Agrosuper,Out! A Case Study of Successful Community Mobilization Against a Mega Pork Production Facility in Freirina

Abstract

This article examines the environmental conflict that developed in Freirina, Chile, between 2011 and 2012 around Agrosuper, owner of the largest agro-industrial project ever built in the country. The stench coming from the feces distressed the residents, triggering a community uprising that attracted a great deal of national attention and even compromised some political authorities. As a result, Agrosuper decided to shut down the company by the end of 2012. The Freirina case exemplifies a “David versus Goliath” dynamic, in which a community achieves a remarkably successful outcome by stopping the operation of a huge industrial facility. To analyse this outcome, the article applies Marco Giugni's joint effects model, while integrating additional conceptual frameworks to elucidate the causal mechanisms that explain the effect of this conflict.

Introduction

In 2005, the Proyecto Agroindustrial del Valle del Huasco obtained a favourable environmental resolution (RCA) from the Regional Environmental Commission of Atacama (COREMA). Owned by Agrosuper, Chile's largest agribusiness conglomerate, the RCA allowed a 500-million-dollar investment with an unprecedented projected capacity of housing two and half million hogs. Given its massive scale, the company acquired nearly 60,000 hectares in Freirina, a sparsely populated rural commune located in the Huasco Province in the northern region of Atacama. The scale of the enterprise made the Agrosuper-Huasco project one of the largest swine barns in the world (Bangkok Post, 2020).

Six years later, after starting its operation in 2011, residents of Freirina started protesting the project due to the persistent stench of manure from slurry ponds. Due to poor odor management, a highly contentious social movement (SMO) arose in Freirina. After several months of clashes, the company announced an indefinite shutdown of their operation in December of 2012.

The outcome of this conflict was unexpected. Organised communities are less likely to shut down established enterprises compared to projects that are still undergoing environmental impact assessment (EIA) (Kemberling and Roberts, 2009). Similar odour-related conflicts in the agricultural sector, such as those of Empresa Agroindustrial Coexca and the Sopraval turkey plant, have not achieved the same level of success. Freirina is one of the rare cases in Chile where community resistance led to the indefinite shutdown of a functioning mega-project.

By examining this unusual case, this article contributes to the literature on the SMO consequences, specifically by bridging the Giugni joint-effects model (JEM) (Giugni, 2004) with a clearer understanding of the mechanisms that unfolded during resistance to a mega-project. The first section of the article outlines the analytical framework and discusses key concepts shaping the case study, with particular attention to SMO outcome literature and the broader context of the Chilean social movements. Theoretically, this article builds on Marco Giugni's JEM, which highlights the simultaneous interaction of social movements, political alliances, and public opinion for driving policy changes. Methodologically, this study is framed as a “least likely” case study (Gerring, 2007a). Subsequently, the article presents the case study, examining the interplay of antecedents, grievances, organisational assets, and the escalation of the struggle within the dynamics of the social movement. The article concludes by analysing the mobilisation's short- and medium-term impacts, along with a set of the study's theoretical implications.

Analytic Framework

The central question of this article is not new. This study adopts the SMO concept from scholars examining community resistance to energy projects, defining it as the organised efforts of marginalised groups “to promote or resist changes that involver recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation” (McAdam and Boudet, 2012: 45). According to Giugni, the primary non-institutional form of political participation is protests events, though social movements employ various other tactics (Rossi, 2015).

Research on the consequences of SMO builds on foundational models like resource mobilisation theory, which emphasises internal capacities such as financial resources, organisational capacities, and strategic leadership (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). More multifactorial approaches, such as the political process framework, highlight the interaction between social movements and the broader political context, emphasising how structural and institutional factors shape a movement's emergence, development, and success (McAdam and Tarrow, 2018). Another key perspective is the mediation theory, which argues that mobilisation and effective framing are essential prerequisites for exerting influence (Amenta et al., 2010). This model stresses that challengers must secure the support of institutional political actors, such as bureaucratic actors, in order to achieve their goals (Banaszak, 2005).

There is now extensive literature on the various effects of environmental SMOs, incorporating elements from the resource mobilisation, policy process and mediation theory. Environmental SMO can have diverse impacts, influencing policies and corporate practices through mobilising public opinion, leveraging scientific knowledge, or exploiting political opportunities (Rootes and Nulman, 2015). The impact of SMO opposing megaprojects varies by country and case, often depending on the balance of power between dominant coalitions favouring extractivism and oppositional coalitions advocating for socio-environmental protections (Silva et al., 2018).

