Electoral competition and government health expenditure in electoral autocracies: A pessimistic view

Abstract

Does electoral competition affect expenditures on the provision of public goods in electoral autocracies? Previous studies firmly agree that multiparty elections are critical to autocratic survival. Accordingly, studies argue that multiparty elections lead to an increase in health expenditure in electoral autocracies. In addition to the literature, less explored is the effect of electoral competition on the expenditure. If oppositions can run elections with a higher level of electoral competition and threaten the dictator's winning over elections, would autocrats provide more public goods to citizens? This paper raises a pessimistic view on this question and argues that the impact of electoral competition does not affect government health expenditure. Empirical findings with 291 cases of 70 electoral autocracies from 2000 to 2018 and an illustrative case study of Armenia demonstrate that autocrats are less likely to provide health and education expenditures to citizens even though they face higher competition during elections.