Subnational Identity,Regional Conflicts,and Public Opinion on Decentralization in Chile

Abstract

Spanish

What factors shape preferences for subnational autonomy in contexts of limited, top-down decentralization? Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we argue that subnational identity can increase support for decentralization, particularly when individuals perceive greater regional conflict. Using data from the 2019 Regional Barometer and representative subsamples from nine Chilean regions, we examine attitudes toward three forms of decentralization: regional administrative, regional fiscal, and municipal autonomy. Results show that regional identity is heterogeneously associated with decentralization preferences, whereas perceived regional conflict is more consistently and positively associated with support for decentralization, especially in the fiscal dimension. Interaction effects vary by region and outcome: In most cases where the interaction is significant, with conflict perceptions widening the gap between respondents with and without regional identity, whereas in others the relationship is weaker or reversed. Overall, the findings suggest that territorial grievances and conflict perceptions—rather than identity alone—are central to public support for decentralization.

Keywords

Public opinion decentralization subnational politics local conflicts Chile

Introduction

Decentralization has become a cross-cutting issue in Chile, as shown by its prominence in two recent constitution-making processes (in 2021–2022 and 2023). Despite their stark ideological differences and eventual rejection, both constitutional proposals advocated increased decentralization to address Chile's territorial diversity and persistent regional conflicts (Bravo, 2024). This widespread support for decentralization contrasts sharply with the country's historical experience of centralism, where decentralization initiatives have typically been elite-driven and top-down, rarely incorporating robust regional participation or bottom-up demands (Contreras et al., 2024). What explains support for decentralization in contexts of centralized, top-down implementation?

We address this puzzle by examining the factors shaping public preferences for decentralization in Chile. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), it hypothesizes subnational identity influences decentralization preferences and that perceiving regional conflicts makes decentralization more favorable. It also states that identity and conflict perception interact: preferences are strongest among those with subnational identity who perceive more regional conflict. Based on 2019 survey data from the University of Los Lagos (CEDER, 2019), this research analyzes public opinion in nine Chilean regions, with a specific focus on preferences for regional administrative and fiscal decentralization, and municipal decentralization.¹

The results show significant heterogeneity across Chile's regions. Subnational identity alone is an inconsistent decentralization predictor, mainly significant where strong historical or cultural factors exist. Perceptions of regional conflict are more reliably linked to support for decentralization. Moderation effects are context-dependent: In some regions, identity amplifies the conflict-support link, but in others, the interaction is weak or absent. Municipal results are highly varied, indicating that municipal decentralization preferences may need more specific local predictors beyond region-focused measures.

The paper makes a significant contribution to the existing literature by systematically exploring these factors. Previous research on Chilean decentralization has primarily focused on structural, institutional, or economic factors (Boisier, 2004; Delamaza and Thayer, 2016; Montecinos, 2013), largely overlooking individual-level attitudes toward top-down decentralization initiatives. We emphasize individual attitudes, focusing on the interaction between subnational identity and conflict perception, to deepen understanding of public opinion's role in decentralization. The regional analysis highlights subnational variations often hidden in national studies, stressing the need for region-sensitive policies. It finds that perceived regional conflicts, not subnational identity alone, consistently drive support for decentralization.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews key theoretical concepts related to decentralization and public opinion, laying the groundwork for the hypotheses. Following this, the paper outlines the methods and data utilized, presents the main empirical findings, and concludes by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of these results for future research and decentralization policy.

Decentralization and Public Opinion

Decades of decentralization reforms in Chile have resulted in a mostly continuous political-administrative model. Scholars see it as top-down, technocratic decentralization, where power stays centralized and subnational actors have limited influence (Contreras et al., 2024; Delamaza et al., 2022; Montecinos, 2023). The Chilean model fits Liesbet and Gary's (2003) Type I multilevel governance, involving authority through a few general-purpose jurisdictions with nested powers and central oversight, but its implementation has favored administrative over political decentralization (Montecinos, 2013), resulting in a highly centralized unitary state. Valenzuela et al. (2019) state Chile shows a vertical, fragmented distribution of competencies, combining administrative delegation, fiscal rigidity, and limited political autonomy.

Reforms like regional governments, development strategies, and direct elections haven't transferred real decision-making power but have reinforced hierarchy between central and regional actors. This limits local authorities’ autonomy and state responsiveness (Henríquez Opazo, 2020; Montecinos, 2006). Thus, Chile remains one of the most centralized countries in Latin America and the OECD (Cravacuore et al., 2024; OECD, 2017).

These institutional dynamics have important implications for public opinion. When decentralization is perceived as symbolic or ineffective, it can generate frustration and skepticism among citizens, particularly in historically neglected regions. A growing body of scholarship highlights the importance of subjective governance evaluations in shaping support for decentralization. In other words, attitudes toward decentralization are not simply a reflection of institutional arrangements; they are shaped by how people experience and interpret the functioning of the state in their everyday lives (Fierro et al., 2020, 2023).