Giugni formulated three broad hypothesis to assess the conditions influencing the policy effects of three distinct social movements; anti-nuclear energy, peace and ecology movements in the US, Switzerland, and Italy between 1977 and 1995 (Giugni, 2004, 2007). He categorised two conventional hypotheses for explaining social movement's policy impacts: the direct effects model (DEM) and the indirect effects model (IEM). The DEM emphasises the role of resource mobilisation and tactical strategies (Gamson, 1975; Piven and Cloward, 1993). According to this template, the contentious repertoire or the organisational capacities are sufficient to explain an outcome. In the contrast, the IEM emphasises political opportunities and constraints, including the influence of government authorities, which can either support or hinder social movements. This second variant includes the mediation theory, that posit that mobilisation and effective framing are essential prerequisites for exerting influence (Amenta et al., 2010). Giugni introduces a third model, the JEM, which integrates the assumptions of the previous two models. In short, it argues that social movements with alliances in both the institutional arena and in public opinion have a greater chance of achieving policy impacts if their claims are considered “viable” by state interests.

By comparing these three social movements across different national contexts, Giugni concluded that the JEM best explains changes in nuclear energy production and environmental spending, though it has limited explanatory power in foreign policy (Giugni, 2004; Giugni and Yamasaki, 2009). Giugni found that social movements have a modest policy impact which is explained by the combined presence of social movements, public opinion, and institutional allies (measured by the number of left-leaning representatives in the legislative branch) in policy areas that are deemed viable, those that are domestic and less critical to state interests.

Despite the JEM's descriptive strength, Giugni did not fully elaborate on its mechanics. The JEM integrates internal SMO characteristics, such as resource mobilisation, with broader structural opportunities. However, Giugni leaves room for a more detailed examination of JEM's mechanics, particularly its interaction with “scale shift” (Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow and McAdam, 2005), “diffusion” processes (Soule and Roggeband, 2019), and mechanisms in the political opportunity structure literature (Kriesi, 2004). While scale shifts refer to the process by which political contention spreads across levels of organisation or geographic scale, diffusion mechanisms help to understand how ideas, strategies, agendas or claims gain territory and are adopted by a larger percentage of the population (Soule and Roggeband, 2019).

A key factor in Freirina was the offensive odours, an issue that can be classified as a “negative” political opportunity or grievance (Almeida, 2015, 2019). Negative political opportunities can trigger collective action (Almeida, 2019; McKane and McCammon, 2018) and foul stench can function as a type of negative political opportunity since they heighten the collective perceptions of injustices. This is significant, as not all affected communities are aware of the type, intensity, or the source of their exposure. For example, Auyero and Swintun's investigation of flammable, a shantytown situated next to a petrochemical hub in the La Plata Delta, demonstrates that state officials and co-operations create a “toxic uncertainty” that obstructs collective action (Auyero and Swistun, 2008). Toxic emissions often impact communities in subtle, long-term ways, accumulating over time though prolonged exposure to chemical pollution (Nixon, 2011). However, odour exposure does not fall into the category of toxic uncertainty, as odours induce immediate physiological and psychological distress (Stevenson, 2010). Strong, persistent odours generate a sense of danger and disgust, which can initiate and sustain collective action (Hess and Martin, 2006).

Context

The Long Cycle of Environmental Mobilisation in Chile

Democratic governance introduced substantial challenges for mobilisations. Within a framework of limited, top-down environmental institutions (Maillet, 2019), numerous ecological trade-offs triggered early waves of environmental activism (Sabatini, 1997; Silva, 1996). Universities, NGOs, and local organisations played a crucial role in raising public awareness about pollution and the ecological consequences of economic activities, some of which persist today (Bergamini et al., 2017b).

Contemporary Chilean history is marked by significant SMO activity (Donoso and von Bülow, 2017). Environmentalist and civil society organisations have contested the subordination of environmental policies to a neoliberal model (Silva, 1996), criticising that environmental and participatory rights were secondary in respect to property rights and economic growth (Costa, 2012). The absence of significant environmental parties and the limited incorporation of sustainability concerns into mainstream politics pushed the ecological movement away from institutional engagement. Hence, the landscape has been abundant in territorial movements challenging extractive or polluting companies (Delamaza et al., 2017; Fuenzalida and Quiroz, 2012; Maillet and Albala, 2018).

Since the democratisation, a cycle of mega-project resistance began. The first major clash between the government, environmental groups, and a mega-project occurred during the Frei administration, amid the forced expropriation of Mapuche lands for Endesa's Ralco project, a mega-dam in Alto Bío-Bío (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). Subsequent conflicts, such as Hidroaysén (Barandiaran, 2016; Schaeffer, 2017) and Pascua Lama (Cortez and Maillet, 2018; Haslam, 2018; Haslam and Godfrid, 2020), became milestones in environmental activism. Environmental protests have intensified ever since (Delamaza et al., 2017; Sepúlveda and Villarroel, 2012), especially during Sebastián Piñera first term as president (2010–2014). However, resistance has not been limited to mega-projects, as a wave of territorial campaigns also spread across the country. A study on the recent socio-territorial mobilisation cycle found that ∼31 per cent of these protests targeted companies, regardless of their size (Maillet et al., 2024).

Environmental mobilisation has been central to recent political history. The Social Outburt of 2019 was closely linked to environmentalist movements, as twenty seven out of the 155 members of the first constitutional process had an environmentalist stance (Maillet et al., 2024). Indeed, the Social Outburst mirrors previous environmental contentious processes, particularly in its perception of abuse by the elites (Somma et al., 2021).

