Organizational history and theory have in recent years begun to integrate the non rational dimensions of action, relationships, and problem-solving with foundational under-standings of rationality.This study demonstrates that when insufficient knowledge bases and extreme urgency are involved, conditions underlying Cold War business– government technological innovations, rational approaches to management and plan ning can prove more metaphorical and confusing than helpful.The case of aircraft jet engine design and fabrication indicates the significance of theoretical frameworks fash ioned by Brunsson and Weick, including the notion of impressionistic management, for situations where innovation is undertaken at the edges of technical and scientific knowl edgeability.
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