Meanwhile, the study of public opinion on decentralization has grown, shifting from focusing on institutional design and elite preferences to emphasizing individual determinants, linking micro-level attitudes with macro-level contexts (Rodon and Guinjoan, 2018). Scholars use various dependent variables like preferences for competence allocation, trust levels, territorial justice perceptions, and support for substate autonomy to analyze territorial preferences. These measures distinguish between moderate demands for autonomy and radical calls for institutional change.

Various explanations exist for differences in support for decentralization. Economically, wealthier areas may favor decentralization to keep fiscal resources, while poorer regions might oppose it due to dependence on central government transfers (Beramendi, 2012; Henderson and Medeiros, 2021; Knight, 1982). Institutional performance and political trust significantly influence public preferences as well. Kuhn and Pardos-Prado (2021) show that citizens prefer decentralization when national-level corruption is salient but shift towards recentralization when regional-level corruption becomes prominent, emphasizing the critical role of perceived governance quality (Dupuy et al., 2021; Hildebrandt and Trüdinger, 2021). Political dynamics and elite framing also shape public attitudes: Guinjoan and Rodon (2014) emphasize how elites strategically frame decentralization as a remedy for perceived political injustices or inefficiencies, shaping citizen views on autonomy. Likewise, Moreno et al. (1998) and Dupuy et al. (2021) highlight that political mobilization, party competition, and elite discourse significantly affect public preferences regarding competence allocation between national and subnational governments.

Research in highly decentralized contexts further reveals policy feedback effects, whereby citizens’ exposure to decentralized governance structures gradually changes expectations and norms, reinforcing support for decentralization over time (Dupuy et al., 2021; Verhaegen et al., 2021). However, such feedback effects may be weaker or even negative in contexts like Chile, where decentralization remains incomplete, fragmented, and largely symbolic.

In such countries, where decentralization has been incremental and technocratic, citizen support depends less on institutional design and more on perceived responsiveness, trust, and political factors. In Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) effective local service delivery boosts citizens’ support, while poor performance undermines regime legitimacy. In Colombia and Venezuela, decentralization was favored by politicians and citizens seeking more influence, especially where local institutions appeared more accountable (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). More recently, in post-authoritarian Indonesia, support for decentralization can arise even in weak systems, not solely from liberal goals but from efforts to bypass unresponsive elites (Fossati, 2023). Public backing reflects citizens’ perceptions of political authority and inequality, not just institutional setups.

Decentralization reforms in Chile have changed the institutional landscape, but often do not meet citizen expectations. Public support depends on how people interpret these reforms and their experiences with governance and inequality. Yet, most existing literature on public opinion and decentralization is descriptive, focusing on regional support patterns without analyzing underlying causes (Delamaza et al., 2022). This study contributes to this gap by analyzing how local attachments and perceptions of regional conflict shape preferences for decentralization in a context of limited, elite-driven reform.

Subnational Identities, Regional Conflicts, and Support for Decentralization

This section distinguishes three empirical expectations that follow from our argument. First, subnational identity is associated with higher support for decentralization. Second, perceived regional conflict is associated with higher support for decentralization. Crucially, and consistent with SIT, we expect these forces to interact: perceived conflict should strengthen the association between subnational identity and support for decentralization.

We identify the elements that play a crucial role in shaping how people perceive reality and, in turn, form an opinion—in this case, an opinion about decentralization. The main problem when attempting to understand the construction of these opinions is the fact that much of the literature (Disi Pavlic and Huanquil, 2026; Delamaza and Ochsenius, 2010; Faguet, 2014; Faguet et al., 2015; Finot, 1998; García-Guadilla and Pérez, 2002; Pozo, 1990) approaches the issue from the opposite perspective, as it has been argued that decentralization serves to address certain shortcomings of the centralized model—primarily democracy and participation—thereby overlooking a basic foundation such as citizens’ attitudes toward this issue. From this perspective, it is assumed that these shortcomings often carry significant weight before implementation and play a fundamental role in shaping opinions.

This paper advances decentralization studies by linking subnational identity and regional conflicts—two key but often separately examined dimensions. Though subnational identity influences opinions on decentralization, federalism, and autonomy (Gourevitch, 1979; Knight, 1982; Requejo, 2001), the interplay between regional conflicts and subnational identity offers a new way to understand support for decentralization. This study explores how regional conflicts influence and strengthen subnational identities, affecting attitudes toward decentralization. Using SIT and examples from Chile and other countries, the paper shows how these identity dynamics and conflicts shape public preferences.

SIT, as developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), provides a foundational framework for understanding how individuals derive their self-concept from group memberships. SIT posits that identification with groups, such as regions or nations, leads to in-group favoritism and can influence political behavior, including attitudes toward governance structures. Drawing on SIT, we conceptualize subnational identity as an individual's psychological attachment to a place below the national level—whether a neighborhood, city, or region. This broader category enables us to examine the political implications of territorial belonging across various spatial scales.

This perspective has been widely applied to explore decentralization, in which subnational identities often demand greater autonomy to assert their distinctiveness. At the core of SIT is the idea that intergroup dynamics can lead to conflict when one group's goals, status, or resources are perceived as being at odds with those of another. These dynamics are especially relevant in understanding how subnational identities may emerge or strengthen in response to perceived neglect or exploitation by central authorities (Lalonde et al., 2016; Moreno et al., 1998).

