Abstract
A growing body of research has examined how access to political information via digital media contributes to democratic participation in new or transitory democracies. Much of this work focuses on cognitive factors, such as political efficacy and civic knowledge, while less attention is paid to the role of emotion. Drawing on insights from the orientation–stimuli–orientation–response (O-S-O-R) and anger activism model (AAM), this study proposes and tests a model of political information seeking and participation using a national survey of adult Nigerians (N = 600). Findings provide support for the model and highlight potential pathways through which political information may enhance participation.
Keywords
Citizen participation in democratic processes is a hallmark of democracy. Widespread participation not only helps to cultivate a sense of citizenship but also confers legitimacy on government and functions as a mechanism for holding elected officials accountable (Wattenburg, 2002). Conversely, political disengagement can undermine the democratic process and cast doubt on outcomes. For nations in the early stages of democratization, also termed as emergent or transitory democracies, widespread political participation is essential for democratic consolidation.
Given the significance of political participation, a large body of communication research has examined the mobilizing effect of news and political information consumption on citizens (e.g., Holbert, 2005; Shah et al., 2007a). With the advent of the internet, social media, and online news platforms, individuals may actively seek out political information and engagement opportunities, resulting in enhanced participation (Boulianne, 2020; Dimitrova et al., 2014; Moeller et al., 2018). While less research has focused on developing, non-Western democracies, including those in sub-Saharan Africa specifically, there is growing evidence that access to political information via digital media platforms can play a key role in mobilizing citizens to participate politically in such societies (e.g., Adegbola & Gearhart, 2019; Conroy-Krutz, 2018).
Despite the growing interest in democratic citizenship across sub-Saharan Africa, much of the current work focuses on access to media information and its cognitive consequences such as increased learning and enhanced efficacy (e.g., Finkel & Smith, 2011; Kamau, 2017; Mahlangu, & Schulz-Herzenberg, 2022). This is understandably because individuals in new democracies or transitory regimes often lack the democratic orientations and civic skills needed to participate meaningfully (Finkel, 2003; Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Finkel & Smith, 2011). Considerable research has explored emotion as an important source of influence on political life in Western settings (e.g., Miller, 2011; Namkoong et al., 2012; Valentino et al., 2009). Yet, discussions about emotion in the political sphere in sub-Saharan Africa are few and tend to be acknowledged primarily when discussing specific cases involving mobilization for collective action (e.g., Bosch, 2017; Okunloye et al., 2023).
This study examines the extent to which political orientations and emotion shape the relationship between political news consumption and participation in Nigeria. Guided by the orientation–stimuli–orientation–response (O-S-O-R) and anger activism model (AAM), this study proposes a moderated mediated model in which emotions, including anger and hope, are theorized to amplify the indirect relationship between online political information seeking and participation. Findings indicate that both discrete emotions play an important role in political mobilization by strengthening the link between (internal and collective) political efficacy and participation, and thus enable citizens to overcome potential obstacles to participation.
Literature Review
The Socio-Political Context of the Study
This study was conducted in Nigeria, a developing democracy and the most populous country in Africa with a population estimated to exceed 200 million (UNFPA, 2022). Although Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the country was ruled primarily by military regimes between 1967 and 1999 when power was returned to a democratically elected government. Since 1999, regular elections have been held at local, statewide, and national levels, and this represents the longest period of uninterrupted democratic rule in the country. Despite the democratic gains that have been recorded, the political system is categorized as a hybrid regime, indicating a failure to fully transition from autocratic to democratic rule (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Since the return to democratic rule, human rights abuses have remained widespread and protests against political corruption and police brutality have been repressed violently by the government (Uwazuruike, 2022). Furthermore, elections have been characterized by fraud and political violence (Aluaigba, 2016; Casimir et al., 2013), both of which can discourage widespread participation. Voting trends show that turnout in Nigeria has decreased steadily over the past two decades, from 69% in the 2003 election to less than 29% in 2023 (Clowes, 2023), possibly indicating disillusionment with democracy and disengagement.
