Abstract
This paper compares the impact of citizen’s charters in delivering services by Union Parishads in Bangladesh in Bengali-majority and tribal areas. Using a qualitative research method, the case study was used to look at CC implementation in a comprehensive and in-depth way. Interview and observation methods were employed to collect data. One hundred interviewees from each union, including service providers, service users, and LG officials, were consulted in equal numbers from May to July 2019. The findings of this study reveal that, although Union Parishads of both areas are implementing charters, their performance differs. Subjects of performance variation are timeliness of service delivery, cost of services and responsiveness of the service providers. Performance variation results from varying degrees of implementation of the citizen’s charter, attributable to several factors that include citizens’ awareness, knowledge and skills, implementation willingness, and performance monitoring of the local officials.
Plain language summary
Purpose of the paper: This paper compares the impact of citizen’s charters in delivering services by Union Parishads in Bangladesh in Bengali-majority and tribal areas. More specifically, the paper’s overarching goal is to illustrate how the CC’s implementation has affected the local government’s service delivery in Bangladesh. Methods: Using a qualitative research method, the case study was employed to look at CC implementation in a comprehensive and in-depth way. Interview and observation methods were employed to collect data. One hundred interviewees from each union, including service providers, service users, and LG officials, were consulted in equal numbers from May to July 2019. Data were collected from the Hariyan Union Parishad (HUP), in Rajshahi District, in the broad agricultural lowlands, populated mainly by majority Bengalis, and Subolong Union Parishad (SUP), a tribal area in the wild Rangamati Hill Tracts. Conclusion: The study finding suggests that the CC was launched without planning and capacity-building at the citizen-UP staff interface level. The local council functionaries have not been sensitised to what may contribute to or impede the successful implementation of CC. In countries like Bangladesh, policies that seem to have generated intended benefits are either imported or promoted by donors. Accordingly, it launched at a large scale without even minimum feasibility. No exception happened to CC. Behind the success of any particular policy, several factors in the country of implementation may wholly or partly be different from what was expected from implementation in other countries. So, this paper suggests implementing policies, especially those imported, with adjustments appropriate to the context, which may also vary within a country. As in the case of local councils studied in this research, each is located in different regions, which differ in terms of factors including, but not limited to, landscaping, socio-economic and demographic features, language and political situation and transport system. So, there appeared to be variation in the performance of local council functionaries. So, policies like CC, which require adjustment with context, should be implemented incrementally so that experience learnt from areas where policy is being implemented can be applied to common areas of implementation. Typical implementation regions can be made suitable or fertile for intended policy implementation. Such exercise is a valuable way to fine-tune the policy implementation process. Implications of the study: Lessons drawn from this study on the experience of implementing CC in delivering services in local areas in Bangladesh could help successfully implement this or similar policy initiatives in other countries. Citizens need to participate in designing and delivering services as well as reporting. Governments must invest in creating public awareness by various means, creating a skilled, knowledgeable and committed workforce at local councils and overseeing the enforcement of legal provisions. Getting things accomplished by local councils should not be subject to political and criminal constraints. The findings of this research may provide a wealth of fascinating information to a non-Bangladeshi international audience from nations with similar backgrounds to Bangladesh. They might, for instance, investigate whether or not local government service delivery could be enhanced through the use of CC. Nonetheless, identifying the barriers to CC implementation could aid future international researchers in identifying the hindering factors in their research. As a result, it can be argued that the study’s results would pique readers’ interest far beyond Bangladesh. Limitations of the study: This study, however, has some limitations. The first is the generalisation of the findings. Although the results of this study are supported by case study evidence portrayed by Huque and Ahsan (2016), for a better understanding of the research problem, a study with a large case sample would further help generalise these findings. Second is the lack of attempt to study a local council, which shows better performance from an NPM theory perspective. Last but not least is the lack of understanding of how political, social and cultural factors induce citizens not to play their intended role. We hope these issues will inspire prospective researchers in this field.
Introduction
Although delivering services is one of the many things that Local Governments (LG) have been doing for centuries, citizens’ perception of public services and servants is damaging in many countries, including Bangladesh. A literature review indicates that Bangladesh’s local public service delivery mechanisms are over-centralised, over-paid, not accountable, inefficient, coercive, unethical, and rent-seeking (Chowdhury & Panday, 2018). Therefore, like many countries, Bangladesh’s government has sought to reform delivery mechanisms for public services over the last few decades. One of those reforms has been modelled on Citizen’s Charter (CC) initiative started by the United Kingdom (UK) Government in 1991.
