Abstract
Doctors owe a legal duty of care to patients, of which legal standard of care, especially on advice, evolves over time. With the modified Montgomery test, informed consent involves a process of best interests decision-making accompanied by disclosure of relevant information in a comprehensible fashion, to the patient. Ethical issues confronting treatment decision and advice are also manifold and have to be confronted. For example, in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), an incurable disease, death is usually due to respiratory failure. Tracheostomy ventilation (TV) may be the only alternative to death, yet patients on TV may be subject to the relentless progression of ALS resulting in a locked-in state. Through a case vignette of invasive ventilation for ALS, we examine the ethical and legal issues regarding choice of assisted ventilation in these patients, especially for TV, to ensure reasoned and defensible methodology in patient care. We also include a tracheostomy counselling info kit applicable for use prior to tracheostomy insertion.
Keywords
Introduction
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is an incurable, gradual and progressive degeneration of motor neurons, which accounts for its four main symptoms: (i) limb weakness and muscle atrophy, (ii) dysphagia, (iii) dysarthria and (iv) respiratory difficulties. 1
In ALS, death is usually due to respiratory failure in the advanced stages of disease.2,3 Such deaths can be delayed through assisted ventilation, either non-invasive ventilation (NIV) or invasive mechanical ventilation (IMV). Patients can receive care at home via either option. 4 Assisted ventilation also improves sleep-related hypoventilation and daytime somnolence. 5
IMV is usually prescribed when a patient refuses or is intolerant of NIV, e.g. when there is a large amount of secretions or in severe bulbar weakness. 6 IMV provides more effective ventilator pressures and better gas exchange with less leakage of air than NIV, 6 and also avoids NIV mask-related skin lesions and ulcerations. 7 Most ALS patients requiring long-term ventilation will be put on tracheostomy ventilation (TV), 8 a form of IMV where a tracheostomy tube is inserted for direct access to the lower respiratory tract. 9
In advanced ALS, IMV via TV may be the only alternative to death; however, this also can result in a locked-in state. 6 In part due to doctors’ diverse views, there is a wide variance in TV use worldwide,10–14 even within regions of the same country.15,16 The legal standard of care for doctors has also evolved over time. There is therefore a pressing need to examine the ethical and legal issues regarding informed consent for TV in ALS patients. Boxes 1 and 5 describe two parts of a case on which the following discussion is based.
First part of case description.
Comment and analysis
The following questions need to be answered in considering treatment options for any patient: How should the team have come to a recommendation in the best interests of the patient? Is the doctor’s role to present options and his recommendation? Or is his role to present options without a recommendation, leaving the patient to decide? How much should the doctor elaborate on each option? Should the amount and extent of detail of information be determined absolutely or relatively? Should a doctor withhold information on an option that might not be available or suited to the patient given the doctor’s understanding of the patient’s situation? The legal issues pertaining to the case study define the boundaries of concern, and hence would be logically examined before the ethical issues.
Legal issues
Legal duty of care
A caregiver (professional or otherwise, such as a doctor) treating a patient owes a legal duty to the patient to take care and to act diligently towards him. This legal duty of care, as explained in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, 17 arises when three elements are present between the parties: (1) it is foreseeable that a negligent act or omission by the first party (doctor/caregiver) can cause harm to the second party (patient), (2) there is sufficient proximity (legal term for the relationship as concluded from the facts) existing between the first party and the second party (whether from contractual, physical relationship or otherwise) and (3) it is just and reasonable to impose liability on the first party and there is no policy reason not to impose such liability.
These principles are universally recognised including in Singapore, as seen in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v. Defence Science & Technology Agency. 18 Such duty and standard of care can apply to all areas of medical practice including caregivers. Using the doctor as an example, duty of care includes providing an accurate diagnosis, provision of safe and effective treatment, giving information on the disease and treatment and ensuring the patient understands, obtaining the consent of the patient throughout the relationship, and maintaining patient confidentiality. While the discussion below is in the context of doctors, it is applicable with modification for use in the context of other caregivers.
Legal test for breach of duty of care and standard of care: Bolam and Bolitho tests
Breach of the duty of care occurs when the doctor’s conduct falls below the standard expected by law. Initially, the standard expected by law for a doctor, was the Bolam test as seen in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, 19 meaning to act ‘in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’.
