Author Reply: We Don’t Yet Know What Emotions Are (But Need to Develop the Methods to Find Out)

Abstract

Our approach to emotion emphasized three key ingredients. (a) We do not yet have a mature science of emotion, or even a consensus view—in this respect we are more hesitant than Sander, Grandjean, and Scherer (henceforth “SGS”) or Luiz Pessoa (henceforth “LP”). Relatedly, a science of emotion needs to be highly interdisciplinary, including ecology, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. (b) We recommend a functionalist view that brackets conscious experiences and that essentially treats emotions as latent variables inferred from a number of measures. (c) But our version of functionalism is not definitional or ontological. It is resolutely methodological, in good part because it is too early to attempt definitions.

Keywords

emotion feelings functionalism

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