Abstract
This paper critically interrogates the role of news media in mainstreaming, normalizing and amplifying contemporary far-right political actors, parties, and movements in the twenty-first century. Through a critical interdisciplinary literature review and two qualitative case studies of high-profile media interviews with former Trump administration strategist Steve Bannon and leading Trump-supporting politician Marjorie Taylor Greene, this paper explores both the limitations and ethics of long-standing journalistic dogmas such as objectivity and neutrality in the face of rising extremism, fascism, and anti-democratic politics on a global scale. Drawing on Whitney Phillips’ ‘oxygen of amplification’ thesis, the paper argues that despite the best intentions of journalists, news media has (unwittingly) played into the hands of the contemporary far-right. The paper concludes with a set of research-informed recommendations to assist journalists and editors in engaging more ethically with the far-right, particularly in ways that limit the uncritical amplification of their reactionary, conspiratorial and anti-democratic political project.
Introduction: the far-right gone mainstream
In May 2024, veteran Wall Street Journal, CNN, and NBC journalist John Harwood penned an article that challenged both the relevance and ethics of cardinal journalistic principles of objectivity, balance, and neutrality in the age of far-right populism. Harwood (2024) argued that ‘Donald Trump is the first American presidential candidate to explicitly threaten the democratic system on which a free press depends. He could win. Considering the stakes for the country, that ought to be the campaign issue that dwarfs all others’ (n.p.). Harwood’s (2024) point that ‘“balance” represents a dubious safe harbour when the central issue is preserving of abandoning free and fair elections, popular sovereignty and the rule of law’ (n.p.) is a sentiment increasingly shared and expressed by journalists, scholars, policymakers, and citizens in the context of rising illiberalism, extremism, and anti-democratic politics globally.
Specifically, the politics of the twenty-first century are increasingly being redefined, shaped, and challenged by the rise of an emboldened global far-right movement. With the electoral successes of figures like Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Viktor Orban, the far-right is now ‘closely connected to the mainstream; and in more and more countries it is becoming the mainstream’ (Mudde, 2019, p. 2).
The threat of this emboldened far-right to democracy, security, and the safety of marginalized communities is very real. As Miller-Idriss (2020) notes, ‘far-right ideologies are hierarchical and exclusionary. They establish clear lines of superiority and inferiority according to race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion and sexuality’ (p. 12). There are well-known examples globally of far-right public violence, including the 2019 mosque massacre in Christchurch, New Zealand and the 2021 Capitol riots in Washington D.C. The increasing prevalence of far-right arguments in political and media discourses – examples of which will be examined below – help create hostile environments for groups that include Muslims, refugees, women, LGBTQIA+ communities.
This article aims to critically reflect on the journalistic ethics of platforming and talking to the far-right in the current era. The article is guided by the research question:
RQ1. How should news media ethically engage with the contemporary far-right?
While this study is primarily a conceptual and theoretical intervention through a critical review of interdisciplinary literature, to illustrate the challenges and risks inherent in interviewing far-right actors, it employs two empirical case studies of high profile and controversial interviews with far-right actors: the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) interview with former Trump senior strategist, Steve Bannon, and a 60 Minutes interview with leading Donald Trump-supporting politician Marjorie Taylor Greene. Both case studies generated significant criticism from users of X (formerly Twitter) and were highly criticized in mainstream media outlets such as Variety, Rolling Stone and CBS for providing the respective actors with a platform to disseminate exclusionary and conspiratorial rhetoric to wider audiences than might otherwise have been possible. This article aims to demonstrate the limitations of conventional journalistic dogmas like ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’, arguing that even adversarial style interviews ultimately work to the advantage of the far-right by amplifying their conspiratorial, anti-democratic, exclusionary and racial politics.
Drawing on internet researcher Whitney Phillips’ (2018) ‘oxygen of amplification’ thesis, this article suggests that when engaging with the contemporary far-right, the platforming is the point, and thus requires a recalibration of orthodox journalistic approaches to interviewing and platforming anti-democratic political actors. ‘Engaging’ can take the form of platforming, profiling, and interviewing far-right actors. This analysis informs a series of recommendations on how journalists and editors might approach engaging with the far-right in a manner that is as ethical as possible.
The media and the contemporary far-right: a critical literature review
‘Far-right’ is an umbrella term that encompasses both the radical right and extreme right (Mudde, 2019). The radical right appears to be nominally pro-democratic but rejects the principles of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2019). The extreme right rejects democracy outright and is commonly associated with fascism and neo-Nazism. Consistent with both the extreme and radical right is a shared hostility to the principles of liberal democracy, including constraints on the will of the majority, and protection and rights for minorities (Müller, 2017). Ideas that were once considered fringe and taboo are being openly discussed, debated, and – through this process – legitimized in mainstream discourse. These ideas are frequently mediated through traditional and digital media. However, it must be noted that the boundaries between the radical right and the extreme right have become porous in recent years (Pirro, 2023) as prominent radical right actors like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro reject notions of democracy and openly embrace White supremacist rhetoric and policy positions.
