Radical Mobilization in Times of Crisis: Use and Effects of Appeals and Populist Communication Features in Telegram Channels

Abstract

Social crisis situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic provide a fertile ground for radical actors and social movements to strengthen their radical mobilization—mainly using social media. In light of the deplatforming efforts of social media platforms that forced radical actors to establish new channels to continue their discourses and the recent crisis that opened a discursive opportunity structure, we investigate how radical actors use Telegram for mobilization. Based on a longitudinal manual content analysis of 13,371 messages from 188 German Telegram channels of the Querdenken movement, conspiracy, and far-right actors, we examine mobilization strategies (namely direct appeals and populist blame game) and their success (retransmission) between March 2020 and December 2021. We found that both offline and online appeals and the use of anti-elitism increased significantly over time. The use of direct and indirect mobilization attempts is related to the ideological background of the actors, with direct appeals being favored by the Querdenken movement. Furthermore, the results shed light on the mechanisms of radical mobilization on Telegram, showing that both direct appeals and the populist blame game are successful strategies for radical actors because they increase message retransmission.

Keywords

mobilization populism Telegram social movement protest

Societal crisis situations can contribute to vitalizing radical actors and protest movements. For instance, the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 was found to strengthen far-right movements in European countries such as Germany (Bitschnau et al., 2021) or Italy (Casaglia & Coletti, 2021). Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic was found a driving force in bolstering populist discourses across Europe (Casaglia & Coletti, 2021; Lamour & Carls, 2022). In this situation, social media platforms have come under pressure for not taking enough measures to restrict the spread of antidemocratic narratives, conspiracy theories, and disinformation, which resulted in a significant number of account removals by mainstream platforms which has forced, particularly radical actors to continue their agitation on other [dark] channels such as the messenger service Telegram (Schulze et al., 2022). For these actors, who have limited access to mass media, social media play a central role in mobilization. They effectively use these platforms to disseminate their ideologies, recruit potential supporters, or spread calls for protests (e.g., M. Ekman, 2018; Wahlström & Törnberg, 2021).

Considering these two developments, namely, the deplatforming efforts that forced radical actors to establish new channels to continue their discourses and the recent crisis that opened a discursive opportunity structure (Wahlström & Törnberg, 2021), we wonder how actors use Telegram for protest mobilization. Our analysis includes actors of the radical and extremist right (hereafter referred to as “far-right”) as well as conspiracy actors and Corona protest groups such as Querdenken. Therefore, our focus is on actors who (at least) demand significant changes in the existing political order, share an (albeit varying) rejection of democratic principles, and therefore (at least) meet the definition of radical actors (Mudde, 2019; Pirro, 2023).

In our study we set out to inquire (a) how these actors use Telegram for their mobilization activities and (b) how successful they are with these attempts. Considering protest movement research (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2011) and the reinvigoration of populism in the context of social media (Engesser et al., 2017) we assume that mobilization happens in two ways: (1) by directly prompting calls for action or (2) by applying the populist blame game that emphasizes the moral superiority of the movement and indirectly increases supporters’ motivation to act.

Empirically, we tested our hypothesis and research questions by conducting a large-scale manual content analysis of messages published by German (speaking) telegram-channels of “Querdenken” (lateral thinking), conspiracy ideologists, and radical right actors. Our findings reveal that radical actors mobilize potential supporters to take on- and offline action through direct appeals. Moreover, the channel operators try indirectly to mobilize their followers by blaming the elites and social minorities. Finally, a multilevel regression analysis reveals that these mobilization efforts pay off as they increase the outreach of messages within the platform.

Our study contributes to the research on protest mobilization on Telegram, since (1) we cover appeals for online and offline actions, which allows us to draw inferences about the underlying motives of radical actors. (2) By using a broad set of channels, we investigate how far mobilization activities are related to different radical groups. (3) We shed light on the dynamic evolution of radical mobilization during times of crisis, by investigating a 20-month timespan. (4) We show that different types of direct appeals as well as the use of the populist blame game, are successful strategies that drive message dissemination, thereby advancing our understanding of the mechanism of radical mobilization in the Western, democratic Telegram sphere.

Protest Mobilization in Digital Media

Political actors such as parties, nongovernmental organizations, or non-institutionalized political movements depend on the support of citizens to mobilize collective action and realize political goals. Accordingly, actors try to win potential supporters for their positions and political agendas and to encourage them to act in a way that makes the realization of these goals more likely.

