Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 2024-7
Dissemination of RT and Sputnik Content in European Digital Alternative News Environments: Mapping the Influence of Russian State-Backed Media Across Platforms,Topics,and Ideology
The study investigates the dissemination of news content from two Russian state-backed media outlets, RT and Sputnik, within digital alternative news environments in Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. We investigate these media outlets as parts of a Russian “sharp power” strategy, aimed at establishing informational influence within Western news environments. The analysis includes over 3.4 million social media posts containing URLs to RT and Sputnik content, published between January 2019 and March 2022. Drawing on a combined network analytical and computational text analysis approach, we examine the dissemination of RT and Sputnik content across a range of social media platforms (Twitter/X, Facebook, Telegram, VKontakte, Gab, Instagram, Reddit, 4chan, and YouTube). In the Danish and Swedish environments, the dissemination of content into core domestic alternative news communities is limited, primarily taking place on Facebook and, to a lesser extent, on Twitter/X. Fringe platforms such as Telegram, Gab and VKontakte facilitate a wider spread of content within domestic alternative news environments in German-speaking environments, predominantly among right-wing digital clusters. Within German-speaking alternative news environments, the shared content from RT and Sputnik primarily addresses domestic issues, such as COVID-19 policies and vaccines. In contrast, Danish- and Swedish-speaking alternative news environments emphasize foreign policy matters, including the Russian–Ukraine War, WikiLeaks, and Western military actions. These findings contribute to research on foreign state-media operations in digital information environments by focusing on both content and sharing patterns.
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