The Bolitho test, as in Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority, 20 refined the Bolam test by clarifying that in order to qualify as being representative of a ‘responsible’ body of medical opinion, the doctors or medical experts have to (1) consider the ‘comparative risks and benefits’ and (2) arrive at a ‘defensible conclusion’. These requirements removed the sovereignty of correctness of medical treatment away from the medical practitioners to the court. The Bolitho test also received judicial acceptance in other jurisdictions, such as Singapore in Khoo James, Dr and Another v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy and Another. Appeal, 21 where it was further clarified that ‘defensible’ meant that the medical opinion ‘must be internally consistent’, not contrary to ‘proven extrinsic facts’ of the matter, and must not ‘ignore or controvert known medical facts or advances in medical knowledge’.
Causation and damage
If the above is not observed and reasonably foreseeable harm occurs as a result of a breach of the duty of care, a doctor would be found negligent. In order to claim for the harm suffered, causation has to be proven, on a ‘balance of probabilities’, which entails demonstrating that there is a greater than 50% chance that the breach of duty caused the harm. 22 If the doctor’s conduct caused harm, or was a necessary element in the chain of causation, the patient would receive damages. Damages would then be approximated using the principle of reasonable foreseeability,23,24 which assesses whether the doctor could have reasonably foreseen that the breach of duty would have caused harm, and therefore should have taken more care to meet the standard of care.
Informed consent: the duty of care on advice
The law of Singapore adopts the view that ‘informed consent’ is subsumed under the rubric of duty of care and negligence.
The change of standard of care relating to advice through Montgomery v. Lanarkshire (‘Montgomery’)
We now turn to Montgomery which was a case which marked the change in the legal standard of care relating to advice. 25 Factually, Montgomery involved a pregnancy with a small increased the risk of shoulder dystocia in vaginal delivery. Although the patient had expressed concerns over safety of vaginal birth, her physician did not warn of the shoulder dystocia or offer the option of caesarean section. Ultimately, although the medical manoeuvres were correctly performed, shoulder dystocia still occurred with morbidity to the neonate. The patient told the court that if she had been told about shoulder dystocia, unlikely as it was, she would have chosen caesarean birth, which would have avoided such injury. She was awarded 5.25 million pounds for the doctor’s negligence.
The Supreme Court in Montgomery raised 6 main points: that the doctor’s duty is to (1) ensure that the ‘patient understands the seriousness of her condition’; (2) ‘take reasonable care’ to ensure that the patient is aware of ‘any material risks involved in any recommended treatment’ and (3) ‘any reasonable alternative or variant treatments’; (4) ensure that the ‘information provided is comprehensible’. The court also said (5) that the patient should take ‘responsibility for the ultimate choice to undergo that treatment’. To avoid abuse of this new principle, (6) a ‘therapeutic exception’ was introduced such that the doctor is legally entitled to withhold information from the patient as to a risk ‘if he reasonably considers that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health’, or ‘in circumstances of necessity … where the patient requires treatment urgently but is unconscious or otherwise unable to make a decision’.
The test of what constitutes a material risk has been revised to that of ‘a reasonable person in the patient’s position’ ‘in the circumstances of the particular case’ or if the doctor can reasonably foresee that ‘the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it’ ‘so that she is then in a position to make an informed decision’.
The shift to the ‘reasonable patient’ from the ‘reasonable doctor’ thus represents a movement away from paternalistic decision-making by the doctor.
Hii Chii Kok v. Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another: modified Montgomery test
Montgomery has since received judicial acceptance elsewhere; in Singapore in Hii Chii Kok v. Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another, 26 a three-stage inquiry on the standard of care on advice (the modified Montgomery test) was set out: (1) the patient must identify the exact nature of the information not disclosed and why it would be regarded as relevant and material to him. (2) The Court must then determine whether the doctor was in possession of such information, and if so (3) the Court must then examine the reasons why the doctor chose to withhold such information from the patient to see if legal excuse could be found. The Court also emphasised that in the event of future disputes, future courts/judges should guard against hindsight and outcome bias.
From the case, it is established that doctors should inform the patient of information relevant and material to a reasonable patient in the patient’s condition, and information that a doctor would know (from interaction with the patient) to be important to that particular patient. As examples, these include diagnosis of the underlying condition, prognosis with or without treatment, nature and risks of treatment options and their alternatives. However the doctor is also not expected to flood the patient with information to such an extent as to confuse the patient and make them less able to make a decision.
