During the European debt crisis, German and Greek media frequently reported on the political conflict between the two countries. This article examines to what extent the media coverage in one country about the other is considered by German and Greek citizens to be hostile (‘hostile media perception’) and influential (‘influence of presumed influence’). Data from a comparative survey in Germany (n = 492) and Greece (n = 484) show that news coverage by foreign media on the European debt crisis is perceived by respondents as hostile against their own country and as influential. Moreover, both media-related perceptions are linked with intensified perceptions of hostility, such as assumptions that an individual’s country is not respected in the other country or that the other country’s citizens are demanding that the individual’s country be punished. Based on these results, it is discussed whether media-related perceptions can have a conflict-intensifying effect in international crises.
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