Occupational Health and Personnel Suitability for Biological Research Programs

Abstract

This article provides an outline of the federal government's occupational health and personnel suitability guidance to work with certain highly infectious and dangerous pathogens. It also includes the results of a survey conducted by Arizona State University regarding the individual requirements to work with these materials. Research shows that a limited number of tools are available to determine the necessary elements of pre-access personnel suitability assessments, ongoing personnel suitability assessments, and occupational health programs for personnel working with Tier 1 and non-Tier 1 Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT). Self-reported answers from biosafety and biosecurity professionals regarding these issues are evaluated here.

Keywords

Tier 1 BSAT Select Agents or Toxins Personnel Suitability Occupational Health and Access

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