While many contributions on legislative politics in the European Parliament rely on recorded votes, the motivations behind the decision to record a vote remain somewhat arcane. This article frames roll-call vote requests as a minority right which offers party groups an opportunity to shape the voting agenda and signal commitment to a policy proposal. The analysis adds to our understanding of legislative behavior by linking the committee stage to the plenary stage. Party groups which do not support a floor proposal drafted by the lead committee are found to be more likely to request a roll-call vote in plenary. The quantitative evidence is supplemented by interview data which shed light both on the actors’ motivations and the internal decision-making processes preceding the decision to go on record.
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