A Self-Righteous,Not a Virtuous,Circle: Proposing a New Framework for Studying Media Effects on Knowledge and Political Participation in a Social Media Environment

Abstract

To explain the participatory effects of news exposure, communication scholars have long relied upon the “virtuous circle” framework of media use and civic participation. That is, news consumption makes people more knowledgeable, and trustful toward institutions and political processes, making them active and responsible citizens, which then leads them to engage in various political activities. In a social media environment, however, the applicability of the “virtuous circle” is increasingly dubious. A mounting body of empirical research indicates that news consumption via social media does not necessarily yield actual information gains. Instead, it often fosters a false perception of being well-informed and politically competent, thereby stimulating political engagement. Furthermore, selective information consumption and interaction within like-minded networks on social media frequently exacerbate animosity toward opposing political factions, which can serve as a catalyst for political involvement. In light of these findings, we propose replacing the “virtuous circle” framework for a “self-righteous” one. In this new model, social media news users develop a heightened sense of confidence in their knowledge, regardless of its accuracy, and consequently become more inclined to engage in politics by reinforcing the perception that the opposing side is inherently wrong and that achieving victory is imperative.

Keywords

self-righteous circle virtuous circle social media news political knowledge political participation

Political participation is one of the strongest indicators of a healthy democracy (Tilly, 1997; Verba et al., 1995). Because it is a core characteristic of democratic citizenship, communication and journalism scholars have long been interested in news media’s role in it. To date, most studies have documented a positive association between news exposure and political participation (e.g., Oser & Boulianne, 2020; Shah et al., 2009; Smets & Van Ham, 2013). Scholars have also noted that the association is not direct, but indirect, that is, it is channeled through various cognitive and attitudinal processes. Thus, news media use influences political participation by enhancing one’s knowledge of politics and current affairs (Chaffee & Frank, 1996; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jung et al., 2011), thereby making citizens as good democratic and responsible citizens that are competent to understand and engage in politics (Hoffman & Thomson, 2009; Moeller et al., 2014).

Arguments about the prosocial effects of news on political behavior are often rooted in a “virtuous circle” framework of news consumption and civic participation (Norris, 2000). In this framework, news exposure encourages people to pay attention to and learn about politics, and trust the government and the political process, making them active democratic citizens, which ultimately leads them to partake in various political activities. However, recent seismic shifts within the political landscape of many democracies, including the rise of populist rhetoric, the spread of misinformation, and deepening partisan divisions, raise questions about whether such framework is still applicable. A poignant example is the 6 January US Capitol attack, during which politically mobilized voters displayed surreal levels of misinformation and animosity toward opposing political figures (Van Swol et al., 2022).

Against this backdrop, we argue that the traditional “virtuous circle” framework is no longer applicable in the current media/political environment of most democracies and thus propose transitioning from the traditional “virtuous” circle (see Figure 1) to a “self-righteous” cycle of news consumption and political participation (see Figure 2). This new theoretical model suggests that the increase in political participation driven by social media news consumption, particularly the process of politically selective news exposure on social media, does not originate from users becoming more informed and trustful toward institutions. Instead, it often arises from users feeling more informed, even when they are actually uninformed or misinformed. Moreover, rather than cultivating trust toward fellow citizens or institutions, the partisan news engagement process on social media frequently incites animosity toward opposing parties or government entities, potentially mobilizing citizens. While some studies have begun to acknowledge that “dark forces”—including misinformation, miscalibration of knowledge, and hostility toward opposition—can stimulate political participation, these studies remain fragmented (e.g., Ahn & Mutz, 2023; Lee et al., 2022; Suk et al., 2022). Consequently, this study aims to introduce a more cohesive theoretical model. This framework is intended to provide a foundation for future researchers to further refine and empirically test.

Figure 1.

A virtuous circle model.

Figure 2.

A self-righteous circle model.

