Indonesia and the UNHCR: Different Approaches to East Timorese Refugees in West Timor

Abstract

This article investigates the refugee crisis occurred in Belu regency in 1999 due to the divergences between the UNHCR and Indonesian government, concerning the status of East Timorese refugees, whether Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons? This issue was analyzed through a case study that the different views have created the split of the roles. The UNHCR became responsible for the repatriation agenda, while the local integration and resettlement burden fell to the Indonesian government, impacting the durable solution implementation. To avoid this burden, the Indonesian government revoked the status of the “refugees” to be Indonesian citizens in 2003, affecting badly the refugees’ lives.

Introduction

Different approaches of the Indonesian government and international organizations toward the status of East Timorese refugees in Belu have significantly affected durable solutions implementations, leading to a refugee crisis and becoming burdensome for the Indonesian government, particularly the local government of Belu (Alkatiri, 2018a; Siregar, 2014). The presence of East Timorese refugees in Belu territory followed the armed conflict over the 1999 referendum result announced in East Timor, where 75% of voters chose the option of independence (Alkatiri, 2018b; Qvortrup, 2015), sparking a series of violent confrontations between pro-Indonesia groups led by militia and pro-independence groups in East Timor (Sakti, 2023). It is well known that armed conflict and violence in an area lead to a variety of negative consequences including violations of human rights (Cingranelli et al., 2019; United Nations Human Rights, 2011, p. 109), and the emergence of forcibly displaced emigrants, who become refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), seeking elsewhere (Ruegger, 2019), this occurred in the border area of Belu district, which is adjacent to East Timor, so it easier for refugees to flee to that area (Alkatiri, 2020). According to Knezevic (2005), between 250,000 to 280,000 East Timorese refugees migrated to Indonesian territory, 61% of whom went to the Belu regency (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2010). Alkatiri (2018a) has recorded that those refugees occupied several huge camps, including Haliwen, Tenubot, Tenukik, Haekesak, Kobalima, and Tohe as well as other small camps around Belu district. At the time, the condition of those camps was below standard living conditions, with lack of health and education facilities, social conflicts and economic hardship. The situation was problematic for not only the refugee community, but also Indonesian government (Alkatiri, 2018a), cooperation between the Indonesian government and the international community was urgently needed.

Having the East Timorese refugees in Belu territory, the international community and the Indonesian government were expected to cooperate under a durable solution framework to be able to stop the suffering of refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (2024), the UNHCR and the host government are the main actors for refugee protection, where monitoring and support are the primary duties of the UNHCR as stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. The goal of durable solutions is to make the lives of refugees more valued and sustainable (Easton-Calabria, 2021), through three important agendas, namely repatriation, local integration, and resettlement (Souter, 2014). However, the divergences between the UNHCR and the Indonesian government have highlighted significant differences in attitudes towards the status of refugees in Belu regency since their arrival in 1999. The UNHCR considers the East Timorese people who have been forcibly moved into Indonesia, as refugees, while the Indonesian government sees them as IDPs (Fanggidae, 2014). These divergences to some extent, have impacted on the durable solution implementations because the Indonesian government and the UNHCR would work according to their own views, leaving the UNHCR limited in what it could achieve(Alkatiri, 2018c).

Various literatures have discussed the issue of the refugee crisis generally, at least under the several main themes, such as discriminatory policies toward refugees in the host countries (Babu, 2020; Kikano et al., 2020; Spiegel & Mhlanga, 2022; Syeda, 2020), unclear resettlement development policies (Messakh, 2003; Sianipar, 2016), the obstacles to the implementation of durable solutions (Bidandi, 2018; Moretti, 2015; Vancluysen, 2022), the implication of the security dimension of the refugees’ life in the border area of Belu (Alkatiri, 2020), the social and economic conditions in the refugees’ life in camps (Bari, 2020; Damen et al., 2022; van Dijk et al., 2022),the unclear status of being refugees or citizens in a host country (Guney, 2022; Karadag & Sert, 2023; Perkins, 2019), and conflict between the refugee community and the local host community (Ansar & Khaled, 2021).