Subnational identities have long been a critical factor in decentralization processes worldwide. In many cases, decentralization has been driven by strong subnational identities emphasizing cultural, linguistic, or historical distinctiveness. For instance, Catalonia in Spain, Flanders in Belgium, and Quebec in Canada illustrate how subnational identities, rooted in unique cultural or linguistic traditions, have underpinned demands for autonomy or independence (Chassé et al., 2025; Henderson and Medeiros, 2021). In turn, decentralization processes cause policy feedback effects, affecting attitudes towards regionalization (Verhaegen et al., 2021), and in some cases, subnational identity (Hildebrandt and Trüdinger, 2021).

Subnational identities in Chile are shaped by geographic diversity, history, and socio-economic inequalities. They vary regionally with distinct cultural, economic, and political traits. Despite centralization, regions develop strong identities affecting decentralization attitudes. In Valparaíso, the port city's history and economic decline compared to Santiago foster cultural pride and feelings of neglect by central authorities (Fierro et al., 2023, 2024). In La Araucanía, regional identity is closely tied to the Mapuche, Chile's most prominent Indigenous people, whose struggles over land, cultural survival, and ongoing tensions with the central state have significantly influenced the region's collective identity (de la Maza, 2014; Zúñiga and Asún, 2010). In Magallanes, geographic isolation and its historical role as a frontier region have shaped a distinct identity characterized by resilience and self-reliance (Molina, 2011; Mularski, 2012; Zuñiga and Asún, 2013), while Aysén's identity emphasizes environmental preservation and resistance to external exploitation (Pressacco and Rivera, 2015). In O’Higgins, identity reflects pride in rural traditions and a sense of invisibility due to its proximity to Santiago, while in Arica y Parinacota, a strong frontier identity combines cultural hybridity with pride in defending national sovereignty and distinction from neighboring Tarapacá (Reveco-Quiroz and Zúñiga, 2014).

These examples show how subnational identities in Chile are linked to local cultural, economic, and geographic factors. Many regions perceive neglect or exploitation by the central government, fueling decentralization demands. Scholars also note a strong city-level sense of belonging, like among indigenous residents in Santiago (Brablec, 2021; Merino et al., 2020). In Maule, regional identity shows tensions between an older rural, local identity and a newer urban-centered one linked to Talca and Curicó, revealing a fragmented sense of belonging and uneven development (Letelier and Concha, 2016).

H1 (identity): Individuals with stronger subnational identity are more likely to support decentralization.

However, subnational identity is not inherently opposed to support for the national state. As Asún and Zúñiga (2013) argue, regional and national identities in Chile are nested, meaning individuals can simultaneously identify with their region and the nation without these identities being mutually exclusive. This nested structure complicates the assumption that subnational identity inevitably fosters decentralization demands, as individuals can simultaneously maintain strong national loyalties that may mitigate or reshape their decentralization preferences, highlighting the need to examine other explanatory factors.

Several studies point to alternative drivers of decentralization, including political party dynamics, economic grievances, and corruption. Guinjoan and Rodon (2014) emphasize the strategic role of party politics in decentralization. Political actors may support decentralization to strengthen electoral coalitions or respond to subnational elite demands. Corruption has also been identified as a significant factor shaping decentralization preferences. Kuhn and Pardos-Prado (2021) argue that decentralization is often pursued as a strategy to mitigate perceptions of corruption by redistributing authority to lower levels of government perceived as more accountable. Finally, economic grievances also play a key role, as Medeiros and Gauvin (2021) demonstrate that individuals in economically disadvantaged areas of Canada are more likely to support decentralization to address regional inequalities and perceived neglect by central authorities Together, these factors underscore the multidimensional nature of decentralization and the importance of looking beyond subnational identity to understand its dynamics more fully.

Subnational conflicts can also affect demands for decentralization. Territory and society influence one another in a relationship wherein territories “are the result of social practices, and that these, in turn, are influenced by the current form of territorial organization. Conflicts, interests, and inequalities are expressed there, and they are also the stage for practices that renew or reactivate those conflicts” (Delamaza and Thayer, 2016: 145–146). Furthermore, Delamaza et al. (2017) point out that conflicts from local issues promote associativity in addressing local problems, but high centralism and unitary traditions limit local governments’ solutions. Indeed, Falleti (2010: 229) states that a decentralization process driven by subnational levels, combined with the positive action of local coalitions, has advanced decentralization in much of Latin America.

H2 (conflict): Individuals who perceive higher levels of regional conflict are more likely to support decentralization.

SIT explains how regional conflicts relate to subnational identities, especially in Chile. It states that people form their identity based on social groups like regions or nations, leading to in-group favoritism and out-group bias. Conflicts happen when external actors, like the state, threaten a group's goals, status, or resources. These threats increase the importance of group identity, boost in-group cohesion, and prompt collective actions to defend the group's interests. In Chile, subnational identity is shaped by hierarchical relations and historical grievances over resource distribution and cultural tensions (González et al., 2016). These conflicts often exacerbate the perception of regional neglect by the central state, strengthening demands for decentralization.