News Use on Social Media and Political Knowledge

Traditionally, researchers explained media effects through the uses and gratifications paradigm, according to which people select media content to fulfill their needs (Katz et al., 1974). That is, people use media for different purposes, which often generate different media effects. Thus, using media to monitor information and stay informed is positively associated with individual knowledge gain (Eveland, 2001, 2002; McLeod et al., 1999; Prior, 2005, 2007), while using media for one’s entertainment may have negative or muted effects (e.g., Prior, 2005, 2007). The connection between surveillance gratifications and pro-civic media effects became particularly relevant in the digital media environment, as online media provide users with myriad content options to choose from compared with traditional media (Eveland & Dunwoody, 2001; Prior, 2005). Thus, individuals who wish to learn about politics would look for political information online, while those who show no interest in politics may simply avoid political information altogether (Prior, 2007). Furthermore, several studies found that online media positively impact political knowledge when it is used for informational purposes (e.g., Boulianne, 2016; Dimitrova et al., 2014; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Xenos & Moy, 2007).

With the emergence of Facebook, YouTube, and other platforms, the relationship between surveillance motivations and political learning should not be any different from that documented for other online media, such as news websites as users can easily consume news from various sources to stay informed. However, contrary to earlier optimistic expectations, most empirical studies have actually been finding either a null (Dimitrova et al., 2014; Feezell & Ortiz, 2021; Lee, 2019; Lee & Xenos, 2019; Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018) or negative (Cacciatore et al., 2018; Lee, 2020; Lee, Tandoc, & Diehl, 2023; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2018; van Erkel & Van Aelst, 2021) relationship between social media news and political knowledge (c.f. Bode, 2016; Park, 2019). Furthermore, studies show that misinformation and political engagement are positively correlated (Valenzuela et al., 2019).

Multiple explanations have been posited to elucidate these patterns (see Lee et al., 2022). First, there is the prevalence of user-generated content on social media. On these platforms, individuals can easily create “news,” whether it is verified or not, leading to the rapid dissemination of user-generated (and not gatekept) content throughout social media channels. Consequently, social media news content is plagued by concerns regarding quality, ranging from superficiality to biased coverage and veracity issues (e.g., Brossard, 2013; Sveningsson, 2015). Furthermore, exacerbating this issue is the significant volume of political content produced not only by the lay public or journalists but also by political actors and professional communicators (Bennett & Livingston, 2023; Lukito, 2020). These entities actively propagate disinformation, exposing users to consistently misleading content, with algorithms contributing to perpetuating this cycle and hindering users’ ability to accurately learn political information (Aïmeur et al., 2023; Diehl & Lee, 2022).

Individuals may believe they are consuming “news” on social media and, therefore, assume they are becoming politically informed; however, they may instead encounter biased, subjective, or inaccurate/misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019), adversely affecting their acquisition of factual political information.

Another explanation is that social media users are frequently exposed to “personalized, issue-specific, and network-dependent” news (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2018, p. 5), which could deter them from engaging with broader political news typically provided by traditional media outlets. Furthermore, partisans often selectively expose themselves to politically aligned news and information by curating their social media feeds accordingly (Thorson & Wells, 2016). Consequently, partisans may easily encounter biased or inaccurate political information while overlooking balanced and high-quality information essential for political knowledge acquisition.

Finally, on social media, news and political information often intermingle with non-political content, such as personal updates from friends, entertainment content, memes, and advertisements (Chadwick, 2009; Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014). This information environment may cause individuals to feel distracted and overwhelmed, hindering their ability to engage effectively with political news and learn about politics.

While the news environment on social media may impede one’s capacity to attain objective knowledge about politics and current affairs, it paradoxically fosters a sense of being informed among individuals, rather than actually informing them about political matters (Lee et al., 2022; Schäfer, 2020). Scholars have observed that heightened exposure to specific events or content may lead media audiences to perceive frequently portrayed events as familiar, without necessarily accruing substantive knowledge. Thus, repeated exposure to news media can render people acquainted with depicted events without significantly deepening their understanding (e.g., Mondak, 1995; Park, 2001), consequently engendering an “illusion of knowledge” (Park, 2001). This argument has been extensively discussed within the realm of social media. For instance, Hermida (2010) highlights that the omnipresence of news in today’s media landscape fosters an “ambient awareness” of news events, where the production and control of knowledge are more fluid. Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2017) further emphasize that the prevalence of news in the contemporary media environment, especially within social media platforms, can engender a flawed perception (known as the “news-finds-me” perception) wherein individuals believe that news will reach them regardless of active seeking. In similar lines, recent studies suggest that people on social media merely scan headlines and snack on news, potentially negatively affecting the learning process (Ohme & Mothes, 2023; Schäfer et al., 2017; Schäfer, 2020). Building on these conceptual frameworks, recent studies have found that consuming news on social media tends to bolster one’s self-perceived knowledge while not necessarily aiding (Feezell & Ortiz, 2021) or even hindering objective knowledge in various contexts (Lee et al., 2022; Yamamoto & Yang, 2021).