Arguing from resource mobilization theory, acquiring material, human, and social-organizational resources is crucial for actors such as social movements to realize their desire for (political) change (Edwards et al., 2018). In this sense, “mobilisation is equivalent to the pooling of individual resources in the hands of a collective actor” (Kriesi, 2008, p. 150). Creating legitimization is crucial to provide a fertile ground for protest engagement. Accordingly, mobilization also aims to portray protest as a morally integer and as an imperative to overcome grievances (Edwards et al., 2018).

In the past decades, digital communication channels have become increasingly important for established actors and groups in mobilizing potential supporters (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011). Especially for social movements with low organizational levels and limited financial resources, digital channels offer new opportunities in recruiting potential supporters and to coordinate political protests (Garrett, 2006). According to the goals of social movements, digital media provide a fruitful avenue for mobilizing different types of resources encompassing access to (monetary) funding and human capital such as voluntary participation or individual commitment and social–organizational infrastructure such as networks (Abdul Reda et al., 2021). For movements that cannot rely on mass media support or that are (or feel) suppressed by governmental institutions, the use of digital communication channels has become increasingly important for mobilization (Cammaerts, 2021). Among the prominent examples of digital mobilization for street protest are the events around the Arab Spring (Howard & Hussain, 2013) or the pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong (Urman et al., 2021). Social movements for racial equality such as Black Lives Matters heavily rely on social media to mobilize participants, mobilize resources, and amplify their messages (Mundt et al., 2018).

In Western cultures, it is often actors that oppose the current (democratic) political system and consider themselves as outside the mainstream public discourse who also make increasing use of digital communication channels to network and mobilize potential supporters (M. Ekman, 2018). Far-right movements such as the German PEGIDA or the Identitarian Movement regularly use Facebook groups to mobilize against immigration (Wahlström & Törnberg, 2021). Further, digital platforms are used as (des-)information hubs to spread messages of the far-right media that “act as ‘indignation mobilization mechanisms’ that not only fuel the indignation of the public [. . .] but also channel bottom-up indignation through online campaigns, petitions, and offline street protests” (Rone, 2022). Moreover, terrorist and extremist movements raise funds and utilize crowdfunding platforms for financing their (terroristic) activities (Keatinge et al., 2019).

Digital media also play a central role for the anti-Corona protest movements. From the beginning of the pandemic, the Querdenken movement relied on social media for protest mobilization and further built its own digital infrastructure for coordinating protests (Vieten, 2020). For instance, regional branches of the movement created websites to publish calls for demonstrations. Still, it remains open which communication strategies were employed to mobilize citizens to support the movement and its goals.

Direct and Indirect Mobilization Strategies

Actors are thus faced with the challenge of acquiring specific resources to achieve their (political) goals. On the one hand, this includes resources that actors need to run their protest actions. On the other hand, actors also need to achieve legitimacy for their objectives and actions to ensure (sustainable) support (Edwards et al., 2018). To do so, actors use direct appeals and communication strategies that stress protest legitimacy which are detailed below.

Direct Appeals

Among other actors, social movements face the challenge of motivating participation and support. One way to mobilize potential supporters is to ask them directly for the desired actions, which we referred to as appeals. In fact, Schussman and Soule (2005) found that simply “being asked to protest” is the strongest predictor of participating in a protest.

Demanded action repertoires differ in their effort and, further, can be categorized both on- and offline. The forms of offline support include participating in demonstrations, providing personal support as a volunteer, participating in a boycott, or distributing information material (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; Edwards et al., 2018). In addition, people can financially support political goals by donating money to actors of a social movement. Actors may also call for acts of civil disobedience or the use of violence or even terror to pursue political goals (J. Ekman & Amnå, 2012). Supposedly lower-threshold forms of online activities comprise measures such as signing petitions, sharing political messages, or commenting on social media about political issues (Conroy et al., 2012).

Populist Communication

The protest movement that emerged in the context of the anti-Corona protests is characterized by a certain degree of ideological heterogeneity. Nevertheless, surveys show that skepticism about the governments’ actions in the context of the pandemic goes hand in hand with populist attitudes (Hunger et al., 2023). This provides a fertile ground for protest movements to use populism in their communication to indirectly mobilize potential supporters by creating the moral foundation for the protest (Aslanidis, 2017).