Moreover, few specified issues on the responses of the UNHCR and states toward refugee crisis have been conducted, particularly discussing the cooperation between international organizations and states. Kelley and Dueieux (2004) have examined the role and responsibility of the UNHCR to meet the challenges of global displacement and found that the UNHCR s’ challenges have been handled through strengthening international protection for refugee and expanding the durable solutions access through multilateral cooperation. Besides that, the study of Ostrand (2015) and Shultz et al. (2020) has shown that the Syrian refugees who were accepted not only in neighboring countries such Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, but also in developed countries such as European countries, and Canada, whether temporarily or permanently based on each state’s policies by collaborating between local governments and municipalities along with the UNHCR and civil societies.

Other research on the refugee crisis issue have shown different results. For example, Faruque has argued that the implementation of the durable solutions by the UNHCR has faced several obstacles, due to two reasons, the IOM as the preferred humanitarian partner to the Bangladeshi government and the failure of the repatriation program because the Rohingnya community in Myanmar are not recognized as citizens (Faruque, 2020). Meanwhile, similar research on Rohingnya refugees in Bangladesh has mentioned the implementation constraints on the durable solution by the UNHCR have occurred due to the overlapping of responsibility among the UNHCR, the IOM the local NGOs, and the Bangladeshi government providing no formal guidance or protocols for camp coordination and management (Khan, 2023, pp. 203–204).

However, there has been next to no writing to discuss the impact of differences in views between the international organization and host-governments toward the status of a person or a group whether being refugee or IDPs in a host-country. Therefore, this article presents an important issue concerning the divergence of views between the UNHCR and the Indonesian government on the status of East Timorese people as refugees or IDPs in Belu, where some of them who were entered to Indonesian territory for safety reasons not seeking for permanent Indonesian citizens. In other words, they wanted to come back to East Timor after being acknowledged as a new country. However, Indonesian government has considered all of them as Indonesian citizens, therefore; they have been treated as IDPs. Therefore, this article addresses the differences of views between the UNHCR and Indonesian government highlighting the status of East Timorese in Belu, the implications of the divergence over the durable solution implementations, and the performance of Indonesian government in handling the refugee’s crisis.

Analytical Framework

Roles of the UNHCR and Indonesian Government on the Durable Solutions

In International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO), such as the UNHCR, the humanitarian values are the core of the programs (United Nations Human Rights [UNHCR], 2011). Therefore, the UNHCR has certain strong mandates to be assessed in the field (Nordin et al., 2021). According to the Statute of the UNHCR, the institution is given the responsibility to protect and assist refugees, working under the authority of the UN General Assembly, including assisting the concern of government or private organizations in focusing on voluntary repatriation and integration with the host communities. However, UNHCR has played a part in assisting in the reintegration of the refugees in the concerned state (Baksha & Safdar, 2020), even distributing food, clothing, blankets, tents, educational needs, finding jobs and housing, and ensuring and improving living standards, and those agendas may be part of the durable solution programs. It is commonly known that the durable solutions consist of repatriation, local integration, and resettlement programs (Souter, 2014; UNHCR, 2011). The durable solutions are considered as the primary solution for the refugee and IDPs communities to resolve independently their problems, particularly their legal status and financial disparities between political institutions (Bradley, 2019). Moreover, the UNHCR is assigned, under the 2005 UN-based cluster approach, to be involved in a collaborative response to IDPs assistance (Morris, 2006), such as cluster protection, camp coordination, and management.

However, Nordin et al. (2021) have pointed out that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee does not define any procedure to assess refugee status, offering opportunities for states to seek “proper” durable solution programs due to lack of a clear definition of the agendas (Bradley et al., 2022). Therefore, the UNHCR needs to “negotiate” its agendas to seek mutual advantages with its stakeholders, such as the host government, NGOs, and private sector actors to handle refugee crisis (Grandi, 2016). Shultz et al. (2020) argue that one form of collaborations could be a humanitarian marketing system where the refugee is offered opportunities to establish connections between them and with the local people and institution, besides assisting local governments and NGOs to formulate and create safe environments. Therefore, Shultz et al. (2020) suggest that humanitarian marketing system may be used to reduce the number of Syrian refugees who have been accepted in many countries, particularly the developed countries.

In certain circumstances, the government plays a vital role, as the major actor, among those stakeholders (Grandi, 2016). As the major actors, several states tend to limit or ignore politically the UNHCR agendas due to national interests, security reasons, state’s policy, institutional choice, and efficiency in refugee crisis responses (Loescher, 2014, p. 182), affecting the work and effectiveness of the UNHCR (Loescher, 2014, p. 186). In several cases, a state may not be obliged to fulfill its legal responsibility towards refugee affairs in partnership with the UNHCR (Betts, 2009).

