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Abstract

This article reflects on personal observations during twenty years of professional career about the ideas developed within New Institutional Economics (NIE). The general theory is analysed by studying the views of Coase, North, Williamson and Ostrom and subsequently the characteristics and specific requirements of network industries are confronted with each of the authors. Is it relevant to study network industries using the tools and ideas developed by NIE scholars? If so, what views are more relevant in the current multi-channel and multi-level reality? Do “institutions matter” for the case, and if so, in what way?

Keywords

institutions markets policy regulation

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Governance in Network Industries: Lessons Learnt from New Institutional Economics

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