At its core, populist ideology is characterized by the assumption of a monolithic and homogeneous population (“the people”) whose prosperity and interests are threatened and ignored by the corrupt elite. Populists claim to be the only true representatives of the “people’s will.” Accordingly, populism is understood as “democratic extremism” (Mudde, 2004, p. 561). Populism can be combined with other (thin and full) right ideologies such as nationalism, conservatism, or left ideologies such as socialism. At least in the Western hemisphere, right-wing populism often emphasizes nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiments, while left-wing populism focuses on the interests of the socially and economically disadvantaged, often with a strong anti-corporate and pro-labor stance (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).

In addition to the ideological understanding of populism, populism is considered a communication strategy that can be observed in parliamentary debates (Cranmer, 2011), in political party broadcasts (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), or the social media communication of political actors (Engesser et al., 2017). A central component of populist communication is to verbally create an opposition between the people and various outgroups and attribute responsibility for social grievances to the latter. Depending on the political ideology populism is linked to, “the people” and who is to blame for their problems are defined differently (Mudde, 2004). The protests that took place around the pandemic have been associated with infiltration by far-right actors in both public debate and scientific discourse. Therefore, we focus on communication strategies that are mainly ascribed to (populist) right actors.

Anti-elitism portrays social and political decision-makers as corrupt and holds them responsible for societal problems. In the understanding of the (populist) right, elites include political actors as well as “the media” or scientists (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Krämer, 2021). As an alternative to vertical exclusion, (populist) right actors also apply out-group exclusion by stigmatizing other social groups defined by ethnic, sexual, or cultural characteristics (horizontal populism) and portraying them as a threat to the culture or security of the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Pirro, 2023).

The populist blame game can be seen as a promising instrument for radical actors. Blaming outgroups offers simple explanations for complex problems, which is why this form of communication is often chosen when citizens suffer the consequences of crises. By reducing complexity in terms of responsibility, populist messages affect receivers’ perceptions of the groups that are blamed, which may cause cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses. In contrast to direct appeals, populist strategies can thus be understood as a form of indirect mobilization, since they contribute to “moral outrage and [. . .] provide a target against which this can be vented” (van Troost et al., 2013). Protest against the elites and outgroups thereby becomes a moral imperative.

Based on this differentiation in direct mobilization efforts, c.f. call for action appeals and indirect mobilization efforts, c.f., by eliciting (negative) emotional appeals through the populist blame game we first aim at inquiring what goals radical actors on Telegram pursue with their mobilization efforts. Therefore, RQ1 reads:

RQ1: To what extent do radical actors use appeals and populist features in their Telegram messages?

Effects of Mobilization Strategies

In the case of mobilization efforts of radical channels on Telegram, we may assume that actors are interested in spreading their messages to the widest possible audience to gain reach and visibility for their concerns (Heft & Buehling, 2022). Therefore, it is in their interest that followers and other channels share their messages and appeals in other channels, which enhances the possibility that users that are not directly connected are reached as well by the appeal. Thus, the number of retransmissions is a relevant indicator of the success of mobilization strategies.

The effects of direct mobilization strategies have been addressed in protest research suggesting that direct appeals, for instance, can indeed mobilize people to protest participation offline (Rone, 2022). Recent research has shown that digital appeals motivate people to engage in digital protest actions (Jenkins, 2020).

Regarding indirect mobilization efforts, studies have demonstrated that populist messages blaming the elites or immigrants elicit negative emotional responses and, thereby, enhance the persuasiveness of populist messages (Wirz, 2018) and affect citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants (Wirz et al., 2018). Blaming social groups for being the cause of problems implies that they can be solved by deposing the elites or suppressing the out-group, which implicitly demands for action. Studies investigating the mobilizing effects of populist blaming encourage various forms of political participation (Bos et al., 2020). Regarding online behavior, the usage of populist elements fuels emotional reactions to political Facebook posts (Jost et al., 2020) as well as users’ willingness to share such messages (Bene et al., 2022). Referring on the effects of both direct and indirect forms of mobilization, we assume:

H1: Messages that contain appeals and apply the populist blame game are forwarded more often compared to posts not containing these features.