Moreover, identity activation in conflict contexts is not limited to political or cultural dimensions. Identity-based dynamics in Chile and Mexico also intersect with social well-being, as subordinated groups often experience a heightened awareness of their collective identity in the face of systemic inequalities (Eller et al., 2016). Furthermore, local conflicts can intensify subnational identities and drive increased demands for autonomy or decentralization, especially when regional actors effectively mobilize grievances through established political structures, such as local parties or movements (Brancati, 2006). These dynamics underline how regional conflicts amplify subnational identities, particularly when individuals perceive their group's resources or autonomy to be under threat.

In Chile's regional conflicts, issues like environmental degradation, resource extraction, and cultural preservation reinforce subnational identities. These conflicts boost support for decentralization and interact with existing regional identities. Stronger identities make conflicts more likely to be seen as decentralization; weaker ones do not mobilize as much support. We suggest that perceived regional conflicts influence how territorial identities shape decentralization preferences.

SIT suggests a conditional mechanism linking perceptions of conflict, territorial identities, and attitudes toward decentralization. Perceived regional conflict can heighten the salience of territorial group boundaries and make identity-relevant considerations more politically consequential. As a result, conflict perceptions should translate into stronger support for decentralization, particularly among individuals who already identify with a subnational community, for whom decentralization can be interpreted as a means of securing greater group autonomy. This dynamic is captured in our third hypothesis:

H3 (moderation): Perceived regional conflict strengthens the relationship between subnational identity and support for decentralization; that is, the positive association between stronger subnational identity and decentralization support is larger at higher levels of perceived conflict.

We do not formulate a mediation hypothesis; our theoretical and empirical focus is on moderation (a conditioning relationship) between identity and perceived conflict.

These hypotheses suggest that both subnational identity and perceptions of conflict influence support for decentralization. Subnational identity may encourage regional autonomy where cultural belonging is strong, but its impact is heightened when regional conflicts signal neglect or injustice. In such cases, identity shapes political preferences and how grievances are perceived. Therefore, the strongest support for decentralization likely occurs where subnational identity and regional conflict perceptions coexist.

Data and Methods

Since decentralization is implemented nationwide but may be perceived differently across territories, analyzing subnationally representative data is essential. The 2019 Regional Barometer survey provides an opportunity to analyze public opinion across various regions. This survey includes a sample of 4205 respondents from nine regions: Antofagasta, Coquimbo, Metropolitana, Libertador General Bernardo O’Higgins, Biobío, La Araucanía, Los Lagos, Los Ríos, and Ñuble. The sample size for each region is 450 respondents, except for the newly established Ñuble region, which includes 605 respondents. The margin of error is 4.6% for most regions, while Ñuble has a lower margin of error at 1.5%. Because our theoretical argument generally concerns decentralization at the regional tier, we focus the main analysis on regional decentralization outcomes. Models using municipal decentralization outcomes are reported in the Appendix.

Although the data do not cover all sixteen regions, the sample includes most of Chile's population, reflecting its geographic, demographic, and cultural diversity. It covers regions in the north, center, and south; includes major urban areas such as the Santiago Metropolitan Region and Biobío; and also rural regions such as Ñuble. It represents both older divisions from the 1974 reform and newer ones like Los Ríos (established in 2007).

The absence of regions with well-documented subnational identities, such as Arica y Parinacota, Valparaíso, and Magallanes, means the sample likely underrepresents contexts where identity-driven support for decentralization would be strongest. As such, the observed correlations between subnational identity and decentralization preferences emerge in a setting more akin to a least-likely-cases design, making these associations highly confirmatory (Gerring, 2007: 233–237).

To analyze perceptions of decentralization, we use three variables based on survey questions about its importance. The first asks how important it is for regional governments to make decisions independently of the national government. The second concerns the importance of regional taxes remaining there. The third, similar to the first, asks about increased decision-making by municipalities versus regional authorities. With Falleti's (2005) typology in mind, the first and third questions assess perceptions of administrative decentralization and autonomy in subnational policymaking. The second question relates to fiscal decentralization, reflecting preferences for regional financial allocation resources.² The questions are measured using the same four-point Likert scale. Thus, our dependent variables capture regional-level support for decentralization, which are reported in the main text. The analyses using municipal-level outcomes are presented in the Appendix as extensions.

Table 1 presents the response frequencies of the dependent variables, showing more than 57.2%, 53.9%, and 67.1% of respondents consider it very important for regional and municipal governments to have greater autonomy and for taxes to remain in the region, respectively. On the opposite extreme, 4.3% and 4.1%, and 3.4% consider these issues to be not important at all. Respondents, therefore, show high levels of support for administrative decentralization and slightly higher ones for fiscal decentralization. Support for regional decentralization is also higher than for municipal decentralization.

Table 1.

Perceptions About the Importance of Decentralization.

	Thinking about the progress of the regions, how important do you consider…
	…that Regional Governments can make more decisions independently from the Central Government?		…that the taxes generated from activities in this Region remain exclusively in the Region?		…that Municipalities can make more decisions independently from the Regional Government?
Category	N	%	N	%	N	%
Very important	2,407	57.24	2,822	67.11	2,265	53.86
Somewhat important	955	22.71	718	17.07	1094	26.02
Not very important	372	8.85	295	7.02	395	9.39
Not important at all	181	4.30	141	3.35	171	4.07
DK/NA	290	6.9	229	5.45	280	6.66
Total	4,205	100	4,205	100	4,205	100

Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019).

