Do employers have a responsibility to treat their workers equally or do employees have a right to be treated equally? In common discourse, rights and responsibilities are often used as substitutable framings for the same event, but they may differentially shape judgment. In this investigation, we develop an experimental manipulation of rights versus responsibilities and evaluate whether framing an arrangement between two parties in terms of rights, versus responsibilities, affects people’s judgment. We found that people judged unequal distributions between two parties as less fair when framed in terms of rights than in terms of responsibilities. Furthermore, people judged a rights framing as fairer for an unequal (vs. equal) contractual agreement. Thus, a subtle framing manipulation can increase or decrease people’s sensitivity to unequal distributions. We discuss potential mechanisms for this effect and implications for behavioral law as well as the potential to nudge people’s sensitivity to inequality.
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