Economically, Nigeria has also witnessed a downturn, and is currently one of the countries having the highest number of people living in extreme poverty, second only to India (Oluwole, 2022), with a rapidly growing gap between the extremely wealthy and extremely poor. This wealth divide, accompanied by rising crime, corruption, and economic mismanagement has fueled anger and frustration among citizens (Lewis, 2021). Yet, observers also note that there have been moments that spark a sense of hope for democratic consolidation and transformation in the country, such as the 2015 election when the opposition candidate defeated an incumbent president for the first time in the nation’s history (Lewis & Kew, 2015).
Nigeria features a vibrant media system consisting of print and broadcast media outlets, with the press historically playing an adversarial role (Daramola, 2006). However, like many other emerging democracies, the media in Nigeria is only partly free and is influenced both directly (e.g., through censorship and ownership of major broadcast outlets) and indirectly through the use of military-era laws and legislation that restrict media operations, as well as intimidation of journalists (Freedom House, 2022). Yet, within this context of limited press freedom, there has been a steady expansion of news websites, blogs, and social media pages dedicated to news and current affairs, which have proven to be less vulnerable to censorship or state control. Indeed, social media and networking sites were central to mobilization for recent large-scale protests such as the #EndSARS movement of 2020.
News Consumption and Democratic Participation
Widespread participation is a core attribute of democratic societies. Political participation refers to activities that private citizens may use to influence the political system. Burns et al. (2001) describe political participation as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly, by affecting the making or execution of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (p. 4). In essence, political participation empowers the governed relative to those who govern.
Individuals may engage in diverse activities intended to bring about political change, some of which may be state sanctioned and fall within the domain of institutional politics, including voting and election campaign behaviors, while others may feature unconventional or disruptive tactics such as protests (Ekman & Amna, 2012). It should also be noted that all types of participation are not created equal. For instance, disruptive forms of political participation may be more costly than institutional forms of participation, especially in less democratic settings where there tends to be low tolerance for dissent (Young, 2019).
With the advent of the internet and digital media platforms that offer access to political information and enable interactions among users, there have been renewed debates about what online activities may constitute political participation. On one hand, some scholars have sought to distinguish between communicative acts online and substantive acts performed online to influence political outcomes (e.g., Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Hoffman, 2012). Others have addressed these debates by distinguishing between online activities and offline behaviors, which are thought to require low effort versus high effort, respectively (e.g., Cantijoch & Gibson, 2019; Matthes, 2022). The current study focuses on participation as it manifests through substantive offline behaviors used to influence the political sphere.
Access to and consumption of political information provided by the news media has been found to be an important determinant of democratic participation. The media provide audiences with public affairs information, and thus, enhance their knowledge of political events, processes, and policy. Studies have also shown that exposure to public affairs information through traditional media such as newspaper (e.g., Dilliplane, 2011; Thorson et al., 2017), television news (e.g., Zhang & Chia, 2006), as well as radio (Dilliplane, 2011; Hofstetter et al., 1999) can enhance participation.
In the past two decades, with the advent of the internet, online news platforms and social media sites have become vital sources of public affairs information. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are increasingly influential as news sources, and individuals may access political information from a vast array of blogs and websites (American Press Institute, 2022). Moreover, studies have shown that accessing political news through such platforms can enhance citizen to citizen engagement about politics as well as citizen engagement with candidates, resulting in enhanced participation (Boulianne, 2016; Yamamoto et al., 2015).
The O-S-O-R Model
While research in the stimulus–response (S-R) tradition theorized direct effects of news media on audiences, this paradigm gave way to a theoretical framework that recognizes media effects on behavior as involving more complex processes. The communication mediation model situates media information and communication as key variables mediating the relationship between psychological attributes and political participation (McLeod et al., 2002; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). This framework is often traced to the work of psychologists Markus and Zajonc (1985), who explicated the role of cognitive structures and orientations as antecedents of behavior. While Markus & Zajonc (1985) did not allude specifically to media, speaking instead of “stimuli” and “information” effects, McLeod and colleagues (2002; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001) applied this model to media effects research by investigating media information and discussion as stimuli, and political behavior as responses.
