The National Basketball Association (NBA) playoffs are structured as an elimination tournament where reseeding does not occur after each round. This structure leads to situations where future competitors (the shadow effect) and previous effort (the spillover effect) affect current performance. Using data from the 2009-2014 NBA playoffs, results here find that, when a future opponent is known, a series favorite is significantly more likely to win a game when the future opponent is weaker than expected. Estimates also provide evidence that greater previous effort by teams increases the probability the series favorite wins a game.
ArkesJ.MartinezJ. (2011). Finally, evidence for a momentum effect in the NBA. Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, 7, Article 13.
2.
BrownJ.MinorD. B. (2014). Selecting the best? Spillover and shadows in elimination tournaments. Management Science, 60, 3087–3102.
3.
DepkenC. A.HoodM.KingE. (2017). Consistency and momentum in NASCAR. Journal of Sports Economics, 18, 601–621.
4.
FamaE. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. Journal of Finance, 25, 383–417.
5.
GrayP. K.GrayS. F. (1997). Testing market efficiency: Evidence from the NFL sports betting market. Journal of Finance, 52, 1725–1737.
6.
KainK. J.LoganT. D. (2014). Are sports betting markets prediction markets? Evidence from a new test. Journal of Sports Economics, 15, 45–63.
7.
KatayamaH.NuchH. (2011). A game-level analysis of salary dispersion and team performance in the National Basketball Association. Applied Economics, 43, 1193–1207.
8.
LeardB.DoyleJ. M. (2011). The effect of home advantage, momentum, and fighting on winning in the National Hockey League. Journal of Sports Economics, 12, 538–560.
9.
PaulR. J.WeinbachA. P. (2005). Bettor misperceptions in the NBA: The overbetting of large favorites and the ‘hot hand’. Journal of Sports Economics, 6, 390–400.
10.
PriceJ.SoebbingB. P.BerriD.HumphreysB. R. (2010). Tournament incentives, league policy, and NBA team performance revisited. Journal of Sports Economics, 11, 117–135.
11.
SauerR. D.BrajerV.FerrisS. P.MarrM. W. (1988). Hold your bets: Another look at the efficiency of the gambling market for National Football League games. Journal of Political Economy, 96, 206–213.
12.
SoebbingB. P.HumphreysB. R. (2013). Do gamblers think that teams tank? Evidence from the NBA. Contemporary Economic Policy, 31, 301–313.
13.
TaylorB. A.TrogdonJ. G. (2002). Losing to win: Tournament incentives in the National Basketball Association. Journal of Labor Economics, 20, 23–41.
14.
ZuberR. A.GandarJ. M.BowersB. D. (1985). Beating the spread: Testing the efficiency of the gambling market for National Football League games. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 800–806.
