The curious case of blockchain in rural China: Unravelling power,profit,and surveillance

Abstract

Blockchain originated from the aspiration for decentralization, and in Western countries, its association with freedom from governmental and corporate dominance remains unwavering. However, in China–where blockchain has taken an intriguing foothold–the socio-technical imaginaries of blockchain diverge significantly. As China rises in blockchain development, critical literature examining its ventures is notably lacking. This article analyses state-led initiatives and corporate endeavours related to blockchain deployment in rural China. While blockchain's roots lie in libertarian ideals, within China, it serves as a ‘state techno-solutionist’ tool, empowering authoritarian capitalism for enhanced state control and corporate profit through data exploitation. Although the application of blockchain in agricultural tracing and finance is heralded as a blessing to elevate smallholder farmers from poverty and enhance agricultural practices, the reality contrasts sharply. Instead of empowering farmers, the technology exacerbates power imbalances, embedding them in a system marked by extensive data harvesting and surveillance. Such integration entangles these farmers subsisting on China's economic fringes within broader national and global capitalist financial frameworks, rendering them more susceptible to exploitation and manipulation. Moreover, blockchain in rural China epitomizes authoritarian capitalism, where capitalists aligning closely with state agendas. Blockchain's transparency, traceability, and tamper-resistant features, instead of diminishing government interference, are harnessed by capitalists to amplify the social credit system, strengthening the data dominance of platform companies and supporting state surveillance. Therefore, blockchain emerges as a threat to rural China's ways of life–all driven by the pursuit of corporate profit and the government's quest to reclaim national greatness.

Introduction

The development of blockchain in rural China presents a fascinating phenomenon that diverges significantly from the understanding and adoption of the technology in Western countries, where it was created and gained popularity. While originating from the cypherpunk movement's vision of decentralization and freedom from governmental and corporate control, blockchain has found a curious place in rural China. Despite limited familiarity with blockchain technology among Chinese farmers, they face incentives and pressure from the communist government to adopt it. In this context, blockchain has shed its association with the radical individualist ideals of Bitcoin. It is viewed as a collective endeavour led by the Chinese state and major corporations to ‘modernize’ and infuse commercial sensibilities into what is perceived as China's ‘backward’ rural culture. This article examines various blockchain projects in rural China, exploring how Chinese narratives and frameworks around blockchain challenge libertarian ideals, while perpetuating inequalities and power imbalances between farmers and the dominant state and corporate powers.

The prevailing techno-solutionist perspectives in many Western countries tend to view blockchain as a solution to the perceived issues embodied by governments, such as oppression, inefficiency, and coercion (Quintais et al., 2019). This rhetoric, fuelled by a mistrust of financial intermediaries, supports the expansion of financial inclusion for the ‘unbanked’ population through blockchain. These narratives align with the libertarian ideologies popular in Silicon Valley, reflecting the hegemonic influence of the Global North, particularly the United States, over the Global South (Howson, 2020b; Jutel, 2021). Although often being portrayed as revolutionary, the socio-technical configurations of blockchain frequently serve to maintain the status quo or concentrate wealth to enhance the efficiency of existing powers (Crandall, 2019).

In contrast to the libertarian perspectives that see the state as an obstacle, China presents a distinct narrative surrounding blockchain. The Chinese communist government perceives blockchain as a pivotal technology that aligns with and supports, rather than contradicts, state objectives. It is considered a powerful tool to strengthen state governance and control through the use of big data. Moreover, the Chinese government recognizes the economic competitiveness it can gain by taking a leading role in blockchain development, with Chairman Xi Jinping emphasizing blockchain's significance for China's transformation into an advanced digital economy. It sees blockchain and the digital economy as essential for uplifting rural areas and alleviating poverty. While the progress of blockchain development in rural China is still in its early stages, discussions and commentaries overwhelmingly express optimism regarding the economic impacts of these developments, echoing the rhetoric of the Chinese government (Bu and Bu, 2020; Kraft and Kellner, 2022; Xiong et al., 2020).

This article examines the blockchain projects taking place in rural China, providing a critical analysis of the narratives, architectures, and socio-economic implications associated with these initiatives. Against the backdrop of the Chinese government's imaginaries of blockchain, this article examines the expansion of blockchain-based authoritarian capitalist governance into rural China. It is noteworthy that the Communist Party of China (CPC) initially gained power through substantial support from peasants, and rural China has historically served as a testing ground for new policies and directions of the communist government (Kerswell and Lin, 2017). In what I call ‘state techno-solutionism,’ discussions about blockchain envision it as a powerful tool to strengthen state authority and promote China's authoritarian capitalist system, both within the country and globally. In the context of China's ideology, technological innovations in rural areas seek to facilitate capital accumulation and promote the development of large, efficient, and ‘modernized’ businesses. Yet, small-scale farmers ultimately pay the price for their labour and resources being exploited for market profit. Their actions are closely monitored and controlled by the government, with data used to strengthen state surveillance and authority.