According to McLeod and colleagues’ (2002, p. 238) orientation–stimuli–orientation–response (O1-S-O2-R) model, first-order orientations (i.e., O1) refer to “the set of structural, cultural, cognitive, and motivational characteristics the audience brings to the reception situation that affect the impact of messages.” These are pre-exposure factors including values, general interest in public affairs, and motivations for news use that act as an interpretive frame. Such orientations may also lead individuals to engage in selective exposure to media content, influence interpretation, and shape the impact on behaviors.
Second-order orientations (O2) refer to cognitive consequences of media stimuli (McLeod et al., 2002), such as political efficacy or knowledge (Jung et al., 2011). Political efficacy is a multidimensional construct that includes internal and collective political efficacy. Internal political efficacy refers to an individual’s belief in his or her ability to understand politics and exert influence on political outcomes (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982), and enables individuals to overcome obstacles to participation (Rasmussen & Nørgaard, 2017). On the other hand, collective political efficacy is defined as an “individual’s perception of whether a collective actor to which the individual belongs is capable of achieving desired outcomes” (Lee, 2010, p. 392). As such, an important distinction between the two concepts is that internal efficacy is self-directed while collective efficacy is group focused. Furthermore, both internal (e.g., Halpern et al., 2017; Wojcieszak et al., 2015) and collective political efficacy (Kim, 2015; Lee, 2006, 2010) have been extensively examined as predictors of political participation.
The O1-S-O2-R model proposes causal relationships among dispositional, informational, and behavioral variables. Specifically, first-order orientations (O1) including education, cultural values, public affairs interest, and political ideology, are theorized to guide selection and consumption of media stimuli (S). Consumption of media information in turn is expected to cultivate second-order orientations (O2) such as internal political efficacy. Finally, political efficacy is expected guide audience behavior through participation in democratic processes (R). Considerable research has found support for the theoretical linkages proposed by the model (e.g., Holbert, 2005; Kwak et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007b).
While the O-S-O-R model has been updated to an O-S-R-O-R model to recognize reasoning (i.e., intra- and interpersonal deliberation) as an important mediating variable, this study relies on the previous model due to its emphasis on democratic orientations, which are of primary interest to this study. As noted earlier, citizens of new or transitory democracies often lack key political orientations needed to understand and participate meaningfully in democratic processes, and require civic education and transmission of knowledge through media programs to inform and empower them politically (e.g., Finkel & Smith, 2011). Therefore, the following hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Online information seeking will be positively related to (a) internal political efficacy and (b) collective political efficacy.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Online information seeking will have an indirect, positive association with political participation through (a) internal political efficacy and (b) collective political efficacy.
A Model of Emotion and Political Behavior
Extant research indicates that emotion plays a crucial role in mobilization for a wide array of political behaviors ranging from election campaign involvement and turnout to contentious behaviors such as protest (Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2019; Lee & Kwak, 2014; Namkoong et al., 2012). For instance, discrete emotions including anger (e.g., Ost, 2004; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013), fear/anxiety (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Miller, 2011; Valentino et al., 2009), and hope (Phoenix, 2020; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017) have been explored as predictors of political learning and mobilization for participation. Yet, research also indicates that the association between specific discrete emotions and political behavior is likely to be contingent on cognitions such as political knowledge and internal efficacy.
In their study of citizen participation in US presidential campaigns, Rudolph et al. (2000) found that anxiety was strongly related to participation, but only among individuals having high levels of political efficacy. Since then, additional theorizing and research has established that citizens are most likely to mobilize for political action when they are both emotionally engaged and perceive themselves to be politically competent (e.g., Magni, 2017; Rico et al., 2020). Specifically, the AAM offers a framework for understanding the contributions of emotion and cognitions, specifically anger and efficacy, to influencing action.