In summary, despite the quality issues inherent in social media news and political information, which could impede individuals’ learning about politics, continuous exposure to such news without critical scrutiny or attention to its accuracy and depth can heighten social media users’ erroneous perception of being informed rather than actually informing them. Given the theoretical and empirical evidence, it becomes evident that the first link of the virtuous circle (i.e., news consumption leading to knowledge) is not functioning effectively in the contemporary media environment. We argue that news consumption on social media primarily fosters the “illusion of knowledge” rather than actual knowledge.

Now, we shift our focus to the second link of the virtuous circle—that is, the notion that gaining more political knowledge through news media leads to increased political participation. As we will demonstrate, accumulating evidence suggests that this link is also showing signs of breakdown.

From Political Knowledge to Participation

Objective political knowledge, also referred to as factual knowledge, has long been considered an antecedent of political participation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Jung et al., 2011; Kaid et al., 2007; Verba et al., 1995). This can be explained by the fact that political knowledge can facilitate political participation by increasing one’s feelings of efficacy, referring to the “individual’s self-perceptions that they are capable of understanding politics and competent enough to participate in a political act” (Miller et al., 1980, p. 253). Based on the communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 1999), Jung et al. (2011) stated that news exposure indirectly encourages political participation through objective political knowledge and efficacy.

While previous studies have positioned factual knowledge as an antecedent of political participation by enhancing one’s sense of efficacy, this feeling of political efficacy does not necessarily align with actual political knowledge. As can be seen in the definition of internal political efficacy, it is about “self-perception,” and numerous studies have documented that one’s self-perception of knowledge rarely matches with actual knowledge (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Park, 2001; Yamamoto et al., 2018). In this regard, recent studies found that self-perceived knowledge tends to serve a stronger antecedent of political participation than objective knowledge. Taking the UK’s context as an example, Lee and Matsuo (2018) found that confidence in one’s political knowledge is indeed a better predictor of one’s political participation than retrieval accuracy as people believe they know enough to recognize the importance of politics and further partake in political activities. Recent studies have also found that self-perceived knowledge (rather than objective knowledge) drives political participation across both cross-sectional data (Yamamoto et al., 2018) and panel data (Lee et al., 2022). Overall, both theoretical ground and empirical evidence suggest that subjective self-assessment of one’s political knowledge, rather than factual knowledge, is what encourages one’s political participation.

Partisan Animosity as a Driving Force of Participation

In addition to promoting the illusion of knowledge, another concerning aspect of social media’s impact on political participation is its facilitation of partisan selective exposure, thereby fostering hate-driven political engagement.

A pivotal characteristic of social media platforms is their facilitation of tailored information consumption, allowing users to reinforce their existing political beliefs and preferences easily. Users selectively follow pages and accounts that mirror their political inclinations, receiving politically congruent information via social recommendations and connecting with like-minded individuals (Bakshy et al., 2015; Sunstein, 2018). In addition, as users interact with content from these sources and their online connections, social media algorithms refine their understanding of users’ political preferences, delivering even more personalized news (Thorson & Wells, 2016). Consequently, social media may limit users’ exposure to diverse viewpoints, potentially amplifying negative sentiments toward political adversaries (Jung & Lee, 2024; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2018).

