Abstract
This article empirically investigates the impact of globalization on voting behavior. Specifically, combining individual-level data from the first nine waves of the European Social Survey, party-level information from the Comparative Manifesto Project, and country-level data from Eurostat, we study the individual determinants of the vote for trade protectionist parties. Our findings show, firstly, that protectionist parties mainly receive electoral support from less-educated voters, unemployed individuals, and members of labor unions. Secondly, we test the compensation principle using a macro measure of a country's compensation potential and find, contrary to expectations, no significant evidence that a greater potential to mitigate the labor market adjustment costs resulting from economic openness deters the propensity to vote for protectionist parties in national elections.
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