The emergence of Web 2.0 and the ongoing processes of mediatization (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014) throughout the twenty-first century have provided a boon for the far-right’s global reach. Research has demonstrated that far-right actors are savvy media performers who have proven adept at exploiting the communicative and technological affordances of contemporary media systems (Wodak, 2021). These actors have developed a suite of communicative tactics and strategies with the aim of generating media attention and mainstreaming their political ideology. The term ‘mainstreaming’ describes
the process by which parties/actors, discourses and/or attitudes move from marginal positions on the political spectrum or public sphere to more central ones, shifting what is deemed to be acceptable or legitimate in political, media and public circles and contexts. (Brown et al., 2023, p. 170)
The aforementioned strategies include the use of political stunts (Sengul, 2022a), the use of covert and coded rhetoric and doublespeak (Feldman & Jackson, 2014), and the strategic use of humour (McSwiney & Sengul, 2024). These strategies align with what Ruth Wodak (2021) describes as the ‘far-right populist perpetuum mobile’ and what the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (2022, n.p.) calls ‘media baiting’. We know that the far-right frequently ‘bait’ the media by ‘actively and strategically seeking scandalisation’ (Wodak, 2021, p. 371) through public provocations. These strategies are effective in generating media interest because they align with the commercial media logic’s desire for controversial, sensationalist, and scandalous content. Thus, the relationship between the media and the far-right is often characterized as a convergence of goals, driven principally by political economic motivations of media organizations.
Research has examined the emergence of a far-right information ecosystem comprising platforms, multiple actors, and assorted modes of content production (Baele et al., 2023; Zhang & Davis, 2022). These include high-profile far-right media commentators such as Gavin McInnes and outlets such as Breitbart. Scholarship has also demonstrated how and why mainstream journalistic reportage has gravitated ever more towards sensationalism and scandal. As Whitney Phillips (2018) writes, ‘in the social media age, the measurability of content, in the form of traffic clicks, and likes, has tethered editorial strategy to analytics like never before’ (p. 19; and see Cover et al., 2022). Journalists interviewed for a 2022 study ‘reported becoming much more selective in what content they share, with their logic based on audience metrics and algorithms – especially those of Facebook and Twitter’ (Walters, 2022, p. 1495). The platforming of far-right actors by media outlets might help works of journalism in receiving clicks and get shared by social media users. In the context of journalism, the term ‘platforming’ describes the provision of media opportunities to far-right actors that enable the broadcasting of their voice, for example, an interview, the inclusion of quotes in media copy.
Indeed, most scholarly explanations for the ‘highly symbiotic and mutually beneficial’ (Mudde, 2024, n.p.) relationship between news media and the far-right generally centre around issues of political economy. An alignment is said to exist between the commercial logics of contemporary media organizations and the controversial, scandalous and conflict-centred communication style of far-right actors like Donald Trump. As Mudde (2019) rightly notes, the media ‘know that far right sells’ (p .108). This often presents a tension between the commercial imperatives and pressures of media organizations and the professional ethics of journalists. For far-right populists, securing a media platform is precisely the point: it enables them to otherwise have reached and, in doing so, growing their influence and following. Phillips (2018) calls this ‘the oxygen of amplification’:
Far-right and extremist discourses do not have enough clout to influence and shift the national conversation. They relied on the “signal boosting power provided by centre-left establishment publications like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and CNN.com to ensure that their messages would spread to a national, even global, audience. (Phillips, 2018, p. 7)
Ellinas (2018) makes a similar point, noting that media outlets have the ability to grant political outsiders ‘validation momentum and legitimacy’ (p. 395). The political benefits of media platforming and coverage have been demonstrated empirically. Murphy and Devine (2020), for example, found that media coverage played a unique role in driving public support for the UK Independence Party. Ekström et al. (2020) demonstrate how news interviews with leaders of the far-right party Swedish Democrats helped normalize that party’s views and ideology. In other work, Ekström et al. (2022) examine the complex dynamics on reporting on right-wing populist parties (RWP), demonstrating how journalistic framing can play a role in mainstreaming and normalizing populist discourses and furthering the political agenda of those parties. Likewise, Patrona (2025) examines the congenial interviewing of these actors on right-leaning television outlets and how such interviews pose no challenge to their views. From an audience reception perspective, Mudde (2019) notes that adversarial and combative style techniques might ultimately backfire in interviews with the far-right as readers and viewers might ‘sympathize with the “underdog” far-right politician who is “unfairly attacked by the “arrogant elite”’ (cited in Sengul, 2022b, 372). This points to a disconnect between the earnest intention of journalists to hold far-right actors “to account”, and how these interviews are received by audiences (Madianou, 2009).