Moreover, this partisan consumption of political information is reinforced by interactions exclusively within like-minded circles on social media platforms. While affective polarization has typically been studied as an outcome of political communication (Iyengar et al., 2012; Tsfati & Nir, 2017), it can also serve as a catalyst for political engagement (Ahn & Mutz, 2023; Huddy et al., 2015; Lee, Choi, & Ahn, 2023; Wagner, 2021). Partisans, driven by disdain for opposing parties and candidates, may experience heightened emotions during political activities, which can prompt individuals to publicly express their views and take immediate action to advance their interests (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022).

Furthermore, partisans strongly aligned with one side and disparaging of the other are often motivated to safeguard their party’s standing, viewing politics as an unyielding competition/high-stakes contest where participation is crucial to securing victory (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008), which encourages further political actions (Harteveld & Wagner, 2023; Lee, Choi, & Ahn, 2023). These findings suggest that the animosity toward opposing parties, fueled by partisan information consumption and interaction with like-minded peers on social media, can spur increased political engagement.

The new theoretical model—referred to as a self-righteous circle model—that incorporates all the mechanisms mentioned above is presented in Figure 2.

Limitations and Future Research

First, we still do not know precisely why the illusion of knowing encourages political participation. Although we suggest that internal efficacy is what mediates the illusion of knowing and political participation, that link has not been empirically tested. In addition, future research should use three or more waves of data to examine such a serial mediation link rigorously.

Second, this model may not work the same way based on the social networks one is immersed in—and thus, the kind of news content/political information to which they are exposed. For instance, if one is surrounded by politically knowledgeable users who tend to share high-quality news content on social media, consuming social media news may increase their political knowledge. Similarly, social media users can be exposed to contrasting news content/political information based on their social networks’ ideological orientations. Numerous studies suggest that partisans often maintain vastly different social networks, exposing them to divergent types of news content (Halberstam & Knight, 2016; Himelboim et al., 2013), thereby resulting in markedly different political outcomes. Again, since the purpose of this commentary article lies in proposing an initial theoretical framework to refine, empirically test, and extend upon later, this model is somewhat generalistic. Thus, future researchers should explore how the theoretical model can vary depending on one’s network characteristics and the kind of social media content to which one is exposed.

Third, future research could examine how the illusion of knowing among social media news users is linked with exposure, beliefs, and sharing mis/disinformation. A significant gap between objective and self-perceived knowledge characterizes misinformed individuals, whose behavior differs from that of both informed and uninformed people in many ways, for whom the gap is narrower—either because they know a lot and are aware of it or because they do not and are aware of their ignorance (see Kuklinski et al., 2000).

Overall, we acknowledge that this commentary piece, lacking empirical data, merely presents an initial theoretical idea of how an alternative model, the “self-righteous” model, may offer better insights into the contemporary media/political environment compared with the traditional virtuous circle model. Hence, it should not be overinterpreted. Future research, as suggested above, should focus on testing the suitability of this newly proposed model and potentially expanding it to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

Concluding Remarks

In a provocative essay, Katz and Fialkoff (2017) argued that several classic concepts of communication sciences deserved to be “retired” because—among other reasons—the new media ecology, dominated by digital media, has rendered them “obsolete” (p. 86). Here, if not outright retirement, we advocate for a revision of the “virtuous circle” concept. It would be inaccurate to solely describe the process by which news consumption leads to civic participation as a “virtuous circle,” considering the theoretical insights provided above. Instead, a more precise description would be “self-righteous”, whereby social media news users grow increasingly confident in their knowledge, even if it is flawed, and consequently, become more convinced to engage in politics by fostering the perception that the opposing side is inherently wrong and that victory is necessary. This perception can serve as a motivating factor for their engagement.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Sangwon Lee

Sebastián Valenzuela

Author biographies

Sangwon Lee (PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison) is an Assistant Professor in the School of Media & Communication at Korea University. His research examines how new media technologies (e.g., digital social media, AI) change the ways in which people learn about, engage with, and form opinions on political and social issues.

Sebastián Valenzuela (PhD, University of Texas at Austin) is an Associate Professor in the School of Communications at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and Associate Researcher with the Millennium Institute for Foundational Research on Data (IMFD) and Millennium Nucleus on Digital Inequalities and Opportunities (NUDOS). His research focuses on political communication, social media, and digital journalism.

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