Institutional Framework: Continuities and Changes

Following Chile's return to democracy, in 1994 the General Bases of the Environment Law (Law 19.300) established the National Commission on the Environment (CONAMA) and the Environmental Evaluation System (SEIA). These institutions were created within a framework of a “protected democracy” (Garretón, 1994; Huneeus, 2014). Under the Eduardo Frei administration (1994–2000), the “Frei Doctrine” prioritised the approval of large-scale economic projects, disregarding technical advice from CONAMA and SEIA. As a result, CONAMA and SEIA functioned as “market enabler” institutions in practice (Tecklin et al., 2011).

In the 2010s, amid the commodity boom, new environmental institutions emerged in response to both international requirements and growing domestic pressure from NGOs and civil society (Madariaga, 2018). Within a “neo extractivist” framework, new environmental institutions were designed to avoid disrupting the economic interests of the elites (Svampa, 2019). In that regard, the law 20,417 established the Ministry of Environment, replacing CONAMA, and created the Environmental Assessment Service (SEA) to oversee SEIA, as well as the Superintendency of the Environment (SMA), responsible for enforcing environmental permits and regulations (Bergamini et al., 2017a). Two years later, in 2012, the Law 20,600 created three environmental courts.

Currently, the law 19.300 defines two key political bodies responsible for environmental licensing. The first is the Environmental Evaluation Commissions (COEVA), a regional body that grants environmental permits. It is chaired by the regional SEA head and the regional presidential delegates and includes regional ministerial secretaries (SEREMIS) from various ministries. The second is the Committee of Ministers, a political body led by multiple ministers, including the Minister of the Environment. Its primary role is to review claims against RCA issued by COEVA. This committee acts as a political instance of review and final decision in the approval or rejection of projects that may have environmental impact in the country. The committee serves as a gatekeeper and, in practice, can exercise veto power over recommendations and decisions made by technical bodies and COEVA.

Environmental institutions remained centralised and hierarchical, sustaining tensions between the state and SMOs. Although the EIA system allows limited avenues for community resistance, it grants neither real veto power nor significant influence over the location or scope of contested projects (Rodríguez-Luna et al., 2021). Environmental courts have been praised as a strength of national environmental institutions (Rodríguez-Luna et al., 2021), providing new channels for social participation through judicialisation (Barandiaran and Rubiano-Galvis, 2019). However, these courts are used more frequently by project proponents than by civil society organisations (Rabi and Campos, 2021). The Committee of Ministers, however, is a reactive body that responds to societal pressure, in fact it was the body that withdrew the RCA of the Dominga mines under Bachelet´s presidency and halted the Hidroaysén mega-dam project under Piñera, both in response to public opposition (Madariaga, 2018). Additionally, the SMA has played a pivotal role in sanctioning controversial projects like Pascua-Lama, partly in response to the pressure from civic society (Haslam and Godfrid, 2020).

Movement's Consequences and Mechanisms

Environmental SMOs have had a significant impact. Due to social pressure, the Pascua Lama (Cortez and Maillet, 2018; Haslam, 2018; Urkidi, 2010) and HidroAysén (Schaeffer, 2017) projects were approved but later halted- Pascua Lama before becoming operational and HidroAysén before entering construction. Additionally, protests during EIAs process have delayed project approval (Huneeus et al., 2021; Irarrazaval et al., 2023). Social movements have also shaped public opinion, raising national awareness of the harmful effects of projects in remote areas of Chile (Schaeffer, 2017).

Social movements have developed strategies to influence policymaking (Madariaga, 2018; Madariaga and Allain, 2018; Silva, 2018). Until the early 2000s, Chile's energy market was deregulated, controlled by a few large companies and reliant on fossil fuels and large-scale hydropower. However, the “Ley Corta 1” and the “Ley Corta 2” bills (2004–2005) introduced Chile's first renewable energy regulations, with environmental organisations like Chile Sustentable collaborating with parliamentarians and regionalist politicians.

Regarding mechanisms, there is no single set of conditions that explains why opposition to the energy projects is successful (Maillet and Albala, 2018). Forming coalitions with state bureaucrats and policy entrepreneurs has been one of SMO's the most consequential strategic choices (Madariaga and Allain, 2018; Silva, 2018). Moreover, the ability to bridge multiple sectors and transcend narrow geographic boundaries reflects a learning process in which SMO adopted multi-level strategies (Cortez and Maillet, 2018), with allies such as NGOs, universities, and journalists serving as strategic brokers (Schaeffer, 2017; Sepúlveda and Villarroel, 2012). Contemporary SMO employ various repertoires of contention, ranging from peaceful protests to disruptive tactics such as roadblocks and strikes (Medel et al., 2022; Medel and Somma, 2016).