The judgement clarified that there was no change in the standard of care outside of advice. Should the doctor not be in possession of the above-mentioned information he would be judged on whether he was negligent in not obtaining the information, after Bolam 19 and Bolitho 20 . However ‘the doctor has no open-ended duty to proactively elicit information from the patient, and will not be at risk of being found liable owing to idiosyncratic concerns of the patient unless this was made known to the doctor or the doctor has reason to believe it to be so’.
Best interests decision-making
The judgements in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire and Hii Chii Kok v. Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien and another reflect present judicial mind-sets that a patient is usually considered the best judge of his own interests,25,26 though there may be exceptional circumstances where he lacks the ability to make such a decision. Under the Singapore Mental Capacity Act (MCA), section 5(1), a person with capacity is expected to be able to (1) ‘understand the information relevant to the decision’, (2) ‘retain’ it, (3) ‘use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision’ and (4) ‘communicate (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means)’ it back to the doctor.
In cases where the patient is incapable of making his own decision, section 3(5) of MCA states that ‘an act done or decision made … for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done or made, in his best interests’. Where there is mental incapacity, steps to take to decide on a patient’s best interests as in as in section 6 of the MCA are shown in Box 2.
Determination of best interests as set out in section 6 of the Singapore MCA.
Ethical issues
In medical ethics, a ‘four principles plus scope’ approach has been developed based on the four prima facie moral principles – respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.27,28 These four moral principles are expected to be of universal application, regardless of personal philosophy, politics or religion. Ethical dilemmas in Mr Tan’s case arise under these four principles. Each will be explained and examined in turn.
How should the team have come to a recommendation in the best interests of the patient?
Returning to Mr Tan, bearing in mind the legal principles discussed, the team could fulfil their legal duty of care by performing the following: evaluating his treatment options including withholding of treatment, in accordance with practice accepted by a respectable body of similar professionals, up to date and currently practiced (Bolam test). 19 The team then could present the relevant options and make a recommendation which the patient can then seek more clarification about if he/ she chooses, before making a decision. To come to a recommendation, they should consider the benefits and risks including long-term harms of each option (specific to the patient), and weigh their importance to the patient. For assessing the importance of benefits and risks to the patient, we recommend considering, as per the MCA, the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings, beliefs and values likely to influence his decision, and other factors that he would be likely to consider, although these were meant to apply only when the patient does not have capacity. Ultimately the medical conclusion on the recommendation as well as options should be defensible by reason (Bolitho test). 20 The benefits and risks specific to TV in ALS patients are summarised in Box 3. Further, in Box 4, we propose a tracheostomy counselling info kit that consolidates advice for patients prior to TV that is indicative of what the team could have used.
Benefits and risks specific to TV for ALS patients.
Tracheostomy counselling info kit.
Justice
Rights-based justice (respect for people’s rights)
In considering the treatment options, the patient’s rights must be respected, even if personally disapproved of by the doctor concerned. Similarly, the doctor’s personal views on the benefits or risks of treatment options cannot obscure the patient’s right to choose, where the patient has mental capacity.
Distributive justice (fair distribution of scarce resources)
Ideally all ALS patients should have access to TV if they need it. However, this also requires resources of personnel, equipment, and services that can support an intensive level of care. The hefty costs of TV demand distributive justice in a world of finite resources. Although all criteria for horizontal (equal access by all ALS patients) and vertical (more access for ALS patients versus the general public because they need it more) equity can be morally justified, not all can be met simultaneously. However, the issue of distributive justice is beyond the scope of this essay.
Autonomy (right of the patient to choose/self-rule)
How much should the doctor elaborate?
As emphasised in Montgomery and the modified Montgomery test,25,26 the principle of autonomy, also referred to as ‘deliberate self-rule’, 28 is respected in the process of advice. The doctor has to elaborate as much as is required for a reasonable patient with capacity to make the decision voluntarily.