The AAM (Turner, 2007) theorizes a moderating effect of anger on the relationship between internal political efficacy and action. The model treats anger as a source of motivation, while efficacy represents a resource that can enable individuals to overcome potential obstacles to action. Accordingly, the model identifies four distinct groups that vary based on levels of anger and efficacy. The first group, labeled as activists, consists of individuals possessing both motivation (i.e., anger) and perceived self-capacity to exert influence (i.e., self-efficacy), and is most likely to take action. In contrast, individuals in the empowered group possess a sense of efficacy but are low in anger, and thus have the capacity but not the motivation to act.
A third group labeled as the angry possess strong feelings of anger but lack a sense of efficacy. Regarding this group, Turner (2007) notes that “their anger is non-utilitarian and therefore they will be unlikely to intend to engage in high commitment behaviors” (p. 117). On one hand, this is consistent with the claim that when anger is not accompanied by the capacity to effect change, it can lead to resignation (Kim, 2022; Wlodarczyk et al. (2017). Yet, studies also indicate that anger may exert a distinct, independent mobilizing effect on participation (e.g., Banks et al., 2019; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013). Finally, those lacking self-efficacy and having low feelings of anger are referred to as the disinterested and are the least likely to be engaged.
Similar to anger, the role of hope in political behavior has received increasing attention. For instance, studies point to efforts including the Obama presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012 (Civettini, 2011; Finn & Glaser, 2010) as well as the Trump campaign of 2016 (e.g., Hochschild, 2019; Reicher & Haslam, 2017), both of which were successful in mobilizing key voting blocs in part by stimulating feelings of hope. Yet, hope by its nature is characterized by uncertainty and lack of control (Just et al., 2007), and it remains unclear whether and under what conditions hope may elicit specific courses of action.
On one hand, the role of hope as a source of motivation toward action is less clearly defined compared with anger (Lazarus, 1991). Indeed, some scholars contend that hope may represent the only alternative to despair when individuals lack agency, and thus, may simply act as a coping strategy when odds of success are low (Bury et al., 2020; Schlosser, 2013). Yet, when there are potential pathways to achieving what is hoped for, and a sense of agency (i.e., efficacy), hope may elicit action (Snyder, 2000). This raises questions as well as suggestions regarding the conditions under which hope may have a motivational effect.
Unlike anger, less is known regarding the extent to which feelings of hope may moderate the relationship between efficacy and political behavior. In a recent study, Cohen-Chen and van Zomeren (2018) found that participation in collective action is most likely to occur when the feeling of hope is accompanied by group-based feelings of efficacy. Similarly, research suggests that individuals having a sense of hope in connection with their group identity (i.e., national, racial, or ethnic) are more likely to mobilize for collective action when they perceive the group as being capable of influencing an outcome (e.g., Kim, 2022; Phoenix, 2020; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017). In other words, hope may bolster the relationship between collective efficacy and political participation.
In line with the research reviewed above regarding the roles of political emotions and cognition in fostering participation, this study hypothesizes that anger and hope moderate the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through internal political efficacy and collective efficacy, respectively. Therefore, the following research questions and hypotheses will be addressed:
Research Question 1 (RQ1). Are individuals who feel angry about the situation in Nigeria more likely to participate politically?
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Anger regarding the situation in Nigeria will moderate the (a) direct relationship between internal political efficacy and participation, and (b) the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through internal political efficacy.
Research Question 2 (RQ2). Are individuals who feel hopeful about the situation in Nigeria more likely to participate politically?
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Hope for the future of Nigeria will moderate the (a) direct relationship between collective efficacy and participation, and (b) the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through collective efficacy.
Method
Data
Data for this study were obtained with the assistance of a professional polling company located in Nigeria. The company was tasked with collecting survey data from a sample of adult (i.e., ≥18 years) Nigerians that reflects the national population distribution. Prior to data collection, the survey questionnaire was pretested in a large multilingual and multiethnic city in southwestern Nigeria, after which minor modifications to question wording were made.