To capture subnational identity empirically and test Hypothesis 1, we use a survey item that asks respondents which territorial unit they identify with the most. The prompt was “If you had to define the place or territory to which you belong, which place would you choose first?” Sense of belonging is an appropriate measure of identity since it captures individuals’ psychological attachment to a particular place and reflects how they define their social and territorial membership (Lewicka, 2011).

As Table 2 shows, respondents had eight options. The most frequent category was neighborhood (38.2%), followed by commune (16.3%),³ and town or locality (11%). For the outcome variables measured at the regional level, identification was dichotomized as identification with the region (6.8%) versus all other categories. For the municipal autonomy variable, identification was operationalized as identification with the commune versus all other categories.⁴ This operationalization aligns the identity measure with the institutional level referenced in each dependent variable (regional governments for regional outcomes; communes/municipalities for municipal autonomy), reducing conceptual mismatch and measurement noise that would arise from pooling informal or non-autonomous territorial attachments.

Table 2.

Distribution of Territorial Belonging Question.

Category	N	%
Neighborhood	1,607	38.22
Town or locality	464	11.03
Commune	685	16.29
City	673	16
Province	81	1.93
Region	287	6.83
Country	346	8.23
Continent	29	0.69
DK/NA	33	0.78
Total	4,205	100

Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019).

Hypothesis 2 is tested using a grid of questions asking respondents whether they have heard about five conflicts in their region that could affect economic, environmental, and cultural activities.⁵ Since more than 75% of respondents reported awareness of at least one regional conflict, we constructed an additive scale that counted the number of conflicts each respondent perceived (ranging from 0 to 5), as shown in Table 3. While the modal category is zero perceived conflicts (23.3%), most respondents were aware of multiple conflicts, with an average of 2.4 (with a standard deviation of 1.8).

Table 3.

Perception of Regional Conflicts.

Number of Perceived Conflicts	N	%
0	979	23.28
1	554	13.17
2	579	13.77
3	670	15.93
4	686	16.31
5	697	16.58
DK/NA	40	0.95
Total	4,205	100

Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019).

Statistical analyses also include a series of control variables to examine the independent association between subnational identity, regional conflicts, and attitude toward decentralization.⁶ These include four attitudinal, four behavioral, four sociodemographic, two geographic, and one contextual variable external to the survey. The attitudinal covariates are preference for democracy,⁷ trust in the regional government, perceptions of corruption in regional institutions and organizations,⁸ and left-right ideology. The behavioral ones are using national, regional and social media to be informed about regional affairs,⁹ and participating in social organizations. The sociodemographic covariates are gender, age, socioeconomic level, and education. The two geographic controls measure whether respondents live in the regional capital or other urban or rural areas.

To complement the survey-based measure of perceived conflict and respond to concerns about common-method bias and reverse causality, we also incorporate an objective indicator of conflict exposure based on protest events. Using the COES Observatory of Conflicts dataset (COES, 2019) we construct contextual measures of protest activity at both the region and commune levels (per 1,000 inhabitants):¹⁰ the rate of protests with regionalist, local or ethnic demands. We use these measures as a contextual control to assess whether the central patterns we document are sensitive to reliance on self-reported conflict perceptions.¹¹

Results

The hypotheses are tested using three sets of models. The first set, which evaluates Hypotheses 1 and 2, has three models, one for each dependent variable. Multilevel ordered logistic regressions are used since the four-point scales used have a limited set of hierarchical values (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013: 99). To account for local dynamics, regional random intercepts are used for the regional decentralization outcome variables, and municipal random intercepts are added to regress the municipal-level outcome.¹² To evaluate Hypothesis 3, the second set of models uses the same model specifications as the first but adds an interaction term between the subnational identity and conflict perception variables. Finally, to take advantage of the regional-level representativeness of the Regional Barometer survey, the third set of models regresses the three dependent variables on each of the nine regional subsamples.¹³ All models use the corresponding (sample or subsample) survey weights and were carried out on Stata 18 (StataCorp, 2023). To facilitate the interpretation of the interaction terms (Brambor et al., 2006: 75), figures are presented that graphically illustrate the observed range of predicted probabilities only for the models in which Wald tests indicate that the interaction term is jointly significant. All predicted values are plotted across the full range of conflict perception (0–5), which is observed in the general sample and the regional subsamples.¹⁴ To streamline the presentation and align the empirical tests with the theory and measurement, we report regional-outcome models in the main text and present municipal outcomes in the Appendix.

Main Results

The first set of models provides partial support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.¹⁵ Figure 1 summarizes the estimated associations of subnational identity and perceived regional conflict with the two regional outcomes. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, subnational identity is positively associated with support for regional fiscal decentralization: respondents who identify with their region have 60.6% higher odds of considering increased regional fiscal autonomy “very important” (p < 0.05). By contrast, the association between regional identity and regional administrative decentralization is smaller and not statistically significant. Similarly, for Hypothesis 2, perceived regional conflict is associated with 26% higher odds of considering regional fiscal decentralization very important (p < 0.01), while its association with regional administrative decentralization is weaker and not statistically significant.¹⁶

Figure 1.