Budarick (2023) examines the dangers of performing objectivity when reporting on the far-right. Journalistic objectivity refers to the journalist not expressing a definitive opinion ( ‘taking a side’) on the issue or topic being reported on or attempting to guide the reader/viewer – for example, through use of language and visuals – to reach a certain conclusion (Tuchman, 1972). Objectivity has historically enjoyed popularity among journalists and media outlets, especially in the United States and Australia, because it has been a ‘means of attaining journalistic credibility’ (the objective journalist is not just advancing their own opinion, as an activist might); and because it can help avoid alienating certain audiences (as overtly partisan journalism might) by ‘balancing perspectives from at least two sides of an issue’ (Aday et al., 2005, p. 5). Conversely, Budarick (2023) argues that
Objectivity as procedure makes racism more visible when it comes in the form of dramatic, individual breaches of acceptable social norms, which present as easily understandable and interpretable. As an embedded part of political systems and the cultural and social fabric of society, racism is harder to see under the objective method. Identifying and challenging racism at this level requires critical and often uncomfortable intervention into social systems and structures. (p. 1709)
Budarick’s insights are pertinent to the two case studies below; indeed, he explores one of these (the Bannon interview). Both case studies evidence procedures associated with the performance – and even momentary non-performances – of objectivity. These include including quotes from interviewees about two or more versions of what might have happened in a particular news item, where the actual events may not have been verified (Tuchman, 1972, p. 666); citing facts (Tuchman, 1972, p. 667); and citing the opinions of others as ‘evidence’ (Tuchman, 1972, p. 668). The procedures also include avoiding overt displays of emotionality (Stenvall, 2014, p. 461).
Our article argues that performances of objectivity pose no challenge to – and may actually end up bolstering – the conspiratorial undercurrent in far-right discourse. Conspiracies are not restricted to one side of politics, though they do overlap with the far-right in striking ways. Web 2.0 affordances have enabled the widespread distribution of conspiracy narratives in the same way they have enabled the widespread distribution of far-right ideas and actions (Ekman, 2022, p. 1133). Far-right actors such as Marjorie Taylor Greene have very publicly endorsed QAnon, which depicts a world in which leaders conceal horrific abuses of power from an unsuspecting public – the exceptions to this being those who believe in the conspiracy and try to enlighten others.
In the case studies, this article identifies a conspiracy narrative in which the far-right actor frames themselves as an ‘underdog’ (to use Cas Mudde’s term) who is only trying to help the white working class, and in doing so, is subjugated by elites (politicians, mainstream media outlets, celebrities). These elites are, according to the terms of this narrative, advocating causes (feminism, LGBTQI rights, anti-racism) that are ostensibly antithetical to the interests of the white working class and to democracy more generally. This conspiracy narrative is invoked by the interviewees in both of our case studies and goes largely unquestioned by the interviewers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the above concerns, there is a growing body of scholarship on no-platforming the far-right. Smith (2020) and Sparrow (2021) write that no-platforming originated on the Left during the 1970s, when activist groups ‘refuse[d] assistance (financial or otherwise) to openly racist or fascist organisations or societies [. . .] and to deny them a platform’ (Smith, 2020, p. 5) and disrupted their public presentations. Smith (2020) details the emergence of no-platforming into widespread parlance during the 2010s, when this was used against high-profile individuals such as Milo Yiannopoulos and Jordan Peterson. Sparrow (2021) describes the refusal of media outlets and politicians to publicly name the Christchurch killer and sometimes even name fascism in response to his crimes. This refusal to name fascism, Sparrow argues, meant that this philosophy went uncontested.
There exists little scholarship on how exactly a media outlet might platform and interview far-right actors, should they choose to do this, without giving credence to their views, amplifying them uncritically and unnecessarily, or downplaying the seriousness of their ideology and actions (Richards et al., 2024). Damhuis and de Jonge (2022) provide useful suggestions for social scientist researchers when interviewing the ‘radical right’, including locating interviewees and building a rapport with interviewees. Their study does not address the very different context of the media interview.
Research approach
To demonstrate the challenges and limitations of conventional journalistic approaches to engaging with the far-right, this article presents two empirical case studies to supplement the critical literature review. The first case study examines the Four Corners: Populist Revolution interview with former Donald Trump senior strategist Steve Bannon, which aired in 2018 on the ABC. The second case study features the prominent Republican congresswoman and leading figure in the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement Marjorie Taylor Greene. This aired on the CBS 60 Minutes Programme in April 2023 and is entitled From the Far-Right Fringe to the Republican Party’s Front Row. The interviews are publicly accessible and were accessed via the ABC and CBS YouTube channels respectively.
This study employs two qualitative research approaches: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Textual Analysis. Both approaches have been extensively used in the study of populist and far-right rhetoric. CDA is a ‘discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimates, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (van Dijk, 2015, p. 466). CDA is based on the premise that language is not powerful on its own, but rather ‘gains power by the use powerful people make it’ (Wodak, 2009, p. 35). Textual Analysis examines ‘the variety of ways that a text can be interpreted and utilised by those who view it’ (Smith, 2017, p. 3). This approach pays particular attention to the social context in which that text is produced, and how this context may impact its production and reception (Smith, 2017, p. 3).
This research adopted a purposeful sampling approach, which is guided by the principle of ‘gaining rich, in-depth information’ (Daymon & Holloway, 2011, p. 12). Purposeful sampling ‘involves selecting data cases (participants, texts) on the basis that they will be able to provide information rich data to analyse. . .with the aim of generating insight and in-depth understanding’ (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 56).