Furthermore, the involvement of the UNHCR in the IDP protection affairs, based on the 2005 UN-based cluster approach, has been seen to overlap with the refugee regime (Loescher, 2014), as well as overlapping with IOM and government entities’ tasks as occurred in Bangladesh (Khan, 2023), creating divergences towards other stakeholders towards the refugee policies formulated by states (Loescher, 2014).

In the case of Belu, there have been at least two approaches marking the differences between the UNHCR and Indonesian government in dealing with the refugee crisis. The UNHCR and its other NGO partners worked on humanitarian objectives to protect East Timorese as refugees, as regulated under the international norms (UNHCR, 2011). Meanwhile the Indonesian government considered the East Timorese immigrants’ crisis not only on humanitarian issues, but took a more political stance by regarding the question of the East Timorese issue in Belu district as a domestic problem under its national jurisdiction, as IDPs. As a result, the divergence has raised different approaches, hindering the process of durable solutions in Belu (Alkatiri, 2018a).

Method

This study was conducted in one of the regencies which is situated in border areas of Indonesia, called Belu. Belu Regency is located between 1240 and 1260 of East Longitude and 90 and 100 of South Latitude. In terms of geographic position, Belu Regency has boundaries as follows: North—Ombai Strait. South—Timor Sea. East—Timor Leste Country. West—TTU and TTS Regency. The area of Belu Regency is 1.28494 km². Administrative area of Belu divided to 12 sub-districts. The largest area is Tasifeto Barat with 22,419 km² (17.46%) and Tasifeto Timur with 21,137 km² (13,96%). The smallest area is Atambua Barat with 15.55 km² (1.21%) and Atambua Selatan with 15.73 km² (1.22%). Besides that, Belu Regency consists of 69 villages and 12 villages where 76 villages included in the non-coastal villages (Regional Statistics of Belu Regency, 2024).

This work has used a case study to describe a social phenomenon and to examine various kinds of groups, such as individuals, communities, institutions, or events, depending on what you want to find (Babbie, 2010, p. 309; Bloor & Wood, 2006, p. 27) and are specific and local in scale (Gerring, 2007, p. 49). In the context of this research, a case study was used to examine the impact of different views between international organizations and the government, the UNHCR and the Indonesian government on the status of East Timorese refugee community in the border area between Indonesia and Timor Leste.

The primary data has been collected through in-depth interviews and observation which were conducted from October 2017 until February 2018 in three studied areas: the resettlements of Taeksoruk, Umaklaran, and Haliwen, which were as the main center of a refugee camp. The process of interview and observation were taken 5 months due to geographical areas and rainy season. The interview took place 7 prominent leader, 3 refugee coordinators, and 15 ordinary refugees who agreed and consented to be interviewed directly. The unstructured interviews took place with few prominent leaders and coordinators of the refugees in those resettlements. The unstructured interviews were used for the refugees who have low level of educational background and the need to avoid sensitive words which may provoke emotional responses. Sometimes, the East Timorese refugees did not want to share information due to the presence of those coordinators who were members of militia groups, so the interview needed to be rescheduled at night time, particularly in Haliwen resettlement. Meanwhile, structured interviews were employed to interview three heads of village, such as village of Umaklaran, Haliwen, and Taeksoruk, regarding the policy implementation of durable solutions and the condition of refugees at grass village levels.

Before beginning this research, a formal permission letter for research had to be obtained from the Kesbangpol Kabupaten Belu (Directorate General of National Unity and Politics of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Belu District), an institution with responsibility to strength the political and unity affairs. The permission letter was always attached with the research proposal anytime when visiting village offices or before commencing the interviews. Generally, the permission letter from the Kesbangpol is considered as an essential document. A research would be impossible conducted without having the letter because the village officers would reject the research in their areas due to the research legality and permission.

