Testing Rosen's Sequential Elimination Tournament Model

Abstract

The authors use an extensive and unique data set from the men's professional tennis circuit to test Rosen's sequential elimination style tournament model. Specifically, they investigate what effect an increase in prize money differentials between rounds has on the stronger player's probability of winning the match. This involves estimating a standard probit model utilizing data from 2,632 individual matches over 68 tournaments during the 2001 men's professional tennis circuit. The results of the study support predictions associated with Rosen's match play tournament model. Increases in prize money differentials have a positive, statistically significant effect on the stronger player's probability of winning the match.

Keywords

elimination tournaments men's professional tennis incentives player performances compensation methods

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