The case studies were selected because they share several key features. Both attracted significant media attention and criticism from social media users, commentators, media practitioners, and politicians for the failure of the interviewer’s to adequately hold the interviewees to account, and for the decision to provide them with a platform in the first place. Both depict exchanges between high-profile White interviewers (Sarah Ferguson on Four Corners, Lesley Stahl on 60 Minutes) and internationally significant far-right populist figures, with populism understood here as a ‘set of ideas which constructs “the people” in homogeneous terms against an inherently corrupt and illegitimate elite’ (Sengul, 2020, p. 23). A purposive approach was also adopted in gathering supplementary media sources – including tweets by journalists reacting to the interviews, as well opinion articles – which provided additional contextual information to the case studies.
Furthermore, both interviews were aired on major networks that, while different in some ways – the ABC is the Australian public broadcaster, CBS is a private US broadcaster – are both politically centrist. The interviews were not screened on exclusively right-wing networks (e.g. Rebel News or Sky News in Australia or One America News Network (OANN) in the United States), where they would be viewed by largely right-leaning audiences. This is particularly noteworthy given that access to more mainstream media outlets is seen as one of the key drivers of the far-right’s normalization over the past two decades (Damhuis & de Jonge, 2022).
Our study focuses specifically on the deployment of language in both interviews; and on what remains unsaid, by the interviewee and/or reporter, or has by some other means not been included in the published story (e.g. it might have been removed by an editor). Taken together, both CDA and Textual Analysis allowed for the exploration of the journalistic strategies employed by the interviewer, the rhetoric employed by the far-right interviewees, as well as an evaluation of the likely interpretations made by the audience of both programmes. CDA is also sensitive to the wider socio-political context and implications of a text. This is particularly important for the present study in not only considering the discursive elements of an interview with figures like Steve Bannon or Majorie Taylor Greene, but also the broader implications of these interviews for the far-right’s mainstreaming and normalization. The two empirical case studies presented in this study serve as illustrative vignettes that highlight the inherent risks and challenges of platforming far-right actors.
Case studies
ABC Four Corners and Steve Bannon
Steve Bannon had gained notoriety as the founding editor of influential right-wing tabloid Breitbart News and then as a strategist in Trump’s government. His Four Corners interview was screened in September 2018, a year after he parted ways with Trump. The introductory montage sets the tone for the interview’s engagement and is thus worthy of analysis. The programme opens with a shot of Sarah Ferguson sitting in a car travelling through Washington, reading about Bannon on an iPad. A male voice intones: ‘He’s been called a streetfighter and the most dangerous man in American politics’. There is a clip of Bannon striding across a stage, microphone in hand, telling an unseen audience: ‘You argue for your freedom and they call you a xenophobe. You argue for your country and they call you a racist’. There is footage of Trump praising Bannon, saying he is ‘good man . . . not a racist’, followed by footage of Hillary Clinton (who ran against Trump in the 2016 US presidential election) reminding an audience that Trump has put Bannon, ‘the head of a right-wing website’, ‘in charge’ of his presidential campaign.
At surface level, this montage raises the question ‘who is Bannon, exactly?’, with the promise that the question will be answered in the interview. To this extent, the opening can be read as a teaser, encouraging viewers to continue watching. Yet the ostensible ‘balance’ – cutting between the views of three white people with differing views of the interviewee (including the interviewee himself) – ‘centres white feelings and assumes a white audience or adjudicator’ (Dreher, 2020, p. 2364). The views and voices of racialized groups targeted by Breitbart and Trump are absent. Furthermore, this opening puts a question mark around the very terms ‘right-wing’ and ‘racist’. There is the suggestion that these terms are as likely to be partisan pejoratives as accurate descriptors of real life, harmful actors and activities. Correspondingly, there is the suggestion that these pejoratives might have been incorrectly applied to Bannon.
The issue of racism is raised within the context of a discussion on economic nationalism, at the 27.35-minute mark of an interview that just exceeds 37 minutes:
‘How do you stop economic nationalism from morphing into something that’s essentially racist?’
‘I don’t think economic nationalism has anything to do with race . . . It doesn’t matter about your religion, it doesn’t matter about your ethnicity, your colour, it doesn’t matter your gender . . . your sexual preference. All of that doesn’t matter’.
‘You say that, and I’ve watched lots of interviews and I’ve watched people ask you and accuse you in various ways of being a racist, and there’s no evidence that that’s what you are, but do you understand what that group of people – the particularly disenfranchised group of people, the white workers in America, how that turns into racism?’
‘The white workers in [the United States] are not racist . . . I come from the American south and it’s such an infinitesimally small percentage of people [who are racist], they’re only important because the left media gives them a microphone’.
Within even this brief exchange, Ferguson’s performance – and momentary non-performance – of objectivity inadvertently reinforces the racism that she has identified in Bannon’s supporters. This happens in two ways. First, ‘racism is externalized and individualized’ (Budarick, 2023, p. 11). Racism here does not stem from or fuel economic nationalism, and it cannot be located in the rhetoric of Bannon or Trump; instead, it becomes the province of what Bannon describes as an ‘infinitesimally small’ group of unnamed attention-seekers who are being granted attention by a dominant, censorious and left-leaning media. The very existence of such a media is not questioned by Ferguson; this omission suggests that it exists and is punishing those who do not toe a left-wing/liberal party line and/or who do not hold economic and political power. That latter group apparently comprises a disenfranchised White working class.