Furthermore, the majority of the participants of this study were selected purposefully due to their position as government officials, prominent leaders of the refugee community, Non-Government Organization, and local traditional leaders, although several refugees were selected randomly in order to obtain additional information. Before the interview started, all participants were provided detail information regarding the purpose and agenda of the research. An information sheet and a consent form were prepared for all participants to be filled and signed, asking for their permissions to be recorded, noted, and interviewed, including making observation in their camps and resettlements, and all participants accepted the research agenda to be conducted. All participants’ identities were anonymized and the given information was considered as confidential data. Several data have been related with the quality of the resettlements built by the local entrepreneurs and the participation of local military institution in Belu district, therefore; some refugees were very careful when conveying information. Besides that, information related to land access was also spoken carefully by the refugees due to potential social conflict escalation with the local traditional community as the local land owners. In that situation, those information were sensitive and essential to be discussed to assist the local government and society to understand the refugees’ condition and find better solutions not only for the Timorese refugees, but also for the local communities in Belu district. In addition, this research did not involve human and animal experimentations.

Moreover, three other resettlements, such as Aitaman, Silawan, and Tohe, were visited also for small interviews with one prominent refugee leader and family for each resettlement and a local official, with the purpose of gathering general information and observations concerning their lives, policy implementation, and the refugees’ copying strategies in dealing with challenges. In Silawan village, researcher had conducted a small interviewed with additional interviewees such as the traditional local leader and heads of local hamlets in the village because the village has been the main cross border gate to East Timor. These interviews in Silawan village were taking place during the month of February in 2018.

In addition, in order to know the durable solution policies and the diverging views of the status of the refugee at government and organization levels, structured interviews were conducted with the former regional secretary (2000–2003) then regent of Belu (2003–2013) as the key informant at governmental level because he was in charge as the regent when the main refugee crisis took place. Furthermore, the researcher had also met other current local government officials such as the regional secretary of Belu regency, an official from social service unit, two actual members and two former members of the local assembly from the East Timorese community and one local assembly member. The informants were interviewed in order to gather further actual information. Moreover, to comprehend the implication of durable solutions, authors have interviewed the Circle of Imaged Society (CIS) Timor, as a Non-Government Organization which has been actively assisting the UNHCR for repatriation and social assistance programs for the refugee community in Belu regency. Besides that, information has been collected with local land owners and another the leader of local cultural institution, called Matabesi, where they disagreed about the use of owners’ land to be occupied by the refugees. The secondary data has been used as complementary information, to compare and distinguish the previous studies’ findings with this research, for example data from the UNHCR, the UNDP Indonesia, academic documents, and local newspapers.

Data from interviews was collected and transcribed, and has been presented and analyzed. Moreover, information on observation has been noted and organized daily. All information has been grouped into two main themes, the divergent views of the status of refugees in Belu and its implication on the durable solutions implementation. The author’s triangulate data, by confirming and checking the data from interviews, observation in camps, and secondary data, to conclude with an interpretation of the evidence. The results have been presented in a narrative to respond to the objective of the research. Finally, the conclusion was reached through a descriptive approach.

Findings and Discussions

Differences in Views Between UNHCR and the Government of Indonesia

The arrival of East Timorese refugees to Belu in unexpected numbers overwhelmed the central and regional government of Belu in dealing with the East Timorese refugee crisis. According to Achmad (2000), it was estimated that there were 100,000 refugees in the Belu area, spreading across various camps such as Haliwen, Tenubot, Tenukik areas, the Military District Command office, the Belu district police office, and other small camps. However, the initial problem for the international community, represented by the UNHCR, and Indonesian government has been the refugee’s status, whether they have been refugees or IDPs.

According to Fanggidae (2014), there was difference of opinion between the UNHCR and Indonesia government concerning the status of the former East Timorese citizens residing in Indonesian territory after the 1999 referendum result announcement, whether they fall into the category of refugees or IDPs. For the UNHCR, the East Timorese people forcibly moved to Indonesian territory were considered as refugees. This view was in accordance with the definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 Convention of the Status of Refugee. It means that every East Timorese who is outside of Timor Leste, who wants to be safe, away from the 1999 conflicts, is considered a refugee. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government saw that the East Timor refugees were Indonesian citizens who had fled the conflict in the former Indonesian territory, because since 1975 East Timor had been part of the Indonesian state.

In my view, the term IDP is appropriate for Indonesian born citizens who went to East Timor since the territory was part of Indonesia in 1975. They came from Java, Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and so on. Meanwhile, people who were born in East Timor seeking security in Indonesia due to conflict could be considered as refugees, although they had choices later to be repatriated back to East Timor or to stay and continue as Indonesian citizens. Tan (2016) has said that Indonesia is not a member of the 1951 Refugee Convention, so it has no obligation to provide protection to refugees. Although there is no obligation for Indonesian government, the 1945 Indonesia Constitution declares Indonesian government to participate in the establishment of a world order which is based on freedom, peace, and social justice as mentioned the opening of the constitution. Damaledo (2018, p. 57) has pointed out that the differences in views occurred at the initial arrival of the East Timorese. However, the Indonesian government’s, President B. J. Habibie admitted that anyone who fled to Indonesia after the 1999 referendum was considered a refugee and social victim.

