Abstract
New data shows that Latinos weathered the recession well and are poised to seize opportunities for further social mobility.
“They are bringing drugs. They are bringing crime. They are rapists.” Donald Trump’s June 2015 characterization of Mexican immigrants drew widespread criticism from the media for its racist undertone and from academics for its mischaracterization of the Latino community in the United States. And yet, as this issue of Contexts goes to press, Trump remains the front-runner with the highest level of support in what was once a crowded field of Republican presidential hopefuls. In a nutshell, Trump’s statement underscores the perpetual myth among many well-meaning Americans on Latinos’ potential failure to assimilate into American society. The good news is that Trump simply got it very, very wrong!
Over the last decade, four key trends have transformed the Latino experience in the U.S. First, Latinos are the largest minority group in the country. In 2010 they comprised 16.3% of the U.S. population, or 50.5 million people, and they are projected to reach 132.8 million people or 30% of the U.S. population in 2050. Second, members of the Latino second generation (U.S.-born children of immigrant parents) are coming of age in sizable numbers and will transform patterns of ethnoracial inequality in American society in the coming decades. Third, the replenishment of the Latino population with new immigrants has increased the heterogeneity among Latinos by ethnic origin, immigrant generation, social class, and legal status. Lastly, Latinos are increasingly settling in smaller cities and towns in new immigrant destinations outside of traditional immigrant gateways.
At the Latino Festival Parade on Constitution Avenue in Washington, DC.
Elvert Barnes Photography
In light of these trends, I examine patterns of socioeconomic assimilation among Latinos using the most recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) following the Great Recession of 2007-2009. I address two key questions: How do second-generation Latinos fare in comparison to their native peers? And how do second-generation Latinos fare in comparison to their “proxy,” first-generation parents? This new evidence tells a mostly optimistic story. Public and media discussions, such as Trump’s statement, often conflate these two sets of comparisons, leading to confusion and slippage in discussions of upward and downward mobility among the second generation and in interpretations of the empirical evidence. Despite pervasive concerns about Latinos’ potential failure to economically assimilate into American life, I find clear evidence of both intergenerational progress and rapid socioeconomic assimilation for many Latino ethnic groups.
Socioeconomic Assimilation
Two competing perspectives frame the discussion of Latino socioeconomic assimilation in the U.S. On the one hand, the theory of “segmented assimilation” highlights the macro-structural sources of vulnerability that might lead to downward mobility among the Latino second generation: their racial minority status, segregated urban schools, concentration in disadvantaged neighborhoods, and the bifurcated economy that offers fewer good jobs. In their seminal study, Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut point out that Mexicans are most at risk of downward mobility into the “new rainbow underclass.” On the other hand, proponents of “new assimilation” theory, Richard Alba and Victor Nee, argue that the Latino second generation will most likely follow the time-honored path of European immigrants and their descendants, who achieved parity with the White American mainstream over the course of three generations. Alba and Nee suggest that the barriers confronting Latinos are significant, but not insurmountable.
Eden Cortez, earning his M.S., gives a graduation address at Oregon State University in 2013.
Oregon State University, Flickr CC
What accounts for such different predictions on Latino social mobility in prior research? Different studies have captured the Latino second generation in different life stages: from early adolescence to young adulthood. For example, the high aspirations for education that are nearly universal among many adolescents from an immigrant background might not be fully realized in young adulthood because of the reality of low-performing public schools and segregated neighborhoods that affect many Latinos. Further, different studies partially capture the anxiety and optimism that are not only emblematic of public sentiments toward immigration, but are also reflections on the economic conditions of the period. For example, it is no coincidence that Herbert Gans warned about second-generation decline in the 1990s during a severe recession whereas Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway reached a cautiously optimistic conclusion about second-generation progress, in part because their study was conducted during the Clinton era’s economic boom. Similarly, Edward Telles and Vilma Ortiz documented race-based exclusion among second- and later-generation descendants of Mexicans who came of age during a specific historical period, whereas Douglas Massey’s prediction about the racialization of Latinos recognized the role of punitive immigration policy and legal status in creating an increasingly negative context of reception toward Latinos.
In spite of these debates, I find no evidence of second-generation decline and clear evidence of intergenerational progress. To be clear, I only focus on two key measures of socioeconomic assimilation: educational and occupational outcomes. I do not address other indicators such as language assimilation, residential integration, and intermarriage. I focus on the children of immigrants between the ages of 25 and 40 from the ten largest Latino ethnic groups, comparing their outcomes with their native-born counterparts and with their proxy first-generation parents. For clarity and parsimony, I present descriptive findings by ethnic group, but these results are consistent even after adjusting for group differences in demographic composition (such as gender and age) as well as in regional concentration in old and new immigrant destinations. (The technical details are in my article in the recommended resources.)