Furthermore, Bannon can reframe racial prejudice as being perfectly rational responses to economic inequality. This reframing is a common trope among speakers endorsing xenophobic and otherwise hostile rhetoric. Wodak writes,
Overt denials of prejudice basically involve two presuppositions. First, they presuppose the existence of ‘real’ prejudice. In this regard, the existence of extreme, outwardly fascist groups enables defenders of mainstream racism, exclusion or discrimination to present their own rhetoric as being unprejudiced – by comparison, thus also constructing an implicit straw man fallacy. Second, speakers, in denying prejudice, will claim that their criticisms of minority group members are ‘factual’, ‘objective’ and ‘reasonable’, rather than based upon irrational feelings, and will accordingly employ a range of discursive strategies of legitimization. (2015, pp. 58–59)
The trope of the ‘disenfranchised’ white working class invoked by both Bannon and Ferguson (2022), and is significant to examine because it has been a staple of far-right discourse (p. 11). This trope describes a vision of white folk who are being oppressed by ‘classless immigrants, refugees and representatives of multiculturalism and diversity who [ostensibly] threaten jobs, resources and nation’ (Mondon & Winter, 2019, p. 512). Through deploying that trope, Bannon can reframe himself as being a champion of a marginalized group.
The Four Corners interview also reinforces the normativity and universality of whiteness through what remains unspoken, that is, not acknowledged during the episode. For instance, Breitbart has been accused – not without justification – of publishing ‘racist, sexist, xenophobic and antisemitic material’ (Elliott & Miller, 2016, n.p.). The episode does show a clip of Hillary Clinton describing Breitbart as ‘right wing’, but says nothing about the site’s racial politics. Second, the unspoken encompasses content that is shown but that goes unremarked upon. Bannon’s defence of Trump’s economic nationalism, for example, is premised on a desire to protect the US economy and workers. Neither Bannon nor Ferguson comment on the racialized nature of Trump’s rhetoric, which includes a clip included in the programme in which Trump tells an audience: ‘We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country. It’s the greatest theft in the history of the world’.
Furthermore, this interview takes a very definitive stance on Bannon, even while purporting not to. Budarick (2023) rightly argues that Ferguson deploys ‘the language of objectivity’ – for example, ‘no evidence’ – to frame Bannon as ‘the victim of unfounded accusations of being racist’ (p. 1708). Worded differently, ostensibly ‘objective’ language is used to highly subjective ends. As mentioned, the interview largely elides the actual evidence of Bannon’s important roles in the production of racist content.
60 Minutes and Marjorie Taylor Greene
Marjorie Taylor Greene’s 60 Minutes interview runs for 13.54 minutes, with an additional 2.53 minute segment (entitled 60 Minutes Overtime, n.d.) in which she discusses her opposition to US assistance for Ukraine. The piece was screened on April 3, 2023; viewers are reminded that this was the same week that Donald Trump was indicted in New York on financial fraud charges. The episode begins similarly to Populist Revolution, with reporter Lesley Stahl describing Taylor Greene’s public profile over a montage of shots featuring the latter:
[Taylor Greene has] gained her national celebrity, some say notoriety with a sharp tongue and some pretty radical views like her proposal for a national divorce where red and blue states would go their separate ways. But she has managed in just two years in Congress to accumulate real power, landing on important committees and influencing the direction of Republican policies. Before Congress, she helped run the family construction company in Georgia, known to be smart and fearless, and has a history of believing in conspiracy theories.
Like Bannon, Taylor Greene is framed as a provocative and controversial right-leaning political pundit. She is someone who has been subject to pejoratives, some of which Stahl reads out in the interview’s opening: ‘Crazy, Q clown, loony tune, unhinged, moron’. Shortly afterwards, Taylor Greene tells Stahl that her opponents ‘call me names and insult me nonstop . . . They call me racist, they call me antisemitic, which is not true’. Like Sarah Ferguson in Four Corners, Stahl does not dispute Taylor Greene’s denial of racism. This refusal may suggest the interviewer’s commitment to objectivity but it also encourages the possibility that said racism accusations are just that – accusations, which are open to debate.
Interestingly, race is not explicitly discussed in the remainder of the episode. There are two moments when it is invoked; as in Bannon’s Four Corners interview, both appear towards the episode’s ending and both ultimately work in Taylor Greene’s favour (or at least do not challenge her denials of being racist). The first comes at 9:40 minutes, when Stahl references the ‘white working class’. Stahl intones, ‘Most of [Taylor Greene’s] constituents in her conservative, largely white working class district agree with her on the issues and especially like the way she fights for her beliefs’. This line plays over footage of the politician greeting people in a street with a familiarity and warmth usually reserved for old friends. At 11:52 minutes, Stahl mentions Taylor Greene’s proposed four-year halt on immigration and Taylor Greene concedes that this is a view she has expressed.