Radical Mobilization on Telegram in Times of Crisis

In recent years, Telegram has become an attractive channel for radical actors and political fringe groups who seek publicity while bypassing stricter governance adopted by social media platforms (Urman et al., 2021). This popularity can at least partly be attributed to its functionalities: Telegram can be considered a group broadcast or micro-blogging platform, while on the other hand, it offers the features of ordinary Instant Messaging applications such as WhatsApp (Nobari et al., 2021). In contrast to other messaging services such as WhatsApp, Telegram allows large user groups up to 200,000 users, and channels can have an unlimited number of subscribers (Urman et al., 2021). The platform experienced a major growth in users from 2020 on and now has a worldwide user base of 700 million active users according to the platform (Telegram, 2022).

Given its features and ways of use by specific actors aiming at alternative communication spaces, Telegram fulfills the characteristics of a dark (Zeng & Schäfer, 2021) or fringe (Schulze et al., 2022) platform. According to Zeng and Schäfer, dark platforms are “less regulated and moderated, hence can be used for hosting content and content creators that may not be tolerated by their more mainstream counterparts” (p. 1321). These types of “alternative” platforms thus enable fringe or radical actors to build (semi) public discourses and potentially foster extremist networks (Curley et al., 2022; Schulze et al., 2022).

Consequently, scholars have begun to examine its use by different types of radical actors (Matamoros-Fernández & Farkas, 2021; Vergani et al., 2022). Some studies have for instance explored the use of telegram in political mobilization in autocratic contexts in 2019–2020, including Belarus, Russia, and Hong Kong (Urman et al., 2021; Wijermars & Lokot, 2022).

Given the growing use of Telegram among radical actors in Western contexts, research has only just begun to explore its relevance as an alternative communicative space and mobilization tool (Curley et al., 2022; Júnior et al., 2021; Schulze et al., 2022; Urman & Katz, 2022). In their network analysis of far-right actors on Telegram, Urman and Katz (2022) illustrate that due to the almost simultaneous migration of these actors to Telegram (as a result of deplatforming), they succeed in rather quickly recreating their networks and connections among like-minded actors. Júnior et al. (2021) focus on the use of Telegram among Brazilian public groups and demonstrate a substantial increase in political mobilization in 2020–2021, suggesting a migration from other mainstream social media platforms. In their analysis of Irish Covid-19 protesters and the Far Right on Telegram, Curley et al. (2022) demonstrate that both actors have embraced the new platform for their mobilization, yet with only little overlap.

With a focus on potential radicalization processes over the initial year of the pandemic, Schulze and colleagues (2022) examined German-speaking far-right actors and the conspiracy actors and, moreover, a channel of the Querdenken movement over the course of around 1 year (March 2020 to February 2021). Regarding mobilization appeals, their results show that calls for online rather than offline participation were most pronounced and could be mostly attributed to the Querdenken movement. The authors interpret this finding as another proof of the relevance of Telegram as a mobilization tool for the German anti-Corona protest. Using structural topic modeling, Zehring and Domahidi (2023) found that topics related to protest events were mentioned on a regular basis over the course of the pandemic, which also points to the importance of Telegram for mobilization.

Arguing from the perspective of discursive opportunity structures as outlined Koopmans and Olzak (2004), this increase of mobilization efforts by radical and protest actors in the context of the pandemic can be seen as a successful exploitation of the political and discursive structure. As argued by Curley et al. (2022) and Hunt (2022), the Corona pandemic has provided a discursive opportunity structure that allowed radical actors to exploit the discursive features of the public debate on COVID-19 to promote their claims. We, therefore, expect a change in the mobilization effort of radical actors over the course of the pandemic (2020–2021) as suggested by previous research (Vieten, 2020). Focusing on the development of mobilization strategies over time will provide insights into how the objectives of utilizing Telegram for mobilization evolve and whether the focus shifts from specific actions to others over time. We thus propose

RQ2: How does the usage of appeals and populist features by radical actors in their Telegram messages evolve over time?

Third, and based on the indication that discourses and mobilization efforts on Telegram differ regarding the type of actors involved as suggested by Urman et al. (2021) and Schulze et al. (2022). In our analysis, we cover channels belonging to the Querdenken movement, the far right, and the conspiracy milieu. There are more or less large overlaps and differences between these groups in terms of their ideology and organizational characteristics. This may also translate into differences and similarities in mobilization strategies.