An a priori power analysis was conducted using the software GPower (v. 3.1) to determine what sample size would be adequate to test the theorized relationships. The power analysis indicated that assuming a small effect size (studies examining media effects on participation often report small- to medium-effect sizes, e.g., Boulianne, 2020) with a significance criterion of .05, and a desired power level of 80%, we would need a minimum sample of 485 respondents. Data collection began on 24 August and ended on 4 September 2021.
Data collection utilized stratified multistage random sampling and was based on a National Population Commission sampling frame from the last national census. Respondents were selected from each of the 36 states in a manner proportional to each state’s estimated population. In the first stage of sampling, three local government areas (LGAs) were randomly selected from each state, after which urban and rural enumeration areas (EAs) within each LGA were selected. Subsequently, interviewers began systematically selecting households from which to interview adult respondents, using a landmark such as a church, mosque, or police station as the starting point. Interviewers selected households for sampling using a 1–5 gap for the household in high density areas and 1–3 gaps in low density areas. In cases where potential interviewees refused to participate, the household selection procedure was used to select the next respondent.
Overall, 44 interviewers were involved in data collection across all 36 states. All data were collected in a face-to-face setting where interviewers (i.e., field agents) input responses directly into a mobile tablet. For respondents who were not fluent in the English language, interviews were conducted in one of the three major languages in Nigeria, including Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo. Survey respondents were not paid for their participation and were asked to voluntarily participate. Overall, data were collected from a sample of 600 individuals.
Measures
Political Interest
Participants’ political interest was measured using a single item asking how interested they were in Nigerian politics and government activities (M = 2.60, SD = 1.40).
Interpersonal Political Discussion
To measure political discussion, four items were used to assess how often participants talk about politics with groups of people including close friends, family members, as well as co-workers and individuals in their neighborhood (1 = never to 5 = daily). These items were then used to construct an index (α = .89, M = 2.39, SD = 1.02).
Online Information Seeking
This was measured using two items asking respondents how often they seek out political information and current affairs using (a) social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and (b) popular online news platforms in Nigeria such as Punch Online News, Naija News, and Sahara Reporters (M = 2.58, SD = 1.21, Spearman–Brown coefficient = .90).
Internal Political Efficacy
This measure was assessed using items adopted from Craig and Maggiotto (1982). Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with statements indicating that they (a) are sufficiently competent to participate in Nigerian politics; (b) understand the political issues that are facing the country; (c) can do just as good a job in public office or better, compared with other Nigerians; and (d) are well-informed about government and politics compared with others. Items were assessed on a Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) and combined to form an index (M = 3.16, SD = 1.29, α = .93).
Collective Political Efficacy
Collective political efficacy was assessed using items adapted from existing research including Lee (2010) and Kim (2015). Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the following statements: (a) dramatic change can occur in this country if people come together and demand change; (b) politicians will listen to citizens if we pressure them; (c) politicians will listen to citizens if we begin a movement, (d) if a large number of people collectively demand change, the government would listen, and (e) organized groups can have a great impact on the politics in this country (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). These items were combined to form an index (M = 3.57, SD = 1.20, α = .93).
Anger
This was measured using a single item that asked participants how often they experience feelings of anger when they think about the situation in Nigeria (1 = never to 5 = frequently). Participants reported frequent feelings of anger regarding the situation in Nigeria (M = 3.97, SD = 1.07).
Hope
This was measured using a single item that asked participants how often they feel hopeful when they think about the situation in Nigeria (1 = never to 5 = frequently). Participants reported sometimes feeling hopeful about the situation in Nigeria (M = 2.68, SD = 1.44).
Dependent Variable
Political Participation
The dependent variable was assessed using five items measured on a Likert-type scale (1 = never to 5 = often). Participants were asked how frequently they engage in political behaviors, including (a) canvassing for their preferred political candidate, (b) distributing campaign material, (c) attending political party meetings, (d) involvement in election campaign rallies, and (e) participation in political forums such as town halls (α = .94, M = 1.91, SD = 1.21).