Tellingly, and perhaps reflecting a commitment to journalistic objectivity, Stahl does not more carefully examine those statements. The interviewer (much like Sarah Ferguson) does not suggest how appeals to a white working class have been deployed as a rhetorical technique by far-right populists (Mondon & Winter, 2019). Nor the shaky factual basis of that group’s support for Trump’s presidency, nor how immigration bans – including those specifically targeting Muslims – were proposed by Trump. There is no mention of the media reports which surfaced in June 2020 of a video in which Taylor Greene attacked Muslims as pedophilic and incestuous (Mutnick & Zanona, 2020). Stahl briefly mentions Taylor Greene’s endorsement of conspiracy movement QAnon, which had been hinted at via the ‘crazy Q’ label, and which Greene appears to now distance herself from. The QAnon conspiracy has been premised on antisemitic myths of blood libel and has been aligned with White Christian nationalism (Forberg, 2022).
Discussion
This article has critically interrogated the role-played by news media in the normalization, amplification, and mainstreaming of the contemporary far-right. This mainstreaming has presented news media organizations and practitioners with complex ethical and professional quandaries relating to their role as democratic watch-dog institutions. Closely held tenets of journalistic practice have been upended by a style of politics that seems to benefit from antagonistic and adversarial exchanges, and exposure to mainstream audiences. Focusing specifically on news media platforming and interviews, this article has argued that journalists and media organizations need to rethink cardinal journalistic principles such as ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ in the face of a rising fascist, anti-democratic, extremist, and illiberal politics globally.
Furthermore, through an interdisciplinary critical review of the literature, this article has concurred with a range of scholars that the news media – either wittingly and unwittingly – have played a central role in the rise of the far-right in the twenty-first century (e.g. Ekström et al., 2020). Drawing on Whitney Phillips’ (2018) ‘oxygen of amplification’ thesis, the article has argued that editorial decisions to disproportionately platform contemporary far-right actors has been a key mechanism in the success and mainstreaming of their ideas, parties and movements on a global scale. Far-right actors are acutely aware of the importance of media to the success of their political project and employ communicative and performance strategies to generate media attention; and they exploit both journalistic objectivity and the logics of commercial media organizations (Wodak, 2021). Research has consistently demonstrated that the far-right have enjoyed disproportionate media platforms in recent years which amplified their reach into the political mainstream. As Phillips (2018) and others have noted, the far-right do not have the clout to influence the national conversation on their own. They have relied on the ‘signal boosting power’ provided by mainstream publications like The New York Times and networks such as the Australian Broadcasting Commission to amplify their reactionary political message (Phillips, 2018, p. 7).
This article joins a growing chorus of researchers, journalists, and policymakers in critically reflecting on the role of news media in the age of far-right populism. As leading scholar of populism and the far-right, Cas Mudde (2024), puts it, ‘the media should cover the far-right differently, because the far-right is different’ (n.p., emphasis in original). In most cases, the far-right benefits from all types of political interviews, even those that are hostile, confrontational and adversarial in nature (Mudde, 2019). In fact, far-right actors have proven adept at spinning adversarial interviews to their political advantage by framing ‘biased’ journalists as part of the corrupt and unfair elite. This results in well-meaning news practitioners (often unknowingly) serving the far-right’s political agenda by amplifying their conspiratorial, white supremacist and anti-democratic political rhetoric to mainstream audiences. Moreover, as outlined in the 2022 Victorian Inquiry into Extremism, ‘far-right groups often [seek] out the attention of mainstream media as media reporting, even if critical, was considered to significantly contribute to increasing a group’s public profile’ (Parliament of Victoria, 2022, p. 27).
Given that the far-right can spin adversarial interviews to their political advantage, it reinforces the importance of limiting platforming opportunities as much as possible. This suggests that for the contemporary far-right, the platforming is the point, exposing the challenges and limitations and conventional journalistic strategies.
The critical literature review was supplemented by two illustrative empirical case studies of recent high-profile and controversial interviews with prominent far-right actors in Australia and the United States: Steve Bannon and Marjorie Taylor Greene. Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis and Thematic Analysis, these case studies serve as empirical vignettes to highlight the complexity, difficulty, and ultimately, the futility of engaging with the far right. The findings of the case studies reinforce what the academic literature has said about the limitations of performances of objectivity and neutrality when interviewing far-right political actors.
Moreover, the case studies demonstrate that in performing objectivity, the two interviewers do not challenge – indeed, they may appear to agree with, or at least not disagree with – the conspiracy narratives being weaved by the interviewees. Conspiracy is a particularly potent rhetorical device. In a conspiracy, the world is reduced to simplistic and crude binaries, for example, ‘us’ versus ‘them’, ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ (Pereira et al., 2020, p. 3). Conspiracies frequently contain kernels of truth – for example, wealth is unevenly distributed; politicians have ignored and even acted against the best interests of their constituents –even if this truth is twisted beyond recognition. To illustrate that last point, Mondon and Winter (2019) explore how right-leaning actors have constructed the trope of the ‘disenfranchised white working class’ by racializing working-class constituencies to be White and suggesting that they hold similar (and similarly hostile) views about issues such as immigration.
