What is the role of economic interdependence with foreign powers when legislators vote on foreign policies? Foreign aid and trade are among the European Union’s most important foreign policy instruments, over which the European Parliament has veto power. Yet, few studies address foreign economic policy voting in European Parliament scholarship. This study presents a new theoretical model about economic interdependence and foreign policy positioning in the European Parliament. I argue that economic interdependence with major foreign powers is associated with legislators’ foreign policy positions. Analysing European Parliament votes concerning aid and trade with Ukraine, I show a statistical association between Members of the European Parliaments with high levels of Russian Foreign Direct Investment in their electoral districts and voting against aid and trade with Ukraine (supporting the pro-Russian policy). These findings offer new insights on Members of the European Parliaments’ position-taking in foreign economic policy decisions that have global economic and political ramifications.
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