This article discusses two blockchain projects in China: GoGoChicken and the Qingyuan agricultural blockchain. Both projects are situated in rural China and align with China's vision of blockchain as a tool for national and rural revitalization by strengthening corporate and state power. GoGoChicken serves as an example of the extractive nature of blockchain in China. Despite its claims of poverty alleviation, this initiative illustrates how blockchain is used to benefit profit-driven technology companies. Although it aims to provide traceability for agricultural products and financial services to farmers, it ultimately reinforces the dominance of these companies in terms of technology ownership, supply chain control, and data platform management. Vulnerable smallholder farmers, already on the margins of the Chinese economy, become further entrenched in the exploitative framework of authoritarian capitalism. Regarding the agricultural chain in Qingyuan, it highlights how the Chinese state effectively employs blockchain to bolster surveillance. Through the implementation of blockchain-based platforms, rural areas appear to be integrated into a strengthened social credit system for heightened state control.

Blockchain and authoritarian capitalism

In the Global North, particularly the United States, blockchain is often imagined through the lens of techno-solutionism as a promoter of privacy, autonomy, and liberty. Advocacy organizations like the Blockchain Association champion blockchain's ability to provide financial solutions for the ‘unbanked’ population, highlighting its liberating and trust-minimizing capabilities (Whitehouse-Levine and Kelleher, 2020). Another promise that blockchain offers is the empowerment of individuals to regain control over their data, addressing growing worries about data privacy (Herian, 2020). Amidst escalating geopolitical tensions, blockchain has also become a battleground for ideological competition. Alex Gladstein, Chief Strategy Officer at Human Rights Foundation and a proponent of Bitcoin maximalism, argues that Bitcoin's proof-of-work and permissionless blockchain presents a challenge to authoritarian regimes by enabling individuals to bypass government restrictions and blockades (Gladstein, 2022; Jutel, 2023). President Joe Biden has also emphasized the importance of ensuring that the development of blockchain technology in the United States upholds the values of democracy and privacy (The White House, 2022).

Critical analyses of blockchain presents a different view. Jutel argues that the notion of blockchain as a ‘solution’ for data issues actually erodes subjects’ authority over their resources. It transforms new territories into objects of power, facilitating data extraction and reinforcing computational capitalism (Jutel, 2021). Despite techno-solutionist narratives, overseas projects orchestrated by influential governments and corporations exploit blockchain as a tool for powerful nations to disseminate neoliberal values and exert control over developing countries. With this in mind, it appears that China's approach to blockchain is different. As a developing country, China has emerged as a world leader in blockchain research (Wang et al., 2020). China's stance on blockchain downplays the promotion of political values and instead positions it as a ‘public good’ to enhance services in an information-rich economy. This seems to align with the Chinese government's focus on economic growth and its strategic goals related to health, productivity, and poverty alleviation (Ning et al., 2021; Sigley and Powell, 2023).

This article argues that in China's context, blockchain has become a new tool for the country's authoritarian capitalist model, allowing the Chinese government to extend the hegemonic power of big corporations and Chinese state interests into rural areas. Authoritarian capitalism, characterized by principles such as authoritarian leadership and nationalism, represents a system where the state utilises these principles to structure capitalism and advance capitalist interests (Fuchs, 2018). Despite its communist foundation, the People's Republic of China has transitioned to authoritarian capitalism since the late 1970s, intertwining developmental initiatives with predatory tactics and establishing an interventionist economy under pervasive state control (Witt and Redding, 2014). The hegemonic control of the Chinese state spans various domains, including the ownership of all land and dominance of state-owned enterprises.

Compared with countries influenced by neoliberalism, where technology usually reinforces corporate capitalism and shifts power from citizens and governments to those corporations, China's technological innovation model is often called neostatist – using market forces to drive efficiency while simultaneously giving the state more power to control the market (Gruin, 2021). For instance, we can see this in China's surveillance and electronic payment technology, where the Chinese government adopts flexible approaches to promote private sector growth and align capitalist interests with state control objectives (Huang and Tsai, 2022; Liu, 2021). In China, technological development does not entail strict distinctions between market-led innovation and state-guided upgrading, since both are directed towards political objectives and are tightly regulated by the government (Gruin and Knaack, 2020).

Within China's governance framework, technology companies are not simply puppets of the government; they are profit-driven entities deeply ingrained in the capitalist principles of the market economy, with the main goal of accumulating capital through technology (To, 2023). Prominent figures like Jack Ma, China's tech mogul, openly endorse the highly exploitative ‘996 working hour system.’ Intense competition among Chinese technology companies leads to despotic management practices, deteriorating working conditions, and intensified exploitation (Zhen, 2021; Zheng and Qiu, 2023). As blockchain technology offers what is claimed to be a superior way to obtain, store, and analyze big data, its widespread adoption turns data into a commodity easily exploited by big tech capitalists. The complexity and cost associated with implementing blockchain systems mean that in China, blockchain initiatives are mostly driven by medium-sized to large technology companies (Kshetri, 2023). Amidst the ‘big data divide’ (Andrejevic, 2014), major market players in China are able to accumulate substantial data and capital, further strengthening their economic dominance over individuals and exacerbating technology's exploitative tendencies (Fuchs, 2019). In constructing an authoritarian capitalist society, the Chinese government has consistently aimed to establish an extensive technological surveillance network to neutralize perceived threats to the regime (Lin and Milhaupt, 2023). Notably, major technology companies in China have long played a pioneering role in these government-led initiatives.