In the case studies, the interviewees suggest that they are being unfairly pilloried for standing up for the white working class (a familiar right-wing culture war trope) and for simply speaking their mind. This pillorying appears to come predominantly from left/liberal commentators. Neither interviewer meaningfully questions these suggestions, nor point to contrary evidence; both appear to largely take the interviewees at their word, with Sarah Ferguson even declaring that she does not believe Bannon to be racist.
It should be acknowledged here that platforms such as Twitter/X have provided spaces for critical discussions around the implications of interviewing anti-democratic, racist, and exclusionary far-right actors. This pushback is not without problems; for example, it has entailed journalists of colour performing the additional labour of pointing out systematic racism. Nonetheless, it does lay bare the limitations of traditional journalistic techniques and approaches in the contemporary mediascape, including journalistic objectivity. For example, following the Bannon interview, Pakistani-born Australian journalist Osman Faruqi tweeted that
The people throwing half-baked ideas out there (Sales, Trioli, Ferguson, Neighbour) seem to have zero awareness of what it might be like to be one of the very few PoC journalists at the ABC, watching the biggest names throw you and people like you under the bus.
Faruqi’s tweet references not only the episode but also the Twitter defences provided by Ferguson and the episode’s producer, Sally Neighbour. Ferguson tweeted a shot of herself with Steve Bannon, accompanied by the line: ‘What’s wrong with this photo? NOTHING’ (cited in Meade, 2018; capitals in original). Neighbour tweeted: ‘Astounded at the hysteria over our Bannon interview. Like it or not, he is one of the most influential people in the world. Does anyone seriously think he will go away if we ignore him?’ (cited in Meade, 2018).
The Greene interview was criticized on similar grounds. For example, African American journalist Jemele Hill tweeted,
There’s nothing wrong with interviewing and profiling controversial, even despicable people, but this framing is shit . . . She’s not some maverick with provocative opinions. She’s an antisemitic racist who supported an insurrection as a sitting Congresswoman’ (cited in Roush, 2023).
Hill’s suggestion is that by framing Taylor Greene as simply controversial, the interview effectively elided the congresswoman’s problematic politics. Investigative journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones tweeted that the interview represented ‘the type of normalizing that mainstream media did of segregationists’ (cited in Roush, 2023).
The following section provides actionable recommendations to guide ethical practice when interviewing far-right actors and avoid the uncritical amplification of far-right actors. These recommendations are informed by the findings of the two case studies and are thus an extension to this Discussion section. They are aimed at journalists and editors; both groups play pivotal roles in determining what will and will not be reported on. The recommendations encompass procedures that might be associated with performances of objectivity: reducing overt expressions of emotion, privileging matters deemed to be in the ‘public interest’, not placing undue emphasis on one individual or viewpoint. At the same time, the recommendations make no pretence to impartiality; indeed, recommendation 4 explicitly advises against this. The recommendations may have use beyond reporting on the far-right; for instance, conspiracy actors of various political stripes (not just the right or far-right) thrive on having their views amplified by mainstream media outlets (Bruns et al., 2022).
Recommendations for best practice in interviewing far-right actors
The authors concede that implementing the following recommendations will be challenging, not least because of the commercial logics of contemporary mediascapes which favour controversial, scandalous, conflict-centred and speculator political performance (Waisbord, 2019). The authors also recognize that a strategy of ‘no platform’ or cordon sanitaire of far-right actors and parties is increasingly untenable, and in some instances undesirable, given the increasing electoral success of far-right parties globally. Therefore, the recommendations are designed to assist journalists in engaging more ethically with the far-right, particularly in a way that limits the amplification of their anti-democratic political projects.
We recognize that our study has its limitations. For example, the analysis focuses on examples from Australia and North America. Further research could investigate media engagement with the far-right parties in India, Brazil, and Hungary, where they are increasingly becoming parties of government. This research would be attuned to the specificities of the political landscape and the media systems in those nations.
1. Address the ‘public interest’ and avoid providing disproportionate media coverage: As mentioned, it is an unrealistic expectation to argue that journalists should never interview the far-right, particularly given the increased number of far-right actors and parties holding positions of power in contemporary democracies. There is, however, little justification to provide them with a platform any more than may be in the public interest. For example, what Donald Trump promised voters during the 2024 US presidential election campaign was absolutely a matter of public interest; it thus made sense to report on these promises (and provide opportunities for his critics to provide counter arguments). There is no ethical reason to ask far-right actors to comment on issues simply for the sake of providing a semblance of ‘political balance’ or for ‘likes’ and clicks.
2. Adversarial style interviews are often counterproductive: In justifying their decision to interview far-right actors, journalists frequently adopt highly combative, confrontational, and adversarial interviewing styles. While this strategy may be effective against conventional politicians, it seldom works against those actors. As mentioned earlier, this can result in the far-right actor being framed as an ‘underdog’
This does not mean that journalists should avoid disagreeing with their interviewee or pointing out the error of their views; it means that persistently challenging them, trying to ‘call out’ the interviewee, may be fruitless. In the context of a television interview: a journalist may provide a to-camera piece that is separate to the interview itself, where they highlight (say) points made by the interviewee that have been debunked and how/where these have been debunked. Journalists should also take the opportunity to highlight the gravity of far-right violence, rather than downplaying it, for example, by framing that violence as retaliation in a fight between two sides with equal moral equivalence (Richards et al., 2024, p. 125). Again, highlighting this violence does not need to entail a stand-off with the interviewee.