The CC aims to offer better services to citizens by achieving an efficient, effective and accountable service delivery system. The CC is a valuable way to fine-tune the service delivery process, monitor effectiveness and improve overall performance. The idea of CC quickly spread from the UK to other countries, becoming an international phenomenon. The results of several other studies show that the successful implementation of CCs has caused significant improvement in the performance of service providers in many countries around the world (Ahsan, 2022; Askvik et al., 2011). However, Kundo (2018) claims that 8 years after the charter’s inception, the vast majority of those receiving services have no idea what it entails. Most charters are written from the producer’s perspective, and their lofty aspirations are unrealistic.
Bangladesh developed its CC in 2008. The government believed that CC would be necessary for establishing the rights of citizens to obtain public services and would open opportunities for them to participate in the governance process. A high level of knowledge of CC among citizens is necessary for its implementation, and this awareness is a byproduct of education; hence, citizens’ standing influences their involvement in the governing process once again. The extent to which individuals are exposed to information about services distributed under the CC framework is directly connected to their level of awareness (Ahsan et al., 2021). To ensure that individuals can hold service providers responsible for their work, it is important to organise service delivery transparently (Nguyen et al., 2015). Hoping, as well, to improve the service providers’ performance, the government introduced CC into all tiers of LG. Therefore, the paper’s overarching goal is to illustrate how the CC’s implementation has affected the local government’s service delivery in Bangladesh. An effort will also be made to describe whether there is any variation in the performance of the UPs with CC being implemented and explain why the variations are found. Taking these primary objectives in mind, this study, focusing on Union Parishad (UP) (lowest tier of local government), addresses the following questions:
(1) What changes have occurred in the service delivery system at the UP level since the introduction of CC?
(2) Does the performance of UPs having a CC in delivering services differ from each other?
(3) If any difference is found in (b), what blame can be made for that?
The paper consists of six sections. The second section reviews the literature and identifies the existing gap. The third section provides a detailed analysis of the research methodology. Section four presents the significant findings of the study. Section five provides a discussion of the key findings. Section six draws a conclusion.
Literature Review
Understanding Citizen’s Charter
A review of the worldwide scholarly literature published in the 1980s and early 1990s on the delivery of public services by central governments and LGs discloses problems of public service delivery, including lack of quality, lack of equity, inefficiency, lack of accountability, cumbersome procedure, imperious bureaucracy, and tyranny of intermediaries and corruption (Siddiquee, 2006). Thus, at that time, there was tremendous pressure on central governments seemingly everywhere to change public sector governance. These governments responded to the pressure with reforms, aiming to enhance efficiency, and improve the service providers’ performance (Kelly, 1998). Such reform came to be known as New Public Management (NPM). Over the past decades, many NPM-influenced reforms have been initiated and implemented globally, transforming the public sector into an effective, efficient, accountable, and citizen-friendly hub for delivering services. Of those, the CC initiative has been concerned about this study.
Originating in the UK, CC gradually spread, in one form or another, to most developed countries and, to a lesser degree, to many developing countries, as it was often a condition for World Bank loans or development aid (Lane, 2000). In Bangladesh, the idea of CC was introduced in 2007 through a Cabinet division circular following the Public Administration Reform Commission’s recommendation in all departments, subordinate offices, and LG bodies. Later on, LG bodies were authorised to publicise CC and implement its elements by enacting relevant laws, as in the case of UP, the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 (hereinafter the Act of 2009). In general, CC seeks to keep the central government’s promises to deliver better-quality services without a large infusion of resources from the central government.
According to Ahsan (2022), CC is driving reform in the provision of government services in Bangladesh. In addition to universal respect and consideration for the needs of all individuals, CC is a symbol of how service recipients should be addressed and handled during the provision of services. To further ensure responsible governance in the service delivery process of public organisations, CC has also been used as a tool to notify individuals of their entitlements to public services, hence minimising needless delay and excess payment. According to Getachew et al. (2021), CC serves as a public reference for ensuring that public organisations are accountable for the quality, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness of the services they provide to the public.
Peters (1997, p. 74) defines CC as “a statement of the rights of citizens/consumers to expect certain quality levels for the services rendered by public bodies.” Nikos described CC as “public documents setting out standards of service to which the customers are entitled” (2001, p. 41). However, the basic idea of adopting CC is to create a social contract between the service users and service providers. The charter informs citizens of their entitlements to public services and reminds service providers about the level and standards of services they ought to provide. In this study, CC means a document published by UPs that outlines service principles, including description, conditions, and timeframe of services offered. Implementation of CC refers to putting those principles into action while delivering services. Walters et al. (2021) stated that service providers must provide services to residents in compliance with the standards for such services set out in the CC. If any CC requirements have yet to be met, the public must monitor LG’s performance and hold them accountable using their understanding of the CC; hence, neither the public nor the LG officials can avoid their responsibilities.