For example, all groups of actors share a critical attitude toward political elites and are therefore likely to use anti-elitism to a comparable extent in their communication repertoire. In the case of conspiracy actors, we can refer to the basic characteristics of conspiracy theories to outline their interrelationship with radical groups. While there is no common definition of conspiracy theories, they can basically be described as narratives or proposed explanations that aim to explain socio-political events by claiming the existence of a secret plot by powerful actors (Douglas et al., 2019). Conspiracy theories are often associated with anti-system and anti-elite sentiments, as they often involve distrust of government institutions, corporations, and other powerful organizations (Bergmann & Butter, 2020). Furthermore, conspiracy actors often use anti-semitic narratives (Douglas et al., 2019). This also applies to actors of the far right that hold views to the right of the conservative right on the political spectrum. Far-right actors believe that natural inequalities exist and that some groups are superior to others, which informs their nativist and authoritarian views of society (Mudde, 2019). Accordingly, the horizontal exclusion of outgroups may be used more often as a means of indirect mobilization than in the case of the Querdenken movement. However, Querdenken channels were found to also share content from far right and conspiracy actors (Zehring & Domahidi, 2023), suggesting an overlap in communication strategies. Moreover, as the Querdenken movement emerged from street protests in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, channels belonging to that group are more inclined to use direct offline and online appeals to get their supporters on the streets. While for the case of conspiracy actors, insights into the relationship with mobilization efforts is scarce, studies found that conspiracy supporters successfully mobilize for offline protests such as demonstrations against authorities and governmental measures, for example, observed during the pandemic (Bertuzzi, 2021; Darius & Urquhart, 2021). Previous research, therefore, does not provide a clear picture of how mobilization strategies on Telegram are tied to specific ideological backgrounds, so we leave it open for empirical investigation:

RQ3: (How) Does mobilization differ between the different types of actors?

Method

Study Design

To answer our research questions and to measure the mobilization activities on Telegram, we conducted a content analysis of 13,371 messages published between March 2020 and December 2021 from 188 German Telegram channels. The list of channels is based on a deplatforming study including 55 channels of extremist and radical right actors selected along the criteria of outreach, activity, transmediality, and distinctiveness (Fielitz & Schwarz, 2020, p. 18). The researchers enriched that list with actors belonging to the anti-Corona movement “Querdenken” as well as conspiracy actors. The two researchers who conducted the list carried out the final ideological classification, considering channel names, bio information, recent content (last 20 posts and 20 most recently shared links), as well as channels’ self-identification with particular ideologies into predefined categories (Bitzmann et al., 2023).¹ For the purpose of the study at hand, we summarized the original (more nuanced) categories into channels of the far right (neo-nazism, Reichsbürger, extreme right, new right, populist right), conspiracy actors (conspiracy ideology, esotericism, QAnon), and Querdenken (Querdenken, Corona disinformation).

The original list included 269 channels and groups at the time of data collection. For our analysis, we focused on channels that were still active at the time of data collection (December 2020). This resulted in a sample of channels that included actors from the Querdenken movement (n = 53), the far right (n = 91), and conspiracy theorists (n = 44).

All of the actors studied have in common that they call for (at least) significant changes within the existing political order and can thus convincingly be categorized as “radical.” Some actors even call for completely overthrowing the current political order and replacing it with a new one, thus falling under extremism (Mudde, 2019). The designation “radical” is therefore to understand as the lowest common denominator.

Channels classified as far right include individual and collective actors such the populist right media activists (e.g., Naomi Seibt) and parties (e.g., “Alternative für Deutschland”). Further, actors of the extremist right including organizations (e.g., “Identitarian Movement”), parties (e.g., “Die Rechte”), and (media) activists (e.g., Tommy Frenck, Nikolai Nerling, Anti-Spiegel) were summarized under this umbrella. Querdenken (literal translation: lateral thinking) emerged as a protest movement in response to COVID-19-related governmental regulations and radicalized throughout the pandemic (Hunger et al., 2023). Channels were identified by their names (including “quer” in the channel name) and enriched with prominent actors of the movement (e.g., Bodo Schiffmann, Markus Haintz) and supportive media activists (e.g., Samuel Eckert). The conspiracy actors include alternative media and groups that do not exhibit any of the aforementioned characteristics but spread disinformation and conspiracy myths that potentially question the political system and democratic institutions (Bertuzzi, 2021; Douglas et al., 2019). These include, for example, QAnon channels or those characterized by specific name suffixes (such as “truth” or “q”).

