To date, the literature on corruption scandals in Congress focuses exclusively on their consequences. Using theory that directs analyses of the causes of corruption scandals at the jurisdictional level in the American states and other countries, we test a variety of hypotheses about which kinds of members of the House are more likely to be caught in these episodes. We derive our hypotheses from three basic propositions about individual-level corruption—opportunity, culture, and target. There is evidence to support them all. Members with cultivated relationships, in positions of power, and elected from districts with traditions of or perceived tolerance for corruption are disproportionately scandalous. So, interestingly, are some potentially marginalized legislators, particularly racial minorities. We explore the finding that Black members are frequently associated with corruption scandals.
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