The CC contains a few principles to make service providers more efficient and responsive. More efficient and more-responsive service providers are expected to improve service delivery (Kelly, 1998).
The following are the typical CC principles:
Understanding Citizens as Performance Evaluators
One of the critical features of NPM is the performance assessment that this study refers to service providers’ performance concerning the execution of CC and delivering efficient and effective services to citizens as per the provision of CC. Performance indicators to measure the contribution made towards obtaining results are required to develop in public sector organisations. The CC is a tool used to measure service providers’ performance as it sets out standards of services that service providers ought to meet while delivering services. Therefore, the CC is implemented to encourage service providers to raise their performance standards, operate more transparently, and be more responsive to citizens’ needs and expectations. So, implementing CC implies sensitising service providers to what their actions produce.
Whether the service providers achieve expected results or targets calls for an assessment of their performance. Since the service providers serve citizens, the subject of performance evaluation is citizens. Two things must be considered regarding the role of citizens as performance evaluators. The first is knowledge. Citizens must know the information about the services they are provided. Examples of information include the type of services, service delivery procedure, service providers’ profile, and service standards: timeframe and cost (Clark, 2004). Citizens knowing about service-related information become agents who can hold service providers into account and do so while going something wrong with services delivered. Acquisition of knowledge by citizens about services depends mainly on their exposure to those services that CC does, as per Nikos (2001). The CC works by informing citizens about the service standards and equipping them with tools designed to ensure their access to information regarding service standards and enforce their right to lodge complaints.
When CC is appropriately implemented, citizens can quickly assess whether the service standards have been met (Walters, 2018). Yet implementation of CC works best when citizens not only focus on their rights and entitlements but also on their roles and obligations. Citizens are then empowered to engage in dialogue with service providers and demand accountability if the delivery of services seems not to be up to established standards (Ahsan et al., 2021). The second is participation, which has two dimensions. Firstly, citizens should choose which services to consume (Taylor, 1999). This can be done by designing services while framing CC (Verba, 1996). Being exposed to the service standards via participation, citizens can consider service providers when lodging complaints that do not meet standards.
Secondly, citizens should consider participation in delivering services and reporting, and this can be done through bottom-up monitoring that reduces service providers’ absenteeism and increases access to and quality of services and responsiveness on the part of service providers (Björkman & Svensson, 2009, as cited in Joshi, 2013). A set of factors may limit participation and include lack of education, ability to speak up, competence, expertise, and diverse interests among stakeholders (Yang & Callahan, 2007).
Adhering to these principles is thought to result in increased responsiveness of service providers and better quality of service due to more accountability of service providers to citizens (Getachew et al., 2021). Several drivers greatly influence CC implementation. Variation in the degree to which drivers are well-managed results in a difference in the effectiveness of CC implementation (Haque, 2005; Ohemeng, 2010).
Understanding Drivers of CC Implementation
As described earlier, CC emphasises delivering better services. Delivery of better services may look different in different situations, so CC implementation should respond to local conditions. How CC is implemented successfully depends on how various drivers contribute to the CC implementation process. Reviewing literature suggests several drivers for implementing policy initiatives such as CC. However, the authors have chosen a few drivers guiding CC implementation. The decision made to choose drivers was based on a few arguments. First, chosen drivers are fundamental elements of policy implementation, without which no policy initiative can be implemented successfully. Second, chosen drivers are context-specific because Bangladeshi society is susceptible to them. Third, selected drivers should be included in all situations. Drivers are:
Awareness of CC by both citizens and civil servants covered by it;
Knowledge, skill, staff and resources;
The commitment of those who will implement CC;
Understanding of CC by those who will implement it; and
Monitoring of implementation.
Awareness
Spreading knowledge is the key to raising consciousness. Information on “where to go” and “how to proceed” should be readily available to citizens from the organisations delivering CC services (Getachew et al., 2021). This can be done by pinning posters up in spaces where citizens frequently come, playing short dramas and displaying information boards at mass-gathering places, posting on the organisation’s webpage, sending text messages to citizens’ cell phones, inaugural celebrations, publishing and distributing brochures, handbills, leaflets etc., depending on best approach suited to locality (Ahsan et al., 2021). Like Bangladesh’s Right to Information Act 2009 (RTI), legislation is necessary to ensure that citizens and civil servants know their rights and obligations under CC. Such legislation gives citizens a right to public information on demand. Of course, getting such legislation enacted requires demand for it by citizens (Ahsan et al., 2018). Doubts are, however, expressed about the effectiveness of information disclosure. Understanding such information varies from citizen to citizen and group to group (Ahsan et al., 2021).
