Qualification in track and field events involves runners competing against individuals within their heat and runners in other heats. Given that the heats are run sequentially, runners in each heat have different information about their competitors. Using data on track and field events from 2001-2011, this article examines whether an individual’s placement in a specific heat and their peers affect their performance and qualification probability. Results indicate that runners’ times and qualification are correlated with the abilities of their peers as well as heat-specific fixed effects. In addition, these effects differ according to runner ability.
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