The decision remained in force under the Megawati Soekarno Putri administration who decided later to make regulations that set out clear criteria about who has the right to be considered as a refugee. These criteria are described in Presidential Decree Article 3 Number 25 of 2003 concerning data collection of residents of the former province of East Timor as follows, (a) born in the territory of the Province of East Timor, (b) born outside the territory of the Province of East Timor but one of the parents was born in the territory of the Province of East Timor, (c) married a person who was born in the province of East Timor, (d) married a person who was born outside the territory of the Province of East Timor, but one of the partner’s parents was born in the territory of the Province of East Timor, and € are not citizens of the Province of East Timor but can be categorized as residents of the Province of East Timor if their last residence was prior to becoming refugees, namely having lived for at least 5 years before the results of the popular consultation were announced on September 4, 1999.

I argue that the five criteria above increase the number of people who are considered refugees because they include people who are not born in East Timor, but residents who come from other parts of Indonesia, as long as they meet the criteria above, for example those who had lived in East Timor for 5 years prior to the 1999 referendum. Some of the above criteria greatly impacted on any welfare assistance received, because the majority are Indonesian citizens and became a “burden” for the Indonesian government. According to the UNHCR Global Report (2003), the Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 25 2003 has arranged the issue of the registration for the East Timorese citizens to choose to become citizens of Indonesia or Timor-Leste, the results show that 90% chose to remain Indonesian citizens.

In my finding, the refugees are divided into three groups, militia members and their relatives, totaling 6,000 refugees. The second group is government officials, both from East Timor and from other regions of Indonesia. According to Damaledo (2018), this second group consists of civil servants, police, and the Indonesian National Army, totaling 14,000 people. I argue that the second category of refugees do not face too much trouble because they are directly handled by the Indonesian government or several of them return to their respective hometowns. The third group is traders or informal sector actors who come from other regions in Indonesia, the majority coming from Java, Bali, Sumatra, and South Sulawesi. In my observation, the majority of the third group chose to return to their place of origin and several of them chose to continue their daily activities around the districts of Belu and Kupang. They are not native to East Timor and did not choose to take part in the durable solutions program. This third group are considered political and social victims as a result of the separation of the territory, so that the Indonesian government has an obligation to provide compensation in the form of money to those who live outside the province of East Nusa Tenggara.

The Implications of the Different Views on the Durable Solutions

In the process of durable solution implementation, a conflict between the refugees and the UNCHR staff was raised. As a result, there were two UNHCR staff members killed in Atambua, so UNHCR decided to stop all activities and withdrew all of its staff from all matters related to East Timorese refugees in Indonesian territory (Dalamedo, 2018, p. 58). In my view, the divergence of views between the UNHCR and the government of Indonesia has affected the processes of durable solutions for more than 2 decades because the resettlement and local integration agendas have not been well-implemented.

Repatriation Program

Repatriation is seen as the most ideal solution of the other two durable solutions programs (Moretti, 2015). The African, Carribbean, and Pacific Observatory on Migration (2013) has underlined repatriation as highly dependent on the social, political, and economic conditions of a country, be it a third country, host country, or country of origin. Therefore, the UNHCR has a vital role in sharing accurate information on the country of origin (International Crisis Group, 2023). In the context of the East Timor refugee in Belu, Achmad (2000) writes that President B. J. Habibie on September 22, 1999 issued a statement allowing East Timor refugees to choose to stay in Indonesia or return to Timor Leste. So, the repatriation process began in 2000 by the UNHCR (Damaledo, 2018).

My findings have shown that there are several reasons that encourage refugees to remain in Indonesia. First, there was intimidation by a group of refugee elites against refugees so they would not return to Timor Leste. Second, there are some refugees who are involved in several Indonesian pro-integration militia organizations so they and other chose to stay in Indonesia for whatever reason. Third, there is still hope that the lives of refugees will be better in Indonesia compared to a new country such as Timor-Leste. Fourth, the principles and commitment of the refugees to continue to defend the Republic of Indonesia and survive with all the consequences. Fifth, some of the refugees have active status as Indonesian officials, such as civil servants, military, and police. Besides that, the UNHCR has not had many options to approach the refugees directly at least for three reasons, such as the status of East Timorese as refugees or IDPs, geographical constraints, and pressure from members of militia groups for both the UNHCR and refugees not to return to Timor Leste.

