Abstract
Franz Kafka’s The Trial (1925) presents a haunting vision of a legal system that operates autonomously, detached from human will or moral considerations. This article examines Kafka’s portrayal of law as a performative and self-sustaining process rather than a human-centered institution. Drawing on J. L. Austin’s speech act theory and Judith Butler’s concept of performativity, the paper explores how law in The Trial functions through ritualized actions that sustain its authority irrespective of substantive justice. Additionally, using Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and contemporary discussions on algorithmic governance, the paper argues that Kafka anticipates modern concerns about automated justice, AI-driven legal decision-making, and predictive policing. The dehumanization of Joseph K. in the novel mirrors contemporary legal realities where individuals become mere data points in bureaucratic and computational legal frameworks. Case studies include AI sentencing systems, automated visa refusals, and predictive policing, all of which reinforce Kafka’s critique of law as an impersonal, inescapable process. The paper further examines the paradox of legal authority in the digital age, where algorithms increasingly mediate justice, often without transparency or accountability. By linking Kafka’s critique of legal performativity to contemporary debates on machine learning in law, bureaucratic statelessness, and predictive surveillance, this paper highlights The Trial’s continued relevance in an era of algorithmic governance and non-human legal actors.
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