As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to transform the contemporary global order, its governance has emerged as a paramount challenge at the intersection of technological innovation and institutional frameworks, marked distinctively by the ascendance of Big Tech companies as formidable new actors in the international arena. This paper examines how Big Tech companies are reshaping global AI governance landscapes through their unprecedented technological capabilities and market influence. While existing literature acknowledges the growing authority of non-state actors in global governance, limited attention has been paid to the distinct mechanisms through which Big Tech companies influence AI governance dynamics. Drawing on new institutional theory and its three-pillar framework, this study develops an integrated analytical framework to investigate three key mechanisms: regulative, normative, and cognitive. Using theory-testing process tracing methodology and taking Google as a critical case study, this research systematically analyzes how Big Tech companies leverage their technological resource endowments, self-regulatory practices, and epistemic authority to influence global AI governance. The findings reveal that Big Tech companies significantly shape governance outcomes through: (1) embedding technical feasibility parameters in formal regulations and standards through strategic deployment of expertise; (2) establishing normative authority through self-regulatory innovations that diffuse globally via multilateral platforms; and (3) shaping shared frameworks of meaning that define how governance challenges are conceptualized and addressed. This study contributes to both global governance and public management literature by theorizing Big Tech’s distinct role as super-sized non-state actors and demonstrating how new institutional theory can illuminate governance dynamics beyond national boundaries.
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