The question of whether lawyers and managers behave selfishly or fairly has inspired discussion for a long time. Empirical evidence, however, is sparse. Using data from an experiment with 359 law and business administration students, we investigate this question empirically and provide first evidence. Our results suggest that law students and business students behave reciprocally, but the degree of reciprocity is higher for lawyers. Surprisingly, it is not university education that makes business students more selfish: candidates seem to undergo a self-selection process before they begin their studies.
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