China's socio-technical imaginaries of blockchain

While blockchain is often seen as a tool for promoting individual freedom and privacy, China mainly regards it as a cutting-edge technology for driving the nation’ development and enhancing its competitiveness. In a 2019 speech, Xi highlighted the importance of blockchain technology for China to attain crucial advancements in ‘self-reliant innovation’ (Foxley, 2019). This announcement catapulted blockchain into a nationwide sensation, saturating media outlets with messages and prompting local governments to craft blockchain policies. Subsequently, in 2023, Xi reiterated the need for China's active involvement in shaping international rules and standards for emerging technologies to solidify its competitive advantages (Moen, 2023). Today, blockchain remains a significant priority on China's technological development agenda, with new initiatives continuingly being launched.

As defined by Jasanoff and Kim (2009), socio-technical imaginaries represent ‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects.’ This concept helps us identify the shared visions surrounding a specific technology and directs our analytical focus towards examining the realization or lack thereof of these visions in relation to technological endeavours (Campbell-Verduyn, 2023). In China's authoritarian capitalist model, socio-technical imaginaries inevitably fall under state dominance. Aligned with state narratives, the perception of blockchain in China is viewed through the lens of state techno-solutionism, representing a state-led project aimed at facilitating national rejuvenation. In contrast to the popular imaginaries in the United States, which portrays blockchain as a catalyst for individual empowerment, shielding people from government surveillance and control with its decentralized nature, China presents a competing perspective. In China, blockchain and algorithms are seen as tools to foster trust among societal stakeholders, enhance efficiency, and ultimately bolster the government's capacity to manage and secure various aspects of society effectively. This illustrates how authoritarian regimes use technology to amplify their influence and shape a more favourable environment for their power and security (Hoffman, 2022).

Consistent with this vision, blockchain development in China is heavily regulated and constrained, as the core characteristic of blockchain, decentralization, is stifled. Decentralization initiatives challenging state authority, like cryptocurrencies, mining, and initial coin offerings (ICOs), are suppressed in favour of state-sanctioned initiatives. Regulations governing blockchain are also crafted in alignment with state ideology. For example, the 2019 ‘Blockchain Information Service Management Regulation’ mandates that blockchain service providers verify users’ identities using identification or mobile numbers (Cyberspace Administration of China, 2019). Moreover, service providers are required to undergo security assessments conducted by internet information offices and obtain approval before introducing new blockchain products. These measures starkly diverge blockchain from its original conception, where decentralization, privacy, and freedom from governmental control are fundamental principles.

It could be debated whether China's approach to blockchain, which involves stripping away its fundamental characteristic of decentralization, truly qualifies as blockchain or merely appropriates the term ‘blockchain.’ Since its inception, blockchain in China has been conceived as a centralized, state-led endeavour aimed at reshaping industry development patterns and transforming people's way of life. In 2016, when blockchain began to capture the Chinese government's attention, different government units were urged to implement policies to promote the growth of blockchain technology and industries (China Blockchain Technology and Industry Development Forum, 2016). As the technology developed, the Chinese state's dominant role became increasingly evident. Blockchain was recognized as a pivotal infrastructure in China's Fourteenth Five-Year Plan (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2022). The Twentieth National Congress of the CPC positioned blockchain technology as a strategic tool to ‘build a Digital China’ and ‘facilitate deep integration between the digital economy and the real economy’ (Du et al., 2023). Regional governments and national ministries began advocating for blockchain's incorporation into industries and daily activities. Following the authoritarian capitalist model, numerous private blockchain enterprises emerged, aligning their efforts with the national agenda and seizing the unfolding opportunities.

Blockchain in agriculture

The Chinese government places significant importance on the role of blockchain in driving agricultural development. Therefore, this article specifically focuses on exploring the applications of blockchain in the agricultural sector. In the following sections, I provide an overview of how blockchain is being used in various aspects of agriculture.

Tracing of agricultural products

Blockchain provides decentralized and distributed ledger functionality that operates without an intermediary. Transactions are verified through a consensus mechanism, generating a relatively immutable record while preserving privacy and transparency for participants involved. These features facilitate the creation of traceability mechanisms in agricultural supply chains, especially in the meat industry (Patelli and Mandrioli, 2020). The implementation of blockchain in agricultural supply chains involves gathering information from various sources, including sensors and manual records. Details such as farm origins, product batch numbers, processing information, and expiry dates are incorporated into the blockchain alongside the food products themselves. At each stage of the supply chain, data is recorded and timestamped (Galvez et al., 2018; Lei et al., 2022). Enabling open access to this data within the supply network is seen as a means to address consumer concerns and assist enforcement agencies in effectively mitigating food safety hazards (Sunny et al., 2020).