Socioeconomic Attainment in Young Adulthood
Are second-generation Latinos at a disadvantage compared to their native peers? Figure 1 presents two measures of educational and occupational attainment by ethnic group: the proportion of college graduates and the proportion in a professional occupation. With regard to education, second-generation Cubans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians, and Central and South Americans report rates of college completion that are similar to those of native Whites and above those of native Blacks. For example, 39% of second-generation Cubans have a college degree or more, compared to 39% of native Whites and only 21% of native Blacks. This is striking given the widespread perception of Latinos as underachievers. Although second-generation Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Dominicans report lower college completion rates than the native majority group, these groups still fare better than the native minority groups of native Blacks and Puerto Ricans. The one exception is second-generation Mexicans whose college completion rate is only 17%.
Socioeconomic attainment by ethnic group
Source: Pooled CPS 2008-2012
Notes: Results are based on the sample of 25-to-40-year-old respondents in CPS. NW: native white; CU: Cuban; SA: South American; CEP: Colombian, Ecuadoran and Peruvian; CA: Central American; SGH: Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Honduran; DR: Dominican; PR: Puerto Rican; MX: Mexican; NB: native black. The categories “SGH” and “CEP” are combined due to sample size. The residual categories of “CA” and “SA” include all the other ethnic groups from these two regions, excluding SGHs and CEPs.
The occupational data tell a similar story. Among those who report being employed, second-generation Cubans, Colombians, Ecuadorians and Peruvians, and Central and South Americans are as likely as native Whites to be in a professional occupation. For example, 52% of second-generation Cubans report being a professional compared to 44% of native Whites and only 30% of native Blacks. In addition, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Dominicans fare better than native Blacks, although these groups have yet to close the gaps with native Whites. Once again, Mexicans are the most disadvantaged, with only 28% (the lowest among all groups) reporting a professional occupation.
It is remarkable that the majority of second-generation Latino groups have achieved parity with native Whites. This suggests a rate of assimilation that compares favorably to the historical record among European groups, especially when one takes into account the many disadvantages Latinos face. The comparatively poor outcomes among Mexicans, and to a lesser extent Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans, are likely due to their legal status and to the relatively low levels of human capital among the immigrant first generation, although the CPS data do not contain the information needed to directly test this hypothesis. The occupational disadvantages of Mexicans may also reflect the effects of the Great Recession because Mexicans are more concentrated in the service sector and construction work, industries severely affected by recent economic downturns.
Social Mobility Across Generations
Are second-generation Latinos at risk of downward mobility compared to their parents? Because the CPS does not contain data on the respondents’ parents, I compare second-generation Latinos to their proxy first-generation immigrant parents using the lagged birth cohort method. This method essentially assumes that a 25-year period approximates one immigrant generation and renders the comparison across generations more accurate. Specifically, it compares a cohort of first-generation Latinos with a later cohort of second-generation Latinos 25 years younger. The data are arrayed so that I can meaningfully compare the average years of education and occupational status scores for first-generation Latinos in the 1945-1965 birth cohort with the same outcomes for second-generation Latinos in the 1970-1990 birth cohort. I focus on these two cohorts because they capture the post-1965 first generation in middle adulthood and the post-1965 second generation in young adulthood.
Figure 2 presents the average years of education and the average occupational status scores by immigrant generation, while also showing the gaps that have been closed between the first and the second generation. Here, the overall intergenerational progress is clear. Among all Latino groups, the second generation reports significant gains in both educational and occupational outcomes compared to their proxy first-generation parents. For most Latino groups, the educational gain averages about one additional year between the first and second generation. For Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans, the second generation significantly outpaces their proxy first-generation parents, reporting an impressive gain of about 4 years of education.
Among all Latino groups, the second generation reports significant gains in both educational and occupational outcomes compared to their proxy first-generation parents.
The occupational data tells a similarly optimistic story. For all Latino groups, the second generation reports working in better jobs with higher occupational status than their first-generation parents. Once again, the gains are largest among second-generation Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans who report occupational scores about 2 points higher (on a 9-point scale) than to their parents. Overall, these analyses show clear evidence of second-generation progress and no evidence of a second-generation decline.
Assimilation into what? Progress compared to whom?
Questions about what it is people assimilate into and against whom their progress is measured are central to assessing the contention around outcomes among the children of Latino immigrants. What if the choice of different comparison groups leads to different conclusions about their progress, decline, or stagnation? Given the racially stratified nature of American society, these questions are not trivial ones.
In comparison to their proxy first-generation parents, there is no evidence of a second-generation decline or downward mobility, as none of the Latino groups report worse socioeconomic outcomes compared to their proxy first-generation parents. Quite the contrary, the evidence clearly points to both intergenerational progress and upward mobility among the second-generation Latinos. In comparison to their native-born peers in the same age group, the results point to significant diversity across Latino ethnic groups. Cubans, Colombians, Ecuadorians and Peruvians, and Central and South Americans have achieved parity with the native majority group, essentially closing the gaps within the course of two generations. This mobility pattern is best described as long-distance mobility. Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans have outperformed the native minority groups, but have yet to achieve parity with the native majority group, so their mobility pattern is best described as short-distance mobility. Dominicans show outcomes on par with native minority groups, whereas there is a clear disadvantage among Mexicans even when compared to outcomes among the native minority groups.