Another set of doubts is whether the implementation approach should be decentralised. Wang and Wart (2007) argue that a decentralised approach enhances citizens’ awareness of policy by keeping their attention and engagement. On the other hand, those who implement CC must also be oriented with it and may not be the best people to explain it. Therefore, civil servants and citizens require relevant training and education about CC, whether centralised or decentralised.
Knowledge, Skill, Number of Staff and Resources
Since frontline staff make CC a reality for citizens, those assigned to implementation must be technically knowledgeable, competent, skilled and policy-literate. Strong leadership is no substitute for staff competence (Clarke & Eck, 2003). Organisations should have capacity-building tools for their members, including training and education, with resources beyond equipment (May, 2003). When organisations lack skilled staff and sufficient resources, policy implementation may suffer delays, high costs, and compromised quality of services (Ahsan & Panday, 2013).
Commitment of Those Who Will Implement CC
How officials respond to assigned tasks depends on several factors. First is a conflict of interest: officials hardly do anything against their interests. Baroi (2013) and Chowdhury (2015) note that officials’ commitment guides information disclosure affecting CC implementation as it brings them under citizens’ surveillance. Second, policy implementation against civil servants’ beliefs, practices, and political forces seems challenging (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981). The third is a lack of performance recognition: an incentive and sanction system is essential in governing staff performance and leads frontline staff to enforce the central authority’s direction (Zhang, 2018).
Yet there needs to be statutory provision ensuring, as Marzotto et al. (2000, p. 96)argue, that “those assigned the implementation tasks will not waver (much) from the program’s original goals.” Thus, commitment may not always be enough to ensure effective and responsive service delivery, guarantee citizens’ rights, and address their grievances.
Understanding of CC by Those Who Will Implement It
Implementation theories illustrate that implementers should completely understand policy objectives (Hogwood & Gunn, 1997). The policy is best executed when the staff is engaged and knows what to do and how. A clear description of policy objectives enriches implementers’ knowledge (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). CC achieves this by making them aware of their responsibilities beyond only delivering the services as described but addressing any problems that may arise for the people seeking those services (Getachew et al. (2021). On the contrary, when policy objectives appear ambiguous, it is difficult for implementers to know what to execute and how (Hill & Hupe, 2007). Moreover, vague goals may confuse implementers, creating obstacles to implementing CC as intended (May, 2003).
Monitoring of Implementation
Implementation of CC provides an opportunity for both citizens and higher-level officials to monitor frontline staffs’ performance. Examples of monitoring methods include citizens’ participation, enforcement of relevant laws and regulations, and oversight of high-level officials’ actions (Snyder et al., 2014). Using these means helps keep implementers under the surveillance of authorities responsible for monitoring CC implementation. Zhang (2018) argues that periodic monitoring greatly influences implementation, showing the benefits of monitoring, and resulting in better performance.
Research Methodology
Under the broader framework of the qualitative research method, the case study was used for a holistic and in-depth investigation of CC implementation. Case studies allowed how, what, and why questions to be posed; researchers were free from control and focused on contemporary issues (Yin, 1994). Research design contrasted two opposite LGs: Hariyan Union Parishad (HUP), in Rajshahi District, in the broad agricultural lowlands, populated mainly by majority Bengalis, and Subolong Union Parishad (SUP), a tribal area in the wild Rangamati Hill Tracts. Similarities include structure, composition, functions, source of revenue, and controlling authority.
The UP was selected for comparison as the lowest level of LG, with the smallest population and area, thus closest to the people literally and in terms of citizen impact. There are 4,550 UPs in Bangladesh, of which 4,400 are located in places like HUP, and 150 are in places like SUP. Several studies were conducted on implementing CC in plain land union(s). Recent studies include Chowdhury (2017) and Rab and Rahaman (2017). But, no implementation studies on CC have been done in union(s) of hilly areas. Moreover, no studies on implementing CC have been conducted comparatively between unions of plain and hilly regions. So, with this issue in mind, two unions, each from both areas, were purposively selected.
A City Corporation and a Pourashava, two separate bodies of urban-local government, are close to HUP’s neighbours. So, HU residents are, thus, well exposed to the service delivery process of these bodies under their networking. On the contrary, SU is a well-known place and tourist spot in other hilly regions. Moreover, its residents must be well informed of local affairs as guides during tourist monsoons. Such knowledge background of locals of both unions is beneficial for this research to evaluate the UP functionaries’ performance because citizens of both unions, under their knowledge of service delivery, will reveal important insight on both CC and service delivery.