I saw that the UNHCR has played a major role in the process of repatriation due to its view that those East Timorese in Belu are refugees not IDPs. Repatriation has been really dependent on the desire of the refugees based on political, economic, and social considerations of their condition in Timor Leste. So, it has affected the number of the participants to register with the repatriation program. According to several refugees, they wanted to encourage their young adult to be repatriated to Timor Leste as they can more easily find work in the newly established country, they would be able to access to their agricultural land, property or other asset as owners in Timor Leste. There are limited incentives or assistance available in Indonesia while living in the refugee camps, and they still have cultural ties in their place of origin. As Messakh (2003) reports that the repatriation program continued until 2002, the number of repatriation participants reached 8,376 households or 24,700 people, and from 2003 to 2005 reached 30,000 people (Mulia, 2014). After 2005, the number of participants in the repatriation program decreased drastically due also to lack of the international and donor support.

The Resettlement Program

Resettlement is one of the durable solutions, which is the responsibility of the relevant state (Moretti, 2015), although it is not an obligation for countries that have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention such as Indonesia. In the context of Belu, Fanggidae (2014) emphasized the resettlement option as the most complicated, because it involves the provision of residential land, infrastructure, socio-cultural integration, economic security, and livelihoods. In addition, the problem with the resettlement program in Belu District is the availability of valid and reliable data of the real number of the refugees.

Whatever its views on the status of the refugee, the Indonesian government has to take responsibility in proving social and economic assistance to the majority of refugees in Belu regency, including basic infrastructure of resettlement. According to the former head of development planning agency of Belu regency, the main objective of resettlement not only to move the refugee out of camps, but also to promote social integration between them and the local community.

To ensure the resettlement program is aligned with the empowerment program, the government implemented several social programs for refugees, including housing construction assistances where land has been provided by beneficiaries, whether local community or refugee community. However, the limited land owned by the government to be handed over to the former refugees or used as resettlement areas prompted the government to issue a policy that after 2003 the land for resettlement development had to be provided by the former East Timorese refugees themselves as well as the local poor people who have been under the program of Masyarakat Berpenghasilan Rendah (MBR or Low-Income Community). To realize the MBR program, the local government focused efforts into constructing housing in the provided land for the program of resettlement.

The Circle of Imaged Society Timor Report (2015) shows that from 2002 to 2005, the government built 7.490 housing units for all communities in East Nusa Tenggara Province, and built 5.000 housing units in 2006 for the local community and the refugees. Besides that, the government of Belu district received housing construction assistance of 1.500 units in 2008, and construction of 380 housing units in 2009. However, we found that the local residents have benefited the most because they could provide their own land certificate as ownership evidence, which has to be cleared in order for them to be considered as the program’s participants, while the majority of the refugees have no purchasing power to buy a piece of land, therefore, they would to struggle for many years to obtain their own land.

In my view, the implication of the revocation of status has greatly affected the lives of the former East Timorese refugees for almost 2 decades due to several obstacles not only lack of land access, but also lack of adequate social and economic assistance, pushing them to find their own solutions. Several prominent leaders of the refugee groups in Taeksoruk and Aitaman resettlement underlined the fact that lack of land access and ownership have made them dependent on the solidarity of the local land owners. The refugees have had to borrow the land for their agricultural activities under the profit sharing schemes, although they have to face risks in the agricultural sector.

Moreover, the development of MBR has been a lack of monitoring and cooperation with international organizations or donors, therefore the construction has not achieved the expected quality. For example, I considered that the recipient has to provide their own land before the housing construction takes place. It means that the house construction program must be carried out on one’s own land. According to few refugees in the Haliwen camp, this condition became an obstacle to the implementation of the resettlement program because it was considered to be burdensome for the majority of refugees who were still experiencing economic difficulties at that time. On the other hand, I saw that the local residents have benefited the most because they could provide their own land certificate, as ownership evidence was a prior condition to be considered as the program’s beneficiary.