Environmental Justice (EJ) and Sacrifice Zones

While many studies focus on successful campaigns, there is also research examining cases of failed resistance. EJ studies in sacrifice zones show that not all affected communities resist the pollution they are exposed to (Ureta et al., 2018). Sacrifice zones are areas subject to “slow violence” (Nixon, 2011) and “toxic uncertainty” (Auyero and Swistun, 2008), meaning they experience pollution in an obscured manner, with the state or the responsible actors failing to communicate the magnitude and type of toxins released. When communities have challenged the polluters, like those opposing mining tailings in the north (Schorr, 2018; Ureta et al., 2018) and petrochemical industries in Quintero-Puchuncaví (Bolados and Sánchez, 2017; Navea and Oyarzún, 2024), the results have been unassertive, like moratoriums. That being said, in recent times political representatives have started to advocate for a better implementation of the law in heavily polluted areas (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2019) and have introduced EJ criteria into energy policies (Apergi et al., 2024).

Methods: Case Selection and Dependent Variable

This case study evaluates the JEM through an environmental conflict, analysing community resistance to a mega-project in a middle-income democracy. Thus, it aims to expand the scope validity of the JEM under a distinct set of conditions. Small-n studies offer an in-depth analysis of unique cases, enabling researchers to explore complexities and contextual factors often overlooked by large-n designs. Small-n studies help clarify context-specific factors and mechanisms, providing significant evidence for or against a theory or model (Lijphart, 1971: 692). Least-likely case studies aim to maximise empirical evidence's ability to confirm theories in contexts where they face a significant risk of disconfirmation (Gerring, 2007b).

This study applies the JEM to an adverse scenario, specifically community resistance to a functioning mega-project. Evidence suggests that SMO opposing operational projects are less likely to succeed (Kemberling and Roberts, 2009). Given the scale of the project and Agrosuper's economic dominance — Chile's largest agro-industrial company — the chances of a favourable outcome were low. Although the literature has examined successful cases such as Hidroaysén (Schaeffer, 2017) and Pascua Lama (Cortez and Maillet, 2018; Haslam, 2018), recent large-n studies on protests effects in the EIA system indicate that while protests can delay the process, they usually do not affect a project's likelihood of approval or rejection (Huneeus et al., 2021; Irarrazaval et al., 2023). In other words, the EIA system is partially responsive to community challenges (Navea and Oyarzún, 2024), as is the case in sacrifice zones (Sanzana Calvet and Castán Broto, 2020).

In Giugni's work, the primary dependent variable is the policy impact of social movements (Giugni and Yamasaki, 2009), operationalised as the extent to which a movement influences public policy changes. For ecological movements, a key dependent variable is the extent to which they influence the adoption or modification of environmental policies (Giugni and Yamasaki, 2009). In the US case, Giugni operationalises as changes in the Environmental Protection Agency's total budget. Freirina is a partially different phenomenon; it is not SMO trying to influence state policies, but rather a community challenging a polluting enterprise, however, the campaign also aimed to affect the environmental regulation and licensing in Atacama.

Freirina aligns with the literature on mega-projects contestation (Silva, 2018; Silva et al., 2018) as it involved a $500 million dollar investment over ∼60,000 hectares, raising concerns about excessive water consumption and a disproportionate the natural resource use in a territory. Though, it is not completely comparable to other similar cases of successful mobilisation, like the Pascua Lama, a mining project that never produced ore before entering its final closure (First Environmental Court, 2020). In fact, Agrosuper was housing about 500,000 hogs when the company announced their indefinite shutdown.

Also, Freirina is not comparable to the anti-salmon farming movement in the Chilean Patagonia. For instance, in 2022 the SMA for the first time revoked RCA of a salmon farm after finding that it had exceeded authorised production limits, which caused irreversible environmental damage to the Alberto de Agostini National Park (SMA, 2022). Nonetheless, the temporal difference is important to note given that in 2012 neither the environmental courts nor the SMA were operational.

The fieldwork took place during February and March of 2020, about eight years after the conflict. First, an extensive collection of press articles, as well as technical and legal documents, was gathered and systematically analysed to reconstruct the timeline and the key characteristics of the conflict (Schreier, 2014). During the exploratory phase, several field observations and informal, unstructured interviews with academics, journalists, and residents of the Huasco Valley were conducted. Given the iterative nature of qualitative research, during a more structured phase, 12 semi-structured interviews with people directly involved in the conflict, such as political authorities, activists, and managers, were conducted to confirm the main hypothesis. Additionally, to strengthen the evidence and contextualise the causal mechanism, four focus groups were conducted, one with public sector officials, another with members of neighbourhood organisations, and two with farmer's organisations. The field notes, interviews, and focus groups were coded and analysed systematically, following state-of-the-art practices in qualitative data analysis (Cyr, 2019; Roulston, 2014).