Discussions surrounding agricultural products blockchain often reflect techno-solutionist perspectives. Traditional paper-based tracing methods are criticized for their susceptibility to information loss and tampering, while blockchain is hailed as a transparent and reliable alternative (Hu et al., 2021). Narratives embody the aspiration for radical transparency and control, believed to be vital in ensuring food safety and meeting consumer preferences (Khan, 2022). The perception of blockchain as a solution to food system inequalities aligns with the broader ideals of the blockchain community, which celebrates blockchain as a force for social good by protecting data confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Semenzin, 2023). Blockchain is purported to help vulnerable supply chain participants, such as farmers, by improving their market access and financial services (Köhler et al., 2021). The endorsement of blockchain by the United Nations Development Programme, coupled with its integration into sustainable development initiatives targeting smallholder farmers, further reinforces the notion of blockchain as a tool for social good (United Nations Development Programme, 2021). However, it has been noted that these blockchain initiatives encounter challenges such as implementation costs, equitable distribution of supply chain information, and industry power imbalances (Howson, 2020a; Jutel, 2021). Smaller participants struggle to compete with larger ones, especially as blockchain becomes increasingly necessary for agricultural exports.

In a blockchain-enabled system, the collection, processing, storage, and publicizing of data are key practices, and farm data holds significant value with implications for commercial activities. However, farmers often lack information regarding data collection, its usage, and whether it is shared with third parties (Linsner et al., 2021). The absence of cohesive legal frameworks and regulations, together with the lack of unified standards for farm data, allows agricultural technology companies to share farmers’ data without their informed consent (Kaur et al., 2022). The rising demand for data from both upstream and downstream entities in the food supply chain exposes smallholder farmers to potential exploitation, as increased transparency may weaken their market position and increase the risk of being acquired by larger businesses (Linsner et al., 2022). Although researchers emphasize data sovereignty as crucial for farmers’ acceptance of data-sharing, many farmers remain unaware of the potential for data exploitation (Martens and Zscheischler, 2022).

Agricultural finance

Blockchain also has the potential to transform agricultural financing, providing improved access to funds for farmers. One application involves the tokenization of physical assets such as crops, livestock, and machinery, representing them as unique digital tokens. This tokenization process transforms previously illiquid assets into liquid ones, unlocking liquidity and facilitating their trade as well as their use as collateral in decentralized finance (DeFi), a peer-to-peer financial market. Smart contracts programmed on the blockchain can be utilized to create asset-backed tokens that adjust their status automatically based on real-world conditions, securely recorded from specified sources (Blakstad and Allen, 2018).

In agricultural finance, blockchain's functionalities mirror those of microfinance, which involves extending credit to people ineligible for traditional bank loans due to factors such as poverty, asset scarcity, or geographical isolation (Aitken, 2013). But while microfinance initiatives are typically facilitated by development banks and public-private partnerships, targeting disadvantaged individuals as part of socio-economic development efforts, blockchain represents a privatized solution that claims to mitigate lender risks and enable expanded access to finance. According to Vítor Uchôa, founder and CEO of Gavea, a blockchain-based commodities exchange, blockchain opens up ‘new credit opportunities’ and provides ‘more diverse interest rates for the producer’ (Pinedo, 2022). By tokenizing physical assets for financial trade, including assets without clear ownership validation like livestock, blockchain exposes the business and assets of smallholder farmers to domestic and international investors. It is seen as a solution to the challenges of volatility and liquidity faced by smallholder farmers, offering the potential for increased investment and exports (O’Loughlin, 2021).

Beyond facilitating asset tokenization, blockchain companies also claim to offer incentives to smallholder farmers. Usman Javaid, CEO of Ricult, an agricultural technology company, suggests that blockchain empowers farmers to manage, control, and profit from the shared data of their farms (Gray et al., 2018). Blockchain is believed to make data collection more equitable and transparent through data platforms built on permissioned public blockchains. Though Zampati (2023) has noted that existing codes of conduct for agricultural data sharing often disregard the rights of smallholder farmers, blockchain is still seen as an empowering tool that provides smallholder farmers with access to tools, infrastructure, and new income sources by selling their data to foreign companies (da Costa Guimaraes et al., 2020).

Blockchain and rural China

In this discussion, we examine various blockchain projects in rural China, drawing from archival analysis of publicly accessible documents such as policy statements, speeches, reports, publications, and other media sources. The objective is to uncover the intricacies and operational aspects of these projects, interpreting them as reflections of the promises, expectations, beliefs, and narratives that shape and are shaped by the prevailing socio-technical imaginaries surrounding blockchain in China. The examination of these cases incorporates the conceptual frameworks of authoritarian capitalism and state techno-solutionism, aiming to facilitate a nuanced understanding of the prominent influence of the Chinese state and technology companies in propelling blockchain initiatives.

