American state constitutions vary tremendously in their length, amendment rate, and age. These three variables—especially the first two—strongly influence the rate at which state supreme courts strike down state actions for violating the state constitution. Longer, more detailed constitutions reduce policy flexibility, increasing judicial invalidations; rarely updated constitutions may fail to address modern concerns, increasing invalidations; and recently adopted constitutions may contain fragile logrolls and similar shortcomings, also increasing invalidations. These findings add new considerations to a rich literature on judicial review in state supreme courts.
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