Case Study

Antecedents

President Ricardo Lagos granted the RCA to Agrosuper, bypassing many of the technical recommendations provided by the environmental agencies. Conferred in 2005 under the “Frei Doctrine,” the RCA overlooked the advice of the regional technical institution and omitted a prior process of substantive consultation (Eichols, 2015). Even though a previous version of the RCA stated that the project should have been developed in three stages, starting with 50,000 reproductive sows, increasing to 100,000, and finally 150,000, President Lagos pushed COREMA to authorise the installation of the facility under the conditions proposed by Agrosuper, bypassing COREMA's recommendations (Eichols, 2015). Chilean law also mandated that project proponents should conduct their own EIA. Agrosuper hired Maria Ignacia Benítez, who a few years later became Sebastián Piñera's Minister of Environment; she was the Environmental Minister during the conflict in 2012 (Urquieta, 2012). Moreover, when the uprising erupted, the country lacked an odour regulatory framework, and neither the environmental courts nor the SMA were functioning. All of these elements cumulated in creating a regulation gap in environmental management.

Freirina is a rural commune in northern Chile, located at the southernmost part of the Atacama region, in a valley named after the Huasco river. The largest neighbouring town — named Huasco, like the valley and the river — is the main provincial port as well as an industrial hub. Huasco is the location of several thermoelectric plants and the smelter plants of the Compañía de Aceros del Pacífico (CAP). Since the return to democracy, the Atacama region has attracted significant and controversial investments, such as the Punta Alcalde, the Castilla thermoelectric plants, and a handful of large-scale mining projects such as the Maricunga gold mine in Tierra Amarilla. Due to the operation's impacts (Pérez et al., 2019), several NGOs labelled Huasco a “sacrifice zone” (Chile Sustentable, 2019).

The Proyecto Agroindustrial del Valle del Huasco was, without question, the largest hog operation ever built in Chile. The barns were designed to accommodate up to 2,500,000 hogs, equivalent to nearly 43 per cent of the total number of hogs produced in the USA in December of 2013 (Pork Checkoff, 2024). Due to the unseen scale of the operation, Agrosuper purchased an area ten times larger than Manhattan. The project encompassed a substantial portion of the Huasco Valley; it included the entire pork production chain, from breeding, fattening, and slaughtering the animals to packaging and distribution the meat products. Because a significant share of the pork was intended for foreign markets, Agrosuper built a shipping dock in Huasco. The facilities were located next to human settlements; < 5 km from Freirina and < 2 km from Maitencillo and Nicolasa. The vast agribusiness complex surrounded all these residences. In this context, the Agro-Industrial Project of Huasco began operations in early 2011.

The villagers in Freirina were adamant that Agrosuper would bring prosperity to their lives. During the EIA between 2004 and 2005, a team of professionals promoted the project at sports events, public meetings, and open gatherings at the city council. The company donated significant resources to local sports clubs, gaining public support in return. During the construction phase, the company invested money into local small-scale businesses, such as accommodation, food services, commerce, and the local workforce. Nearly 500 workers were hired for the construction, many of them residents of Freirina and the surrounding areas. A job office opened at the Freirina city council, explicitly aimed to work for Agrosuper.

The Grievance

Initially, the population in Freirina supported the enterprise. However, this changed rapidly in September 2011, when the gusts of wind carrying the stench of feces and swarms of flies invaded schools, homes, and workplaces in a town previously untouched by such odours. The stench persisted for over nine months until May 2012, when the Health Minister issued a sanitary decree imposing a moratorium on the operations. A key moment in the early stages occurred at the Samuel Castillo Lopez kindergarten in Hacienda Nicolasa. Each morning, teachers were forced to suspend their lessons because the stench was so intense that the children complained of dizziness and headaches. In the following weeks, the foul odours were also being detected in more distant places, such as Vallenar. Residents quickly identified the recently inaugurated Agrosuper sow farms as the source of the stench.

The problem stemmed from the treatment of the pig slurry in open-air ponds, which relied on a trickling filter — an aeration system that used bacteria in open-air lagoons to break down waste. The pigs produced large volumes of feces mixed with water, which was then transported to collection chambers. In September 2011, a major pipeline connecting the slurry chamber to the air ponds failed, killing the bacteria responsible for breaking down the wastewater. The rupture of a critical pipe in the trickling filter caused a sharp decline in fecal-decomposing bacteria, unleashing an overwhelming stench.

Manure lagoons are among the most controversial aspects of hog farming (Carolan, 2007). The odours from waste lagoons are notoriously difficult to control (Zahn et al., 2001) and Agrosuper's lagoon was exceptionally large. Odours are deeply tied to cultural perceptions of status and hierarchy (Classen et al., 1994). For the people of Freirina, the issue was just not the stench, it was also a matter of human dignity. The situation quickly became critical, as the stench disrupted daily lives. Schools and kindergartens were forced to close due to the unbearable odour.