To understand the Chinese government's push for blockchain in rural areas, it is crucial to consider the historical context. Traditional smallholder agriculture has been at the core of China's economy for centuries. Nevertheless, exposure to Western ideas in the early twentieth century prompted Chinese intellectuals to perceive rural China as backward, leading to a belief in replacing smallholding agricultural practices with ‘modern’ methods (Zhong, 2008). Marxist criticisms of smallholder farmers, labelling them as conservative and stagnant ‘bulwark of the old society,’ deeming their agricultural methods ‘irrational’ and ‘old-fashioned,’ profoundly influenced Chinese society (Gan, 2020). Unsurprisingly, after the CPC came to power, radical policies were implemented in rural China, from the creation of collective farms to the introduction of agricultural industrialization led by corporations, all aimed at phrasing out smallholding practices and transitioning to large-scale specialized agricultural production.

Today, as China's geopolitical tensions with the West escalate, the Chinese government places increasing importance on agricultural self-sufficiency, necessitating transformation in rural China. As Xi emphasized, ‘for national rejuvenation, rural rejuvenation is a must (Xi, 2022).’ Rural areas are depicted as in need of ‘rejuvenation,’ with the goal of ‘transforming agriculture into a promising industry and making farming an attractive profession (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, 2018a).’ This portray of rural China as unpromising and unattractive implies a need to ‘improve’ farming methods, develop farming technology, and ‘transform all permanent basic farmland into high-standard farmland (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, 2018b; Xinhua News Agency, 2022).’ With a progressive perspective, we can certainly recognize nuanced benefits of smallholder farming, including the unique planting techniques, diverse farming products, and efficient use of farm waste (Liu, 2014). While the Chinese government has shown some openness to smallholder agriculture in recent years, it still favours ‘modernized’ farming practices and is exploring blockchain technology as a solution to drive this transition (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 2021).

Furthermore, alongside narratives of state techno-solutionism, the authoritarian capitalist system has played a significant role in propelling the adoption of blockchain in rural China. The ‘Digital Agriculture and Rural Development Plan (2019–2025)’ (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 2019) highlights the importance of capital participation in various forms, such as purchasing services, government-social capital collaboration, and subsidized loans. More specifically, the ‘Guidelines for Social Capital Investment in Agriculture and Rural Areas’ encourage capital to establish innovative agricultural technology enterprises, with a particular emphasis on exploring crucial agricultural technology research and promoting blockchain application (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 2022). Amidst the intensified state policies and resource allocation driving investments in agricultural blockchain applications and new markets, rural China represents a frontier marked by the exploitation resulting from the collusion between state techno-solutionism and capitalist profit motives.

Penetrating rural landscapes with capitalism: The goGoChicken experiment

China's intriguing narratives and applications of blockchain technology are exemplified by the famous GoGoChicken (bubuji) project. This project utilizes permissioned blockchain to create a traceability system for chicken supply chains. The blockchain records and validates transactional data on-chain, including chicken breeds, farming practices, slaughter, logistics, and sales processes. Additionally, IoT devices and sensors attached to the chickens continuously monitor their conditions and surroundings, enabling human sourcing of real-time data on factors such as movement patterns, water consumption, food intake, and farm conditions like humidity and temperature (Du, 2018). The data is uploaded to the blockchain to ensure its authenticity and integrity, and stakeholders including farmers, government authorities, food processing companies, logistics companies, retailers, and consumers can access the recorded information (Wang and Lü, 2020). Considering the serious issue of trust within China's food industry, resulting from previous scandals like the milk powder controversy, the emerging consumer class becomes a key factor in driving state techno- solutionism, which seeks to foster trust rather than eliminate the need for it. GoGoChicken primarily caters to safety-conscious consumers in major Chinese cities, who are willing to pay a premium for food that ensures traceability from farm to table, despite the higher prices compared to conventional chicken products in the country.

While Western observers have identified the GoGoChicken project as a collaboration between local governments and Lianmo Technology, a medium-sized blockchain technology company (Wang, 2020), the initiative is actually spearheaded by ZhongAn Technology. This entity operates under the umbrella of ZhongAn Insurance, which is the largest online-only insurance company in China and was co-founded by influential figures in China's technology industry, such as Jack Ma from Alibaba and Pony Ma from Tencent. For ZhongAn Insurance, the GoGoChicken project extends beyond agricultural food tracing, as outlined in its Environment, Society, and Governance Report. Aligned with the Chinese government's ‘13th Five-Year Plan for Poverty Alleviation’ and the state's initiative of ‘rural rejuvenation,’ GoGoChicken is framed as an initiative that empowers impoverished households and individuals. Importantly, with plans to expand nationwide, it also aims to ‘provide financial services like loans and financing based on farmers’ economic conditions’ (ZhongAn Insurance, 2018).