3. Resist the far-right populist perpetuum mobile: Phillips (2018, p. 7) notes how easily mainstream news publications have been and continue to be commandeered as unwitting mouthpieces by the far-right through their effective use of ‘narrative hijacking strategies’ and tactics. Thus, journalists should critically evaluate the newsworthiness and public interest of far-right provocations before giving in to the far-right’s media baiting. As Ruth Wodak suggests,
Not falling into the trap of far-right populism entails developing and maintaining alternative patterns of media reporting – oriented less towards scandalous incidents and clever performances and staging of far-right politicians, and more towards deconstructing them, commenting on them and debunking what they are. (2021, p. 264)
4. Prioritizing media ethics above impartiality and objectivity: This critical juncture requires a recalibration away from outmoded notions of objectivity and impartiality to a practice that centres public interest and media ethics. This article has argued that exposing marginalized and racialized audiences to violent far-right rhetoric contravenes the media ethics principle of harm mitigation. The rise of the global far-right has also exposed an irreconcilable tension between the public interest and media ethics on the one hand, and ideals of objectivity and neutrality on the other. Indeed, the approach adopted by Mondon and Winter (2020, p. 4) to academic research provides a useful model for media practitioners: ‘We do not believe that objectivity in research can be achieved. We do not hide the fact that we take sides: racists and anti-racists are not equivalent, and we do not stand in the middle or above as objective bystanders’.
5. Adopt an explicit pro-democracy bias: Connected to the previous recommendation, Brian Klaas (2021) has argued that, in the face of asymmetric anti-democratic far-right movements, journalists should adopt a more explicitly pro-democracy stance. The rationale is that as democracies come under increasing attack globally, journalists should be more strident in their defence of democratic principles. Klaas (2021, n.p.) explains that ‘when authoritarians take over one party but not the other, pursuing “balance” is a gift to antidemocratic forces. And when democracy itself is under attack, horse race coverage – between those attacking democracy and those defending it – becomes indefensible’. For a profession inexorably linked to the maintenance of democracy, adopting a pro-democracy bias in the face of antidemocratic movements seems axiomatic and justifiable.
One example can be found in a 2024 ABC interview in which Sarah Ferguson interviewed Marjorie Taylor Greene about the release of Julian Assange from custody. Taylor Greene had been a high-profile supporter of Assange’s. At one point, Ferguson asks her interviewee if Trump will face legal consequences for his role in the 6 January 2021 Capitol riots and why she does not accept the result of the 2020 presidential election. Ferguson links this question (which Taylor Greene responds defensively to) to a key aspect of the Assange case, which is the ‘limits of the law’ (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2024). Highlighting Taylor Greene’s refusal to believe the 2020 election result encourages viewers to question her commitment to democratic principles (e.g. truth), which she praises Assange for protecting.
6. Ensure that all incorrect information is identified as such: Leaving factually baseless or questionable information is tantamount to approving it. Identifying such information can entail the interviewer politely (not aggressively or defensively) correcting their interviewee. This approach could work particularly well in visual mediums, where the body language as well as tone of voice of both interviewer and interviewee can be directly observed by audiences.
There are some formats – for example, live debates – where immediately correcting misinformation may not be appropriate. One notable example is the September 2024 presidential debate, where Trump famously declared that Haitian immigrants ‘are eating the pets of the people that live’ in the American town of Springfield (ABC News, 2024). David Muir, an ABC News anchor who was moderating the debate, waited until Trump had finished speaking before confirming that there was ‘no evidence’ to support claims of immigrants eating pets. Significantly, Muir did not interrupt Trump mid-speech; that would not have suited the format (in which both presidential candidates are generally permitted to speak uninterrupted) and might have reinforced Trump’s self-styled persona of a truth-teller being victimized by the mainstream media.
In text-based interviews (e.g. for newspapers and blogs), a sentence about the factually baseless/questionable information spoken by interviewees should suffice.
7. Demarcate extreme right actors: Media outlets and practitioners must employ a strict strategy of demarcation when dealing with extreme right actors, such as fascist, white supremacists and neo-Nazis (de Jonge, 2019). There is little public interest justification for providing a platform to extreme right figures as this only serves to legitimize their racist and antidemocratic agenda.
Demarcation is not a straightforward process. The boundaries between the extreme right and the radical right have progressively blurred over the past few years as more radical right actors embrace anti-democratic positions (Pirro, 2023). In this context, it may be difficult for journalists to distinguish between these groups. Notwithstanding these blurring boundaries, while there is still a meaningful distinction between the radical and extreme right, journalists should make a concerted effort to no platform (Smith, 2020) extreme right and other anti-democratic agitators.