As clarified in the modified Montgomery test, 26 unless in the exceptional case that particular disclosure would be extremely damaging to Mr Tan’s health, the doctor ought to provide comprehensible information to ensure that Mr Tan is aware of his diagnosis, prognosis with and without treatment, nature of the proposed treatment, and the material and relevant risks involved in each treatment option and their probabilities, enabling Mr Tan to make an informed decision. The certainty of hastened death should Mr Tan decide to go with the recommendation of withholding tracheostomy has to be clearly conveyed. Mr Tan would then be expected to communicate his decision to the team of doctors, and bear the responsibility of the decision that he has voluntarily made, although he is at liberty to revoke his decision as long as he has mental capacity.
Is the doctor’s role to present options and his recommendation? Or is his role to present options without a recommendation, leaving the patient to decide?
The modified Montgomery test suggests that the doctor should advise on a proposed medical treatment, thereby make a recommendation. 26 This does not compromise autonomy, as autonomy can be considered on a spectrum, representing a spread of difference in degree of autonomy, as opposed to a difference in kind. In the face of information asymmetry, with the doctor’s professional experience and knowledge of the experiences of other similar patients, the doctor is in the better position to make an informed recommendation and to defend such a recommendation. This partnership process of shared decision-making if done well, 45 allows the patient to decide as if he had been imbued with all the necessary medical foreknowledge and experience (contributed to by capable explanation and proper analysis by the doctor).
Another reason for the doctor to make a recommendation is the question of voluntariness, and its difference in degree, in the patient who could be under coercive pressure, as he has to make a decision on which his life hangs upon. News of a possible imminent demise could cause distress and skew the patient’s objectivity in decision-making and leave weak-willed people paralysed in the decision-making process. This might be a reason why up to 13% of palliative care patients, albeit in Western contexts, 46 chose to delegate the responsibility of decision making to their doctor, waiving their consent. This is also a reminder that patients should be consulted on how much they want to know, and how much participation they want to have, before embarking on disclosure to facilitate a decision-making process.
However, although patients like Mr Tan would be medically (being ill and dependent on healthcare) and institutionally (being inpatients) vulnerable to making the ‘right’ decision, in other words, being considered unable to decide rationally given their illness/being in a hospital environment where they are not in control; vulnerability does not necessarily preclude voluntariness. The decision Mr Tan makes during such difficult circumstances could nevertheless be genuine, free of interference from irrelevant concerns, 47 congruent with his personality and expressive of his character. 48
As medical paternalism could be more rampant in Mr Tan’s case, 49 given that Confucianism is one of the main influencing forces in the Chinese culture, it is important to present options, as the choice is likely to stop patients from automatically accepting what doctors recommend, in turn distinguishing informed consent from informed compliance.
Lastly, it would also be critical to conduct the discussion not only with Mr Tan, but also his key family caregivers who would be taking care of him. Patients’ and caregivers’ opinions may differ, 50 and it would not only enhance patient-centred care but also minimise unwanted impact of his decision on his family members. 51 Mr Tan’s interests are also served by considering the interests of those who he cares about, as one’s autonomy is to be respected so far as it does not encroach on another’s.
Trial of treatment option
Other than the option of whether or not to take up TV, another option is withdrawal of TV following a trial.
Despite the lack of moral difference between withdrawing and withholding, there are emotional, religious and cultural differences that make withdrawing treatment such as TV more difficult than withholding, 52 and vice versa. Some view withdrawal as a form of suicide such that it is illegal to stop ventilation support in Italy. 53 In Singapore where withdrawal is not viewed as suicide, as the cause of death remains the underlying advanced neurological disease, and hence is not illegal, the patient’s and his family’s religious and moral convictions on life sustenance may nevertheless make withholding more difficult than withdrawal. Given their Chinese cultural environment and Confucian values, 54 Mr Tan’s children may feel an obligation to do, and be seen to do, their utmost for their parent, 55 to fulfil filial piety as an appreciation for the care they had received, and to avoid disapproval from the rest of their community. 56 The team therefore needs to ensure that Mr Tan’s children do not exert coercive influence and reduce his autonomy for their own interests.
