Abstract
Disinformation during nuclear emergencies poses critical challenges as state actors exploit information asymmetries to shape public narratives. While contemporary propaganda theories emphasize algorithm-driven disinformation in decentralized networks, traditional state-led propaganda models’ relevance during nuclear crises remains underexplored. This study examines disinformation campaigns during the Zaporizhzhia and Fukushima nuclear emergencies through Jowett and O’Donnell’s (2014|1986|) pre-digital Legitimizing Source Model (LSM) and Deflective Source Model (DSM) in Propaganda and Persuasion. Through multilingual analysis of 522 disinformation instances across state media, private outlets, and social platforms, the authors demonstrate how classical propaganda frameworks effectively capture state actors’ disinformation mechanisms. Their findings reveal two key evolutions: traditional linear propagandist–intermediary–recipient structures have transformed into transnational networks operating across multiple platforms, and digital technologies enable unprecedented temporal responsiveness in narrative deployment and strategic reactivation. These adaptations show how legitimization and deflection mechanisms persist as core propaganda strategies. The study provides theoretical extensions for analyzing state-sponsored disinformation in future nuclear crises.
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