Demographics
Demographic variables such as age, sex, education, and income were included in the theorized models as covariates. Respondents varied in age from 18 to 71 years, with a mean age of 33.13 (SD = 8.96). Furthermore, the sample was split evenly between males (50.6%) and females (49.4%) and had some undergraduate education on average (M = 6.59, SD = 1.55). Respondents’ average monthly income was between ₦30,000 and ₦90,000, the equivalent of US$167 and $251 (M = 2.65, SD = 1.97). Political interest and interpersonal political discussion, both of which are positively associated with political participation, were also included as covariates.
Analysis
Hayes’s macro process for conditional process analysis was used to test the predictions of the proposed models. First, the mediated models were tested by regressing the outcome variable (i.e., political participation) on online information seeking, while internal political efficacy and collective efficacy were independently specified as mediating variables (model 4). The moderated mediated models were subsequently tested by specifying anger and hope as moderators in the two theorized models (model 14).
Results
H1 predicted that online information seeking would be positively related to (a) internal political efficacy, and (b) collective political efficacy. Findings indicate that online information seeking is positively related to internal political efficacy (β = .16, SE = .05, p = .002). Thus, H1a was supported. However, online information seeking was not positively related to collective efficacy (β = −.06, SE = .05, p = .29). Therefore, H1b was not supported (see Figures 2 and 3).
(a) Conceptual model linking information seeking to participation through internal political efficacy, with anger as moderator. (b) Conceptual model linking online information seeking to participation through collective political efficacy, with hope as moderator.
Fully mediated model linking information seeking to participation through internal political efficacy. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
Model linking information seeking to participation through collective efficacy. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.
H2 predicted that online information seeking would have an indirect, positive association with political participation through (a) internal political efficacy and (b) collective political efficacy. As seen in Figure 2, findings indicate that internal political efficacy is positively related to participation (β = .20, SE = .04, p < .001). This finding, coupled with the positive relationship between online information seeking and internal political efficacy suggests an indirect relationship. The results further indicate that the relationship between online information seeking and participation is mediated by internal political efficacy (point estimate = .03, SE = .01, 95% CI = [.01, .05]). Therefore, H2a was supported.
Although the findings show that collective efficacy is positively related to participation (β = .16, SE = .04, p < .001), as seen in Figure 3, online information seeking was not significantly related to collective efficacy, therefore H2b was not supported. Collective efficacy did not mediate the relationship between information seeking and participation (point estimate = −.009, SE = .01, 95% CI = [−.03, .007]).
RQ1 asked whether feeling angry about the situation in Nigeria is related to increased participation. The results indicate that anger is negatively related to political participation (β = −.36, SE = .10, p < .001). Individuals reporting more anger regarding the situation in Nigeria were less likely to participate politically (see Table 1).
Regression Models of News Consumption and Turnout With Theorized Moderators.
Note. The beta weights are unstandardized regression coefficients (*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001).
H3 predicted that feelings of anger concerning the situation in Nigeria would moderate the (a) direct relationship between internal political efficacy and participation, and (b) the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through internal political efficacy. As seen in Figure 4, the results indicate that the relationship between internal political efficacy and participation is positively moderated by anger (β = .09, SE = .03, p = .001). Specifically, the relationship between internal political efficacy and participation was strongest at 1 SD above the mean on the measure of anger (β = .28, SE = .05, p < .001), but decreased at the mean point (β = .18, SE = .04, p < .001) and was nonsignificant at 1 SD below the mean level of anger (β = .08, SE = .05, p = .09). Therefore, H3a was supported.
Interaction effect of internal political efficacy and anger on participation, significant at p < .01 (β = .09, SE = .03, 95% CI = [.04, .15]). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.