Symptom control
Regardless of whether Mr Tan chooses TV, palliative care strategies for symptom control should be instituted. His fears should also be explored, including reassuring regarding the low likelihood of choking or suffocating to death. 57
Should a decision on withdrawal of TV be made, the patient should also receive palliative care. 58
Advance care planning
Patients who decide on withdrawal after a trial of TV would need to discuss the circumstances for withdrawal especially when capacity is lost. This was most commonly defined as the condition of, apart from that of permanent unconsciousness, when the ability to communicate is lost. 59 Patients should make their wishes known early, or decide whom they would like to delegate their decisions to in the future when they lose capacity. The need for advance care planning (ACP) is underscored by the high incidence of cognitive impairment in as many as 50% of ALS patients. 60
Even if the patient is unable to make a decision before capacity is lost, the process of discussion allows the doctor to build up an understanding of what the patient’s preferences may be, and make the doctor better informed in the best interests decision-making process. ACP therefore is a process of communication that gives patients a higher chance at avoiding interventions that they would not have wanted. 59
Although decisions made in advance directives were usually stable over time,50,61 advanced decisions are less accurate than contemporaneous decisions, due to an affective forecasting error of quality of life in future health status by healthier people who rate more negatively than when they become ill. This is explained by the prospect theory, which suggests that two prospects, for example, total dependence or death, would be more easily told apart the more imminent they are. 62
The unpredictable disease course indicates that decisions have to be made in a cyclical fashion, as symptoms change, 63 and as patients go through life-stage transitions. 64 Patients should also be reassured that as long as they have capacity and are able to communicate, they can change their mind.
What if TV is not an option?
Consent taking also needs to be distinguished from giving explanation, in which there is no decision making required from the patient, for example where TV is not medically or distributively viable. For example, if the medical team had decided that tracheostomy was out of the question for Mr Tan for certain reasons, an explanation on why tracheostomy is not available to him should be given, instead of embarking on an informed consent process, and recommending that he refuse to give consent for tracheostomy when he has no other choice. This will assist Mr Tan in understanding the medical team’s decision-making process and help him consider if he would reach the same conclusion. As one’s right to autonomy is restricted by the options available, when there are no options available, be it due to cultural, legal, health policy or financial reasons, an explanation, rather than consent, should be offered.
Withholding information
Respect for autonomy also includes the right not to be lied to, also known as truth telling, as a patient needs to believe the information given to use the information to come to a decision. Trust builds a collaborative relationship that enhances autonomy. 65 As in Montgomery, 25 a doctor is only is legally entitled to withhold information from the patient ‘if he reasonably considers that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health’.
The decision to withhold information would also have to be weighed against possible consequences should the non-disclosure be discovered. There could be a loss of trust by the patient and loss of public trust in health care professionals. For the professional involved, emotional distress may be incurred from the difficult task of balancing the potential harms and benefits of deliberate omission of information, or regulation of self-bias. 66
Justifications for withholding should outweigh the objections to disclosure, and be consistent with Mr Tan’s consent to non-disclosure if he had been aware of the facts. 66 As mentioned previously, such conduct needs to be defensible at a hearing of the professional body or at the court of law.25,66
Beneficence (to do good, other things being equal) and non-maleficence (to avoid harm, other things being equal)
The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are inextricable from autonomy. It has been demonstrated that doctors can only act in the patients’ best interests, doing good and not harm, by knowing the patients’ wishes. Further, the act of empowerment, a beneficent act that shifts patients from an external health locus of control to an internal locus, enhances autonomy by enabling patients to be more in control of their own health and health care when they believe that the choice to accept or refuse a recommendation is ultimately theirs. Thus, patients who made the decision of starting TV, either on their own or together with their family, did not regret their decision. 67
Conclusion
We have explained the elements of the tort of negligence and the evolution of the legal duty and standard of care of a doctor from acceptance by peers, to representation of a responsible body of medical opinion that is logically defensible. In relation to advice, there is further shift in the legal standard of care from the ‘reasonable doctor’ to the ‘reasonable patient’. The standard of care recommended of a doctor now extends to ensuring relevant and comprehensible information is provided to the patient, in order that the patient may make an informed decision which he will take responsibility for. In considering what constitutes relevant information, the patient’s best interests may be considered as per the decision-making process under the MCA. We therefore find that the process of informed consent in Singapore can be understood as a process of best interests decision-making coupled with relevant disclosure of information (see Box 5).
Second part of case description.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Lydia Soon Hse Yin, Yingxiang Khoo and Rob George for their assistance and guidance in this research.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Availability of data
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
Authors’ contributions
KA and LMY researched literature and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. All authors reviewed and edited the manuscript and approved the final version of the manuscript
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.
Informed consent
Not applicable
Ethical approval
Not applicable