However, the extent to which the GoGoChicken project can truly achieve its lofty goal of poverty alleviation is highly questionable. Implementing blockchain technology in product tracing incurs exorbitant costs related to packaging, barcode labels, sensors, machinery, and software systems (Xu et al., 2020). Smallholder farmers, lacking the necessary funds and knowledge, find it nearly impossible to afford such platforms (Hu et al., 2021), leading to the dominance of powerful corporations like ZhongAn Insurance. These farmers must rent the equipment, and they do not own the code and software used (Wang, 2020). They rely on corporations for orders, sales, and delivery, which are all managed in collaboration with China's largest e-commerce and logistics platforms. This substantial power imbalance between smallholder farmers and large businesses places the former in an extremely vulnerable position, making them susceptible to exploitation and dependent on the whims of the latter.

Despite ZhongAn Insurance's claims of commitment to alleviating rural poverty, the integration of cutting-edge technology into agriculture is likely to raise barriers rather than reduce them for farmer participation. Large-scale farmers, with their more active involvement in agricultural insurance and easier access to loans, are significantly more likely than smallholder farmers to adopt new technologies (Zhang and Gao, 2018). Corporations prefer collaborating with large-scale farmers as they consider the data collected from them to be more reliable (Xiong et al., 2020). The fact that media reports on the GoGoChicken project predominantly highlight collaborations with owners of large-scale farming cooperatives is not coincidental (Du, 2018; Sui Feng, 2017; Work Committee of Departments under Pingwu County, 2019). In China, smallholder farmers, comprising 98% of the agricultural workforce, are often overlooked in state policies that favour large-scale farming entities (Qiao, 2021). Aligned with the logic of authoritarian capitalism and the objective of phasing out smallholder practices, these policies envision an agricultural industry dominated by more ‘efficient’ players, gradually displacing the ‘inefficient’ smallholders through market competition. This trend is exemplified by the establishment of farming cooperatives in China, which often exploit policy subsidies rather than fostering democratic management. The phenomenon of ‘big farmers eating small farmers’ (danong chi xiaonong) is prevalent, where powerful large-scale farmers, as owners of cooperatives, consolidate control and benefit themselves at the expense of smallholder farmers (Li and Hu, 2021; Liang and Li, 2015; Tong and Lou, 2010).

Exploitation intensifies in the food supply chain, especially in agricultural products that require storage and refrigeration. Intermediaries with access to expensive infrastructure facilities, such as distributors, hold significant power over the geographically scattered smallholder farmers (Huang, 2012). The profit-oriented practices of capital lead these intermediaries to drive down purchase prices for smallholder farmers, while blockchain technology enables them to increase selling prices for consumers. As blockchain aims to strengthen quality assurance systems and prevent fraud, there is heavier burden of accountability placed on smallholder farmers, particularly through credit rating systems that evaluate them based on product licenses and reputation scores given by distributors, retailers, and consumers (Patel et al., 2021). The constant surveillance and threat of punishment further weaken the position of smallholder farmers. Consequently, the proliferation of blockchain in rural areas, influenced by both state and corporate entities, reinforces the dominance of powerful players with substantial capital, allowing them to exercise hegemonic control over smallholder farmers.

Beyond food tracing, blockchain technology exacerbates the phenomenon of ‘capital flowing to the countryside’ (ziben xiaxiang), which the Chinese government sees as a catalyst for rural rejuvenation (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, 2023; Jiang and Jiang, 2022). As ZhongAn Technology acknowledges, its collaboration with various entities to implement blockchain in agriculture ultimately seeks to ‘revolutionize’ rural finance and explore new business avenues. The introduction of blockchain enables traceability and increased monitoring of farmers’ data, hence reduces assessment costs and risks for credit and insurance purposes (ZhongAn Insurance, 2023). While the narrative aligns with the techno-solutionist rhetoric of increasing access to credit services for the ‘unbanked’ and ‘excluded’ populations, it is as Taylor (2012) described, ‘disingenuous,’ as it overlooks the existing credit and debt relations prevalent in rural society. Rural households already engage in credit debt relations through various sources like relatives, private lenders, pawnbrokers, and merchants (Li Zhou and Takeuchi, 2010; Turvey et al., 2010), and these informal lenders with local knowledge are often better equipped to assess the needs of farmers (Li Zhou and Takeuchi, 2010). Meanwhile, the challenges associated with insuring and lending to farmers, such as evaluating their financial use and vulnerability to income fluctuations, persist despite blockchain technology. Since research suggests that the advances made are insufficient to render insurance affordable and accessible to smallholder farmers in developing countries without substantial government support (Kramer et al., 2022), the application of blockchain in this context appears nothing other than, as Sadowski and Beegle (2023) describe, an extractive network. Despite the rhetoric of access, it is about leveraging technology to move and amass money, capturing new markets while enrolling vulnerable individuals.

