In vielen psychologischen Studien wurde gezeigt, dass Performance-Feedback als Motivator innerhalb einer Arbeitsbeziehung wirkt. In diesem Papier soll nun die Wirkung von Feedback mit Methoden der Ökonomie untersucht werden. Dazu wird der Einfluss von Feedback auf die Arbeitsanstrengung des Agenten in einem einfachen Zweiperioden-Modell analysiert. Im zweiten Schritt werden die theoretischen Resultate in einem ökonomischen Experiment getestet. Im Modell führt Feedback (1) zu einer Anstrengungsanpassung in der zweiten Periode, (2) zu einem Anstieg des Gesamtnutzens des Agenten und (3) zu einer Steigerung des erwarteten Gesamtoutputs. Die Daten aus dem Experiment bestätigen die theoretischen Vorhersagen weitgehend. Feedback beeinflusst die Anstrengungswahl des Agenten, obwohl die Entlohnungsfunktion in den Fällen mit und ohne Feedback identisch ist.
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