Regarding the full model, the index of moderated mediation indicates that the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through internal political efficacy is moderated by anger (point estimate = .014, SE = .01, 95% CI = [.003, .03]). The indirect association between information seeking online and participation through internal political efficacy was strongest at 1 SD above the mean on the measure of anger (β = .04, SE = .01, 95% CI = [.02, .07]) but decreased at the mean point (β = .03, SE = .01, 95% CI = [.01, .05]) and was nonsignificant at 1SD below the mean level of anger (β = .01, SE = .02, 95% CI = [.002, .06]). Therefore, H3a was also supported.
RQ2 asked whether feeling hopeful about the situation in Nigeria is related to increased participation. The results indicate that hope is negatively related to political participation (β = −.33, SE = .09, p < .001). Individuals reporting more hope regarding the situation in Nigeria were less likely to participate politically (see Table 1).
H4 predicted that hope for the future of Nigeria will moderate the (a) direct relationship between collective efficacy and participation, and (b) the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through collective efficacy. As seen in Figure 5, the findings indicate that hope moderates the direct relationship between collective efficacy and participation (β = .11, SE = .02, p < .001). Specifically, the relationship between collective efficacy and participation was strongest at 1 SD above the mean on the measure of hope (β = .30, SE = .05, p < .001), but decreased at the mean point (β = .15, SE = .04, p < .001) and became nonsignificant at 1 SD below the mean level of hope (β = −.004, SE = .05, p = .94). Therefore, H4a was supported. Regarding the full model, the index of moderated mediation indicates that the indirect relationship between online information seeking and participation through collective efficacy is not moderated by hope (point estimate = .001, SE = .006, 95% CI = [−.01, .01]). The indirect association between information seeking online and participation through collective efficacy was not contingent on respondents’ level of hope. Therefore, H4b was not supported.
Interaction effect of collective political efficacy and hope on participation, significant at p < .01 (β = .11, SE = .02, 95% CI = [.06, .15]). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.
Discussion
This study sought to examine the role of political information, emotion, and orientations in shaping democratic participation within the context of an emerging democracy. Using national survey data from Nigeria and drawing on insights from the O-S-O-R and the AAM, this study probed potential pathways through which online information seeking may shape citizens’ political behaviors, as well as the roles of anger and hope in potentially enhancing the direct and indirect effects of information on citizen participation. While we acknowledge that the use of cross-sectional data clearly limits our ability to establish causality, our findings are consistent with existing scholarship, while advancing research on the conditions under which political information is likely to translate into enhanced engagement.
Consistent with the theorized O-S-O-R model, findings point to a mediated relationship rather than a direct association between information seeking online and participation. Specifically, findings also indicate that internal political efficacy mediates the relationship between information seeking and participation. This finding aligns with prior research indicating that public affairs information enhances political participation, in large part by strengthening citizens’ feelings of efficacy (e.g., Halpern et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2011).
Online information seeking was not positively associated with collective efficacy, thus, collective efficacy did not mediate the relationship between online information seeking and political participation. As noted earlier, research on the relationship between news consumption and collective efficacy remains mixed. Some studies show a positive association between news use and collective efficacy (e.g., Saleem et al., 2021; Yamamoto, 2018), while others find that interpersonal political discussion rather than news consumption, fuels collective efficacy (Halpern, 2017; Lee, 2010; Velasquez & LaRose, 2015). This highlights the need for further investigation into whether and under what conditions various forms of political information may aid in the development of beliefs about collective efficacy.
Interestingly, anger was related to disengagement from politics. Although these findings deviate from existing research, there are some plausible explanations. Although anger has typically been shown to have politically mobilizing effects (e.g., Banks et al., 2019; Weber, 2013), feelings of anger that are not accompanied by the capacity to effect change, either due to individual limitations (e.g., lack of resources, low efficacy) or societal constraints (e.g., suppression of dissent), may lead to resignation and disengagement (Kim, 2022; Wlodarczyk et al. (2017). Moreover, negative feelings about the political system may manifest in a variety of ways, including by politically disengaging when citizens consider political institutions and mechanism of political change to be ineffective (Croke et al., 2016). In other words, anger alone could have adverse consequences for political engagement.