Another implication from the resettlement issue due to lack of international supports has been the existence of some refugee camps, particularly the Haliwen Camp. According to one of the refugee figures in the Haliwen camp, the government’s policy of closing refugee camps with the aim of moving refugees was seen as a hasty policy. Consequently, the program did not receive a response at the start of its implementation for several reasons prior land ownership was accepted as housing assistance and therefore benefited the owner. This criterion has been burdensome to refugees in several camps, such as the Haliwen Camp. The camp considered as the biggest camp in Belu regency since the arrival of the refugees, “house” more than 400 refugee families.

Efforts to be resettled were initiated by a few refugee leaders. I identified two patterns of resettlement. First, the refugees have been encouraged to work and collect money individually, then join a similar ethnic-group and purchase their own land. The idea had been proposed to the government through a formal mechanism or political lobby, and most of proposals were accepted if the land ownership issue was clear. Examples of this pattern have been found among former refugees who live in the largest resettlement location in Belu regency, in Kabuna village. There have been eight resettlements constructed in the village. Second, the refugees could reside in a resettlement provided by a prominent leader or refugee’ elite, then the refugees would have had to pay in installments the price of the piece of land, as occurred in Rai Basin resettlement. However, the option of self-resettlement has been limited due to financial obstacles.

These patterns of resettlement have been the alternative solutions for the refugees, although few of them could purchase the land and build their own houses individually, particularly for those who had been civil servants in the government offices or worked as employees or successfully developed a small business; however, these are only small numbers of refugees in Belu regency.

The Burden on the Local Government of Belu

The former regent of Belu, 2003 to 2013 and the local government’s secretary of Belu, explained that the local government did not expect that there would be such an overwhelming exodus of refugees to Belu district after the poll. There has been a wave of refugees beyond the expectations of the central and regional governments. The former regent repeatedly admitted that the number of refugees was beyond the government’s estimation, making it difficult for the government to deal with durable solutions, so that many refugee problems went unaddressed, giving rise to problems in various dimensions of the lives of refugees and local communities.

I argue that lack of the UNHCR support have pushed the local government of Belu regency to work alone in handling a resettlement program, as a result; the resettlement program has not been well-implemented, to some extent, affecting local integration in Belu through several related land access issues. In my analysis concerning the obstacle of social integration in context of Belu has been not only land access for the refugees, but also land ownership because land has been the most essential key of social integration, not only as an economic resource (Hall et al., 2013, p. 4; Rodgers, 1995, p. 45). For those whom have been excluded from land access this would lead to social unrest (Rodgers, 1995, p. 47), as occurred between the East Timorese refugees and the local community in several resettlement around Belu regency.

Implementation of the resettlement program is entirely the responsibility of the state, including the Belu local government. According to the former Belu regent, the government’s heaviest burden was the lack of funds allocated in the Belu regional government’s budget to provide land and facilities for the needs of the refugees in large numbers, especially land for resettlement development. In fact, at the beginning of the implementation of durable solutions, the UNHCR was willing and able to help the local government by purchasing vacant land to be used as a resettlement location, as was done at the resettlement of Aitaman in 2000 before the withdrawal of the UNHCR. Moreover, the former regent and the local government’s secretary of Belu have argued that another main cause was due to insufficient financial support from the central government after being hit by the 1998 global financial crisis. The 1998 crisis affected the country’s economy and social conditions, restricting almost all national expenses. From the regent’s view, at local government level, the annual budget had been insufficient to handle the cost of resettlement and local integration because it had mainly been used for local government’s operational and local development. Therefore, the initial phase of the durable solution implementation was very dependent on international, national and individual donors. However, according to the former Belu Regent and a member of the local assembly of Belu have admitted that the government’s limitation and unpreparedness prompted the regional government to negotiate with the tribal chiefs so that their communal land could be loaned and used temporarily as resettlement locations, not to purchase the land. A member of the Taeksoruk tribe confirmed that their tribe agreed with the local government proposal to provide land to the East Timorese refugees, but for a certain period of time, “borrowing” for 3 years as occurred in the Taeksoruk and Umaklaran resettlements. After that, the refugees had to hand back the communal lands belonging to local indigenous peoples. It seems that local governments feel a heavy burden in resolving the refugee crisis, so they need the help of landowners or customary institutions to ease the government’s burden. However, land conflict in Taeksoruk and Umaklaran have occurred because the refugees have rejected the proviso to leave the resettlement after 3 years, affecting the local integration processes. According to Alkatiri (2018b), the land conflicts between refugees and the local community have led to social integration disturbance. The physical conflicts and house burning in Taeksoruk, Aitaman, Umaklaran, and other small resettlements have shown that social integration has not been achieved due to misunderstanding of land use and status.

