Adolphs and Andler’s methodological functionalism recommends that affective science focuses on what emotions do rather than on what emotions are physically constituted by or how emotions feel. In addition, it is suggested that the functional roles of emotions should be extrapolated from a set of “features” emotions intuitively appear to have. In this brief commentary, I discuss both prescriptions, focusing on the concept of function and on the role folk psychological platitudes should play in a functionalist theory of emotions.
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