Given these issues, the extension of blockchain technology to rural China, as demonstrated by the high-profile GoGoChicken project, seems driven by the principles of authoritarian capitalism, seeking to integrate those residing at the fringes of the economy into credit practices deeply embedded within national and global financial markets (Aitken, 2013). This is underscored by the fact that current proposals for integrating blockchain in agricultural finance, including those by ZhongAn Insurance, originate from private corporations seeking efficiency and reduced risks in profit-driven lending. Without providing technological know-how and ownership provisions, blockchain merely exacerbates indebtedness in marginalized communities, as empowering terms are employed to sanitize exploitative business practices (Chadwick, 2019).

Of the party, by the party, for the party: State technosolutionism and data harvesting

In techno-solutionist narratives popular in Western countries, blockchain is often celebrated as a new means of enhancing data sovereignty and protecting against exploitation. The claim is that blockchain gives users more control over their data, thus reducing its commodification or exploitation (Swa, 2015). However, as demonstrated by GoGoChicken, such optimism appears to be unrealistic. Smallholder farmers, lacking technological knowledge, rely completely on corporations for guidance, which prevents meaningful shift away from exploitative data practices. As discussed, ZhongAn Insurance openly acknowledges its expansion into the agricultural sector, as blockchain is employed to increase control over farmers’ livestock assets and data (Shen et al., 2023). Despite claims that blockchain reinstates traditional property concepts of data ownership and empowers individuals to use and dispose of their data as they see fit (Herian, 2020), the reality in rural China is quite the opposite. Blockchain fortifies the extraction and exploitation of data, granting businesses greater access and control over information belonging to vulnerable groups.

The tremendous power of corporations such as ZhongAn Insurance over smallholder farmers is further bolstered by the explicit directives of the Chinese government. A consortium of Chinese ministries, including the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, issued a guidance on financial services for ‘rural rejuvenation.’ In clear words, this guidance encourages blockchain technology's use in the rural financial sector to monitor credit risks and ‘strengthen’ the collection and sharing of agricultural credit data (The People's Bank of China et al., 2019). The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs openly praises blockchain-based agricultural finance initiatives as exemplary applications of new technologies in rural areas (Xu, 2021). With state endorsement and facilitation, the expansion of corporations into rural China appears to be unstoppable, and the latitude they enjoy in their data harvesting operations is evident.

Exacerbating data harvesting practices, blockchain projects in rural China not only serve to advance corporate profit but also strengthen state control, all under the banners of national and rural rejuvenation. To elaborate more, we shift our focus to the agricultural blockchain in Qingyuan, located in China's Guangdong (Canton) province, which has been known as a prime example of emerging technology adoption in the region (Shi, 2022). This blockchain serves various purposes, including tracing agricultural products, facilitating digital asset financing, and notably, implementing blockchain governance for rural communities. As a permissioned blockchain, it enables the real-time tracing of agricultural goods from Qingyuan, such as black tea and organic rice, by collecting data on factors like soil acidity, workshop temperature, and humidity, as well as storing on-chain information about fertilizers and picking processes (Qingyuan Daily and Wanting, 2020). It also establishes a digital asset platform that facilitates the tokenization of assets and promotes financing activities between farmers and the urban population. These functionalities bear similarity to GoGoChicken, and smallholders in Qingyuan face a similar risk of exploitation by powerful corporations, particularly when it comes to their data and assets.

What is of greater concern, however, is the role that blockchain plays in bolstering state power. In December 2019, a symposium titled ‘Blockchain and Modern Governance’ was held in Qingyuan, bringing together over twenty experts and scholars to discuss strategies for implementing blockchain technology in governance (Zhu and Zhang, 2020). Key figures at the symposium included Jin Tong, the chief scientist of Yunrun Big Data Company, and Lan Yun, the chairperson of Beijiang Blockchain Research Institute, both of whom were collaborative developers of the Qingyuan agricultural blockchain. Notably, senior representatives from the Central Party School of the CPC and the Party School of the Guangdong Provincial Committee, Sun Yat-Sen University, were also present. While the CPC representatives, predictably, emphasized strengthening the Party's leadership in blockchain development to build an ‘information socialist society,’ it was intriguing that corporate representatives at the symposium echoed this sentiment, applauding blockchain's potential in reinforcing state governance.

During the symposium, Jin Tong explained how blockchain could effectively manage the flow of people, goods, funds, and information in rural areas, which aligns with the blockchain project he helped develop. The Qingyuan agricultural blockchain embeds a social credit system called Persimmon Points (shizi fen). This system, reminiscent of China's criticized social credit systems known for state surveillance, allows participants to earn points for ‘positive actions’ such as respecting elders, children's achievements, and involvement in public affairs. Conversely, perceived negative behaviours result in point deductions (Lan, 2020; Mu, 2020). The point data is transparently recorded on a public blockchain and is interconnected with rural microcredit and annual collective distribution, guaranteeing that participants receive corresponding rankings, rewards, or penalties. For example, villagers who ‘actively engage in rural public affairs,’ such as assisting in flood prevention and drought resistance, are recognized for their contributions with 3 Persimmon Points (Qingyuan Daily and Wanting, 2020). This system monitors the behaviours of villagers, ensuring their alignment with state-endorsed ‘socialist core values’ and ‘Chinese cultural virtues.’ In this context, the immutable nature of the blockchain database intensifies the strictness and unwavering nature of the social credit system, as well as the seriousness of state-endorsed rules and social norms.

