Abstract
The events of 2000 inspired renewed debate in America over the manner in which presidents are chosen, with many critics of the existing system favoring the alternative of direct popular election. These advocates of reform often argue that the strategic environment shaped by the electoral college distorts the democratic process by encouraging candidates to focus on a few politically competitive states while virtually ignoring the majority of the nation. Using empirical evidence, we evaluate the claim that the electoral college is antidemocratic due to its effect on campaign strategy. Furthermore, we consider the possible alternative strategies adopted by candidates under a hypothetical national popular presidential election. We conclude that many of the consequences of electoral college reform, unacknowledged by its proponents, would not necessarily make presidential elections substantially more democratic, and we call for additional empirical research on a topic that has heretofore been dominated by theoretical debate and speculation.
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