Multilevel Regressions of Importance of Regional Decentralization Over Regional Identity and Perception of Regional Conflicts. Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019) and COES (2019).

Evidence supports Hypothesis 3: As perceived conflict rises, the gap in decentralization support between those with subnational and national identities widens. Wald tests show that subnational identity and regional conflict perception are jointly significant for decentralization outcomes.¹⁷ Figure 2 shows the predicted probability that respondents view decentralization as “very important” across conflict perception levels for those with and without regional identity. Support increases with conflict perception in both models, but patterns differ by group. For regional decentralization, the support gap is modest but consistent, with regional identifiers slightly more supportive. The gap widens as conflict perception rises, indicating a modest interaction effect. For fiscal decentralization, support rises sharply for both groups, especially among those with regional identity, leading to a clearer divergence as conflict perception grows. Overall, regional conflict perception positively links to decentralization support, with subnational identity influencing this, notably in fiscal decentralization.

Figure 2.

Predicted Probabilities of Importance of Regional Decentralization Over Regional Identity and Perception of Regional Conflicts. Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019) and COES (2019).

Results by Region

To examine regional differences in decentralization preferences, we estimated three main models for each of the nine regions in the 2019 Regional Barometer survey.¹⁸ In these subsamples, identity, perceived conflict, and their interaction are significant in some models, but their effects vary across outcomes.¹⁹

Across region-specific models, evidence for Hypothesis 1 (subnational identity) is limited. In most regions, local identity is not significantly linked to support for regional administrative or fiscal decentralization. The main exceptions are in the fiscal dimension. In La Araucanía, regional identity, linked to Mapuche indigenous identity and historical land and cultural struggles (de la Maza, 2014), has a large and positive correlation with regional fiscal autonomy (p < 0.01). Similarly, in Los Ríos, a region that successfully mobilized strong regional identity sentiments to separate from Los Lagos and become an independent administrative region (Amtmann et al., 2010), regional identity is associated with a preference for greater regional fiscal decentralization (p < 0.05).²⁰ Overall, these results suggest subnational identity alone is not a consistent predictor of decentralization preferences across most Chilean regions, except in contexts with specific historical or cultural dynamics, as observed in La Araucanía and Los Ríos.

By contrast, the results provide more consistent support for Hypothesis 2 (perceived conflict). Perceptions of regional conflicts are positively associated with support for regional administrative decentralization in Coquimbo (p < 0.05), Biobío (p < 0.01), and O’Higgins (p < 0.1). For regional fiscal decentralization, perceived conflict is positively associated with decentralization support in O’Higgins (p < 0.1), Biobío (p < 0.01), Los Lagos (p < 0.1), the Metropolitan Region (p < 0.01), Ñuble (p < 0.1), and La Araucanía (p < 0.01).²¹

The conflicts that may explain these results are patterned across regions by economic sector. In O’Higgins, they are strongly associated with agriculture and farming projects; in the Metropolitan Region, they concentrate around mining and environmental sanitation; in Los Lagos, they are closely linked to salmon aquaculture; and in Biobío and La Araucanía, they are dominated by energy-related projects (often hydroelectric) (Carranza et al., 2020). In this context, conflict may foreground a perceived mismatch between locally concentrated costs and centrally concentrated fiscal and regulatory authority, aligning with arguments that Chile's centralized territorial governance can amplify grievances in conflict zones (Berasaluce et al., 2021). The Los Lagos case is illustrative: analyses of this type of conflicts in the Chiloé Archipelago emphasize how negotiations were largely conducted by the central government, reinforcing perceptions of limited local autonomy despite communities bearing social and ecological risks (Delamaza Escobar et al., 2023). A related logic appears in Ñuble, where the region-creation process explicitly invoked resource scarcity and limited local decision power over centrally allocated funds, linking territorial grievances and mobilization to demands for greater fiscal autonomy (Rodríguez Leiva, 2017).

Wald tests show that the interaction terms are jointly significant for all three outcome variables across regions. Local identity and perception of conflicts are significant for regional administrative decentralization in Coquimbo and Biobío. Significance also appears in O'Higgins, Biobío, La Araucanía, Metropolitan, and Los Ríos for fiscal decentralization. Interactions are significant in five regions for municipal decentralization. These findings indicate that the influence of subnational identity and perceived conflict affects various regional levels and contexts, not limited to specific areas.

In regional decentralization, predicted conflict perception probabilities show a clear moderation in Coquimbo and Biobío (Figure 3). At low conflict, non-regional identifiers more often see decentralization as “very important,” but with increasing conflict, this reverses: regional identifiers’ probability rises faster, making them more likely to rate decentralization as “very important” at high conflict levels. Thus, conflict perception boosts support for decentralization in both groups, but more strongly among those with regional identity, creating a cross-over at high conflict levels. These patterns align with Hypothesis 3, indicating regional identity amplifies the link between perceived conflict and support for decentralization.

Figure 3.