Interview and observation methods were employed to collect data. One hundred interviewees, including service providers, service users, and LG officials, were consulted with equal numbers from each union from May to July 2019. Service providers of interviewees were UP officials, elected and un-elected, whereas service users refer to citizens, including students, teachers, homemakers, businessmen, farmers, and day labourers. Both purposive and random sampling logic was used in selecting interviewees. Open-ended interview schedules were mainly used, with some closed-ended questions. All qualitative data were processed by analysing steps between texts and explanations in qualitative research. Accordingly, all texts were linked to raw data about the research questions. Then raw data were consolidated, and patterns were identified in the data. Finally, practices were integrated to seek answers to research questions. Apart from primary data, secondary data were also gathered from published and unpublished books, dissertations, journal articles, book chapters, newspapers, and the Internet.
A map of Bangladesh showing loawlands and highloands.
Source: Adapted from Qureshi, Asad & Ahmed, Zia & Krupnik, Timothy. (2015). Groundwater management in Bangladesh: An analysis of problems and opportunities. Research Report No. 2. Cereal Systems Initiative for South Asia Mechanization and Irrigation (CSISA-MI) Project. Dhaka, Bangladesh (p.13).
One may ask why the data collected in 2019 will still be applicable in 2023. In response to such a question, it can be stated that the local and urban government bodies have been working for a long time in the country. There has not been any change in the working mode of these bodies in the last 3 to 4 years. Of course, the COVID-19 pandemic severely pressures these bodies to discharge their responsibilities. However, those were related to providing services, encouraging people to abide by COVID-19 protocols, and receiving the vaccination. It is believed that the situation remains the same concerning the implementation of CC. Therefore, the data collected in 2019 still has equal importance in describing the role of the citizen charter in service delivery.
As stated earlier, a qualitative case study approach was used in this research. Therefore, the data were analysed using the qualitative data analysis method, which entails becoming familiarised with the data, organising the data using themes and categories, coding the data (which may include labeling or tagging the data to identify important features or themes), and conducting analysis by looking for patterns, trends, relations, and context. After the data analysis was completed, conclusions were drawn from the data, considering how the findings related to the study’s aims.
Results
In response to the government’s instruction, UPs have displayed CCs that outline the service standards, including:
names of services available;
their cost; and
delivery time.
This has contributed to making the service delivery process citizen-friendly and transparent. In addition, citizens, who find problems getting service according to the standards, can lodge complaints and are provided clarification, with compensation if applicable. Thus, the data of the interviewees was that CC provided benefits to citizens but also contributed to the accountability of UP officials. Citizens informed of CC sensed a need to question service providers about the unmet standards. However, the CC has created quality interaction between service providers and users. That, in turn, has generally reduced corruption and nepotism in UP’s affairs. The following statement summarises what a group of respondents said about the significance of displaying CC near service-providing points.
Now there is a display board of services in UP that shows the name of services, the charge to be paid and the waiting period for those services. That is why; UP functionaries cannot charge more than the amount stated on the board. People can raise queries if services are not rendered within the stipulated time and cost. So, that board has squeezed the scope and scale of corruption and created an opportunity to hold UP functionaries answerable for their actions [Interview with the service users, 2019].
Implementation of CC is reasonably and logically expected to be an instrument for improving the performance of UP’s functionaries. The CC, thus, creates an opportunity to improve accountability and thus reduce corruption and nepotism at the local level. As a result, implementing CC can help to ensure the quality of services delivered. However, as data analysis progressed, it became apparent that this opportunity to reduce corruption and enhance service quality in UPs is not always followed. Two UPs studied are lawfully entrusted with the same responsibilities and services, but their performance in serving citizens under CCs significantly differed. Even they are not sensitised to the result of their performance.
Performance Variation as Cause of Implementation Gap
Citizens were happier with the performance of HUP’s CC than that of SUP. The difference in the degree of CC implementation, as data analysis indicates, was responsible for the difference in the level of citizens’ satisfaction. Two UPs are not equally committed, apparently in practice, to follow the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act of 2009 in implementing their respective CCs. For example, HUP is more active than SUP in publishing its CC from the start of the implementation process.
Timeliness of Service Delivery
Strict adherence to the process of CC implementation by HUP ensures the timely delivery of services: in SUP, this does not always happen. Moreover, SUP had created barriers to implementation, which caused its residents not to demand services on time, while HUP’s residents raised questions about when delivery was delayed. For example: I lacked knowledge about the timeliness of service delivery by UP. I had not thought to ask anyone working in UP about service deadlines. The time UP takes to deliver services makes no sense: they seem to think we are unnecessary [Interview with SUP constituent, 2019]. Since I have learned about the deadlines for rendering services of UP from CC displayed at the UP complex, I asked secretaries about the delay in issuing my birth certificate. Secretary responded to my query by saying that any certification from UP requires the signature of the UP chairman. Since the chairman remained absent from the office for two days, the certificate was not issued on time due to illness. So I could accept that [Interview with HUP constituent, 2019].