Community Mobilisation

With no prior experience with large-scale agribusiness, Freirina's residents immediately recognized that Agrosuper was the source of the stench. As the stench grew more intense and persistent, it mobilised a handful of local organisations, like neighbourhood councils, sports clubs, and parishes. As in many rural villages, kinship ties played a central role in communal life. A leader from Freirina explained the rich organisational strength of the Huasco Valley:

We took advantage of the organizations that already existed here before. For example, the mothers’ centers of CEMA Chile — they empowered and provided organizational capacities to women (…). Also, clubs for seniors and children. Hence, these institutional organizations were brought together. (Interview n° 6)

Freirina Consciente became the organisational backbone of the community throughout the conflict. Formed in late 2011, it became a major player and leading actor in mobilising people and gathering resources. The main spokespersons, Andrea Cisternas and Yahir Rojas, regularly called for meetings in various parts of the town, such as plazas, sports clubs, and neighbourhood associations. During daily meetings, participants exchanged views and personal experiences about the stench, describing how the company disrupted their daily lives. They discussed the causes and consequences of the stench and collected testimonies about the “environmental suffering” that Agrosuper was causing (Auyero and Swistun, 2009).

Another key player was Radio Profeta, a community radio station that regularly reported on the stench, denounced Agrosuper for not complying with environmental laws, and aired testimonies from across the Huasco Valley. In this matter, Freirina had direct ties to Pascua Lama through Red Radial Profeta FM, a radio station that played a fundamental role in both conflicts (Lorca and Silva-Escobar, 2020).

However, the response to the stench was not unanimous. Residents from lower income areas, particularly in Hacienda Nicolasa, formed Freirina Esperanza, an group that supported the company. Led by Olga Pastene, the group consisted of Agrosuper factory workers. The pro-employment organisation aimed to negotiate a peaceful resolution with the company, seeking to protect the jobs of around 450 Agrosuper workers in Freirina. The group also organised demonstrations but failed to garner the same level of support (La Tercera, 2012).

Strategies of Contention

The foul odour first appeared in September 2011 and persisted until May 2012, when the Heath Minister imposed a moratorium on the company. Early during the conflict, the residents complained directly to the city mayor and demanded to meet with Agrosuper's upper management. They also submitted formal complaints to the regional authorities in Copiapó and Vallenar. In December 2011, Freirina Consciente organised several demonstrations outside the city council. The campaigners took on the Mayor, Roberto Bruzzone, who had been in office since 2008. Bruzzone was accused of defending Agrosuper and having vested interests in their swine farms. Many locals suspected that municipal authorities were colluding with Agrosuper's interests.

During 2012, the conflict started to grow in intensity and geographical extension, garnering the attention of Chile's political authorities. The escalation from peaceful protests to violent tactics was triggered by the company's lack of response. The intensification caused a change in the social movement's scope and “repertories of contention” (Tilly, 1978, 1993). Adopting a new repertoire of contention marked the shift from a contained struggle to an insurgent conflict.

A pivotal moment was the “Battle of Tatara” on 18 May 2012, in Tatara, a frontline village near the Agrosuper food factories. In the preceding weeks, roadblocks had blocked access to Agrosuper offices and interrupted traffic across a large portion of the Huasco Valley. That day, protesters breached the fences and attempted to set fire to the factory. Activists described the Battle of Tatara as a “citizen audit” of the facilities. As they put it, protesters sought to “take justice into their own hands” by sabotaging the company, trespassing on its property, opening cages, and releasing the sows. The desperation caused by the stench paved the way for the adoption of more radical tactics.

During the Battle of Tatara, several police officers and protesters were injured, multiple police vehicles were set on fire, and Agrosuper's central administrative headquarter in Freirina was burned down. Later that day, a group of picketers from the Huasco Valley blocked Route C-46, which connects the port of Huasco to major cities in the region, including Vallenar and Copiapó. At the same time, roadblocks in Maitencillo, Tatara, Nicolasa, Freirina, and El Pinto disrupted traffic and blocked access to Agrosuper warehouses and offices. Protestors also blocked access to other strategic enterprises in Huasco, such as the Guacolda power-generation facilities and the CAP steel factory.

From that point forward, there was a marked shift in the community's strategies, and police forces responded with ruthless repression. The movement was therefore energised by the lack of response and the violent repression by the police:

When we saw how the police forces attacked the neighbors, the opposition to Agrosuper grew in intensity. Even to those who worked for Agrosuper, the images (of police violence) were devastating. Even the quietest people felt enraged. (Interview n° 9)

Agrosuper reinforced its security by installing alarms, surveillance cameras, and guard dogs, as well as hiring professional security personnel. Special police units from other parts of Chile were deployed to support local forces in suppressing the movement. Later, the Human Rights Ombudsman of the Coquimbo Region reported that special police forces severely injured multiple protesters (INDH, 2012). Security guards and police targeted movement leaders, intimidating Yahir Rojas and Andrea Cisternas with anonymous threats and phone calls.

Scale Shift, Diffusion, and Brokers

From the outset, dialogue with authorities and company managers failed to progress as expected. This scaled up the contention “in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and broadened claims” (McAdam et al., 2001). Soon, a network of organisations coordinated by the Movimiento Socioambiental del Valle del Huasco called for taking “direct actions” against Agrosuper. Several organisations accused that due to this, the Huasco Valley was transforming into a “saturated zone.”