Predicted Probabilities of Importance of Regional Administrative Decentralization Over Regional Identity and Perception of Regional Conflicts, by Region. Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019) and COES (2019).

Figure 4.

Predicted Probabilities of Importance of Regional Fiscal Decentralization Over Regional Identity and Perception of Regional Conflicts, by Region. Source: Authors with data from CEDER (2019) and COES (2019).

Support for regional fiscal decentralization generally rises with conflict perception across five regions, but baseline support and the strength of this link vary (Figure 4). In O’Higgins, regional identifiers show a sharp support increase from low to moderate conflict perception, then saturate. In Biobío and Metropolitan Region, both groups see support rise steadily, with regional identities consistently more supportive, though the gap narrows in Biobío as conflict perception increases. Los Ríos shows regional identifiers maintaining high, stable support, while non-identifiers gradually increase support, reducing but not eliminating the group differences.²² In La Araucanía, support among those with regional identity is nearly universal, while among those without, support rises as conflict perception increases. These patterns support Hypothesis 3, showing that the link between perceived conflict and preferences for fiscal decentralization depends on regional identity, though the strength and direction of this moderation vary contexts.

Regional models show that the links between identity, perceived conflict, and decentralization preferences depend across contexts. Perceived conflict generally correlates with higher support for decentralization, but how identity influences this varies in size and direction, indicating a moderation effect rather than a single identity effect. This means decentralization attitudes in countries like Chile cannot be guessed from national data alone: the same identities and grievances can lead to different preferences depending on local history and institutions. Therefore, regionally focused analysis is crucial for understanding and theory development.

Conclusions

This study analyzes factors shaping preferences for decentralization in Chile, emphasizing the role of subnational identity and perceptions of regional conflicts. Drawing on SIT, it argues that subnational identity positively influences decentralization preferences, especially in contexts marked by regional conflict. Using data from the 2019 Regional Barometer survey, representative of nine Chilean regions, the findings underscore significant regional variation and complexity.

Contrary to initial expectations and some previous literature (Henderson and Medeiros, 2021; Moreno et al., 1998), subnational identity alone was inconsistently and often negatively associated with support for decentralization. Positive associations emerged primarily in regions characterized by strong historical or cultural dynamics, such as the Mapuche-influenced identity in La Araucanía (de la Maza, 2014) and the regionalist mobilization in Los Ríos (Amtmann et al., 2010), but these were exceptions rather than the norm. Notably, municipal identity negatively correlated with municipal administrative decentralization in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, reflecting how fragmented subnational identities might undermine collective demands for greater local autonomy in highly centralized metropolitan contexts (Valenzuela et al., 2021).

Perceptions of regional conflicts emerged as a more consistent predictor of decentralization preferences, aligning with broader discussions on the role of grievances in support for decentralization (Brancati, 2006; Delamaza and Thayer, 2016). Awareness of regional disputes correlated positively and significantly with support for decentralization across multiple regions and decentralization dimensions—regional administrative, fiscal, and municipal. These findings confirm arguments that subjective governance evaluations and perceived regional neglect shape support for decentralization (Fierro et al., 2024).

Interaction analyses revealed that identity and conflict perceptions interact significantly across regions and outcomes, with varied implications. In some cases, identity amplifies conflict perception, supporting decentralization, like in Coquimbo, Biobío, O’Higgins, and La Araucanía. However, unexpected negative correlations occurred in places like Los Ríos and some regions, indicating that subnational identity can sometimes act defensively, especially where local institutions seem weak.

These findings have significant theoretical and policy implications for how decentralization is justified and designed in highly centralized settings. Decentralization is often defended as a way to improve responsiveness, accountability, and the quality of democracy by bringing decision-making closer to citizens (Faguet, 2014; Faguet et al., 2015). Our results indicate that in Chile, support for decentralization comes more from territorial grievances and conflict than identity. Citizens see autonomy as a remedy for unresponsive or misaligned centralized decisions. Reforms can shift attitudes as citizens experience and understand institutions (Mettler and Soss, 2004). This links micro-level preferences to debates on democratic legitimacy and regime support under multilevel governance, where positive views of subnational performance can boost support, but weak or distrusted institutions can undermine it (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Kuhn and Pardos-Prado, 2021). Conversely, they also underscore a core promise of decentralization: to institutionalize, channel, and address territorial and social conflicts within democratic institutions (Keil and Anderson, 2018).

In particular, the variation in results across regions highlights the value of subnational analysis for understanding decentralization, which is profoundly shaped by territorially uneven grievances, identities, and political contexts (Eaton, 2020; Giraudy et al., 2019). This aligns with prior literature emphasizing that territorial preferences and identity-driven politics are spatially contingent and cannot be inferred from national averages (Henderson and Medeiros, 2021; Rodon and Guinjoan, 2018). It goes beyond description by showing that the “national” decentralization debate depends on local logics: in some regions, conflict perceptions activate territorial identities, while in others, this link is weaker or reversed, emphasizing region-specific political and institutional factors (Brancati, 2006; Guinjoan and Rodon, 2014). The Los Ríos case shows that the grievance-amplifier effect depends on governance perceptions: when regional corruption is considered, conflict perceptions do not boost support among regional identifiers, supporting the idea that support for decentralization hinges on perceived subnational governance quality (Kuhn and Pardos-Prado, 2021; Verhaegen et al., 2021).