Cost of Services
Both UPs charge for some services, but they charge for different services. HUP’s residents pay service charges stated in CC, but SUP staffs impose charges arbitrarily, causing oral financial bargaining, in which residents are often the losers. Moreover, the lack of a fixed fee creates a tendency to resort to “fixers” who offer to use their connections to get a better price in SUP. Thus, the cost rises for citizens, who have to pay a profit to each queue of people now interested in their transaction and whatever UP gets. This is a common source of corruption in Bangladeshi LG. In this regard, a SU constituent quoted a story told him as follows: One of my friends needed to get a citizenship certificate. A fixer told him that he could make it easy for him. But for this, an extra payment is required for this. He was, however, charged BDT 100 for this [Interview data, 2019]. NOTE: The fee for a citizenship certificate, as per the CC guideline, is BDT 50.
Responsiveness
Publication of CC was found to significantly enhance the responsiveness of HUP’s officials to citizens’ needs, but not in SUP. Knowing HUP constituents how to lodge complaints and their willingness to do so has made HUP officials flexible in responding to citizens’ queries. However, no evidence of SUP constituents’ lodging grievances was found. In this regard, a HU constituent said: Once, I met the UP secretary at the office to collect my citizenship certificate. Secretary was too busy, so I went home. I was asked to come back the next day. Instead, I met the chairman and told him what had happened. UP chairman ordered the secretary to issue my citizenship certificate that day, which the secretary did [Interview data, 2019].
SUP functionaries were often unresponsive to the citizens’ needs. They did not tell citizens about their rights to lodge complaints. Regional politics, dominated by many armed groups vying for power in SUP, interfered with who would deal with citizens’ complaints. SUP functionaries only responded to armed groups who might kill them otherwise. Another result of this political situation is that citizens with no armed supporters may get little attention from SUP. Citizens, thus, have little confidence in the organisation’s ability to serve them (Taylor, 1999) like SUP.
Implementation Gap: What Matters?
Data analysis indicates that public awareness, UP staff capacity, UP staff commitment to CC, and monitoring of compliance with CC are the significant differences between UPs who successfully use CC to improve services and reduce corruption and those who do not.
Public Awareness
Successful implementation of CC first depends on citizens’ awareness of the standards of CC. HUP residents are aware of such standards, but SUP residents are not. Thus, HUP residents push HUP officials to comply with CC and raise queries and complaints when they do not comply. No one informs SUP residents of CC standards because of political and criminal constraints that make SUP officials afraid to commit to standards that might conflict with a natural source of power in the area. Thus, CC works in HUP, and citizens are happy with it. Yet CC is a dead letter in SUP, which citizens do not respect, as they are unaware of and cannot use it to push SUP officials to serve them.
Several types of exposure create public awareness of the CC’s standards. The first is informational exposure. In addition to family, neighbours and friends (see also Ahsan et al., 2021), the dissemination of information about services outlined in CC by HUP played an essential role in informing citizens of CC. Examples include displaying the CC board at UP and conducting ward shava (meeting). Additionally, citizens are exposed to CC by NGOs through yield meetings and training (see also Ahsan et al., 2018). Citizens’ exposure to information at SUP happened only through the CC board displayed in the UP office, but it only exhibited information on Old Age Allowance.
Such an exhibition, however, has no impact on service delivery. Regarding the importance of displaying CC, a HU resident was quoted as saying: What I know now about CC has been learnt from an exhibition of CC through the installation of a board at the entrance of UP. It has put me at the heart of the process of how services from UP should get delivered to citizens [Interview data, 2019].
The second most citizens in the hills never visit the UP office. While most lowland areas of Bangladesh have a good road network, electricity, and transport, people living in those areas, like those in HUP, can easily visit the UP office. The picture of the hilly regions is sharply different from that of the lowlands. Citizens of SUP hardly see their UP complex in cases of genuine need. The SUP office is in the middle of a lake, accessible only by boat. Most SUP area residents are fisherfolk, so they must be busy catching and selling fish all day. SUP residents said: Travelling to the UP complex was time-consuming as the UP office was far from their homes, and the quality of transport was poor. Sometimes they spend all day getting to the UP complex and find no one there. UP officials also leave early because of the flawed transport system [Interview data, 2019].