Backed by a sparse yet active network of territorial actors, the grassroots movement expanded across the region and “went beyond its localized origins” (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005). Collaboration with environmental groups such as SOS Huasco and the Red Ambiental Norte, which originally opposed large-scale mining projects and coal power units, enabled the scale shift. Although the stench was a triggering event, the conflict's escalation was driven by support from a regional network of environmental activists in the Atacama region. A broad coalition of activists, co-ordinated through the Consejo de Defensa del Valle del Huasco, Huasco Consciente, SOS Huasco, and the Red Ambiental Norte, campaigned against environmental assessments of many coal-powered electricity-generation plants such as Guacolda, Castilla and Punta Alcalde. Strategic support from organisations such as OLCA, as well as the Oceana and Terram foundations, all based in Santiago, was crucial in making the conflict known in the capital. This highlights the crucial role of academics, specialists, and environmental NGOs society who lobbied for Freirina in the capital.

Institutional brokers, such as Cesar Orellana, a member of the Consejo Regional (CORE), brought the case before CORE, where central state officials regularly convene. On several occasions, Orellana denounced the dire situation in Freirina, warning regional and national authorities of an impending escalation. Additionally, during the State of the Union on 21 May 2012, a photograph of senator Isabel Allende holding a “Fuerza Freirina” banner went viral. It was rare for high-profile political figures to align with a remote community disrupting the typicially quiet and passive north.

Institutional Reactions

Regional representative of the Health Ministry (SEREMI), Lilian Sandoval, and the Environment Minister, Mario Manriquez, conducted several on-site inspections in Freirina in December 2011. Technical institutions such as the DGA, the SAG, and the SEA also audited the facilities and sanctioned Agrosuper. However, growing opposition to Agrosuper compelled president Piñera to act. A key political move was the replacement of the Intendenta Ximena Matas on 4 May by Rafael Prohens, an ambitious politician who later became a senator and leader of the right-wing party Renovación Nacional. Following Matas’ resignation, Health Minister Jaime Mañalich visited Freirina and issued Health Emergency Decree n° 18, granting state authorities broader oversight to inspect the facilities and manage odour and sanitary conditions (Ministry of Health, 2012). The decree also imposed a moratorium on Agrosuper from 20 May to 31 August.

A major institutional response was COEVA of Atacama's review of project's RCA. The commission led by newly appointed Intendente Rafael Prohens, included the head of the SEA and other Seremis. They enlisted an international team from the University of Minnesota, which concluded that the facility was oversized. The specialists recommended scaling down the project and subdividing the facilities into three phases, each housing 30,000 reproductive female hogs (Atacama Environmental Commission, 2012). As a result, the commission amended the original RCA, dividing it into smaller phases with a stricter monitoring plan.

Another institutional milestone was the municipal elections in October 2012, which in Freirina centred around the conflict. The incumbent candidate, Roberto Bruzzone, was a member of Renovación Nacional, the same party as President Sebastián Piñera and intendente Rafael Prohens. His main opponent, Cesar Orellana, was a member of Freirina Consciente and also member served on the CORE. After a tightly contested election, Orellana won on 28 October with 50.1 per cent of the vote. Daniel Diaz, a social leader from Huasco and one of the leaders of Frerina Consciente, was also elected as Concejal (City Councilor). Agrosuper viewed the campaigners’ takeover of local government as a negative development. Immediately after the municipal elections, on 9 November, movement leaders and Freirina's newly elected officials travelled to Santiago to deliver an open letter to the president, demanding the permanent — and not just temporal — shutdown of the project.

Public Opinion Resonance

In the JEM framework, public opinion plays a central role in influencing the success of social movements. In Chile, ecology is considered a “valence” issue, as environmental concerns tend to enjoy broad public support (FIMA, 2023). In a brief time, media coverage was sufficient to bring the struggle to the national stage. Journalists, along with independent and mainstream media outlets, played a crucial role in attracting national attention. In fact, television, radio, print, and digital media covered the conflict both regionally and nationally throughout 2012.

Andrea Cisternas and Cesar Orellana played a prominent role in this shaping media coverage. Cisternas was interviewed during prime time on major television networks, including CNN Chile, as well as El Mostrador TV, the leading online news platform at the time. Likewise, once Orellana was elected mayor, he was interviewed on CNN Chile. These interviews transformed a previously unknown town into a national symbol of a “David versus Goliath” battle between a corporate giant and a humble rural community. Journalists from Santiago travelled to Freirina, interviewing residents and leaders who consistently recounted stories of abuse and misconduct by Agrosuper and the government. Community leaders were invited to prime-time talk shows on national television. By March 2012, Freirina had gained national attention.