Source: Pooled CPS 2008-2012
Notes: Combined samples are limited to those between the ages of 25 and 65. The data are arrayed so that the results represent the average years of education and occupational status score for the first generation in the 1945/1965 birth cohort, along with the second generation that were born 25 years later in the 1970/1990 birth cohort, essentially assuming that the latter group is the second-generation children of the first-generation cohort. Education is measured in years from 0 to 16 whereas occupational status score is measured on a scale from 0 to 9, with higher scores representing more prestigious occupations such as managers and professionals. Gap bars between two data points for each ethnic group illustrate the extent of intergenerational progress by each ethnic group.
To be sure, the progress among Dominicans has been somewhat slow and the relative disadvantage among Mexicans provides some support for the concerns over their future trajectories. Still, the intergenerational progress in both groups suggests that they stand to make further gains by the third- and fourth-generation. Historical records also provide important lessons for our assessment of Latino progress: European ethnic groups closed gaps with the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant mainstream in the U.S. over the course of three generations. Therefore, it would be extremely unrealistic to expect Latinos to catch up with the American mainstream in two generations, given the economic, legal, and social barriers facing them. For example, ethnic groups with more human capital, legal status, and lighter skin tone (such as Cubans) should fare better than those with less education who lack legal status and face significant discrimination (such as Mexicans and Dominicans).
How Latinos are assimilating into American life is not a new question, but prior studies were based on pre-Recession data, and the most recent evidence is now almost a decade old.
The Future of Latino Socioeconomic Assimilation
Given the sheer demographic presence of Latinos, evaluating their socioeconomic assimilation provides key insights into the continuing transformation of American society. Since the onset of the global economic recession in December 2007, there has been increasing evidence that Latinos and African Americans were hit the hardest, given their already tenuous position in the labor market and significant wealth gaps that left them with smaller safety nets than other U.S. racial groups. As a result, understanding social mobility among Latinos has become even more pressing in an era of growing inequality, economic recession, stagnation of wages, and increasing financial insecurity.
How Latinos are assimilating into American life is not a new question, but prior studies were based on pre-Recession data, and the most recent evidence is now almost a decade old. My post-Recession evaluation of outcomes among the Latino second generation with the most recent evidence is not only timely, but also relevant because recent shifts in our politics and our economy have resulted in a rather negative context of reception for Latinos. First, the Great Recession disproportionately affected the Latino population. According to a report from the Pew Hispanic Center, the number of Latino children in poverty rose sharply from 4.4 million in 2007 to 6.1 million in 2010. This 36.3% increase, compares to 17.6% among non-Latino Whites and 11.7% for non-Latino Blacks during the same period. Another direct consequence of the Great Recession was significant wealth loss, especially among Latinos due to the foreclosure crisis. According to one study from the Urban Institute, Latinos lost 44% of their overall wealth between 2007 and 2011, compared to only 11% among non-Hispanic Whites and 31% among non-Latino Blacks. Second, the debate around the undocumented population (estimated at 12.2 million in 2007 and 11.2 million in 2011) remains highly divisive, especially in a context in which millions of Americans have been out of work. As a result, Hispanics, especially Mexicans, have been stigmatized and have borne the brunt of a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment. The number of deportations reached a record high, rising from 359,795 in 2008 to 438,421 in 2013, an increase of 21.9% over five years. Debates about the undocumented unfolded alongside the DREAMers movement, which transformed the national conversation on immigrant rights and brought about significant immigrant education reforms.
A crowd gathers to learn about the DREAM Act and how undocumented students can prepare for college.
Connie Ma, Flickr CC
At the same time, Latinos have yet to achieve full parity with native Whites and to secure a place in the highest echelons of the American mainstream. More importantly, the disadvantage among Mexicans highlights the profoundly negative impact of legal status on socioeconomic assimilation. Their situation deserves special attention because the Mexican-origin population accounts for two-thirds of the total Latino population in the United States.
Yes, these are some depressing trends. But the very good news is that Latinos are increasingly being integrated into American society. The second generation has made striking gains in education and escaped the dead-end jobs prevalent among the first generation. The clear intergenerational progress even among Mexicans suggests that they may close the current gaps with native Whites within the course of three to four generations, instead of two generations, as I have observed among many Latino groups. Although the future of Latinos as a group remains uncertain, we have reasons to be optimistic: they have weathered the economic downturn well and are poised to take advantage of the new opportunities that lie ahead.