The third is a linguistic problem. Every ethnic group in the hilly areas has its language. Many older tribal people only understand their language and are illiterate. All information and advice in UP are given in the official language, Bengali, the language of the lowlands. Many hilly people neither read it nor understand it.
Knowledge and Skills of UP Staff
Another factor that has caused the difference in the degree of CC implementation between the two UPs is the lack of knowledge and skills among UP functionaries. Data showed that HUP’s functionaries better understand CC and its implementation process than their counterparts in SUP. The causes behind this knowledge and skills gap are many. First is NGO intervention to direct orientation to HUP staff about implementing CC. Additionally, NGOs provide logistic support. None of these is available in SUP.
The second is apathy toward following the rules in serving citizens. The UP functionaries tend not to read legal documents specifying what they must do and how to do it. Instead, they follow the standard operating procedure: what their predecessors did in similar instances or demands of the Councillors. If the councils are not monitoring or pushing them to follow CC, they do what they have always done. Data showed that SUP’s functionaries were more apathetic in these ways than their counterparts in HUP. Such apathy arises from electoral politics, lack of understanding of the rules, focus on personal and political affairs, and, most importantly, no monetary incentive to change.
The third is the lack of orientation. The UPs were instructed to introduce CC by the Act of 2009. Still, none of the UP functionaries has yet received orientation from the government on enforcing the instructions. Generally, there is very little training for UP staff on anything. For example, UPs offer some services using Union Information Service Centres (UISC). The UISCs are operated by entrepreneurs who deliver CC services but have no training in what they do. Data indicated that SUP entrepreneur has insufficient knowledge of information technology, which is thought to be their speciality and impedes CC implementation. A SU resident quoted a story told to him as follows: He was required to get an online-issued birth certificate and, accordingly, approached UP. But he was turned back twice from UP without a certificate because the UISC’s entrepreneur did not know how to issue it. Finally, he was able to receive it on the 3rd day.’ He added that the entrepreneur’s lack of knowledge makes the promise of delivering this service within 1 day impossible to fulfil but also causes frustration for citizens [Interview data, 2019].
Commitment of UP Staff
People committed to doing something often find ways to achieve it despite all obstacles. However, the data indicates that both UPs lack the commitment to implementing CC for several reasons. Firstly, implementing CC faithfully would be contrary to their interest. Secondly, neither a reward nor any positive or negative incentive for implementing CC faithfully. Implementation of CC requires patronage-free service delivery and accountability. Yet patronage is how LG works in Bangladesh. If the UP chair puts his prestige and power behind implementation, many informal positive and negative stimuli are created.
This is nothing more than the common knowledge that if your boss thinks you are a problem, you do not have a happy life, but if you make them happy, they can do many things for you when you need them. Thirdly, pressure from citizens to demand the delivery of services as per CC guidelines is a significant factor. As noted above, HUP residents got better results because they pushed staff, but SUP residents did not and could not do so. Citizen awareness and determination, driven by NGO orientation and training, can create UP staff commitment to meeting CC standards.
Monitoring
Generally, no central government monitors whether the statute’s CC requirement is enforced. Yet the data disclosed some informal DDLGs (central government civil servants) monitoring in the study areas. Rajshahi DDLG seemed most effective: He [the DDLG official] often visits UP, particularly where projects are going. Even when he talks to the citizens and asks them about their experience with UP, this has contributed to keeping UP staff on their toes in dealing with citizens [Interview data of UP staff, 2019].
The difference between DDLGs seems to have resulted from the difference in their mindset and level of commitment to CC and citizen’s rights: a personal attribute of officers. The more incredible difficulty of transport in the hills may also be a factor limiting the ability and willingness of central government civil servants to get out to UPs. Then, of course, the more active citizenry in pushing HUP staff for results may inspire support from central government officials. In a populous district near a significant city like Rajshahi, adverse media coverage may be more of a factor than isolated and marginalised SUP. Media can push LG for value for money, equity, and accountability (Podger et al., 2012).
Discussion
More than its existence, implementing CC is of particular importance in improving the performance of service-providing organisations, like, in this study, local councils (i.e., UP) in Bangladesh. After introducing CC, the service delivery of local councils has been transparent and citizen-friendly because CC displayed at local councils’ premises has spelt out the service standards. Furthermore, the implementation of CC has allowed citizens to complain about the service delivery system of local councils. As a result, the service delivery process has been freed from some degrees of corruption. On the other hand, it has created an opportunity for the citizens to hold local councils’ officials into account for their performance in delivering services. However, although the local councils studied are implementing CC, their results differ. The difference in performance is related to the success of CC implementation. Areas of performance variation include service delivery timeliness, cost, and responsiveness.