Data Collection and Sampling

Based on the channel list, all messages were derived by Telegram’s application programming interface using Telethon-aio for Python. The original dataset of 4.6 million messages included the name of the channel, the message id, as well as the text (including emoticons and hyperlinks) of each message. We then excluded messages of less than 10 words, since they most likely do not provide substantial information for only textual coding ending up in a set of 2.2 million messages. From this data set, a random sample of 80 messages for each channel was then drawn that were finally coded manually.² In February 2022, the number of forwards (i.e., times a message was shared) was collected for all messages and added to the data set as a dependent variable for answering H1.

Content Analysis

The manual content analysis was performed by 24 trained coders in the period from January to February 2022 during a seminar at a German university. The coders were instructed to code the message using all textual features, including emoticons and information that can be inferred from hyperlink-texts (without clicking them).

First, it was coded whether a message contained appeals. With appeals, speakers pursue the goal of encouraging recipients to act or refrain from acting (behavioral goals). Speakers can appeal explicitly (e.g., by using the imperative, requests, and warnings) or implicitly (e.g., by interrogative sentences, future tense sentences, or rhetorical questions; Perloff, 2003). In a message, up to three appeals were coded in order of occurrence. The coding scheme distinguished between different types (i.e., goals) of appeals derived from the goals of social movement research (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011).

In addition to the appeals, we collected anti-elitism and out-group devaluation which are two characteristics of right-wing populist communication. Anti-elitism was coded when functional elites or institutions (e.g., “the established parties,” “the economic leaders,” “the media”) were portrayed as corrupt, incapable, or ignorant regarding the concerns of the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Out-group devaluation and its subcategories are based on the concept of group-oriented animosity (“Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit”; Heitmeyer et al., 2013).³

We assessed intercoder reliability by using Brennan and Prediger’s Kappa which corrects for chance and is robust regarding variables with a skewed distribution (Quarfoot & Levine, 2016).⁴ Intercoder reliability ranged from .70 (anti-elitism) to .96 (offline appeals), which is “moderate” and “substantial” (Shrout, 1998).⁵

Analysis Strategy

In the following, we first analyze the relative occurrence of different mobilization strategies and their usage over time. To identify trends, we use R’s Funtimes package (Lyubchich et al., 2022). This allows us to test assumptions regarding possible trends in the data statistically by using a sieve-bootstrap approach of the t-test (Bühlmann, 1997). We then examine the relative share of different mobilizing strategies separated by actor type.

Finally, we inquire the effectiveness of communication styles on the retransmission of the appeals. Therefore, we ran a regression model using the mobilization strategies as independent variables and the number of forwards as a dependent variable. To assess the influence of message features statistically adequately, we applied multilevel regression models, allowing varying intercepts for each profile and month (Hox, 2010). In doing so, we statistically considered that the differences in profile characteristics (e.g., number of followers) randomly affected the number of forwards. By allowing random intercepts for each month, we further controlled for the general increase of Telegram users during the period of investigation. To correct the right-skewed distribution of the count data analyzed, we used negative binomial models with Laplace approximation. Moreover, we controlled for channel ideology.

Results

Regarding RQ1 and RQ2 inquiring on the types and development of mobilization efforts over time (see Figure 1), our findings show that the most dominant form of direct mobilization is appeals to online behavior (32%). Their share increases by around 10% in the period under review. Sieve-bootstrap Student’s t-test signals a positive linear trend (t = 7.78; p < .001).⁶ The share of calls with the goal of eliciting offline action is around 8% overall but doubles over time. Especially during the second lockdown between December 2020 and March 2021, the number of offline appeals increases. Despite this trend leveling off again after the anti-Corona measures were scaled back, we observe a significant positive linear trend over time (t = 6.03; p < .001). Calls for donations play a comparatively minor role compared to the other two forms of direct calls to action. In more than 2% of all messages, channel operators call on their followers to provide financial support. The relative share of calls for donations follows a significant positive trend (t = 3.45; p = .011). Calls for violence are by far the least frequent mobilization strategy. Their share remains relatively stable over time, without showing any significant trend (t = 1.62; p = .115).

Figure 1.

Relative use of mobilization strategies over time (in %).

Our analysis reveals further indirect mobilization efforts through the populist blame game at a comparatively high level. While stigmatization of minorities seems to play a minor role and was only observed in 3% of the posts, we observe anti-elitism in about every fifth message. Whereas the first followed a significant decreasing trend (t = -3.65; p < .001), the latter increased significantly by about 10% over the course of observation (t = 4.96; p = .004).

