Has Immigration Slowed Down Secularization in Germany? Empirical Evidence From 2014 to 2021

Abstract

The aim of this data visualization is to answer the question of whether immigration has acted as a counter-secularization force in Germany in recent years. The hypothesis is based on the tendency of first- and second-generation immigrants to exhibit higher levels of religiosity compared with the host populations. Simulation analysis involving more than 15,000 respondents of data from the 2014 to 2021 German General Social Survey indicates that the increase in the immigrant population during this period does not emerge as a substantial counterforce to religious decline in both eastern and western Germany. An effective slowdown of secularization in Germany would have required a more substantial increase in immigration, a notably higher level of religious engagement among new arrivals and their descendants than was observed, and a reduced pace of secularization among them.

In recent years, the importance of religion has rapidly declined globally (Inglehart 2021). Concurrently, substantial numbers of immigrants continue to move around the world (de Haas et al. 2019). This data visualization brings together the two processes, secularization and immigration, and raises the question of whether immigration can serve as a counter-secularization force.

Secularization is primarily the result of people’s leaving their religious communities and increasingly abstaining from attending religious services. However, there also is a demographic component to it. Immigration has the potential to slow down secularization, because it may alter the religious composition of a country’s population (Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012). Immigration is not the sole demographic factor influencing secularization. Disparities in fertility and mortality rates between the religious and secular can shape long-term trends. However, only immigration may be a short-term demographic driver of secularization. First-generation immigrants tend to arrive with higher levels of religiosity compared with host populations. Moreover, both first- and second-generation immigrants often experience increases in religiosity over time, indicating a religious revival (Guveli and Platt 2023). Thus, immigration to a country may impede or even stop the trend of religious decline in host countries.

To address the research question, I visualize the results in the context of Germany on the basis of the 2014 to 2021 German General Social Survey (GGSS). The survey aims to capture a representative cross-section of adult individuals in Germany. Germany stands out as a compelling case because of its above-average influx of immigrants in recent years, starting with the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 (Destatis 2024). As secularization has progressed further in eastern Germany compared with western Germany because of the politically enforced secularization in the eastern part of Germany until the fall of the Iron Curtain (Meulemann 2004), the visualization distinguishes between the two former German states. The final sample comprises more than 15,000 participants (eastern Germany, n = 5,082; western Germany, n = 10,541).

The central variable is religiosity, with respondents classified into three levels of religious engagement on the basis of religious membership and attendance. Participants who hold religious memberships and actively attend religious services (at least once a month) are designated as “core religious members.” Participants with (nominal) religious affiliations who attend religious services less frequently or not at all are categorized as “marginal religious members.” Individuals without religious memberships are classified as “nonmembers of religious groups.”

The assumption that immigration has the potential to slow down secularization is based on two premises: immigrants are increasing as a share of the overall population, and immigrants are more religious than natives. Therefore, the analytical strategy consists of the following three steps. First, it is visualized how the relative frequencies of core, marginal, and nonmembers develop over time. Second, changes in the proportion of the immigrant population and the distribution of the three levels of religious engagement separately for natives and immigrants are depicted. Third, I use simulation analysis and visually represent the distribution of the three levels of religious engagement in 2021 under the assumption that the number of immigrants has remained unchanged since 2014. A retrospective simulation provides an alternative approach to examining the demographic component of secularization. In contrast to projections of future religious decline (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 2012; Skirbekk, Kaufmann, and Goujon 2010), it does not rely on the accuracy of the assumed immigration scenario. More information on the data, sample, operationalization, missing values, analytical strategy, robustness checks and code can be found in the Online Appendix.

Figure 1 supports the well-known finding of religious decline in Germany. Throughout the depicted period, the share of core and marginal members decreased, while the proportion of nonmembers experienced an increase, albeit at very different levels in eastern and western Germany. At the same time, the immigrant population nearly doubled in eastern Germany, and it rose by almost 8 percentage points in western Germany. In both 2014 and 2021, the level of religious engagement among immigrants in Germany is higher compared with that among their native counterparts. In eastern Germany, immigrants are more likely to be classified as marginal and core members compared with natives. In western Germany, immigrants are more prevalent among core members but less prevalent among marginal members than natives.

Figure 1.

Religious change and immigrant population in Germany (2014–2021).

A comparison between the actual results for 2021 and the simulated (structurally adjusted) results for 2021 answers the question of whether immigration can function as a counter-secularization force. Both premises for the assumption that immigration slows down secularization are met; however, the resulting lower religious engagement in the simulated results compared with the actual data is almost negligible. For all three levels of religious engagement, it is evident that both actual and simulated results are very similar. The finding that immigration has not substantially impeded the progress of secularization in Germany between 2014 and 2021 can be attributed to two reasons for each of the former federal states: for eastern Germany, the proportion of immigrants (4 percent in 2014 and 8 percent in 2021) is simply too small to really make a difference. Additionally, immigrants secularize faster than natives, reflected in the more pronounced increase in nonmembers among immigrants (from 61 percent in 2014 to 67 percent in 2021) compared with natives (from 74 percent in 2014 to 76 percent in 2021). In western Germany, the difference in average religiosity between the two groups is relatively small (in 2014 and 2021). And again, immigrants secularize faster than natives, as evidenced by the more pronounced decrease in marginal religious members among immigrants (from 61 percent in 2014 to 53 percent in 2021) compared with natives (from 62 percent in 2014 to 60 percent in 2021).

To conclude, although immigration may play a role in shaping the religious landscape of a country, this data visualization highlights that effectively counteracting secularization in Germany would require a substantially larger increase in immigration, a notably higher level of religious engagement among newcomers and their descendants, and a slower rate of secularization among them.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-srd-10.1177_23780231241271687 – Supplemental material for Has Immigration Slowed Down Secularization in Germany? Empirical Evidence From 2014 to 2021

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-srd-10.1177_23780231241271687 for Has Immigration Slowed Down Secularization in Germany? Empirical Evidence From 2014 to 2021 by Jan-Philip Steinmann in Socius