Implementation of CC variation between councils is due to differences in citizens’ awareness, LG staff’s knowledge, capacity and commitment, and monitoring by citizens, LG leaders, central government civil servants, and the media. Besides, some other factors are responsible for the implementation variation of CC between councils, including NGO intervention, citizens’ educational qualification, exemplary communication system, and positive mindset of UP staff. These findings corroborate several studies’ results on policy implementation, right to information, participation, accountability, service delivery, and GO-NGO collaboration (Ahsan & Panday, 2013; Ahsan et al., 2018, 2021; Baroi, 2013; Huque & Ahsan, 2016; Zafarullah et al., 2001).
The data analysis shows that citizens can hold service providers into account for their performance when citizens are transformed into performance evaluators. Of the local councils studied, HUP is an example of such an assertion empirically made. Despite not participating in designing and delivering services and reporting, HU residents, under their knowledge of the service standards, can push HUP officials to comply with CC and raise queries and complaints when they do not comply. Moreover, knowledge of HU residents about the services standards has made HUP functionaries flexible in responding to citizens’ questions. There, thus, has been an improvement in service quality that has made citizens happy with the HU functionaries’ performance.
But, SU residents cannot do so because they lack participation in designing services and reporting and are ignorant of the CC standards. Thus, citizens can no longer engage in dialogue with UP functionaries and demand accountability for delivering services when they do not adhere to set standards.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Although the CC was an NPM-style reform effort in Bangladesh, data obtained support Manning (2001)’s assertion that NPM’s contribution to enhancing responsiveness and improving public sector performance outside OECD countries is very slight. Specifically, LG in Bangladesh seemed to have adopted businesslike tools. Still, the impact has not been as significant, as Hood (1991) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) argued, as it was in the UK, Netherlands, and Australia. The CC neither made local councils that much more efficient and responsive nor improved the delivery of services, despite NPM’s promises (Hood, 2002; Kelly, 1998). Furthermore, although NPM focuses on results, local councils are hardly attentive to their performance resulting in a decrease in citizens’ confidence towards local councils from “empty promises” of CC. Neither a system of reward nor sanction exists to enforce CC or achieve targets, nor is there a formal practice of monitoring staff performance to support NPM-style “management” (see also Ahsan et al., 2021).
The CC was launched without planning and capacity-building at the citizen-UP staff interface level. The local council functionaries have not been sensitised to what may contribute to or impede the successful implementation of CC. In countries like Bangladesh, policies that seem to have generated intended benefits are either imported or promoted by donors. Accordingly, it launched at a large scale without even minimum feasibility. No exception happened to CC. Behind the success of any particular policy, several factors in the country of implementation may wholly or partly be different from what was expected from implementation in other countries. So, this paper suggests implementing policies, especially those imported, with adjustments appropriate to the context, which may also vary within a country.
As in the case of local councils studied in this research, each is located in different regions, which differ in terms of factors including, but not limited to, landscaping, socio-economic and demographic features, language and political situation, and transport system. So, there appeared to be variation in the performance of local council functionaries. So, policies like CC, which require adjustment with context, should be implemented incrementally so that experience learnt from areas where policy is being implemented can be applied to common areas of implementation. Typical implementation regions can be made suitable or fertile for intended policy implementation. Such exercise is a valuable way to fine-tune the policy implementation process.
This study, however, has some limitations. The first is the generalisation of the findings. Although the results of this study are supported by case study evidence portrayed by Huque and Ahsan (2016), for a better understanding of the research problem, a study with a large case sample would further help the generalisation of these findings. Second is the lack of attempt to study a local council, which shows better performance from an NPM theory perspective. Last but not least is the lack of understanding of how political, social, and cultural factors induce citizens not to play their intended role. We hope these issues will inspire prospective researchers in this field. Lessons drawn from this study on the experience of implementing CC in delivering services in local areas in Bangladesh could help in the successful implementation of this or similar policy initiatives in other countries. Citizens need to participate in designing and delivering services as well as reporting. Governments must invest in creating public awareness by various means, creating a skilled, knowledgeable, and committed workforce at local councils and overseeing the enforcement of legal provisions. Getting things accomplished by local councils should not be subject to political and criminal constraints.
The findings of this research may provide a wealth of fascinating information to a non-Bangladeshi international audience from nations with similar backgrounds to Bangladesh. They might, for instance, investigate whether or not local government service delivery could be enhanced through the use of CC. Nonetheless, identifying the barriers to CC implementation could aid future international researchers in identifying the hindering factors in their research. As a result, it can be argued that the study’s results would pique readers’ interest far beyond Bangladesh.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Data Availability Statement
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.