Related to RQ3, we were interested in the differences in communication strategies between the different ideological orientations of the channels (see Figure 2). Results reveal a relative consistency across channels in the high use of online appeals, although radical right actors (34%) and conspiracy actors (32%) use them somewhat more frequently than the Querdenken milieu (29%). The various ideologies also share a high degree of anti-elitism in their posts. In around one in five messages, radical right actors (22%), conspiracy actors (21%), and Querdenker (19%) blame “those up there” for grievances. Calls for donation do not noticeably differ between the ideologies.

Figure 2.

Relative use of mobilization strategies by actor type (in %).

Major differences between the ideologies exist in calls for offline action: As expected, the Querdenken channels (15%) stand out and were found to use offline appeals more than twice as often as the far-right actors (6%) and almost four times more than the conspiracy actors (4%). Channels of far-right actors stigmatize foreign groups in more than one in 20 messages and thus more than twice as often as conspiracy actors (2%) and five times as often as Querdenken channels (1%). Although the proportions are small, far-right actors also call for violence significantly more often (0.4%) than conspiracy ideologues (0.2%) and Querdenker (0.1%).

Finally and to answer H1, we test whether the use of the different mobilization strategies impacts message forwarding. The results of the negative binomial regression model reveal that the use of online (incidence rate ratio [IRR] = 1.08; confidence interval [CI]: [1.05, 1.12]) and offline (IRR = 1.07; CI [1.01, 1.12]) appeals increases the number of referrals by 7% and 8%, respectively (cf. Figure 3). Apparently, appeals are increasingly disseminated by users as well as other channels and hence may also unfold a potentially mobilizing effect beyond the channel of the sender. The greatest effect on the dissemination of messages is the presence of anti-elitism, since it increases the number of forwards by as much as 21% (IRR = 1.21; CI [1.17, 1.25]). This supports the assumption that the attribution of responsibility for grievances to political and social elites has a mobilizing effect on recipients. In contrast, appeals for donations have a negative effect: to call for financial support drops the average number of forwards by 30% (IRR = 0.70; CI [0.64, 0.77]). Calls for violence and the blaming of outgroups —probably the most problematic mobilization strategy in our study—have no effect on the number of forwards.

Figure 3.

Negative bionmial regression on the influence of communication styles on the number of forwards.

Discussion

Focusing on mobilization appeals among radical protest actors in the German Telegram sphere, we found that Telegram is used extensively to mobilize potential supporters through direct appeals: Calls for online action are by far the most frequently used form of direct mobilization efforts increasingly used during the period under investigation. Online appeals seem to be a substantial part of mobilization regardless of ideological leaning. This is not surprising, since calls to online actions, which includes redistribution of content, seem to fall on fertile ground and supporters seem to follow this call. Such appeals increase the number of forwarded messages. Accordingly, the use of online appeals adds to the virality of messages. While these forms of micro-activism or “slacktivism” (Morozov, 2009) were seen as potentially weakening the power of social movements (Smith et al., 2019), studies focusing on social media-led protests demonstrated that such low-effort online actions also serve particular purposes such as social or collective identity formation (Odağ et al., 2016). Considering the specific context of Telegram, this platform allows radical actors in a more pronounced way compared to other (mainstream) social media to “self-mediate” and disseminate their messages and appeals more easily and bypass state and market control (Cammaerts, 2021). The construction of a shared identity in contrast to the ideological enemy can thus be considered another crucial element for mobilizing in semi-public arenas such as telegram groups.

Appeals for financial support by contrast were rarely used. Still, across all three channel types examined, Telegram was used on a regular basis to try acquiring financial resources. However, such calls seem to decrease messages’ virality. Thus, it seems like actors have to find a balance between outreach and the chance to generate financial resources.

Calls to violence are even rarer in the messages, with far-right actors being the most likely to use this form of mobilization, as also found by Schulze and colleagues (2022). A qualified evaluation of how problematic a call to violence in every 250th message actually is can at best be assessed by comparing this with other (digital) contexts.

