the concept of violence capital and other concepts, such as social capital and human capital (Putnam, 2002; Schultz, 1961). Furthermore, it will be an empirical question if violence capital works like other forms of capital, for example, that it does not get reduced by use, but can be increased by the way it is used, etc. (Westlund, 2006). However, after having explored both previous research and our empirical case we would argue that the merging of “violence” and “capital” could potentially be an important contribution to the theorization of violence. While violence is something actors “do,” capital is something actors (individual or collective) “have” and by merging these two concepts into one it may be possible to better understand the processes by which violence is accumulated and can be transformed into other resources.

Conclusion

Debates among legislators since at least the 1960s show that the issue of how to tackle patterns of violence through criminal law is not specific to Sweden, but a general challenge for legislators, across different legal systems. Is the concept of violence capital helpful and will it enable more efficient criminal law responses to organized crime? And if so, is it applicable across different legal systems? Although the introduction of the concept of violence capital into Swedish criminal policy and criminal law can be traced back to demands on more efficient policing of organized crime, and demands from law enforcement agencies, and mainly seem to have been made to empower the police and protect witnesses, etc., the concept may be open for other uses within the justice system, as indicated by the comments by senior police staff. It lies beyond the scope of this article to explore legal practice, and the extent to which it will broaden the applicability of the concept of violence capital beyond what was discussed in the legal reform process. It thus remains to be seen to what extent a reference to violence capital will be used as a reason for assessing a crime as gross in other types of cases, such as cases of honor related violence, or intimate partner violence, for instance. We conclude that the gap between common sense ways of understanding patterns of violence and their cumulative effects and researcher models of violence visible in the case of Sweden point to a need of theory development and academic debate regarding the concept of violence capital.