Meanwhile, the 2011–2012 student protests erupted in Chile's major cities, threatening the popularity of Sebastián Piñera (Castiglioni, 2014; Funk, 2013), the first democratically elected right-wing President in Chile since Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez (1958–1964). These student protests created a political crisis, leading to the resignation of Education Minister Joaquín Lavín in 2011. President Piñera's declining popularity coincided with the escalating crisis in the Huasco Valley. Across Chile, student strikes dominated headlines and disrupted major cities, paving the way for the political rise of Gabriel Boric, a student leader who would later become President of Chile in 2022.

The Outcome

After nearly a year of conflict, on 10 December, Agrosuper's board of directors announced the indefinite shutdown of the Proyecto Agroindustrial del Valle del Huasco. The decision was attributed to the 2012 RCA review by the Atacama COEVA, as well as the SMO's takeover of local government. In 2013, hundreds of thousands of hogs were transported to slaughterhouses nationwide.

The political consequences extended beyond the local level. The movement escalated into a well-organised political campaign, calling for stronger enforcement of environmental laws in the Atacama region. The movement also led to the creation of Chile's first environmental regulation on odour control, specifically targeting swine production facilities. Known as the “Freirina norm,” this regulation was approved in 2022 by the Council of Ministers for Sustainability.

Conclusions

The JEM was developed by analysing the impact of anti-nuclear, ecological and peace SMOs in Italy, Switzerland, and the United States (Giugni, 2004). Giugni concluded that SMOs have a modest yet statistically significant policy impact, shaped by the interaction of social movements, public opinion, and institutional allies in viable policy areas. This study applied the JEM in a different context to expand the understanding of how SMOs influence mega-projects already in operation. The case study argues that all three elements of the JEM — organisational assets, political support, and favourable public opinion — interacted to explain Agrosuper's indefinite shutdown.

The three elements of the JEM are essential for a causal explanation: internal factors such as organisational assets and strategies, a favourable context (or political opportunity structure) and allies within the state. However, the JEM proved effective in a contextwhere public support was strong, yet both the government and the business community resisted change. A key theoretical takeaway is that the JEM serves as a tool for generating hypothesis and identifying the factors associated with SMO success, but it does not fully unpack the inner workings of social movements. To better understand these mechanisms, there are some omitted variables that must be considered.

While the JEM is a parsimonious framework, it does not account for the underlying mechanisms (Falleti and Lynch, 2009; Gerring, 2008). This study encourages using the JEM alongside a deeper exploration of the elements driving contentious dynamics (McAdam and Tarrow, 2018). This case study highlights the need for a more detailed approach to understanding the “nuts and bolts” of collective action impacts, incorporating mechanisms from mediation theory (Amenta et al., 2010) and political process theory (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015), among others.

In odor conflicts, grievances, or “negative opportunities” (Almeida, 2019), play a crucial role in shaping how SMOs emerge and evolve. In Freirina, the unbearable stench both triggered and sustained high levels of activism, despite severe police repression. The role of the grievances in Freirina parallels the 2019 Social Outburst, particularly in terms of “political grievances associated with neoliberalism,” such as the distributive inequalities (Somma et al., 2021). In other words, the conditions under which SMO emerge, particularly the type of grievance, shape their subsequent development.

The JEM can also be enhanced by factors that set SMOs “in motion,” particularly scale shifts and the role of institutional and public opinion brokers in bringing the issue into the public spotlight. Initially, Freirina lacked direct connections to elected political representatives, a common trend in recent Chilean SMOs (Cortez and Maillet, 2018). However, a defining feature of the Freirina mobilisation was its ability to integrate into a broad network of regional activism, transcending the local context and forging alliances with NGOs and broader coalition opposing extractive activities. Once again, striking parallels emerge with the 2019 Social Outburst, as both cases underwent a process of escalation and diffusion. In both instances, a wide range of grassroot organisations, along with “hooded actors,” initially engaged in peaceful protests before escalating into riots and violent actions (Joignant and Somma, 2024). The strategic use of a diverse repertoire of contention, alternating between peaceful and violent tactics, proved pivotal. Lastly, the violent interactions between the challengers and the state illustrate how repression can ultimately radicalise the population (Somma et al., 2021).

In sum, this article sheds light on the complex “contextual mechanics” of the JEM (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). A key consideration is that SMOs are often territorially and temporally interconnected (Tarrow, 1993) with different cycles of mobilisation intersecting across various scales and intensities. In other words, SMO tend to function within “networks of activism” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In this context, NGOs, along with regional and national environmental campaigns, enforce key assumptions from political mediation theory, namely, that “many simultaneous circumstances, some movement-related and some not, are required to effect extensive change” (Amenta et al., 2010).

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-pla-10.1177_1866802X251336251 - Supplemental material for Agrosuper, Out! A Case Study of Successful Community Mobilization Against a Mega Pork Production Facility in Freirina

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-pla-10.1177_1866802X251336251 for Agrosuper, Out! A Case Study of Successful Community Mobilization Against a Mega Pork Production Facility in Freirina by Sebastián Huneeus in Journal of Politics in Latin America