Offline appeals are particularly popular in the mobilization repertoire of Querdenken channels. These channels call for events like protests and other offline actions significantly more often than channels with other ideological orientations, which is consistent with existing research (Schulze et al., 2022; Zehring & Domahidi, 2023). Its decentralized (offline) structure with actors organizing local demonstrations also transformed into the digital sphere by setting up Telegram channels across Germany (named after telephone area codes). The combination of offline appeals and geographically segmented communication channels seems to be successful, as it promotes retransmissions. Future research might enrich digital mobilization data with extra media data from actual protests to be able to make claims about the effect of mobilization (e.g., Abdul Reda et al., 2021).

Among the indirect forms of mobilization, blaming the elites was the most popular appeal across all three ideological orientations and its use increased over time. We see primarily two reasons for this finding: First, our analysis revealed that anti-elitism is the message feature that by far adds the most in message virality. Second, by playing the anti-elitist blame game, radical movements damage trust in the political actors and ultimately in the political system. Thereby, actors provide a moral argument to legitimize their protest against the elites, “suggesting that the ‘people’ should mobilize to reclaim what is rightfully theirs” (Aslanidis, 2017, p. 7).

Social minorities by contrast were less of a target for grievances. This can most likely be attributed to the context of the Corona Pandemic with a focus on political measures taken by elite (political, scientific) actors. We nevertheless found that out-group attacks were apparent among channels of the far right who generally share a nativist world view which was even prevalent in this (pandemic) time period.

Of course, some limitations should be considered in interpreting the study’s results. First, this concerns the selection of our channels. A fundamental issue in research on non-institutionalized actors is that no reliable lists of actors are available. Thus, it is challenging to determine a population as a reference point for sampling. Although we were able to rely on experts to select channels that largely overlapped with actors previously studied (e.g., Urman & Katz, 2022; Zehring & Domahidi, 2023), our selection only covers a certain portion of the Telegram universe. That said, there might be smaller channels, we did not identify and whose communication behavior differs from that of the channels studied. Moreover, our classification is based on an expert-rating that partially differs from existing classification approaches (e.g., Urman & Katz, 2022; Zehring & Domahidi, 2023). To shed light on this dark field, comprehensive network analyses and extensive snowball sampling in combination with intersubjectively comprehensible categorizations of actors on the basis of crowd coding or codebooks are future tasks.

In addition, our study is bound to textual messages. Consequently, we cannot say to what extent external and (audio-)visual content comes into play in the mobilization. By relying on messages including text of more than 10 words we might have missed memes or videos that play a significant role in mobilization. This also seems to be a relevant avenue for future research.

Finally, the sample covers a specific period of time, which was dominated by issues and events related to the COVID-19 pandemic. To what extent this has led to specific mobilization patterns on Telegram can only be answered by future research. Currently, it seems that the actors on Telegram are mobilizing around other issues, such as the Ukraine–Russia war and the energy crisis, as they have done in the past (Puschmann et al., 2020). Therefore, as argued by Hunt (2022), adopting the discursive opportunity structure approach in combination with crisis exploitation theory seems to be a promising avenue to study in-depth how radical actors who seek changes in the current political system seize their activities in light of the crisis situation. For the case of radical mobilization on Telegram, we can just speculate that actors adapt their mobilization appeals to the changing crisis situation and the related discursive structures. Empirically, this calls for longitudinal studies that take into account a shift in the contextual environment of radical or protest groups.

Our analysis highlights the crucial role that social media platforms, and Telegram in particular, play in mobilizing and shaping radicalization in times of crisis. Further research on the consequences, for example in real-life situations, is therefore needed. In the case of the pandemic, journalists and policemen were regularly assaulted in the protests that some of the channels we examined were mobilizing. To protect the principles of democracy and tolerance, knowledge of mobilization strategies can help to combat anti-liberal ideologies and support pro-democracy initiatives both online and offline.

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Footnotes

Authors’ Note

All authors have agreed to the submission. The manuscript is not currently being considered for publication by any other print or electronic journal.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Pablo Jost

Leyla Dogruel

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available at:

Notes

Author Biographies

Pablo Jost (Ph.D. Johannes Gutenberg-University) is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Communication at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. His research is on political communication in the context of digitalization. Recent projects are focused on how (non-institutional) political and societal actors use digital platforms and how they adapt to the changing communication environment.

Leyla Dogruel (Ph.D. Freie Universität Berlin) is a Professor of Communication with a focus on social communication at the University of Erfurt. Her research focuses on digital media and regulation, media innovation theory, online privacy, and (local) media structures and performances.

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