As predicted, findings indicate that anger amplifies the link between internal political efficacy and participation, as well as the indirect relationship between information seeking and participation through internal efficacy. On one hand, this finding supports the AAM, indicating that as anger increases, the relationship between internal political efficacy and participation grows stronger. This in turn positions the activist group, characterized as high in both anger and internal political efficacy, as the most politically engaged. Beyond lending support to the AAM, this finding more generally highlights the role of anger in augmenting the effects of political information on participation.
Similar to anger, hope was negatively associated with political participation and thus appears to have a demobilizing effect. On one hand, hope tends to reflect the possibility for positive change (Tarrow, 2001), and thus can be motivating. Yet, whether hope enables or hinders mobilization for participation may depend on the context (Cohen-Chen, 2022). We suggest that within political contexts where there are significant obstacles to meaningful democratic change, citizens may retain hope primarily as a coping strategy (Schlosser, 2013). That is, they may disengage from short-term participation while hoping for political opportunities or favorable conditions necessary for change.
As theorized, hope moderated the relationship between collective efficacy and political participation. In other words, hope appears to play a mobilizing role similar to anger, such that individuals possessing a sense of collective efficacy are more likely to participate politically if they equally feel hopeful. This finding is consistent with the growing body of work examining how cognitive and affective resources contribute to political engagement (e.g., Cohen-Chen & van Zomeren, 2018; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017), and indicate that like anger, hope is an important ingredient needed for mobilizing for political action.
This study has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, this study combines insights from the O-S-O-R and AAM to explore conditional, indirect processes through which informational resources, political orientations, and emotion contribute to enhanced political participation. We believe that this offers a more comprehensive theoretical approach to understanding the varied sources of influence on political participation compared with previous theorizing proposing either informational, cognitive, or affective explanations for political behavior. Moreover, findings indicate that hope, like anger, can help to promote action among individuals who possess a sense of collective efficacy. Conversely, it appears that in the absence of perceived individual or group-based efficacy, emotion alone could have a demobilizing effect on political participation. While this runs counter to studies, especially in the United States and Europe, pointing to anger as a strong, positive predictor of political action (Banks et al., 2019; Valentino et al., 2011), one could make the case that because political action tends to be more costly in less democratic societies, feeling angry or hopeful without an equally strong sense of efficacy would lead to frustration and disengagement.
Regarding practical implications, the findings of this study can offer insights into targeting of political messaging to specific target audiences who may differ in terms of emotional states or feelings of efficacy. For instance, it may be more beneficial to target individuals who tend to be more politically efficacious and sophisticated with anger-inducing messaging. Conversely, social movement organizations and advocacy groups may find efficacy-inducing messaging to be more useful for mobilizing to action during moments of collective outrage. This is especially likely to be crucial in new and emerging democracies where citizens tend to feel less efficacious or empowered to influence political outcomes (Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Finkel & Smith, 2011). As such, while this study was conducted in Nigeria, we believe that findings and applications are relevant beyond the context of Nigeria to other countries in the early stages of democratization, including those in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.
This study is not without its limitations. In addition to the use of cross-sectional data which offers only a “snapshot” in time of the phenomena being studied, the use of single items to assess anger and hope presents clear limitations for the measurement of such complex emotions. Furthermore, while this article has assumed that political participation is essential for sustaining democracy, we also acknowledge that certain types of participation may be problematic or even anti-democratic and harmful, as seen in recent populist movements or efforts to influence political outcomes using aggression. Despite these limitations, our study offers insight into influences on political behavior within a context characterized by several obstacles to participation.
Future research needs to examine the nature and attributes of political news in emerging democracies, including whether citizens are represented as active and efficacious, or passive and lacking agency. Such inquiry may shed light on patterns of political news reporting and campaign information that may shape citizens participation. Research is also needed to explore how the absence or presence of political opportunity which comes with political change may contribute to understanding of citizens’ decisions to participate or disengage.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