Second, the inconsistent role of subnational identity suggests reevaluating how identity influences decentralization, as subnational identities may not always lead to more support for autonomy in incomplete reforms. In consolidated systems, policy-feedback mechanisms can stabilize pro-decentralization attitudes as citizens “experience” regional institutions over time (Verhaegen et al., 2021). In Chile's more fragmented and centrally constrained model, by contrast, our results suggest that perceived conflicts and performance-related evaluations are especially central in structuring support (Contreras et al., 2024; Montecinos, 2023). Decentralization reforms build legitimacy by addressing regional grievances with substantive actions like credible competence transfer, resources, and accountability, rather than symbolic identity appeals. Differentiated decentralization matching authority and resources to regional demands can be especially valuable (Allain-Dupré et al., 2020). Such links between grievances and institutional preferences are also plausibly mediated by elite cues and framing, which can render territorial conflicts legible as problems of authority and competence allocation (Bullock, 2011).

An additional important insight is that although communal identity is far more prevalent among respondents, the association between regional identity and support for decentralization is more consistent. This distinction aligns with Abdelal et al.'s (2006) framework, which differentiates identities by their content and the degree of internal contestation. Regional identities in Chile often focus on center–periphery issues and grievances, making decentralization political. Communal identities are more diverse and less tied to institutions. Our findings show that identity operates through relational and purposive content, with conflict perceptions boosting political importance differently across regions (Abdelal et al., 2006; Brancati, 2006).

Several limitations should be emphasized. First, the Regional Barometer item for identity is dichotomous (identify with the region: yes/no), preventing measurement of intensity, multiple attachments, or salience. Future work should test whether stronger or more multidimensional attachment measures yield different patterns (Lewicka, 2011). Our key predictors rely on perceptions of conflict and regional corruption, which are meaningful but may reflect biases, raising concerns—so we interpret cautiously. While we partly address this with protests as an objective measure, stronger causal methods like experiments are needed. Finally, municipal autonomy varies greatly, likely due to measurement mismatch, highlighting the importance of local factors such as service quality, capture concerns, networks, and trust (Córdova and Layton, 2016).

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-pla-10.1177_1866802X261440957 - Supplemental material for Subnational Identity, Regional Conflicts, and Public Opinion on Decentralization in Chile

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-pla-10.1177_1866802X261440957 for Subnational Identity, Regional Conflicts, and Public Opinion on Decentralization in Chile by Tomás Huanquil Vega and Rodolfo Disi Pavlic in Journal of Politics in Latin America

Footnotes

Acknowledgments

Rodolfo Disi acknowledges support from the Chilean National Agency for Research and Development (ANID) through the projects Fondecyt Regular ANID/FONDECYT/1230733, the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES) ANID/FONDAP/15130009, and the Millennium Institute for Authority and Social Regulation (ASOR) ANID/MILENIO/ICS2025_02. The authors are grateful for the detailed and insightful comments provided by Amanda Domingos De Lima and Virginia Rocha. They also thank the participants of the Segundo Congreso del Sur, organized by the Universidad Austral de Chile, and the XII COES Internacional Conference, for their valuable feedback on an earlier version of this paper.

Data Availability Statement

Replication code and non-restricted materials are available in the Harvard Dataverse (Disi Pavlic and Huanquil Vega, 2026). The 2019 Regional Barometer data used in this study should be requested directly from CEDER.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Ethical Approval and Informed Consent Statements

This study uses secondary data from the Barómetro Regional survey, conducted by the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo Regional y Políticas Públicas (CEDER) at the Universidad de Los Lagos, Chile. The anonymized dataset does not contain personally identifiable information. As such, no additional ethical approval or informed consent was required for this analysis.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article was supported by Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico, Fondo de Financiamiento de Centros de Investigación en Áreas Prioritarias, Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (grant numbers ANID/FONDECYT/1230733, ANID/FONDAP/15130009, ANID/MILENIO/ICS2025_02).

ORCID iDs

Tomás Huanquil Vega

Rodolfo Disi Pavlic

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author Biographies

Tomás H Vega is a political scientist from the Universidad Católica de Temuco pursuing a master's degree in Government and Public Affairs from the same university, supported by a CONADI postgraduate scholarship. His professional experience includes higher education management and community development projects, with a focus on innovation, territorial equity, and indigenous participation. He currently serves as Executive Secretary of the ANID InES Género project at Universidad Católica de Temuco. His research explores subnational identities, decentralization, and participatory governance in southern Chile.

Rodolfo Disi Pavlic is Associate Professor at the School of Government, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, and Principal Investigator of the Millennium Institute for Authority and Social Regulation (ASOR). A political scientist specializing in comparative politics and political behavior, his research focuses on political participation, social movements, and subnational politics. He currently leads a project on municipal democratic quality in Chile and has participated in projects on protests, labor movements, and public opinion. His work appears in journals such as Social Movement Studies, Latin American Politics and Society, and World Development.

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