According to East Timor refugee representative in Taeksoruk and Umaklaran resettlements, this agreement between the local government and indigenous peoples did not sit easily with the refugees. For refugees, the occupied land has been considered as compensation for their assets they left behind in Timor-Leste, in order to defend Indonesia. In other words, resettlement land is compensation for all assets owned by them, so the government should compensate in the form of houses and agricultural land, however; the government and the local tribes have rejected the refugees’ demand, on the other hand the government revoked the status of refugee in favor of Indonesian citizenship in 2003 to avoid more demands from the refugees.

Lack of international support, the UNHCR assistance, brought significant hardship to the local government to handle the refugees’ crisis. The national and local government of Belu’s budget allocation and land access for the resettlement work were drained and limited. Therefore, based on the Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 25 2003, the Indonesian government finally decided to revoke the status of East Timorese as refugees in 2003 and they were now considered Indonesian citizens, with the same status as other Indonesian citizens. According to the former Belu regent, the consequences of the status change were that all the social and economic problems of the new residents were transferred to national programs related to poverty alleviation and the Timorese refugees have worked by themselves to resolve their difficulties with limited social and economic assistances.

Conclusion

This study has shown that the divergence view between the UNHCR and Indonesian government, whether they have been considered as refugees or IDPs, has been the main caused on refugee crisis. For the UNHCR, residents of East Timor who enter Indonesian territory, such as in Belu district, can be categorized as refugees, meanwhile, for the Indonesian government, residents of the former province of East Timor who entered Indonesia’s territory were considered Indonesian citizens who returned to Indonesian territory due to conflict and violence. This difference in views resulted in disruptions in the handling of the refugee problem, including the implementation of durable solutions, where the UNHCR has concentrated more on the repatriation program, and the Indonesian government has taken more responsibility on the resettlement and local integration programs.

Theoretically, previous findings have shown that the refugee crisis has caused by overlapping humanitarian tasks between the international organizations and/or states or the International Organizations against the state policies and interests. This study presents a novel insight which is the divergent view between the UNHCR with the central government of Indonesia whether East Timorese people in Belu have been considered as refugees or IDPs. Those claims have impacted significantly the relationship between the UNHCR and Indonesian government and the durable solution implementations, where repatriation has been executed by the UNHCR and Indonesian government has taken more responsibility to handle local integration program.

As the durable solution executor, Indonesian government has bearded the heaviest burden due to financial limitation, less capacity, and less of land and housing access, leading of the status of the refugee in 2003 in order to reduce the burden. This research confirms and strengthen the knowledge of refugee’s crisis research, particularly the dynamic relationships and working environment between international community organization, the UNHCR, with the central and local government in Indonesia.

This study also has practical implications for policymakers and practioners working in the field. For policymakers, the UNHCR and Indonesia government, should align the social and economic interests than political approach, providing opportunity for refugee to decide to be Indonesia citizen or repatriated to East Timor. Those Timorese refugee in Belu as different interests when they entered Belu in 1999, seeking for security temporarily or becoming Indonesia citizen. Moreover, security should be provided for all stakeholders, such as the UNHCR, refugees, the local community. For practioners, working with Timorese refugees in Belu, could obtain essential information from this study by understanding important issue such as land and housing access, social integration, social conflict, local tribe and local land ownership, resilience and durable solution in Belu. Thus, practitioners may intervene and formulate relevance program to end and refugees’ crisis. In addition, this article deepens OUR understanding that humanitarian tasks need cooperation from all stakeholders, particularly international supports to handle refugee crisis. In addition, this paper deepens OUR understanding that humanitarian tasks need cooperation from all stakeholders, particularly international supports to handle refugee crisis.

This study has been limited to Timorese refugees in Belu regency only, although there are many Timorese refugees within the province, besides focusing more on the institutional performances and policies. For future study, I suggest to conduct research specifically on the implications of the divergence views on the refugees live whose have suffered from the divergence views and any policy decisions from the UNHCR and Indonesian government, including the membership of the 1951 Refugee Convention for Indonesian government consideration and types of cooperation between the UNHCR and Indonesian government based on the refugees’ local context.