Therefore, Qingyuan's agricultural blockchain, as a corporate initiative, showcases the alignment of capitalists with the Party's and the state's directives. During the symposium, Lan Yun emphasized that while blockchain's revolutionary capacity to establish trust via algorithms and drive societal and industrial reconfiguration is significant, it must be harmonized with efforts to protect ‘the interests of the nation and its people’ (Zhu and Zhang, 2020). He went on to suggest that the Party should take charge of managing, constructing, and leveraging blockchain technology, utilizing centralized design and resource allocation capabilities to enhance the Party's governance prowess. Despite the transparency, traceability, and tamper-resistant nature of blockchain, its implementation in China does not align with Western techno-solutionist narratives that advocate for reduced reliance on intermediaries and government interference. Instead, it paves the way for a fortified social credit system that bolsters the data dominance of platform companies while supporting increased governmental surveillance.

Conclusion

The integration of blockchain technology in rural China reflects a unique socio-technical landscape shaped by the country's authoritarian capitalist governance and state techno-solutionist vision. While blockchain was originally conceived with ideals of decentralization and privacy, its adoption in China aligns with the Chinese government's control objectives. Blockchain is seen as a tool for enhancing national competitiveness, fostering collaboration between the Chinese state and technology corporations to achieved shared objectives. Despite the discussed projects taking place during the early peak of blockchain's popularity, the technology continues to be a prominent focus within China's state techno-solutionist agenda. A 2023 report from the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology reveals that 29 provinces and cities have incorporated the development of the blockchain industry into their ‘14th Five-Year Plan’ (China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, 2023). The pursuit of a ‘Chinese-style blockchain,’ without involving cryptocurrencies, aims to achieve extensive adoption in critical sectors of China's national economy, ultimately enhancing the global competitiveness of Chinese businesses.

In rural China, blockchain has become a state-led initiative, driven by the government's determination to use technology as a solution for increasing competitiveness and achieving agricultural self-sufficiency in the pursuit of the ‘glorious rejuvenation of the Chinese race.’ Presented as a means to improve livelihoods, blockchain becomes yet another technological instrument for social control. By aligning their ventures with state objectives, technology capitalists in China reinforce state dominance over individuals’ economic activities and lifestyles, simultaneously serving corporate interests and strengthening the state's control over historically disadvantaged rural areas. The inherent characteristics of blockchain, such as transparency, traceability, and tamper resistance, become a means to reinforce the grip of the state and corporations over smallholder farmers.

The goal of increasing agricultural productivity is framed as an empowerment strategy for smallholder farmers, steering them towards ‘modernized’ farming practices and poverty alleviation. As illustrated by the GoGoChicken example, although it promises digitalized farming techniques, more sales channels, and more financial sources for farmers, the proclaimed are undermined by operational realities, offering little to address inequalities and power imbalances. The overarching effectiveness of the digital economy in addressing rural-urban disparities in China remains uncertain, with research indicating a widening income gap (Jiang et al., 2022). Given its exorbitant costs, limited knowledge dissemination, absence of ownership transfer, and failure to address distinct financing obstacles, blockchain not only falls short as a solution for smallholder farmers but also exposes them to heightened vulnerabilities against significantly more powerful entities.

Contrary to promises of data sovereignty, blockchain in rural China intensifies data harvesting. Power disparities, technological expertise gaps, and financial limitations severely limit smallholder farmers’ bargaining power, reducing their agency in determining data usage. They become mere subjects generating data and ‘business opportunities.’ GoGoChicken transforms farm data into a resource for corporate exploitation, extracting collateral and indebtedness from farmers. As for Qingyuan's agricultural blockchain, data serves as a tool for state control, removing blockchain's decentralization nature and establishing a public and open social credit system. This allows the state to evaluate the rural population based on norms of state-endorsed behaviours, fostering a surveillance culture where individuals monitor each other under the state's watchful eye. Operated within the framework of authoritarian capitalism and state techno-solutionism, blockchain, in unleashing its capabilities, emerges as a threat that jeopardizes rural China's agricultural traditions, self-organization, and individual ways of life–all for the pursuit of corporate profit and the government's self-aggrandizing quest to make China great again.

Statements and declarations

This study did not involve human participants. All data and information were sourced from publicly available materials, obviating the need for ethics approval. The author received no financial support for the preparation of this manuscript and has no affiliations or engagement with any organization or entity that holds a financial or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed herein.